

The Invisible Wound: The Long Term Impact of China's Cultural Revolution on Trust

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Abstract

As one of the most destructive socio-political upheavals in the history of contemporary China, the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976) incentivized people to snitch on each other to signal loyalty to the Party. This paper identifies the causal effect of exposure to Cultural Revolution on social trust, taking advantage of both cohort and regional variation. Specifically, the regional intensity variation is captured by the number of abnormal deaths on county level, and cohort variation is measured by the interrupted years of schooling during the Cultural Revolution. The major finding is that individuals from counties with higher Cultural Revolution intensity and exposed to more years of interrupted schooling during the revolutionary years significantly trust less. I also discuss mechanisms through which the Cultural Revolution affected social trust. Robustness checks are conducted considering migration issues, measurement error, omitted variable bias, heterogeneous effects and placebo test.

Keywords: Cultural Revolution, Trust, China.

JEL Codes: Z13, N45.

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I Introduction

As an important facet of social capital (Bourdieu,1985; Lin, 1982; Coleman, 1988, 1990; Burt, 1992; Putnam, 1993; Fukuyama, 1995), trust plays a key role in economic development, financial development, government efficiency, international trade, health and subjective well-being (Arrow, 1974; Knack and Keefer, 1997; La Porta et al., 1997; Guiso et al., 2004, 2008, 2009, 2013; Sapienza et al., 2013; Kawachi et al., 2008; Helliwell and Putnam, 2004). Given the significance of trust in economic and sociopolitical arena, to understand the origin of trust is the interest of both scholars and policy makers.

This paper will investigate into the institutional origin of trust in the context of China’s Cultural Revolution (1966-1976). As one of the most severe sociopolitical upheavals in China, the Cultural Revolution (the Revolution, hereafter) is featured by an mutual censorship system incentivizing people to snitch on one another and signal their loyalty to the party. During the movement, many people betrayed their friends and family members¹, revealed by memoirs, autobiography and interviews.

To identify the causal effect of the exposure to the Cultural Revolution on social trust, this paper takes advantage of both regional and time variation of the Cultural Revolution. The regional variation of the Cultural Revolution comes from the fact that the intensity of the revolution is not uniform across the country, measured by the number of abnormal deaths during 1966-1976. Specifically, the abnormal deaths here include deaths (or suicide) as a result of the struggle sessions, violent struggles, and other civil conflicts during the revolution. This quantitative measure is compiled from China’s county gazetteers published in the 1980s and early 1990s². With respect to the cohort variation in the intensity of exposure to the Cultural Revolution, I use interrupted years of schooling during the Cultural Revolution based on the interrupted education system during the revolutionary years. Following Meng and Gregory (2002, 2007), the interrupted years of schooling are defined as years when schools were completely shut down, or that the curriculum is “abnormal”

¹Lee Langley. 2009, March 31. “I betrayed my friend for Mao”.

Retrieved from: <http://www.dailymail.co.uk/home/books/article-1163537/I-betrayed-friend-Mao-Chinese-Whispers-Jan-Wong.html>.

Tania Branigan. 2013, March 27. “China’s Cultural Revolution: son’s guilt over the mother he sent to her death”.

Retrieved from: <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/mar/27/china-cultural-revolution-sons-guilt-zhang-hongping>, March 27, 2013.

²A similar measure has been well discussed and documented by Walder and Su (2003) and Bai (2015), which used casualty numbers reported by county gazetteers as intensity measure of the Cultural Revolution.

even schools were functioning again. The key argument here is that individuals who have more interrupted years of schooling may have took up more revolutionary activities, including joining the Red Guards, travelling across the country to spread the revolutionary ideas (the Great Rally, or the Great Exchange), and learning about the Red Book as well as the revolutionary spirits. A combination of the regional and cohort variation indicates that individuals who missed more years of schooling during the revolution and from a county with higher conflict intensity are most vulnerable to the Cultural Revolution.

I use a Difference-in-Differences strategy to identify the causal effect of individual exposure to the Cultural Revolution on trust. Considering individuals may either directly exposed to the revolution or indirectly affected by their family members and other social connections, I construct two samples to detect the direct and indirect effect: (1) the restricted sample including ones born by the end of the revolution (1931-1976), who are directly exposed to the revolution; and (2) the full sample including individuals born both before and after the revolution (1931-2001), who are either directly or indirectly exposed to the revolution. The empirical results from both analytical samples show that individuals from counties with higher Cultural Revolution intensity and exposed to more years of interrupted schooling trust significantly less of others.

