Corporate Governance Under Financial Control: Shareholder Primacy and (Im)patient Capital of Asset Managers
Abstract
The recent decade has been characterized by the rapid proliferation of US asset managementfirms who currently manage tens of trillions of dollars in investments globally. This study
examines one particular consequence of asset manager capitalism—the prioritization of the
interests of shareholders above all other stakeholder groups. While many of these
passively-managed investment funds proclaim to be long-term investors and providers of
“patient capital,” their rise in the United States has coincided with increased dividend payouts
and stock buybacks. Given a lack of firm-level studies exploring the relationship between
ownership by asset management firms and shareholder payouts, this paper examines whether
higher rates of ownership by US-based asset managers leads firms to prioritize the short-term
interests of shareholders. We analyze the shareholder composition of 39,029 globally listed firms
in 2018 (provided by the Orbis database) and the investment holdings of US institutional
investors (including mutual funds) in US publicly-traded firms between 1997 and 2020 (provided
by the Thomson Reuters/Refinitiv database). Under various model configurations, we find a
positive and statistically significant relationship between ownership by US-based asset managers
and distributed payouts in the form of dividends and stock buybacks. While there are
country-level and industry-level differences among the firms investigated, the effect of US asset
management ownership remains strong across the majority of examined cases. The study makes
a timely contribution to the literatures on shareholder primacy and asset manager capitalism by
systematically outlining the impacts of US asset managers on shareholder payouts across
countries and economic sectors.