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Financial Intermediation: Banking - General

Paper Session

Saturday, Jan. 6, 2024 8:00 AM - 10:00 AM (CST)

Marriott Rivercenter, Grand Ballroom Salon M
Hosted By: American Finance Association
  • Chair: Filippo De Marco, Bocconi University

Information Chasing or Adverse Selection: Evidence from Bank CDS Trades

Andrada Bilan
,
Swiss National Bank
Steven Ongena
,
University of Zurich
Cosimo Pancaro
,
European Central Bank

Abstract

Can banks trade credit default swaps (CDSs) referenced on their current corporate clients at competitive prices, or are banks penalized for potentially holding private information? We merge CDS trades reported under the European Market Infrastructure Regulation (EMIR) with syndicated loans from DealScan, and compare the prices on similar CDSs that the same dealer offers to banks and to other investors. We find that banks lending to a corporation purchase CDSs on this corporation at lower prices, and that, after trading with banks, dealers position better their prices when trading with other investors. This suggests that dealers do not fear being adversely selected, but rather chase banks' private information. This information gets incorporated into market prices, helping price discovery.

Why Does the Yield Curve Predict GDP Growth? The Role of Banks

Camelia Minoiu
,
Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta
Andres Schneider
,
Federal Reserve Board
Min Wei
,
Federal Reserve Board

Abstract

We provide evidence on the effect of the slope of the yield curve on economic activity through bank lending. Using detailed data on banks' lending activities coupled with term premium shocks identified using high-frequency event study or instrumental variables, we show that a steeper yield curve associated with higher term premiums (rather than higher expected short rates) boosts bank profits and the supply of bank loans. Intuitively, a higher term premium represents greater expected profits on maturity transformation, which is at the core of banks’ business model, and therefore incentivizes bank lending. This effect is stronger for ex-ante more leveraged banks. We rationalize our findings in a portfolio model for banks.

The Network Structure of Money Multiplier

Ye Li
,
University of Washington
Yi Li
,
Federal Reserve Board
Huijun Sun
,
Columbia University

Abstract

The circulation of deposits as means of payment churns reserves—the settlement assets—among banks. A bank's position in the network of payment flows determines its liquidity risk from depositors' payment activities and its willingness to fund illiquid loans with deposits. We develop a model of liquidity percolation in the payment system and a modern version of money multiplier that links the payment-induced redistribution of liquidity and equilibrium level of bank credit funded by deposits. Using transaction-level data on payment settlement, we estimate the model and identify a subset of banks that have disproportionately large impact on the equilibrium outcome due to their systemically importance in the payment network.

Leverage Regulations and Treasury Market Participation: Evidence from Credit Line Drawdowns

Giovanni Favara
,
Federal Reserve Board
Sebastian Infante
,
Federal Reserve Board
Marcelo Rezende
,
Federal Reserve Board

Abstract

We examine the effects of the supplementary leverage ratio (SLR) on large banks’ participation in U.S. Treasury markets. In contrast to risk-based capital requirements, the SLR calculation treats all assets equally, irrespective of their risk. Because the SLR requires bank capital to back both safe and risky assets, it may create incentive for banks to shed low-yielding safe assets, such as U.S. Treasury securities.
Establishing a causal channel from the SLR to Treasury market participation, however, is challenging because exogenous shocks to banks’ balance sheets and detailed data on banks’ holding of Treasury securities are scarce. To overcome this challenge, this paper uses daily supervisory data to identify exogenous shocks to credit line drawdowns, and it shows that an increase in banks’ balance sheet size reduces their participation both in Treasury cash and repo markets. These effects are particularly salient in times of stress, weaker for banks with higher SLRs, and muted when a regulatory change excluded Treasury securities from the computation of the SLR. The paper also shows that banks’ response to these balance sheet shocks is concentrated in their repo activity, which make up for the largest share of banks’ Treasury market participation. Accounting for regulatory liquidity or risk-based capital ratios does not change these results.
These findings contribute to the academic and policy debate on the potential unintended effects of leverage requirements on banks’ willingness and ability to intermediate markets for safe assets, especially in time of stress (Greenwood et. al, 2017; Duffie, 2018; Powell, 2021).

Discussant(s)
Sascha Steffen
,
Frankfurt School of Finance and Management
Ana Babus
,
Washington University in St. Louis
Diane Pierret
,
University of Luxembourg
Filippo De Marco
,
Bocconi University
JEL Classifications
  • G2 - Financial Institutions and Services