Gerrymandering
Paper Session
Sunday, Jan. 8, 2023 8:00 AM - 10:00 AM (CST)
- Chair: Allison Stashko, University of Utah
The Economics of Partisan Gerrymandering
Abstract
In the United States, the boundaries of congressional districts are often drawn by political partisans. In the resulting partisan gerrymandering problem, a designer partitions voters into equal-sized districts with the goal of winning as many districts as possible. When the designer can perfectly predict how each individual will vote, the solution is to pack unfavorable voters into homogeneous districts and crack favorable voters across districts that each contain a bare majority of favorable voters. We study the more realistic case where the designer faces both aggregate and individual-level uncertainty, provide conditions under which appropriate generalizations of the pack and crack solution remain optimal, and analyze comparative statics. All districting plans that we find to be optimal are equivalent to special cases of segregate-pair districting, a generalization of pack and crack where all sufficiently unfavorable voter types are segregated in homogeneous districts, and the remaining types are matched in a negatively assortative pattern. Methodologically, we exploit a mathematical connection between gerrymandering—partitioning voters into districts—and information design—partitioning states of the world into signals.Gerrymandering with Swing Voters
Abstract
We study strategic drawing of electoral maps by political parties, known as gerrymandering. We develop a theoretical framework whose main novelty is that citizens have two dimensions of heterogeneity: partisanship and the probability of turning out. In this framework, parties adopt different gerrymandering strategies depending on the relative turnout rates of their supporters and opponents. This framework allows us to derive a number of empirical implications about the link between partisan support, turnout rates, and electoral maps.Partisan Gerrymandering and Turnout
Abstract
How does partisan gerrymandering impact turnout for US House elections? Common measures of gerrymandering are a function of turnout, making assessments of the impacts on turnout difficult. We present evidence from two natural experiments. First, in a nationwide sample, we construct a state-level measure of gerrymandering based on the partisan composition of districts and leverage variation stemming from Congressional redistricting. Second, we draw on Pennsylvania and Ohio voter files and leverage the court-ordered redrawing of Pennsylvania districts in 2018 aimed at undoing partisan gerrymandering. Both approaches reveal that higher levels of partisan gerrymandering causally reduce turnout.Discussant(s)
Daniel B. Jones
,
University of Pittsburgh
Garance Genicot
,
Georgetown University
Alexander Wolitzky
,
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Ethan Kaplan
,
University of Maryland
JEL Classifications
- D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making