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What Drives Preferences for Giving?

Paper Session

Friday, Jan. 7, 2022 12:15 PM - 2:15 PM (EST)

Hosted By: Association for the Study of Generosity in Economics
  • Chair: Marta Serra-Garcia, University of California-San Diego

Fairness across the World: Preferences and Beliefs

Ingvild Almas
,
Stockholm University
Alexander Cappelen
,
Norwegian School of Economics
Erik Sorensen
,
Norwegian School of Economics
Bertil Tungodden
,
Norwegian School of Economics

Abstract

The paper reports from a large-scale study of people’s fairness preferences and beliefs, where 65 000 individuals from 60 countries make real distributive choices. We establish causal evidence on the role of the source of inequality and efficiency considerations for inequality acceptance, and we provide a rich description of people’s beliefs about the main sources of inequality and the cost of redistribution. We find large heterogeneities in both preferences and beliefs and show that they are strongly associated with people’s policy views on redistribution. The paper also studies how people’s fairness views relate to various country characteristics. In particular, we show that there are striking differences between the developed and developing countries in both fairness preferences and beliefs.

Preferences for Giving versus Preferences for Redistribution

Johanna Mollerstrom
,
George Mason University
Avner Strulov-Shlain
,
University of Chicago
Dmitry Taubinsky
,
University of California-Berkeley

Abstract

We attempt to bridge the gap between the evidence on social preferences from laboratory experiments and their expression in the field. We report on the results of an online experiment studying redistribution and giving decisions in small (four people) and large (200 people) groups. We document that preferences for giving and preferences for redistribution are distinctly different, and that this difference is increasing with group-size. This implies that demand for taxation among the rich cannot be substituted by charitable giving. Also, taxes can be a tool to help overcome coordination problems, insuring that the rich’s demand for redistribution is implemented.

Pivotal or Popular: The Effects of Social Information and Feeling Pivotal on Charitable Giving in Laboratory and Field Experiments

Laura Gee
,
Tufts University
Michael Shreck
,
Analysis Group

Abstract

On the one hand feeling important, or in the extreme pivotal, to a goal being achieved is associated with an individual being more likely to be called to action. For example, closer elections have higher turnout and if you’re the only person around in an emergency you are solely responsible for calling 911. On the other hand, there is a growing body of evidence that being informed that an action is popular, makes an individual more likely to take that action. This finding has been observed in a number of settings including voting, accepting a job, and paying taxes. Often as an action is taken by more people, it also decreases the importance of any single individual taking that action towards reaching the final goal. We use a series of field and laboratory experiments to explore the effect of feeling pivotal, the effect of knowing an action has been popular, and the interaction of these two effects on the likelihood a person will take an action like voting or donating.

Beliefs about Gender Differences in Social Preferences

Christine L. Exley
,
Harvard Business School
Oliver Hauser
,
University of Exeter
Molly Moore
,
Harvard University
John-Henry Pezzuto
,
Harvard Business School

Abstract

How does gender relate to social preferences and how is gender believed to relate to social preferences? Across a range of common games (i.e., dictator games, ultimatum games, trust games, prisoner’s dilemma games, and public good games), we find little to no gender differences in behavior. But, across all of these games, we observe substantial differences in how men and women are believed to behave. Women are believed to favor distributional decisions that appear more fair, trusting, and cooperative. These differences in beliefs also arise with ”broader” (i.e., not game-specific) beliefs and are held by both men and women. We document the robustness of our results among a traditional undergraduate student population, an online subject pool, and a representative sample.

Discussant(s)
Aakaash Rao
,
Harvard University
David Seim
,
Stockholm University
Eugen Dimant
,
University of Pennsylvania
Catherine Eckel
,
Texas A&M University
JEL Classifications
  • D6 - Welfare Economics
  • C9 - Design of Experiments