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Models of Autocracy

Paper Session

Saturday, Jan. 3, 2026 2:30 PM - 4:30 PM (EST)

Philadelphia Marriott Downtown, Room 410
Hosted By: Society for Institutional and Organizational Economics
  • Chair: Marta Troya Martinez, Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona

A Relational Theory of Power Alternation

Zanhui Liu
,
Tsinghua University
Zhaotian Luo
,
University of Chicago
Yucheng Qiu
,
Peking University
Shuyi Yu
,
University of Chicago

Abstract

We study the spontaneous emergence of power alternation from the need for cooperation by developing a model in which two parties repeatedly cooperate and negotiate the position of power, defined as the control right of a productive regime. Unless the party in power, “incumbent,” compromises, the party out of power, “opposition,” would withdraw from cooperation. Central to our analysis are two
impediments: the incumbent’s hold-up problem and information asymmetry. We establish a recursive structure of the model, taking into account the endogenous roles—incumbent or opposition—the two parties play. We find that alternation of power is necessary to sustain cooperation in the long run, while within-period compromise is essential for efficiency. Two norms are inherent in efficient self-enforcing agreements, prescribing an implicit bargaining protocol and the
persistence of power. We characterize the implied dynamics of compromise, legitimacy, and power alternation and illustrate the results in context of the Whig-Tory alternation in England from 1688 to 1830.

The Threat-Enhancing Effect of Authoritarian Power Sharing

Jack Paine
,
Emory University

Abstract

Power-sharing deals can potentially solve the commitment problem inherent to autocratic bargaining, but often fail to prevent conflict. This paper develops a formal-theoretic model to examine a largely overlooked friction to successful power sharing—the threat-enhancing effect. Sharing power improves the opposition’s ability to defend its control over promised concessions; alternatively, though, an empowered opposition can initiate an offensive against the ruler. The consequent threat-enhancing effect creates three distinct frictions. First, the opposition cannot commit to refrain from leveraging its enhanced threat. Consequently, the ruler might prefer to incur a revolt than to peacefully share power. Second, the opposition faces a time-inconsistency problem. Its temptation to wait for a future power-sharing deal risks conflict at present. Third, the ruler is more prone to reverse power-sharing deals when the opposition wins a revolt with higher probability. Strong defensive capabilities for the opposition counteract some deleterious consequences of the threat-enhancing effect.

Revealed and Concealed Repression: Measurement, Deterrence, and Backlash

Maria Titova
,
Vanderbilt University
Emily Hencken Ritter
,
Vanderbilt University
Mehdi Shadmehr
,
University of North Carolina-Chapel Hill

Abstract

Regimes sometimes conceal and sometimes reveal acts of repression, making observed repression a distorted proxy for total repression. As a result, trends in observed and total repression may diverge, and policy interventions based on observed repression can be misguided. Strategic concealment also complicates research on state–society interactions by obscuring the deterrence and backlash effects of repression. We develop a model of the strategic environment in which regimes decide whether to repress and whether to conceal repression. We identify conditions under which observed and total repression are negatively correlated and show how total repression can be recovered from observable parameters using equilibrium relationships. We define and characterize the deterrence and backlash effects, identify conditions under which each arises and is magnified, and derive a lower bound on the backlash effect that can be estimated based on observable parameters.

A Relational Theory of Autocracy

Scott Gehlbach
,
University of Chicago
Zhaotian Luo
,
University of Chicago
Spencer Pantoja
,
Stanford University

Abstract

Dictators rule through their agents, but those same agents can attempt to seize power and become the dictator. We analyze a dynamic agency model with this feature. Competent agents generate more rents for the ruler but also pose a greater coup threat; dynamically, they are also more incentivized to attempt a coup because they are better at preventing coups after seizing power. In equilibrium, incompetent rulers earning high “natural” rents from office are more likely to rule alone. Rulers who govern through agents select actors who are neither too competent nor too incompetent. Finally, competent rulers are more willing to recruit competent agents, a form of assortative matching. Our model sheds light on the diversity of relationships between dictators and their agents.

Discussant(s)
Arjada Bardhi
,
New York University
JEL Classifications
  • P0 - General
  • D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making