Endogenous Network Under Incomplete Information
Abstract
We develop an endogenous production network economy model coupled with incomplete information, where the degree of information at the firm-level is the engine of the network formation and distorts both producers’ decision and the aggregate allocations of the economy. To tie this relationship, we considerthat producers find their suppliers through a decentralized search given their level of information, in
which firms become more or less informed depending on how edges far they know of the equilibrium production network. In our model, we establish the existence, uniqueness and efficiency of the network
equilibrium for a given level of information, and show that the higher the level of information, (i) the
more stable the network, (ii) the lower the density of the network, and (iii) the higher the spillover
impact of a productivity shock on the aggregate output. We also design an optimal contract to show that the combination of information-enhancing policies and tax-subsidies is able to mimic a Walrasian full information equilibrium. Finally, we use a proprietary dataset that covers a large share of Brazilian
financial transactions and simulate our model with it.