Next, I examined potential mechanisms through which the Cultural Revolution affects social trust. The first channel is that the revolution may affect trust through destroying human capital accumulation. In this case, what we've observed from the DID estimates may just come from a lack of education on the trusting outcomes, instead of experiencing the Cultural Revolution. To deal with this issue, I directly control for one's years of schooling in the DID specification. The results show that there is still significant negative effect of the exposure to the revolution after controlling for one's educational attainment. The second channel is that the negative estimates from the DID regressions may be driven by a certain group of people who have experienced the Send-down movement. If this is the case, what we've observed will not be a global effect, that the Cultural Revolution may have no effect for people without Send-down experience. As an inspection into this possibility, I control the Send-down experience variable in the analysis, and major findings stay. Finally, I discuss the impressionable years hypothesis in Social Psychology in the case of Cultural Revolution, which indicated a critical period for value and belief formation of individuals (often childhood and early adolescent, Krosnick and Alwin, 1989, 1991). My major finding is that individuals who spent

more years during his/her 12-18 during the Cultural Revolution in a region with higher revolution intensity trust less on average. Finally, to explore the possible intergenerational transmission of the effect of Cultural Revolution from parents to children, I use a coresidence sample of parent-child pairs in which children born after 1977. By examining the effect of parent's exposure to the revolution on children's trust, I find only weak evidence for the intergenerational transmission, that children of parents with more intensive exposure to the movement would trust less.

Finally, I conduct robustness checks towards the baseline findings. The first discussion is on the reporting bias of the Cultural Revolution intensity measure on county-level, since the county gazetteers may have the incentive to under-report the actual numbers of deaths. To deal with this, I constructed a variable from the gazetteers capturing the narrative style of the book. Secondly, to alleviate the concerns about unparalleled trend between counties in the DID specification, I controlled for county fixed effects, province-year trend, as well as county-level year trend step by step, and the major result stays. In addition, to explore the heterogeneous effect of the Cultural Revolution on trust, I conduct DDD (triple differences) analysis by family class origin, father's party membership, rural-urban dichotomy, county revolutionary tradition, and revolutionary ideology captured by prevalence of the red names. Lastly, considering the Cultural Revolution should not affect the outcomes that it wasn't tailored on, I conduct a placebo test examining whether the Cultural Revolution affects individual mistreatment due to gender and Hukou-status.

To sum up, the contribution of this paper is two-fold. First, this paper adds a stone to understanding the origins of trust in historical context. Consistent with Alesina and La Ferrara (2002), this paper confirmed that a history of traumatic experience could result in a lower level of trust. In the case of African slave trade, Nunn and Wantchekon (2011) demonstrated a negative long-term impact of ancestral slave trade on contemporary individual trusting of others in African countries, making use of both historical data on slave trade and Afrobarometer data. In the context of ex-socialist regime, Lichter et al. (2015) looked at the long-term cost of mass surveillance system in East Germany on its contemporary social capital and economic outcomes. By taking advantage of the regional variation in the spy density, they found out that more intensive surveillance system results in lower social capital and worse economic performance. My results are complementary to theirs, in the sense that slave trade in Africa, mass surveillance system in the East Germany and the censorship system in the Cultural Revolution China, are all detrimental incentive systems

discouraging trust. Focusing on civil conflict in Uganda, Rohner et al. (2013) examined the effect of the conflict on trust, finding out that higher intensity of conflicts decreases generalized trust yet increases ethnic identity. Last but not least, by dating back to historical climate variation, Durante (2009) examined the historical relationship between environmental risk and trust. His major finding is regions with higher environmental variability display higher levels of trust.³

Second, this paper also contributes to the literature of the Cultural Revolution in China studies. Given there is a noticeable qualitative examination of Cultural Revolution in political science, anthropology and China studies, quantitative evidence on the Cultural Revolution are still limited. Most empirical papers have been focusing on the effect the revolution on individual's educational attainment. For instance, Deng and Treiman (1997) examined father's and son's educational attainment during the revolution using China census data, and found out that it has generated a highly egalitarian educational achievement regardless of father's origins. Meng and Gregory (2002, 2007) and Giles et al. (2008) investigated into the interrupted education system during of the revolution on individual's educational attainment. With respect to economic development, Bai (2015) demonstrated a negative effect of the Cultural Revolution on economic development in rural China, and also investigated into the effect of the Cultural Revolution on lending behavior, revealing that residents in more revolutionary counties have less mutual lending within community. This finding is also part of the trust story in this paper, in the sense that informal lending is often trust-based in rural China.

The rest of this paper proceeds as follows. In Section II, I briefly review the historical background of China's Cultural Revolution. In Section III, a description of data and sample is provided. Section IV discusses the identification strategy and Section V presents the baseline empirical results. Section VI discusses the mechanisms through which the revolution may affect trust, and robustness checks are provided in Section VII. Section III concludes this paper.

³Besides, there are also a literature more specifically on political trust. Chen and Yang (2015) demonstrated destructive effects of China's Great Famine (1929-1933) on Chinese citizen's political attitudes and trust towards the government. In the context of Korea war, Hong and Kang (2015) looked into the long-term effect of wartime violence on the political attitudes and trust with a DID setting.

II A Brief Review of China’s Cultural Revolution

The Cultural Revolution is one of the most severe sociopolitical upheavals in the history of People’s Republic of China, and has rocked China with deep social, political, economic and cultural consequences (MacFarquhar and Schoenhals, 2006; MacFarquhar, 1997).

Though the Cultural Revolution is complex by nature, there are three key features of it that are particularly relevant to this paper’s content. First, the Cultural Revolution has a unique incentive system that people are incentivized to signal their loyalty and revolutionariness to the party. While Chairman Mao’s spirit of the revolution has been spread across the country, the measurement of “revolutionariness” was often vague, leaving plenty of room for local interpretation. Therefore, individuals are incentivized to behave carefully and signal one’s revolutionariness with observable effort.

