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Labor Finance

Paper Session

Sunday, Jan. 5, 2025 1:00 PM - 3:00 PM (PST)

San Francisco Marriott Marquis, Yerba Buena Salon 3 & 4
Hosted By: American Finance Association
  • Paige Ouimet, University of North Carolina-Chapel Hill

Careers and Wages in Family Firms: Evidence from Matched Employer-Employee Data

Edoardo Di Porto
,
University of Naples Federico II
Marco Pagano
,
University of Naples Federico II
Vincenzo Pezone
,
Tilburg University
Raffaele Saggio
,
University of British Columbia
Fabiano Schivardi
,
LUISS and EIEF

Abstract

We investigate the compensation policies of family and non-family firms using a novel employer-employee matched dataset, comprising virtually the universe of Italian incorporated companies combined with information on their shareholders. Family firms pay significantly lower wages and offer slower careers. Half of their wage gap is accounted for by workers' time invariant characteristics, while the rest cannot be explained by differences in productivity or in non-monetary compensating differentials. The evidence is consistent with a model where family owners protect their control over the firm by creating a ``glass ceiling'' that limits workers' career progression, thus hindering their human capital accumulation.

Equity Pay Beyond the C-Suite

Andrea Eisfeldt
,
University of California-Los Angeles
Antonio Falato
,
Federal Reserve Board
Dongryeol Lee
,
University of California-Los Angeles
Mindy Xiaolan
,
University of Texas-Austin

Abstract

Equity pay has become increasingly common over the last several decades but the differences in the level of equity pay across firms are very large. This study documents the inequality in equity pay across firms and describes the drivers of firm-level differences in equity pay policies. We show that firm-level equity pay is very persistent, and a large fraction of the differences across firms in equity pay comes from differences in initial values. Some of the differences in initial values can be attributed to differences across firms' financial constraints and to substantial peer effects. We show that high equity pay firms manage equity pay most actively, in particular counteracting the effects of stock price gains and losses. High-equity pay firms tend to be younger, and to experience subsequently higher employment growth. We also compare equity pay beyond the C-Suite to CEO equity pay and show that CEOs' equity pay is much less persistent, and is actually lower at younger firms and firms that experience higher employment growth. We argue that equity pay is both a compensation and a capital structure decision, and draw out these parallels.

Longevity and Occupational Choice

Marius Guenzel
,
University of Pennsylvania
Ulrike Malmendier
,
University of California-Berkeley
Denis Sosyura
,
Arizona State University

Abstract

Using administrative vital records for 15 percent of the U.S. population, we find large variation in longevity across occupational groups. For some occupation pairs, the differences in lifespan are comparable to the longevity gap between men and women. This variation persists after controlling for demographic, environmental, and pecuniary drivers of longevity. A key mechanism linking the variation in longevity to occupations is the intensity of manual tasks. A higher manual intensity predicts a shorter lifespan. Consistent with the importance of on-the-job tasks for terminal health, occupational choice predicts the cause of death, even holding constant the age at death. Overall, we provide evidence on a key lifestyle determinant of longevity with implications for occupation-based healthcare and retirement plans.

Talent Market Competition and Firm Growth

AJ Yuan Chen
,
University of Southern California
Miao Zhang
,
University of Southern California
Zhao Zhang
,
International Monetary Fund

Abstract

How does competition for talent affect firm growth? Combining establishment-level occupational employment microdata with job posting data, we measure a firm's talent retention pressure (TRP) based on other firms' job postings for talent in the local market. Our TRP captures CFOs' subjective talent retention concerns and predicts firms' talent outflows. We show that (i) TRP substantially dampens firms' capital investment; (ii) firms do not elastically retain talent when TRP is higher, yielding lower subsequent talent productivity; and (iii) TRP dampens primarily laggard firms' growth but not superstars', leading to a limited impact on aggregate U.S. investment but increased industry concentration.

Discussant(s)
Spyridon Lagaras
,
University of Illinois
Tania Babina
,
Columbia University
Malcolm Wardlaw
,
University of Georgia
Jan Bena
,
University of British Columbia
JEL Classifications
  • G3 - Corporate Finance and Governance