Voting
Paper Session
Sunday, Jan. 8, 2023 10:15 AM - 12:15 PM (CST)
- Chair: Christopher M. Li, Vanderbilt University
Felony Financial Disenfranchisement
Abstract
Twenty-eight states, governing over 182 million Americans, either directly or indirectly require those with prior felony convictions to repay all legal-financial obligations (LFOs) -- fines, fees, and/or restitution stemming from convictions -- before restoring voting privileges. Proponents of this practice, which we call felony financial disenfranchisement, claim low rates of electoral participation among those with felony convictions imply such disenfranchisement is inconsequential.This article challenges this claim, drawing upon new empirical and contextual evidence from Florida, which disenfranchises more returning citizens than any other state. We rely on data and natural experiments from a non-partisan, non-profit advocacy group that we launched called Free Our Vote. We make two main contributions. First, using a novel informational campaign, we capture how felony financial disenfranchisement creates uncertainty around voter eligibility, deterring approximately 16% (8.6 p.p.) of otherwise qualified voters with felony records from participating.
Second, we measure, for the first time, how felony financial disenfranchisement impacts voter turnout, using a debt relief program implemented by Free Our Vote. Specifically, we compare electoral participation between registered voters whose LFOs were eliminated by Free Our Vote against virtually identical debtors who did not benefit from our program. We find debt relief increased voter turnout by approximately 26% (11.1 p.p) among this group during the 2020 election.
In sum, the contextual and empirical evidence we present suggests narratives in favor of felony financial disenfranchisement are misguided.
Political Advertising by Special Interest Groups and Voter Participation: The Effects of Less Restrictive Campaign Finance Rules Following Citizens United
Abstract
This paper explores the consequences of the US Supreme Court’s Citizens United decision in 2010, which lifted previous bans on independent campaign support from corporations, unions, and ideological groups. The empirical strategy exploits that about three fifths of US states had no pre-Citizens United prohibition on such independent spending, serving as a control group in a difference-in-differences research design. Based on information about broadcast political advertising for relevant gubernatorial elections at the state level in local US television, the evidence found suggests that, contrary to expectations, there has been no increase in overall advertising as well as no higher proportion of advertising supporting Republican candidates. There is a strong and significant effect on the composition of advertising towards a higher proportion of special interest group-funded advertising (vs. candidate/party advertising) and a higher proportion of negative advertising. Finally, the paper studies the electoral consequences of this shift. Using survey data from the Cooperative Congressional Election Study (CCES), the results show a demobilizing effect as well as a strong pro-Republican effect in gubernatorial elections, amounting to about 7% and 20-30% of the respective means. Interestingly, both effects are primarily driven by citizens with lower levels of education.Strategic Voting in Two-Party Legislative Elections
Abstract
I study multi-district legislative elections with two parties and two binary dimensions of policy. Strategic voters focus on the most likely pivotal dimension in the legislature. Anticipating this, candidates select different policies than they would in single-district elections. The final policy is: (i) uniquely pinned down by voter preferences, (ii) preferred by a majority of districts on each dimension, (iii) a Condorcet winner if one exists. These properties are not guaranteed in single-district elections. Furthermore, I show that (iv) parliamentary systems generate superior policies to presidential systems and (v) voter polarisation affects outcomes in single-district elections but not legislative elections.Minority Underrepresentation in U.S. Cities
Abstract
In the United States disproportionality in the representation and in the voter registration rates of Minority groups is widespread, but stronger when racial or ethnic minorities are electorally pivotal. We define this phenomenon strategic underrepresentation and show that for the period 1981-2020 levels of strategic underrepresentation of African American, Asian, and Latino voters in U.S. city politics are substantial. Underrepresentation is determined by the combination of several endogenous institutional features, starting from systematic disparity in voter registration, strategic selection of electoral rules, city’s form of government, council size, and pay of elected members of the council. We provide causal evidence of the strategic use of local political institutions in reducing electoral representation of minorities based on the U.S. Supreme Court narrow decision of Shelby County v. Holder (2013), which deemed unconstitutional Voting Rights Act (VRA) Section 4(b), removing federal preclearance requirements for a specific subset of U.S. jurisdictions.JEL Classifications
- D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making