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Robustness in Contracts and Mechanisms

Paper Session

Friday, Jan. 5, 2024 2:30 PM - 4:30 PM (CST)

Grand Hyatt, Presidio C
Hosted By: Econometric Society
  • Chair: Benjamin Brooks, University of Chicago

Data-Driven Monopoly Regulation

Modibo Khane Camara
,
Stanford University

Abstract

To regulate markets effectively, regulators need to anticipate market conditions that may be inherently unpredictable and constantly changing. In this paper, I propose regulations that leverage data to remain effective in unpredictable environments. These are relevant for natural monopolies and other settings where antitrust policy is either too costly or not viable.

I introduce a new theoretical framework for robust dynamic mechanism design and apply it to a model of monopoly regulation (Laffont and Tirole 1986). There is a regulator, a firm, and a sequence of consumers that arrive over time. Regulations map the observed history (including prices, sales, and realized production costs) to payments for the firm and consumers.

I avoid many standard assumptions. The stochastic process that governs demand and costs need not be stationary, Markovian, etc. I do not assume that either the regulator or firm know this process (although the firm may). I do assume that if there exists a heuristic that guarantees the firm ?% of its optimal profits, the firm will not follow a strategy that obtains less than ?% of its optimal profits.

My results provide a robust foundation for customer-first regulation, reminiscent of Loeb and Magat (1979). Customer-first regulation involves a subsidy proportional to estimated con- sumer surplus and a tax on profits, where consumer surplus is estimated using an A/B test that always leaves participating consumers better off. It guarantees 81% of “first-best” welfare (if the marginal cost of public funds is 1.3). The optimal regulation guarantees 85% of first-best welfare and is a non-linear variant of customer-first regulation.

In an extension, I obtain similar results without relying on subsidies. Here, customer-first regulation simply caps profits at a small fraction of estimated total surplus.

Robust Delegation

Ju Hu
,
Peking University
Fei Li
,
University of North Carolina

Abstract

This paper investigates delegation mechanisms that maximizes the principal's payoff in the worst-case scenario, considering all state distributions that align with the principal's partial knowledge. The principal only knows the mean of payoff-relevant state and delegates decision-making authority to an informed but biased agent. Using elementary convex analysis, we obtain the optimality of interval delegation under a mild concavity condition on the principal's Bernoulli utility. This finding has broad implications for various economic settings, including capital budgeting, legislative-rule design, and mandatory minimum-savings.

Randomization and the Optimality of Linear Contracts

Ashwin Kambhampati
,
United States Naval Academy
Juuso Toikka
,
University of Pennsylvania
Rakesh Vohra
,
University of Pennsylvania

Abstract

We study robust contracting between a principal and an agent, both of whom are risk neutral and protected by limited liability. The principal knows a surplus-generating action the agent can take, but is concerned that others may be available. Hence, she chooses a contract to maximize her worst-case payoff over all possible unknown actions. Carroll (2015) showed that the optimal deterministic contract in this setting is linear, but Kambhampati (2023) showed that randomization strictly benefits the principal, leaving open the question of the structure of optimal contracts. We show that there exists an optimal random contract that randomizes over two linear contracts. Thus, even with randomization, optimal contracts are still linear and simple.

Robust Mechanisms for the Financing of Public Goods

Benjamin Brooks
,
University of Chicago
Songzi Du
,
University of California-San Diego

Abstract

We propose a novel proportional cost-sharing mechanism for funding public goods with interdependent values. In this mechanism, the agents simultaneously submit “bids,” the expenditure on the public good is an increasing function of the sum of the bids, and each agent is responsible for the fraction of the expenditure proportional to their bid. The proportional cost-sharing mechanism provides a non-trivial guarantee for social welfare, regardless of the structure of the agents’ information and the equi- librium that is played, as long as the social value for the public good is sufficiently large. Moreover, this guarantee is shown to be unimprovable in environments where the designer knows a lower bound on the social value. These mechanisms guarantee the entire efficient surplus when the social value becomes large. When there are two agents, our model can be reinterpreted as one of bilateral trade.
JEL Classifications
  • D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty