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Asset Pricing: Climate Change/Climate Finance

Paper Session

Friday, Jan. 3, 2025 10:15 AM - 12:15 PM (PST)

San Francisco Marriott Marquis, Yerba Buena Salon 8
Hosted By: American Finance Association
  • Ayako Yasuda, University of California-Davis

The Benchmark Greenium

Stefania Damico
,
Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
Johannes Klausmann
,
University of Virginia
Aaron Pancost
,
University of Texas-Austin

Abstract

In this paper, we study the benchmark greenium, the frictionless premium of sovereign
risk-free green securities relative to otherwise identical non-green securities. Identifying this type of greenium is important for two reasons. First, since sovereign green bonds are not project-specific, in the absence of market frictions, our greenium will capture the shadow value of wide environmental concerns. Second, because bids in the primary auction market depend largely on resale prices in the secondary market, the benchmark greenium provides a signal about future savings from the issuance of green securities.

Exploiting the unique ``twin'' structure of German government green and conventional securities, we use a dynamic term structure model to estimate a frictionless sovereign risk-free greenium, distinct from the yield spread between the green security and its conventional twin (the green spread). The model purifies the green spread from confounding and idiosyncratic factors unrelated to environmental concerns.

We have three main findings. First, the model-implied benchmark greenium differs substantially from the observed green spread: it tends to be significantly larger; at times it
widens while the green spread narrows; and its term structure is mostly flat, rather than
downward-sloping. Second, proxies of confounding and idiosyncratic risk factors, such as
stock market prices, measures of flight-to-quality, and liquidity, do not affect the model-
implied greenium, but do correlate with the green spread. Conversely, the benchmark greenium correlates with shocks to environmental concerns, such as the economic damages from environmental disasters. Interestingly, once we control for confounding and idiosyncratic risk factors, the green spread does not correlate significantly with shocks to environmental concerns. Third, the difference between the expected return on green and conventional bonds, the expected green excess return, varies with the investment horizon and investors’ information set: it is positive at issuance and turns negative after the German floods.

Our findings are important not only because they indicate that green spreads should not
be taken at their face value to price environmental concerns, but also due to their policy
implications. First, the fact that the benchmark greenium is not reverting to zero over
time signals that green security issuance can provide interest cost savings to governments. However, to access these savings, government finance agencies need to minimize market
frictions. Second, a persistent benchmark greenium justifies the inclusion of green assets by central banks in the conduct of conventional and unconventional monetary policy, since it indicates investors’ preference for green investments, and eligibility for central bank
operations reduces liquidity risks and other frictions affecting these assets, especially in
periods of crisis. Third, a risk-free benchmark greenium will allow for more efficient pricing
of private green securities, strengthening the market for green investments.

Climate Capitalists

Niels Gormsen
,
University of Chicago
Kilian Huber
,
University of Chicago
Sangmin Oh
,
University of Chicago

Abstract

Climate change has raised the question of how to incentivize green investments by firms even when the returns to green investments are low relative to emission-intensive investments. In theory, a cost of capital channel can raise green investments similarly to a carbon tax even if the returns to green investments remain low. This channel requires that firms perceive the cost of green capital as lower than that of brown capital. Using hand-collected data, we show that green and brown firms perceived their cost of capital to be the same before 2016. Once climate concerns by financial investors and governments surged after 2016, green firms perceived their cost of capital to be on average 1 percentage point lower. Moreover, some of the largest energy and utility firms have started applying a lower cost of capital to greener divisions. The findings suggest that the cost of capital channel can incentivize the reallocation of capital toward greener investments across firms and within firms.

Climate Transition Risk and the Energy Sector

Viral Acharya
,
New York University
Stefano Giglio
,
Yale University
Stefano Pastore
,
New York University
Johannes Stroebel
,
New York University
Zhenhao Tan
,
Yale University
Tiffany Yong
,
New York University

Abstract

We build a general equilibrium model to study how climate transition risks affect energy prices and valuations of different firms in the energy sector and test it empirically. We consider incumbent fossil fuel firms that have developed oil reserves they can extract today or tomorrow, and new entrants that must invest in exploration and drilling today to have reserves to extract tomorrow. Renewable energy firms produce energy without generating carbon emission but cannot currently supply non-electrifiable sectors of the economy. We analyze three sources of climate transition risk: (i) changes in the probability of a technological breakthrough that allows renewable energy firms to serve all sectors tomorrow; (ii) changes in expected future taxes on carbon emissions; and (iii) restrictions on today’s development of additional fossil fuel production capacity. While a greater chance of renewable technology breakthroughs decreases energy prices—in part because incumbents fearing future competition from renewables decide to extract more of their reserves today—this need not be the case with carbon taxes and drilling restrictions. These latter transition risks make it less attractive for newly entering fossil fuel firms to create additional capacity. Therefore, if breakthrough technologies do not arrive, incumbents will face a world with less capacity and higher energy prices. This mechanism therefore can create incentives for incumbent fossil fuel firms to hold inventories and carry them to the future, with the expectation of profiting if the breakthrough technology does not materialize. In turn, this reduces supply today and therefore raises prices. The valuation of renewable energy firms generally increases upon the realization of all three types of transition risks, while valuations of fossil fuel entrants decline, whereas incumbent fossil fuel firm valuations decline by less than those of new entrants and might even increase upon the imposition of drilling restrictions that reduce competition from new entrants.

Systemic Climate Risk

Tristan Jourde
,
Bank of France
Quentin Moreau
,
Hong Kong University of Science and Technology

Abstract

This paper introduces a market-based framework to study the effects of tail climate risks in the financial sector. In addition to identifying the financial institutions most vulnerable to physical and transition climate risks, our framework explores the potential for these risks to induce contagion effects in the financial sector. Based on the securities of large European financial institutions spanning from 2005 to 2022, we show that, unlike physical risk, transition risk significantly and increasingly influences systemic risk in the financial sector. We also examine
the potential levers available to financial institutions and regulators to address climate-related financial risks.

Discussant(s)
Peter Feldhütter
,
Copenhagen Business School
Aymeric Bellon
,
University of North Carolina-Chapel Hill
Deeksha Gupta
,
Johns Hopkins University
Hyeyoon Jung
,
Federal Reserve Bank of New York
JEL Classifications
  • G1 - General Financial Markets