Exchange Controls
Paper Session
Friday, Jan. 5, 2024 2:30 PM - 4:30 PM (CST)
- Chair: Stephanie Schmitt-Grohé, Columbia University
Sanctions and the Exchange Rate
Abstract
Trade wars and financial sanctions are again becoming an increasingly common part of the international economic landscape, and the dynamics of the exchange rate are often used in real-time to evaluate the effectiveness of sanctions and policy responses. We show that sanctions limiting a country’s exports or freezing its assets depreciate the exchange rate, while sanctions limiting imports appreciate it, even when both types of policies have exactly the same effect on real allocations, including household welfare and government fiscal revenues. Beyond the direct effect from sanctions, increased precautionary savings in foreign currency also depreciate the exchange rate, when they cannot be offset by the sale of offcial reserves or financial repression of foreign-currency savings. Furthermore, the government may choose to compensate sanctions-induced fiscal deficits with an exchange rate depreciation using either monetary loosening or FX accumulation; the former solution comes at a cost of higher inflation, while the latter policy provides only a temporary relief. The overall effect on the exchange rate depends on the balance of foreign currency demand and supply forces. We show that the dynamics of the ruble exchange rate following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 are quantitatively consistent with the combined effects of these forces calibrated to the observed sanctions and government policies.Exchange Controls as a Fiscal Instrument
Abstract
About 20 percent of countries employ dual, multiple, or parallel exchange rates, which represent a distortionary tax on external trade. We show that they also reduce the government's external debt burden. Both channels generate fiscal revenue. We study an optimal taxation problem where chronic fiscal deficits must be financed with money creation and exchange controls. For plausible calibrations, when exchange controls apply equally to exports and imports, their optimal level is virtually zero. If instead the policymaker can apply distinct exchange rates to imports and exports, the optimal policy consists in moderate controls on exports and no controls on imports.Discussant(s)
Pablo Ottonello
,
University of Michigan
Thomas Drechsel
,
University of Maryland
Eduardo Davila
,
Yale University
JEL Classifications
- F4 - Macroeconomic Aspects of International Trade and Finance