The Effect of Information on Generosity
Paper Session
Saturday, Jan. 7, 2023 8:00 AM - 10:00 AM (CST)
- Chair: Laura Katherine Gee, Tufts University
Do Late Donors Learn from Early Donors in Crowdfunding?
Abstract
The application of crowdfunding to philanthropy has not yet been studied extensively. In this paper, we focus on the sequential nature of giving on crowdfunding platforms. On the one hand, this feature exacerbates late donors' incentives to free-ride on early donors' contributions. On the other hand, sequential giving provides an opportunity for leadership-giving by early donors. Economic theory states that lead donors can signal their information about the quality of the public good to downstream donors. Thus, downstream donors are expected to respond positively to early donations. To understand the impact of leadership and donor behavior in the context of crowdfunding, we will use data from a prominent crowdfunding platform to estimate early donations' effect on later donations' frequency and size to verify which one is the dominant effect: free-riding or signaling.On the Design of Fundraising Campaigns: Goal Setting and Information Provision in Dynamic Fundraisers
Abstract
This study uses a laboratory experiment to study key aspects of dynamic fundraising campaigns that utilize goals that must be met for a good or service to be provided. In particular, we compare campaigns with one (final) goal versus campaigns with two goals, an intermediate and a final goal. In campaigns with two goals, we also vary whether the final goal is known at the start of the campaign. Across these three settings, the design varies whether an individual’s payoff from reaching a goal is uncertain or certain. We find that the addition of an intermediate goal decreases both the likelihood of reaching the final goal and the amount of money raised. Introducing payoff uncertainty decreases campaign performance in the one goal case. Within the two-goal setting, value uncertainty and final goal uncertainty have negligible effects on performance. The overall high success rates of our experimental fundraising campaigns suggests that the coordination problems characteristic of one-shot, simultaneous multi-threshold public goods games are diminished by our dynamic fundraising environment, which typifies many of the popular online donation platforms currently used.Gift of Giving: Recognizing Donors and Revealing Donation Amounts
Abstract
Publicly announcing how much individuals donate on behalf of themselves is a common fundraising strategy. For tribute gifts made on behalf of others, however, charities only reveal donor identities to the honoree with few revealing the size of their contributions. As this simple form of donor recognition remains unexplored, this paper examines the fundraising consequences of recognizing donors with and without information about their donation. I do so both for giving on behalf of oneself and in the novel domain of tribute giving. I find that revealing contribution amounts in addition to recognizing donors benefits fundraisers, irrespective of the type of giving. For tribute donations in particular I find that both the likelihood of giving on behalf of others and contribution amounts increase when honorees learn how much donors give. The results either suggest that fundraisers are leaving tribute donations on the table, or that announcing the size of these gifts may be repugnant and constrains what practices fundraisers can implement.Discussant(s)
Guglielmo Briscese
,
University of Chicago
Nic Duquette
,
University of Southern California
Tim Cason
,
Purdue University
Anya Samek
,
University of California-San Diego
JEL Classifications
- D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty
- H4 - Publicly Provided Goods