The second feature of the Cultural Revolution is that the masses were greatly involved in the political movement, among which an important part was the Red Guard. Mobilized by Chairman Mao, the Red Guards were the paramilitary force of the political movement during 1966-1968. Specifically, they were mainly constituted of students (and workers in later stage). The Red Guards were legitimized to criticize whom they believed to be in lack of revolutionary credentials, including government officials, school teachers, neighbors, friends, and family members. Their criticizing toolbox often includes writing the big-character posters (*Dazi Bao*), organizing struggle sessions, raiding peoples houses, and so on.

Last but not least, there exists political majority and minority during the Cultural Revolution, usually marked by ones family class origin⁴. There are three major types of family class origin: the Red (good class origins), the Middle and the Black (bad class origins). The Red origins are typically families of revolutionary cadres, martyrs, pre-liberation industrial workers, as well as poor peasant families, and the Black origins include families of former capitalists, pre-liberation rich peasant families, landlord families etc. (Deng and Treiman, 1997⁵). While the risk of being counter-revolutionaries is non-zero for everyone, individuals from black families are particularly vulnerable

⁴The family class assignment began at 1956, and it is part of the political control system in the PRC. During the CR era, family origin is the most important criteria defining whether one is revolutionary or not.

⁵Since a one-to-one mapping between the items in CFPS questionnaire and the list in Deng and Treiman (1997) is not available, we use external resources in deciding which family class origin should go to Black, Middle or Red. See the appendix Table A2 for details of the mapping.

to the political movements during this period.

Marked by Chairman Mao's death and the collapse of the "Gang of Four", the ten-year Cultural Revolution came to its end. In 1981, the Sixth Plenary Session of the 11th Party Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party officially established the assessment of the Cultural Revolution in "Resolutions on the History of the Party since the Founding of the PRC": "[*the Cultural Revolution*] is an upheaval that was wrongly launched by party leaders, taken advantaged by the counter-revolutionary cliques, resulting in severe disasters for the Party, the country and its people"⁶. This initiated official criticism of the Cultural Revolution. Deng Xiaoping, who took charge of the governance since 1978, identified the nature of the Cultural Revolution as an "overall mistake, damaged social morals"⁷.

The impact of the Cultural Revolution is massive on economic development, human capital accumulation, political system, as well as culture and ethics. First, with respect to economic performance, the Cultural Revolution has resulted in significant loss of China economic development. As documented by the Office of the Central Leading Group on Financial and Economic Affairs (1999), during the ten-year movement, there are three years experienced negative growth⁸, 2 years has growth rate less than 4%. In addition, with interrupted education system during the Cultural Revolution, young generations were involved in the political movements, laborious work and revolutionary activities instead of staying at school, resulting in a huge loss of human capital. In terms of political system, the dysfunction of government, public security and procuratorial organs as well as courts lasted for years. Finally, numerous of historical and cultural relic destroyed during the breaking up the "Four Olds" (old customs, old culture, old habits and old ideas) movement. Therefore, the trauma of the Cultural Revolution may have lasted for generations, among which I will focus on the loss of trust in this paper.

⁶In addition, the document also established some limited, non-judicial responses to the Cultural Revolution, such as rehabilitation of Mao's political opponents, and redress to others who had been wrongfully convicted.

⁷There are also other sources of the official comments on the Cultural Revolution. For instance, the Peoples Daily (April, 23th, 1984) stated a "complete denial" on the Cultural Revolution, based on its destructive impacts on the intellectuals and economic development.

⁸The GDP growth rate of 1967 is -5.7%, 1968 with -4.1%, and 1976 with -1.6%.

III Data and Sample

A County-level Data

There are two sources of the county-level data used in this paper. For the historical part, the key quantitative measurement of regional intensity of Cultural Revolution comes from county gazetteers, which is first used by Walder and Su (2003) and discussed by Bai (2015). County gazetteers are comprehensive records of local geographical characteristics, demographics, economy, governance, transportation, education, culture and social customs and norms, etc. The history of compiling county gazetteers dates back to the Han Dynasty. Since the Ming dynasty, county gazetteers are published every 30-50 years. The county gazetteers covering the Cultural Revolution are mostly published in the mid-1980s or the early 1990s. Specifically, gazetteers has the information on the number of abnormal deaths due to the Cultural Revolution from 1966 to 1976, including the deaths (including suicide) as a result of the struggle sessions (Pi Dou), violent struggles (Wu Dou), and other civil conflicts during the revolution⁹. In the empirical analysis, I will normalize this measure with population size of 1966, or the density of abnormal deaths during the revolution at county level.

Figure 1 illustrated the regional variation of Cultural Revolution conflict intensity, graphed based on the 160 counties covered by our survey sample. This figure reveals that there's considerable variation of intensity both within and cross province. By ANOVA, I find that around 40% of the variation of the county-level intensity is between-province. With respect to mean value of the intensity variable, Guangxi is the most intensive province and Shanxi Province is with the least revolution intensity. Besides, there's also significant variation of revolution intensity within province. For instance, the highest intensity in Liaoning province is above 3 and the lowest is 0.

