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On Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection

Back to Results
Chair:
Pierre A. Chiappori
, Columbia University

The Informed Principal with Agent Moral Hazard

Daniel Clark
,
Massachusetts Institute of Technology

Loss Aversion, Moral Hazard, and Stochastic Contracts

Hoa Ho
,
Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich

Financing a Black Box: Dynamic Investment with Persistent Private Information

Felix Zhiyu Feng
,
University of Washington

Gaming a Selective Admissions System

Frances Xu Lee
,
Loyola University Chicago
Wing Suen
,
University of Hong Kong

Robust Corporate Signaling with Heterogeneous Beliefs

Thomas Rivera
,
McGill University