Altruism and Risk Sharing In Development Contexts
Friday, Jan. 6, 2017 1:00 PM – 3:00 PM
- Chair: Daniel Hungerman, University of Notre Dame
Experimental Evidence on Other-Regarding Preferences in Partnership Formation
AbstractWe study how other-regarding behavior vary across two decision contexts: when subjects make a pure allocation decision; and when they pick a partner. In both settings each subject is decision is final, as in a dictator game; and it affects their payoff and that of other subjects in the same way under both settings. We find that that subjects are less likely to sacrifice their own material wellbeing to increase that of others when selecting a partner in a large anonymous setting than when dividing a pie ó even though the consequences on the material payoffs of others are identical. We interpret this differences as suggesting the application of different norms or heuristics: a pure allocation decision between four individuals including oneself resembles the decisions people make within a household, where norms of gift exchange and fairness apply; a partner selection decision resembles the decisions people make when competing for mates, where the pursuit of self-interest is acceptable.
Asymmetric Information and Remittances: Evidence From Matched Administrative Data
AbstractUsing new large-scale, administrative data matching remittances and monthly payroll disbursals, we demonstrate how migrants' earnings in the United Arab Emirates affect their remittances. We consider several types of income changes: Ramadan, weather shocks, a labor reform and returns to time in the UAE. We demonstrate that two key characteristics of the income changes that affect the income elasticity of remittances are the observability of the income and whether the income change is positive or negative. The results are consistent with a private information model where remittances are viewed as payments in an income-sharing contract.
- D6 - Welfare Economics
- O1 - Economic Development