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Social Priorities and Corporate Objectives

Paper Session

Saturday, Jan. 4, 2025 2:30 PM - 4:30 PM (PST)

San Francisco Marriott Marquis, Foothill C
Hosted By: Association of Financial Economists
  • Chair: Kose John, New York University

What Purpose Do Corporations Purport? Evidence from Letters to Shareholders

Raghuram Rajan
,
University of Chicago
Pietro Ramella
,
University of Chicago
Luigi Zingales
,
University of Chicago

Abstract

Using natural language processing, we identify corporate goals stated in the shareholder letters of
the 150 largest companies in the United States from 1955 to 2020. Corporate goals have proliferated, from less than one on average in 1955 to more than 7 in 2020. While in 1955, profit maximization, market share growth, and customer service were dominant goals, today almost all companies proclaim social and environmental goals as well. We examine why firms announce goals and when. We find goal announcements are associated with management’s responses to the firm’s (possibly changed) circumstances, with the changing power and preferences of key constituencies, as well as from management’s attempts to deflect scrutiny. While executive compensation is still overwhelmingly based on financial performance, we do observe a rise in bonus payments contingent on meeting social and environmental objectives. Firms that announce environmental and social goals tend to implement programs intended to achieve those goals, although their impact on outcomes is unclear. The evidence is consistent with firms focusing on shareholder interests while incorporating stakeholder interests as interim goals. Goals also do seem to be announced opportunistically to deflect attention and alleviate pressure on management.

Social Priorities, Institutional Quality, and Investment

Amar Gande
,
Southern Methodist University
Kose John
,
New York University
Guanmin Liao
,
Renmin University
Lemma W. Senbet
,
University of Maryland
Xiaoyun Yu
,
Shanghai Jiao Tong University

Abstract

We examine the role of corporate taxation and institutional quality in aligning privately optimal
investments with those that are socially optimal. We develop a model to characterize how limited
liability and non-monetized social benefits give rise to corporate investments to deviate from the
socially optimal levels. Our model predicts that, while taxes bridge the wedge between the
private objectives of firms and that of the society at large, the level of corporate tax required to
achieve social optimality is attenuated in the presence of high-quality institutions. We provide
empirical evidence in support of the model’s predictions. Exploiting the staggered designation of
strategically important industries by the Chinese government in its Five-Year Plans (FYPs), and
leveraging a regulatory event that affected the corporate tax rate, we show that the government
lowers taxes to spur corporate investment to a lesser extent if there is a strong local legal regime
or a well-developed market-based system. The results are driven by the FYP industries which
adhere to the social priorities that generate larger non-monetized benefits. Both corporate
taxation and institutional quality also affect the likelihood of firms expanding into FYP
industries. Importantly, the investment misalignment decreases in these FYP industries, as
previously underinvested (overinvested) firms speed up (slow down) their investment to a greater
extent compared to peer firms in the same industry. Our findings highlight taxes as an alternative
self-enforcing implicit contract in aligning private and public interests while also demonstrating
the moderating effects of quality institutions.

Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion

Alex Edmans
,
London Business School
Caroline Flammer
,
Columbia University
Simon Glossner
,
Federal Reserve Board

Abstract

This paper measures diversity, equity, and inclusion (DEI) using proprietary data on survey responses used to compile the Best Companies to Work For list. We identify 13 of the 58 questions as being related to DEI, and aggregate the responses to form our DEI measure. This variable has low correlation with gender and ethnic diversity in the boardroom, in senior management, and within the workforce, suggesting that DEI captures additional dimensions missing from traditional measures of demographic diversity. DEI is also unrelated to general workplace policies and practices, suggesting that DEI cannot be improved by generic initiatives. However, DEI is higher in small growth firms and firms with high financial strength. DEI is associated with higher future accounting performance across a range of measures, higher future earnings surprises, and higher valuation ratios, but demographic diversity is not. DEI perceptions among professional workers, such as R&D employees, are significantly correlated with the number and quality of patents. However, DEI exhibits no link with future stock returns.

Discussant(s)
Gordon M. Phillips
,
Dartmouth College
John Jianqiu Bai
,
Northeastern University
Wei Jiang
,
Emory University
JEL Classifications
  • G3 - Corporate Finance and Governance
  • H2 - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue