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  5. Household Economics in Low-Income Countries
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Household Economics in Low-Income Countries

Paper Session

Saturday, Jan. 7, 2023 2:30 PM - 4:30 PM (CST)

Hilton Riverside, Cambridge
Hosted By: Econometric Society
  • Chair: Melanie Morten, Stanford University

Polygyny and the Economic Determinants of Family Formation Outcomes in Sub-Saharan Africa

Augustin Tapsoba
,
Toulouse School of Economics

Abstract

This paper studies how short-term changes in aggregate economic conditions influence family formation outcomes in the presence of polygyny. It develops a simple marriage market framework with overlapping generations in which polygyny is modeled as a sequential one-to-one matching, and bride price acts as an important source of consumption smoothing. When there is a drought, the demand for second spouses (from older men) is more sensitive to the income and bride price drop than the demand for first/unique spouses (from younger men). This leads to an increase in the market share of younger men and a much smaller rise in the equilibrium quantity of female child marriage compared to the one observed in monogamous markets.
The attenuation effect is such that droughts have no detectable impact on the timing of marriage and fertility onset in high polygyny areas. Evidence from global crop price shocks confirms these patterns. It shows that higher food prices affect marital outcomes in opposite directions in crop-producing and crop-consuming areas.

Cultural Institutions and Structural Change: Dowries as Pensions When Sons Migrate

Natalie Bau
,
University of California-Los Angeles

Abstract

This paper examines whether an important cultural institution in India – dowry – can enable male migration by increasing liquidity at the time of marriage. We hypothesize that one cost of migration is the disruption of traditional elderly support structures, where sons co-reside with parents and care for them in their old age. Dowry can attenuate this cost by providing sons and parents with a liquid transfer that eases constraints on income sharing. To test this, we collect two novel datasets on property rights over dowry among migrants and among families of migrants. Net transfers of dowry to a man's parents are common. Consistent with using dowry for income sharing, transfers occur more when sons migrate, especially when they work in higher-earning occupations. Nationally representative data confirms that migration rates are higher in areas with stronger historical dowry traditions. Finally, exploiting a large-scale highway construction program, we show that men from areas with stronger dowry traditions have a higher migration response to a reduction in migration costs. Despite its potential negative consequences, dowry may have a role to play in facilitating migration and therefore, structural change.

Polygamy, Co-wives’ Complementarities, and Intrahousehold Inequality

Ana Reynoso
,
University of Michigan

Abstract

I develop and test a novel theory of polygamy that incorporates an empirical feature previously overlooked: Co-wives interact in a senior-junior hierarchy. In equilibrium, single, monogamous, and polygamous households emerge. Optimal female sorting generates co-wives' inequality: High-skilled women become senior wives in polygamous households with wealthy men and low-skilled juniors. Monogamous couples are in the middle of the attractiveness distributions. Three sets of nonparametric tests using various data sets confirm the model's predictions.

Terms of Engagement: Migration, Dowry, and Love in Indian Marriages

Andrew Beauchamp
,
Boston College
Rossella Calvi
,
Rice University
Scott L. Fulford
,
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau

Abstract

The Indian marriage market is characterized by extensive female migration, sizable dowries, and the widespread practice of arranged marriage. We develop and estimate a dynamic, general equilibrium, two-sided matching model with non-transferable utility to recover women's and men's preferences over spousal characteristics (such as age and education) and features of their marriage (including migration upon marriage, dowry payments, and women's involvement in the choice of their spouse). In counterfactual simulations, we study how changes in sex-ratios, women's education, and the practice of dowry, arranged marriage, and child marriage affect the equilibrium match and welfare in the marriage market.
JEL Classifications
  • J1 - Demographic Economics
  • O1 - Economic Development