A Friedmanian Reading of Monetary Policies in the Great Recession
Abstract
Bearing in mind that Friedman's predictions on the relationships between nominal output and the quantity of money depend on the monetary aggregate under consideration (M1, M2 or M3?), the paper offers a reading of the Great Recession (2007-2009) through Friedman's lens. The first point worth examining is the period probably been mislabeled as the "Great Moderation". Just as in the 1920s, after a fairly long period of inflation that seemed to be under control, when the rate of money growth started to fall, the first impact was on the prices of financial and real assets rather than on the prices of goods and services.Next, we investigate the comparison between the first crash of 1929, which led to the Great Depression, as that dramatic event is now understood, and the crash of 2007, which did not repeat the same catastrophe. It seems to be seldom noticed that the policy reaction of the US Federal Reserve, which led to the explosion of the Fed's balance sheet, did not correspond to a rise in the money supply. Thus, the attempt to avoid credit defaults played a much more important role than the desire to maintain a constant money supply, as Friedman would have demanded.
To conclude, examining the Great Recession through Friedmanian lenses means, on the policy side, first considering what is at stake in terms of central banks' ability to maintain stable monetary growth. On the theoretical side, it brings back to the fore the relevant monetary theory of macroeconomics, in particular the distinction between money and finance.