>> *Figure 1* <<

Having observed a geographical distribution of the revolution intensity, one may wonder what explains this variation. Scholars have realized and documented the regional variation of the revolution intensity (e.g. Walder and Su, 2003; Bu, 2008; Shi and Li, 2008), and the observation of

⁹The report of such abnormal deaths scatters around different chapters sometimes in the gazetteers, e.g. the chronological history of the county, a special section on the Cultural Revolution, or a section on the Party's history.

MacFarquhar and Schoenhals (2006) may shed light on this issue: “in some places it became a massive pogrom against people of exploiting class backgrounds; in some places a campaign of retribution and murder against factional rivals; and in still others a campaign of torture and murder to uncover wholly imaginary mass conspiracies that could involve tens of thousands”. In a work exploring the economic legacy of the Cultural Revolution, Bai (2015) used variation of county agricultural shock explaining the county conflict in rural area. In spite of these work, there’s a lack of systematic investigation into the explanation of such variation across China, which calls for future scholarly attention.

In addition to county variables during the Cultural Revolution years, I also collect contemporary county data from China Statistical Yearbook for Regional Economy 2013. The contemporary variables include population size at 2012, value-added of the primary and second industry at 2012, number of high school students and hospital beds at 2012, aiming at capturing county-level economic development, human capital accumulation, health and demographic characteristics. The descriptive statistics of the county level variables are shown in panel B of Table 1.

>> *Table 1* <<

Finally, I also use Chinese people’s given names to capture the revolutionary ideology during the Cultural Revolution years as additional variation for the Cultural Revolution. During the revolutionary years, many parents named their children with revolutionary spirit. For instance, many people were named as ”Cultural Revolution”. To get a sense of how the Cultural Revolution has generated a political ideology flux among Chinese people, I analysis the changes of naming fashion that reflects Cultural Revolution spirit. Following Obukhova et. al. (2013), I restrict some names as being revolutionary if the given name includes the words “Cultural Revolution”(*Wen-Ge*), “Protect Chairman Mao”(*Wei-Dong*), “Forever Red”(*Yong-Hong*), “Forever Loyalty”(*Yong-Zhong*), etc. (See Appendix Table A1). Figure 1 shows the trend of proportion of individuals with the above revolutionary given names by year of birth, thus revealing the changing naming fashion related to the revolution. It is clear that there is a jump of such naming fashion during the 1966-1976 period, and then gradually declines close to zero in the 2000s.

>> *Figure 2* <<

B Individual-level Survey

The individual level data used in this paper is the second wave of Chinese Family Panel Studies (CFPS) conducted in 2012, covering 25 provinces in China¹⁰. The survey is conducted by the Institute of Social Science Surveys (ISSS) of Peking University, and by now is one of the most comprehensive and nationally representative surveys in China. This survey is designed to examine Chinese social and economic changes through individual-, family-, and community-level data. The CFPS sampling method is PPS (probability proportional to size). The CFPS include basic information (gender, birth year and place, occupation, marital status, and education) of all family members of respondents, and is a powerful dataset for studying family configurations in China. As a panel survey, CFPS started from 2010 with the baseline coverage, and conducted the follow-up survey in 2012.

There are four components of this survey, including: (1) the adult survey, including individuals aged above 16; (2) children survey, including individuals aged from 0-15, answered either by children or their parents; (3) household survey and (4) community survey. The trust question of this paper is included in the 2012 questionnaires of both adult and children survey. However, some variables on the Cultural Revolution, e.g send-down experience and family class origin¹¹, are only available in the 2010 questionnaire. Thus only the ones in both 2010 and 2012 wave of the survey have this information.

C Measurement of Trust

There are several questions measuring trust in the adult questionnaire of CFPS 2012. The primary measure of trust is the generalized trust, which has been widely used in large-scale surveys, e.g. General Social Surveys and the World Value Survey. The wording of the general trust question is the following:

“In general, do you think that most people can be trusted, or can’t you be too careful in dealing

¹⁰Note that the CFPS do not cover the following provinces/areas: Xinjiang, Qinghai, Inner Mongolia, Ningxia, Hainan, Hong Kong SAR, Macau SAR, and Taiwan.

¹¹CFPS 2010 asked individuals their family class origin during the Cultural Revolution. I classified individual family class origin as Red, Black and Middle based on the mapping of Deng and Treiman (1997). Since a one-to-one mapping between the items in CFPS questionnaire and the list in Deng and Treiman (1997) is not available, I use external resources in deciding which Chengfen should go to Black, Middle or Red. See the appendix for the result of the mapping.

with people?

0. You can't be too careful. 1. Most people can be trusted. "

This measure is often used in large-scale surveys when laboratory setting is not available, and till now there has been rich discussion on its validity. Knack (1991) validated that the generalized trust is a good measure of the underlying theoretical concept, and it is also a robust determinant of corruption or the prevalence of violent crime (Lederman et al. 2002; Uslaner, 2002). However, this measurement has complexity when examined under experimental setting. Glaeser et al. (2000) found that it is not correlated with the sender's behavior but correlated with receiver's behavior in the game, thus it is a good measure of respondents own trustworthiness under the experimental setting. In a recent study, Guiso et al. (2008) further decomposed the components of trust into beliefs and preferences, and demonstrated that the WVS-like trust measure captures mostly the belief based component of a trust game. Therefore, to the extent that this measure can capture the theoretical part of the notion of trust as well as the belief of individuals, this paper will mainly focus on this trust measure as the key outcome variable.

