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  5. Intertemporal Social Preferences
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Intertemporal Social Preferences

Paper Session

Sunday, Jan. 9, 2022 12:15 PM - 2:15 PM (EST)

Hosted By: Economic Science Association
  • Chair: Georgia Michailidou, New York University Abu Dhabi

Intertemporal Altruism

Felix Chopra
,
University of Bonn
Phillipp Eisenhauer
,
University of Bonn
Armin Falk
,
University of Bonn
Thomas Graeber
,
Harvard Business School

Abstract

Standard consumption utility is linked in time to a consumption event, whereas the timing of prosocial utility flows is ambiguous. Prosocial utility may depend on the actual utility consequences for others -- it is consequence-dated -- or it may be related to the act of giving and is thus choice-dated. Even though most prosocial decisions involve intertemporal trade-offs, existing models of other-regarding preferences abstract from the time signature of utility flows, limiting their explanatory scope. Building on a canonical intertemporal choice framework, we characterize the behavioral implications of the time structure of prosocial utility. We conduct a high-stakes donation experiment that allows us to identify non-parametrically and calibrate structurally the different motives from their unique time profiles. We find that the universe of our choice data can only be explained by a combination of choice- and consequence-dated prosocial utility. Both motives are pervasive and negatively correlated at the individual level.

Understanding Cooperation in an Intertemporal Context

Felix Kolle
,
University of Cologne
Thomas Lauer
,
University of Cologne

Abstract

In today’s highly complex economic environment, cooperation among individuals is crucial for organizational and societal success. Most of the situations in which cooperation is required involve costly efforts whose consequences play out over time. Here, we provide a systematic and comprehensive analysis of cooperation in an intertemporal context. In a first study, we show that cooperation is substantially reduced when the benefits of cooperation are shifted towards the future, and increased when the costs are delayed. An analysis of the underlying behavioral mechanisms reveals that the change in cooperation can be explained by (i) a shift in the beliefs about others’ actions, (ii) a shift in the willingness to conditionally cooperate, and (iii) an individual’s degree of impatience. We further demonstrate that social norms are unaffected by the timing of consequences, indicating that the shifts in conditional cooperation are due to a change in norm compliance rather than the norm itself. In a second study, we demonstrate that the amount of economic incentives needed to close the cooperation gap are substantial, thereby providing policy makers with a useful estimate for conducting cost-benefit analyses.

Lie O’Clock: Experimental Evidence on Intertemporal Lying Preferences

Hande Erkut
,
WZB Berlin
Georgia Michailidou
,
New York University Abu Dhabi

Abstract

In standard lying utility models, benefits and costs typically occur presently and simultaneously. However, lying and its products often develop asynchronously. To consider variations in psychological costs brought by these asynchronies, we develop an experiment in which lying decisions occur presently, while lying observability and externalities, i.e. the causes of psychological costs, occur in future temporal brackets. We report significantly different intertemporal behavioral expressions in contexts where psychological costs are experienced as social preferences compared to contexts in which they are experienced as lying preferences, suggesting that lying, per se, affects discounting processes. Further, that costs related to social preferences are subject to significant discounting, while lying costs seem time invariant when social image motives are present.

It's Not My Fault: Excuse-Seeking Behavior in the Intertemporal Domain

Marissa B. Lepper
,
University of Pittsburgh

Abstract

TBD

Discussant(s)
Glenn Harrison
,
Georgia State University
Laura Gee
,
Tufts University
Marta Serra-Garcia
,
University of California-San Diego
Roberto Weber
,
University of Zurich
JEL Classifications
  • C9 - Design of Experiments