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Banking and Interest Rate Risk: Deposits and the Risk of Bank Runs

Paper Session

Sunday, Jan. 5, 2025 8:00 AM - 10:00 AM (PST)

Hilton San Francisco Union Square, Golden Gate 7&8
Hosted By: American Economic Association
  • Chair: Mark Jeffrey Flannery, University of Florida

Deposit Betas and Banks' Interest Rate Risk Exposure

Mark Jeffrey Flannery
,
University of Florida

Abstract

A number of researchers have recently been estimating the sensitivity of bank deposits and asset returns to market interest rates. I pursue the same idea, being careful to include the known information about asset maturities and deposit maturities in my regression model.

Flight to Safety in the Regional Bank Stress of 2023

Cecilia Caglio
,
Federal Reserve Board
Jennifer Dlugosz
,
Federal Reserve Board
Marcelo Rezende
,
Federal Reserve Board

Abstract

Using confidential data on deposits at U.S. banks, we document a flight to safety by depositors to
large banks in early 2023. In weeks of heightened stress, large banks experienced faster deposit
growth than small and regional banks without raising deposit rates. Large banks’ deposit growth
rates exceeded other banks’ even after accounting for characteristics associated with failures,
including uninsured deposit funding and unrealized mark-to-market losses. Monthly data show
that uninsured deposits rose faster at GSIBs relative to large non-GSIBs, but insured deposits
grew slower. While retail and small business depositors also flew to safety, nonfinancial
corporations reacted more strongly.

A Framework for Evaluating Banks' Resilience in a Rising Interest Rate Environment

Filippo Curti
,
Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond
Jeff Gerlach
,
Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond

Abstract

The failure of Silicon Valley Bank (SVB) brought renewed attention to the risk to financial institutions of runs on their deposits. In this paper, we propose a framework to determine whether conditions exist for banks to experience runs. We compare the performance of our method with several alternative measures of bank fragility. Our measure is able to identify weak banks earlier and as accurately as any of the alternatives, and at much lower cost in terms of falsely identifying banks as weak. The results indicate that this metric could be used to help banks effectively manage their balance sheets to avoid creating conditions where depositors have an incentive to run.

Discussant(s)
Atanas Mihov
,
University of Kansas
Mehdi Beyhaghi
,
Federal Reserve Board
Jennifer Dlugosz
,
Federal Reserve Board
JEL Classifications
  • G2 - Financial Institutions and Services
  • G0 - General