D Sample

The sample used in this paper constitutes individuals born during the period of 1931-2001, which is a combination of both adult and child dataset of CFPS 2012. I will use two analytical samples in later analysis: (1) individuals born from 1931-1976, who are directly exposed to the Cultural Revolution; and (2) individuals born from 1931-2001, including people both directly and indirectly exposed to the revolution. By indirect exposure to the revolution, I refer to intergenerational transmission of beliefs and norms from parents to children, as well as the effect of siblings and other social relations. The descriptive statistics of the full sample constructed from CFPS 2012 are presented in panel A of Table 1.

In Table 1, I provide the summary statistics of the full sample by an indicator whether a county is with high Cultural Revolution intensity (above the median for all 160 counties in our full sample). The t-test statistics of the two groups for all variables are provided in the final column. From Panel A, we observe that the individuals from counties with low revolution intensity have higher level of trust than those from high intensity counties, and the difference is statistically significant. Other variables whose means are significantly different between the two groups include marital status,

employment status, send-down experience, and fathers party membership. On the other hand, the difference between the means of gender, age, educational attainment and party membership is not significant from zero. For family background variables, the means of fathers education, occupation and family class origin do not differ significantly for the two groups. However, given that those evidence is descriptive and only informative, a formal identification strategy will be introduced to address the causal relationship of trust and the Cultural Revolution.

IV Identification Strategy

The identification of the causal effect of exposure to the Cultural Revolution on trust faces several challenges. First, the regional intensity of Cultural Revolution is endogenous due to omitted variable bias. The nature of Cultural Revolution is complex and often is a mixture of political upheaval and civil conflicts. For instance, local political fractalization can result in higher intensity of the revolutionary movement, and may hurt the trust as a tradition at the same time. Therefore, the observed negative correlation between revolution intensity and individual trust is spurious. Secondly, the measure of revolution intensity, namely the density of abnormal death within county, may suffer from measurement error. In fact, as the county gazetteers are compiled by the General Office of County Gazetteers, which is under the jurisdiction of local government, the Office may have political incentive to underreport the devastating consequences of the Cultural Revolution ¹². Therefore, counties with higher density of abnormal death may not be the intense ones but may be the honest ones reporting the true numbers (e.g. Wuming county, Guangxi).

In terms of the cohort variation, the key challenge is to identify the exposure to the Cultural Revolution varying by cohort. In the following analysis, I will take advantage of one institutional setting during the Cultural Revolution: the interrupted education system since 1966 (Meng and Gregory, 2002, 2007; Jiles et al., 2008). From 1966 to 1968, the functioning of all schools, including primary schools, junior high schools, senior high schools, and universities were interrupted. Instead of taking courses, most students took up revolutionary activities as primary mission as Red Guards, including participating in struggle sessions, posting the “Big Character Posters”, joining the “Great Rally” to travel across the country to spread the revolutionary ideas, going to the countryside to

¹²In addition, the publication of county gazetteers is subjective to review by multilevel government, respectively the county level, prefecture level and the province level.

learn from farmers, etc. From 1969 to 1971, many primary schools and junior high schools recovered in the urban area, and most senior high schools recovered since 1972. The case for rural education is more complicated. Before the Cultural Revolution, most schools in rura area were primary school, which were interrupted too during the period of 1966-1968. However, since 1969, there was an expansion of junior high schools and senior high schools supported by villages in the rural area, regardless of the fact that there was limited qualified teachers and poor teaching facilities. Besides, the curriculum taught at school was still abnormal ¹³, since the key content of education is the Red Book and the revolutionary spirit and experiences.

>> *Figure 3* <<

To quantify the interrupted years of education, I adopted Meng and Gregory (2002)'s mapping of individual year of birth with the projected interrupted years of education, where the interrupted years of schooling not only include the years when schools were closed, but also include the years when schools resumed yet the curriculum was still abnormal. As Meng and Gregory (2002) indicated, missed schooling and at school but not under normal curricula had a similar impact on subsequent educational achievement. Figure 3 plotted the cohort variation of interrupted years of schooling including primary school, junior high school and senior high school, based on Meng and Gregory (2002)'s Table 1. From this figure, we observe that those who born before 1947 and after 1964 are not affected by the Cultural Revolution in terms of education. However, for those individuals born between 1948 and 1963, their education was interrupted more or less. For instance, people who born in 1955 would miss 2 years in primary school, 3 years in middle school and another 3 years in senior high school. In the following, I will make use of this cohort variation as a second dimension in identifying the exposure to the Cultural Revolution. The key argument here is that the interrupted years of schooling could capture intensity of exposure to the revolution.

