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Corporate Culture

Paper Session

Sunday, Jan. 3, 2021 3:45 PM - 5:45 PM (EST)

Hosted By: American Finance Association
  • Chair: Paola Sapienza, Northwestern University

Exposing Revolving Doors in Executive Branch Agencies

Logan Emery
,
Purdue University
Mara Faccio
,
Purdue University

Abstract

We develop the first comprehensive mapping of revolving doors in the U.S. by examining the work experience in executive branch agencies of 1,910,150 individuals covering top corporate positions in 373,011 unique firms. We document that revolving doors are prevalent, with one out of every 15 firms, and one out of every three publicly traded firms, having at least one top employee with prior work experience in U.S. executive branch agencies. On average, revolving doors appear to be established in anticipation of increases in regulation and in response to more aggressive regulator behavior. Firms headquartered in more corrupt states and firms seemingly more corruption-prone receive benefits in the form of a reduction in the likelihood of receiving fines after hiring regulators from fine-imposing agencies. This occurs despite some evidence of those firms worsening their behavior (e.g., increasing their emissions of hazardous chemicals) after hiring regulators. In contrast, we do not observe firms headquartered in less corrupt states and firms seemingly less corruption-prone receiving any benefits.

Sexism, Culture, and Firm Value: Evidence from the Harvey Weinstein Scandal and the #MeToo Movement

Karl Lins
,
University of Utah
Lukas Roth
,
University of Alberta
Henri Servaes
,
London Business School
Ane Tamayo
,
London School of Economics

Abstract

During the Harvey Weinstein and #MeToo events, firms with a non-sexist corporate culture, proxied by having women among the five highest paid executives, earn excess returns of 1.6%. These returns are followed by positive revisions in analyst earnings forecasts. Returns for female-led firms increase to 3.2% in industries with few women executives, and 2.1% and 2.7% if headquartered in states with a high level of sexism or gender pay gap, respectively. Firms in industries with more women executives or headquartered in less sexist states also earn positive abnormal returns. Our evidence attests to the value of having a non-sexist culture.

Shared Culture and Technological Innovation: Evidence from Corporate R&D Teams

Tristan Fitzgerald
,
Texas A&M University
Xiaoding Liu
,
Texas A&M University

Abstract

Given the increasing focus on workplace diversity and labor productivity in today’s economy, we open the black box process of corporate innovation production by examining the most important input into the firm’s R&D process, namely the individual employees tasked with developing new inventions. Using information on over two million inventors employed at U.S. public firms, we investigate how individual inventors’ inherited traits (cultural values and gender) and acquired career experiences affect their desire to collaborate with one another in a corporate R&D setting and how shared cultural values amongst R&D team members affects innovative output. We first provide novel evidence that, even amongst groups of comparably experienced inventors working in the same corporate office, inventors who share similar cultural values are 20% more likely to work together on new research projects. Second, using exogenous shocks to inventor team composition arising from premature co-inventor deaths, we find that more culturally homogenous teams produce a higher quantity of patents that are more likely to exploit existing technologies and become moderately successful inventions. In contrast, more culturally diverse teams produce a higher share of risky, more exploratory patents that have a greater chance of becoming high impact innovations. Our results have important implications for promoting different types of innovation in R&D intensive workplace environments and the likely effectiveness of diversity hiring policies.

Hidden in Plain Sight: The Role of Corporate Board of Directors in Public Charity Lobbying

Changhyun Ahn
,
University of Florida
Joel Houston
,
University of Florida
Sehoon Kim
,
University of Florida

Abstract

Using IRS tax filings by public charities linked to lobbying disclosure and corporate board data, we show that charities with corporate directors on their boards spend more money on lobbying for the connected firms' industry interests. The effects of board connections are stronger when charities are connected to firms with greater lobbying expenditures or when charities are constrained on funding. We rule out spurious factors by controlling for firm-charity pair fixed effects, and address concerns of reverse causality using director turnovers as shocks to firm-charity connections. Consistent with quid-pro-quo relationships between firms and charities, we find that connected firms benefit from increased procurement contracts, and that connected charities receive more grants and donations. Our results highlight executive charitable engagement as a complementary avenue for corporate political activities.
Discussant(s)
Elisabeth Kempf
,
University of Chicago
Renee Adams
,
University of Oxford
Danielle Li
,
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Pat Akey
,
University of Toronto
JEL Classifications
  • G3 - Corporate Finance and Governance