Social Motivators for Giving
Paper Session
Saturday, Jan. 6, 2024 2:30 PM - 4:30 PM (CST)
- Chair: Laura Katherine Gee, Tufts University
Paying or Rewarding Other to Volunteer: An Experimental Study
Abstract
Achieving cooperation and social efficiency in coordination games such as the volunteer’s dilemma has challenged theorists for decades. We examine whether allowing players to “pay others to volunteer” yields greater coordination on the efficient and payoff-equalizing equilibrium. We consider three alternate coordinate-to-cooperate mechanisms: (1) players may choose to make a binding pre-play offer to a designated player for volunteering (2) players may choose to make a non-binding pre-play offer to a designated player for volunteering, i.e., they may renege on the payment after the volunteering decision is made by all players (3) players may choose to make a post-play payment to the volunteer. The key advantage of all three mechanisms is that they do not involve a regulator or central planner mandating taxes and transfer payments; instead, they rely upon the players to design side payments that lead to the efficient outcome. We find that ex-post payments yield highest rate of volunteering, and pre-play offers yields more efficient volunteering.Are Matching Subsidies Effective When the Ask Can Be Avoided?
Abstract
Do matching subsidies remain effective when there is an opportunity to avoid the ask? Standard economic theory predicts that a match encourages giving by reducing giving’s effective price and thus should not be affected by the avoidance opportunity. Our results, however, show that a match significantly increases giving only when the ask cannot be avoided. We further test and show that the data are consistent with the theoretical predictions of the norm mechanism of giving under matching; a match increases the psychological costs of deviating from the giving norm. Our findings highlight the limits of matching subsidies.The Impact of Sanctioning in the Nonprofit Sector
Abstract
Just as in the for-profit sector, enforcement can encourage compliance in the nonprofit sector too. This paper studies both donor and nonprofit responses to alleged or confirmed misconduct being investigated by the media or governmental agencies. Using advisory notices published by Charity Navigator, I find no evidence that donors respond to these events, yet charities take steps to improve and restructure, especially when misconduct is organizational, or attracts more media attention. On average, the publication of an advisory notice prompts charities to spend more on their program services, increasing the program expense ratio by 3 percentage points. The results are consistent with reputation-building, and help to quantify the value of a crucial accountability tool in the nonprofit sector.Discussant(s)
Marco Castillo
,
Texas A&M University
Anya Samek
,
University of California-San Diego
Joy Buchanan
,
Samford University
Daniel Lee
,
University of Delaware
JEL Classifications
- H4 - Publicly Provided Goods
- D0 - General