To sum up, employing both regional and cohort variation of the Cultural Revolution, a Difference-in-Differences strategy will be used. By introducing cohort variation, the time-invariant unobserved county characteristics which confound our causal interpretation could be eliminated. So our major interpretation of individual exposure to the Cultural Revolution on both regional and cohort dimension would be that individuals in a county with higher revolution intensity as well as

¹³The study mode at that time is abnormal too, and three-year junior high school and senior high school was often squeezed to two years.

born in a cohort that is more susceptible to the revolution are less trusting. However, the potential weakness of the DID estimator is that it cannot rule out the time-varying county factors that affect both revolution intensity and trust outcomes. In this case, we will try to resolve those issues by controlling for regional differential time trends and discussing potential vulnerabilities. To get a sense of how the effect Cultural Revolution regional intensity could vary by cohort, I use a flexible specification as following:

$$Trust_{ijc} = \sum_{i=1}^{15} \gamma_j Cohort_j \times CR_c + X_{ijc} \beta + \theta_j + \phi_{prov} + \epsilon_{ijc} \quad (1)$$

In equation (1), $Trust_{ijc}$ denotes the trust of individual i born in year j and county c . CR_c is county-level intensity measure of Cultural Revolution. $Cohort_j$ is a dummy indicating individuals born in five-year window j . X_{ijc} is a set of individual control variables, including age, gender, Hukou status. θ_j is a set of birth year dummies, with base year being 1931. ϕ_{prov} is a set of province dummies, and ϵ_{ijc} is idiosyncratic error. In above specification, in order to get the baseline effects of revolution intensity for the first cohort, I allow for all the interaction terms between the cohort dummies and revolution intensity, and drop the constant term in the model. A series of coefficients γ_k is plotted in Figure 4.

>> *Figure 4* <<

Figure 4 presents a dip of the effect of the revolution intensity for cohorts born roughly from 1946 to 1960. Specifically, the coefficients of the early cohorts born from 1931 to 1945 are positive and close to zero, and the coefficients for cohorts born between 1946-1975 are negative. For younger cohorts in the sample, namely those born after the Cultural Revolution (from 1976 to 2001), their corresponding coefficient bounced back to positive again. In terms of significance, the effect of revolution intensity only show up to be significant from zero for the mid-cohort (those who born between 1946 and 1960). This V-shape pattern conveys us the information that the revolution intensity variable only work for the cohort who's relatively young during the Cultural Revolution, and that this intensity variable does not driven trust patterns for post-CR cohorts.

V Empirical Results

A Descriptive OLS

This section begins by estimating the effect of regional intensity of Cultural Revolution in OLS specification. Our baseline specification is the following:

$$Trust_{ijc} = \alpha + \gamma CR_c + X_{ijc}\beta + \theta_j + \phi_{prov} + \epsilon_{ijc} \quad (2)$$

Here $Trust_{ijc}$ denotes the trust of individual i born in year j and county c . CR_c is county-level intensity measure of Cultural Revolution. X_{ijc} is a set of individual control variables, including age, gender, Hukou status. θ_j is a set of birth year dummies, with base year being 1931. $prov$ is a set of province dummies, and ϵ_{ijc} is idiosyncratic error. The standard errors here are clustered on county level. The major results are shown in Table 2.

>> Table 2 <<

In Table 2, I used two samples: (1) the restricted sample including the individuals born before 1976, who are directly exposed to the Cultural Revolution; and (2) the full sample includes individuals born in all years from 1931 to 2001, who are either directly or indirectly exposed to the Cultural Revolution. Column 1-4 used our baseline measure of revolution intensity, which is the logarithm form of one plus the number of abnormal deaths due to the Cultural Revolution from 1966 to 1976. From Column 1, we could observe that number of county-level abnormal deaths is negatively associated with trust among individuals who were born by the end of the revolution, and this effect is statistically significant from zero. Column 2 presents results with Probit as model specification, which are very close to OLS estimates. With the same intensity measure, I conduct OLS and Probit again with the full sample, which results are in Column 3 and 4. The major pattern is that the correlation between the revolution intensity variable and trust is still significantly negative, yet the coefficient is a bit smaller than their counterparts in Column 1 and 2. From Column 5 to 8, I use a second measure, namely the logarithm form of one plus the number of abnormal deaths normalized by county population in 1966, thus capturing the density of abnormal death. Column 5 and 6 focus on the restricted sample of people who born before 1976. The results in Column 5 and 6 show that the density of abnormal death negatively correlated with the trust

outcome variable, and the results are stable across OLS and Probit model specification. Similarly, Column 7 and 8 present the counterpart analysis for the full sample, and the magnitude of their estimates is smaller than those from the restricted sample. For the remainder of this paper, I will use the logarithm form of one plus the number of abnormal deaths normalized by county population in 1966, since it's more intuitive as a density measure of the Cultural Revolution intensity.

The overall picture we can have from Table 2 is that a higher level of county-level Cultural Revolution intensity is associated with lower level of trust. Though we have the same direction of the estimates for both restricted sample (people who born before 1976) and full sample (people who born during 1931-2001), the magnitude for the restricted sample is larger. This illustrates that people who are directly exposed to the revolution are more affected. However, in terms of the causal inference of the effect of the revolution on individual trust, what the descriptive regressions in Table 2 can tell us is limited. As we have discussed in the identification session, the key challenge here is that the Cultural Revolution intensity is endogenous and may be associated with other unobserved county characteristics that may also affect contemporary trust outcomes. Therefore, it is necessary to have more information on institutional setting of the Cultural Revolution to identify this causal link.

