ESG and Sustainable Finance
Paper Session
Saturday, Jan. 4, 2025 2:30 PM - 4:30 PM (PST)
- Kelly Shue, Yale University
Pollution-Shifting vs. Downscaling: How Financial Distress Affects the Green Transition
Abstract
Polluting practices can reduce costs in the short-term at the expense of exposing firms to significant environmental liability risk. This paper examines whether firms increase their pollution intensity as they become more financially distressed, akin to a risk-taking motive. We construct granular pollution measures for the oil and gas industry and empirically confirm the prominence of this channel therein. We then calibrate a rich dynamic model featuring endogenous default, clean and dirty capital, and financing frictions to study and quantify the relationship between financial distress and pollution. Our counterfactuals point to the limited impact of blanket divestment campaigns, as firms may scale down and pollution-shift their assets simultaneously. Tilting strategies are more effective at taming overall pollution.Willingness to Pay for Carbon Mitigation: Field Evidence from the Market for Carbon Offsets
Abstract
This paper leverages a large-scale field experiment with an online supermarket (N=255,000) where consumers are offered carbon offsets that compensate for emissions. Consumers are price-elastic but fully inelastic to the environmental impact of the offsets---consistent with ``warm glow" utility. When the firm offers to share the offsetting costsBrown Capital (Re)Allocation
Abstract
This paper studies capital reallocation in the fossil fuel industry by investigating whoowns coal power plants – the largest single source of global greenhouse gas emissions.
We build a bottom-up measure of the ownership of these brown assets by merging asset-
level data on firms’ plant ownership (real capital) in Europe with firms’ shareholder data
(financial capital). We document a sharp increase in private firms’ coal ownership since
2015, accompanied by a large decline in public equity ownership. A formal decomposition
shows that the large decline in public equity ownership was however not due to capital
reallocation (“exit”) but to capital utilization: these investors scaled down plants, not
sold them. Instead, state investors played a crucial role: they sold to private firms, while
being the slowest at scaling down their plants. We illustrate the economics of brown
capital allocation by calibrating a model in which asset owners vary in how they value
externalities. The possibility of nationalization of coal plants by state investors that
value social factors (e.g. jobs, “energy security”) is an important limit to the ability of
“green finance” to decrease aggregate emissions, in line with recent episodes in Germany
and Poland.
Discussant(s)
Sascha Füllbrunn
,
Radboud University Nijmegen
Daniel Green
,
Harvard University
Florian Heeb
,
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Ran Duchin
,
Boston College
JEL Classifications
- G3 - Corporate Finance and Governance