Heterodox Perspectives on Technology, AI, and Digital Capitalism
Paper Session
Saturday, Jan. 3, 2026 2:30 PM - 4:30 PM (EST)
- Chair: Ali Alper Alemdar, St. Francis College
Liquidity, Centralization, and the Mobility of Capital in the Platform Economy
Abstract
This paper explores how the platform economy has intensified capital mobility through the increasing liquidity and centralization of capital, particularly in intangible forms such as data, algorithms, and intellectual property. Building on Clifton’s (1977) analysis of corporate concentration in advanced capitalism, I argue that platform firms represent a new phase of accumulation—marked not only by monopolistic market control but by the intra-firm mobility of capital across sectors and industries. Rather than focusing on capital flows between separate firms, I examine how individual capitals within large platform corporations are redeployed across diverse business lines and platform verticals in pursuit of surplus profits. This internal mobility is facilitated by the intangible, reconfigurable nature of platform assets, which are perceived as less risky, more liquid, and more scalable than traditional fixed capital. As a result, capital can shift rapidly between industries, products, or regions, minimizing exposure while maximizing speculative potential.Furthermore, these dynamics are shaped by the strategic role of venture capital. Platform firms increasingly function as venture capitalists themselves, investing in startups to extend control and preempt competition. In this context, capital liquidity becomes a strategic tool for restructuring labor, reshaping markets, and consolidating power. Rather than diffusing competition, the mobility of capital under platform economy deepens monopolization, allowing firms to dominate production and circulation. This paper argues that the abstraction and mobility of capital in the platform age reflects a new configuration of accumulation—intensifying centralization, rentier power, and the separation of capital from labor.
Disseminating Heterodox Economics in an Age of Artificial Intelligence (A.I.): Understanding the Challenges and Opportunities
Abstract
The dominance of mainstream economics presents itself in several ways, including the vast majority of undergraduate principles textbooks, the curriculum of graduate programs, and the editorial boards of peer-reviewed journals, among others. These professional barriers have informed a self-reflective literature within heterodox economics that has asked two questions. First, how can heterodox economists advance their project outside of traditional textbooks, curricula, and journals? Second, given that heterodox economics is diverse in terms of theoretical assumptions, policy positions,mand research methods, what common themes do heterodox economists share? The advent of generative artificial intelligence (A.I.) has brought forth interesting and compelling questions for this literature. Given the accessibility of various platforms, could A.I. facilitate the dissemination of heterodox economics in ways that are far easier than traditional textbooks, journals, and courses? Alternatively, given that the architects of A.I. may have an interest in preserving the status quo, could A.I. simply be yet another barrier to promoting heterodox economics? Most importantly, what does A.I. know about heterodox economics itself? This paper therefore investigates the content produced by multiple A.I. platforms – such as Copilot, ChatGPT, Gemini, and Perplexity – in the field of heterodox economics. This research utilizes the NVivo qualitative software package to extract and analyze common themes and insights. This work will be of critical importance to heterodox economists as we seek to advance our theoretical and political project in an age of A.I.The Economics of Intangible Concentration: Power Laws, Intangible Assets, and Intellectual Monopoly
Abstract
The issues of concentration and centralization of knowledge, power, and, relatedly, intangible assets havebeen key to many theories of competition in a digital age (Pagano 2014; Rikap 2021, 2022; Rikap and
Lundvall 2022; Birch 2020; Haskel and Westlake, 2017; Durand and Milberg 2018; Foley 2013;
Varoufakis, 2024). While a voluminous theoretical body of research exists, limited quantitative research
has evaluated these claims about concentration and market power. This work methodologically builds on
the voluminous literature on statistical regularities in firm size, growth and profitability (Gibrat 1931;
Simon and Bonini 1958; Ijiri and Simon 1987; Stanley 1996; Axtell 2001; Bottazzi and Secchi 2003,
2006; Dosi 2007; Scharfenaker and Semieniuk 2017) by expanding to the parameterization and evaluation
of the distribution of firms’ intangible assets as well as intangible to tangible asset ratios. What is revealed
is the consistency of power-law distribution of both of these variables. The non-gaussian nature of these
distributions indicates the existence of underlying correlation mechanisms leading to these persistent
outcomes. In addition, parameterization of these distributions allows the use of the estimated alpha
parameter as a measure of concentration. Accordingly this estimation allows for the empirical evaluation
and reflection of the manifold theories of competition in the digital age coming from the field of political
economy.
JEL Classifications
- B5 - Current Heterodox Approaches
- O3 - Innovation; Research and Development; Technological Change; Intellectual Property Rights