B Difference-in-Differences Strategy

In this section, the DID identification strategy will be used to identify the effect of Cultural Revolution on trust based on both regional and cohort variation. The specification of DID is the following:

$$Trust_{ijc} = \alpha + \gamma CR_c + \delta CR_c \times CohortExp_j + X_{ijc}\beta + \theta_j + \phi_{prov} + \epsilon_{ijc} \quad (3)$$

In equation (3), X_{ijc} is still the same set of individual control variables as before, and θ_j is a set of birth year dummies. ϕ_{prov} is a set of province dummies. ϵ_{ijc} is idiosyncratic error. Our key independent variable is the interaction term between the Cultural Revolution intensity of county c and the cohort exposure to the revolution of individuals born in year j . As discussed above, here the cohort exposure to the revolution is captured by the interrupted education variables. Specifically, three sets of variables are used: (1) a dummy variable indicating whether one is supposed to have any

years of schooling interrupted due to the revolution, namely an indicator of the cohort 1948-1963; (2) the numbers of interrupted years of schooling one is supposed to have due to the disruption; and (3) the indicators of any interruption in education one is supposed to have in primary school, junior high school and senior high school due to the Cultural Revolution. Therefore, a negative coefficient indicates that individuals in the region with higher revolution intensity and having more intensive cohort exposure to the revolution have lower level of trust. All standard errors here are clustered on county level. The key results are shown in Table 3.

>> *Table 3* <<

Table 3 presented the results from DID specification of (3), with both restricted sample and the full sample. The merit of employing different samples is that, the control group of the cohort exposure to the Cultural Revolution is different. For the sample who born before 1976, the control group constitutes only the people who are also directly exposed to the revolution, namely those who born during 1931-1946 and 1964-1976. For the full sample, the control group also includes people who are not directly exposed to the revolution, or those who born during the years of 1977-2001.

In Table 3, Column 1, 2 and 3 presents DID coefficients with restricted sample, and Column 4, 5 and 6 presented results with full sample. In Column 1, the coefficient of the DID interaction term is negative and significantly different from zero, indicating that individuals from a county with higher intensity of the cultural Revolution and with more intensive cohort exposure to the revolution trust less. From Column 2, we could observe that the coefficient of interaction term between interrupted years of schooling and revolution intensity is negative, showing that people with more years of interrupted education from a more Cultural Revolution-intensive county trust less. In Column 3, I follow Meng and Gregory (2002) to use the following categories indicating interrupted years of schooling by education level: (1) interrupted primary school (1959-1963); (2) interrupted primary and junior high school (1956-1958); (3) interrupted junior and senior high school (1951-1955); and (4) interrupted senior high school (1948-1950). From the five interaction terms between those cohort exposure measures and regional intensity variable in Column (3), we noticed that the coefficients of interaction terms between all cohort variables are negative except for the high school indicator. However, only the coefficient of interaction term between primary school exposure and revolution intensity is statistically significant from zero, revealing that the effect of

missed primary school education can translate the revolution impact most significantly. Column 4 to 6 present corresponding results with the full sample. The estimated coefficients are very similar to those from Column 1 to 3, indicating that an inclusion of people who are indirectly exposed to the revolution does not drive the results from the restricted sample significantly.

VI Mechanisms

A Education Disruption

The first possible mechanism is that the Cultural Revolution may negatively affect trust by destroying the accumulation of human capital, as education has been argued to play an important role in generating social capital (e.g. Helliwell and Putnam, 2007; Oreopoulos and Salvanes, 2011). This is a very reasonable case since the interrupted education system may damage the quantity and the quality of individual educational attainment. If this is the case, the results from DID analysis may be interpreted as the individuals with lower human capital and in a region with higher revolution intensity would trust less. To test this story, a straightforward way is to control for years of schooling.

The results presented in Table 4 are parallel to Table 3 except for the difference that Table 4 controlled for years of schooling, employment status and marital status in all specifications. Compare Table 3 and Table 4, we could detect that the coefficients of the interaction terms between revolution intensity and cohort exposure are smaller when educational attainment and other variables are controlled. Overall, the two sets of coefficients from two tables are still close to each other, and staying statistically significant from zero. This indicates that though the Cultural Revolution may affect one's trust through its influence on years of schooling, the direct effect of the revolution still survives after we controlled for educational attainment.

>> *Table 4* <<

B Send-down Experience

In this section, I will examine the role of the Send-down experience during the Cultural Revolution on individual trust. Started as early as 1950s and ended in the late 1970s after the Cultural

Revolution, the Send-down movement has been considered as dramatic and traumatic experience for the affected youth, since they were uprooted from their families and forced to live in the countryside (Bonnin, 2005). As discussed by Li et al. (2010), Liang and Li (2014) and Gong et al., (2014), the Send-down movement has profound effect on individual trust, beliefs, values and family source allocation. So given send-down experience is most prevalent during the Cultural Revolution and it could affect trust outcomes, our previous findings may be driven by those with send-down experience. To investigate into this case, I use the information from CFPS questionnaire that whether an individual was sent-down in the past, and directly control for the send-down experience dummy in the DID specifications. However, it should be noted that the sample size when controlling for send-down experience became significantly smaller, since the send-down information is only available in the 2010 CFPS, and was only collected for those who born before 1977. Therefore, the comparison between the results of Table 3 and 4 may suffer from sample selection issue.

Results in Table 5 show that the coefficients of DID estimators are still negative when send-down experience is controlled, yet the magnitude gets smaller. For instance, when focusing on the interaction term between revolution intensity and interrupted years of schooling, the coefficient from Column 2 in Table 5 is almost half of its counterpart in Table 3. The patterns from other DID specifications are similar, that the estimates in general become smaller. This illustrates that the send-down experience of some individuals indeed contribute to the effect of exposure to the Cultural Revolution on individual trust.

>> *Table 5* <<

C Impressionable Years Hypothesis

In this section, I will examine the effect of exposure to the Cultural Revolution from perspective of the impressionable years hypothesis (Krosnick and Alwin, 1989) from Social Psychology. This hypothesis indicated that the plasticity of individual beliefs and values is different across life stages, among which childhood and early adulthood is a critical period in terms of socialization and the formation of one's core beliefs and values. In terms of sociopolitical orientations formation, Krosnick and Alwin (1989, 1991) suggested that the key period is 18-25. With empirical examination, Giuliano and Spilmergo (2014) investigated into the impact of growing up in a recession on political

attitudes and redistribution preference in the context of the U.S., finding out that the age window 18-25 is the most sensitive. With respect to more general personal values and beliefs, Gong et al. (2014) discussed the impressionable year hypothesis as 12-18 when exploring the impact of send-down movement on individual beliefs. In this paper, I will examine this hypothesis defined as 12-18 and 12-25 respectively. The key idea is that individuals who are more exposed to the Cultural Revolution during his/her impressionable years would be more easily affected. Specifically, two measures on the impressionable years will be used: (1) a dummy indicator whether one has spent any of the defined impressionable years during the Cultural Revolution; and (2) the number of years one has spent of impressionable years during the Cultural Revolution. To test for the different argument about the critical age range, I use 12-18 and 12-25 respectively define the impressionable years. The regression results are shown in Table 6.

In Table 6, we first focus on column 1-4, where the impressionable years are defined as 12-18. Column 1 illustrates that individuals spent non-zero years during his 12-18-year-old during the revolution significantly trust less. The key interaction term in Column 2 shows consistent results as Column 1, that individuals spend more years during 12-18 during the revolution are less trusting. In addition, across the restricted sample (born before 1976) and the full sample, the coefficients of the interaction terms are very similar. From column 5-8, I expand the impressionable years to 25, and the pattern becomes less clear overall. Specifically, the magnitude of the interaction term coefficients from 5 and 7 is close to their counterparts in Column 1 and 3. However, the estimates from Column 6 and 8 with continuous measure of the impressionable years are significantly smaller than those of 2 and 4. Overall, it could be seen that individual trust seems more plastic during ones early ages of childhood and adolescence, and less plastic during early adulthood.

>> *Table 6* <<

D Intergenerational Transmission

This section will explore the intergenerational transmission of the Cultural Revolution effects on trust. Specifically, we will see how parents'exposure to the revolution affects children's trust. In CFPS sample, I constructed a subsample of coresiding parents-children pairs, where children are born after 1977. To capture parents'exposure to the revolution, I use interaction term be-

tween parent's interrupted education indicators and local revolution intensity, while controlling for parents' cohort indicators. The regression results are shown in Table 7.

Table 7 adopted father's and mothers exposure to the Cultural Revolution respectively in the regressions. Parallel to our baseline DID analysis, I still use multiple measures of the interrupted education variables, including: (1) a dummy variable indicating whether ones father/mother is supposed to have any years of schooling interrupted due to the revolution; (2) the numbers of interrupted years of schooling one is supposed to have due to the revolution; and (3) the indicators of any interrupted years of schooling the parent is supposed to have in primary school, middle school and high school due to the revolution. For father-children pair sample, the results in Column 1, 3, and 5 of Table 7 show that fathers exposure to the revolution is negatively associated with childrens trust, yet the significance of this correlation is very weak overall. For mother-children pair sample, the results in Column 2, 4 illustrate that the effect of mother's exposure to the revolution is even weaker compared with that of fathers. To sum up, the overall pattern across Column 1 to 6 show that there is no strong evidence for the intergenerational transmission of the impact of the Cultural Revolution.

>> *Table 7* <<

E Analysis of Migration Subsamples

The Cultural Revolution may have broken the local equilibrium of trust, so that individuals within county would be all affected. Thus a natural question to be asked is: would the migrated people be affected by the local revolution intensity? In this section, I will investigate into this issue by taking advantage of the migration information available in CFPS: whether an individual has been migrated before age of 3 and 12. With this information, we can use subsamples based on personal migration history and check whether local revolution intensity matters for migrants. The results are shown in Table 8.

>> *Table 8* <<

In Table 8, Column 1 presents the results that the effect of the exposure to Cultural Revolution for people who hasn't migrated before age of 3, and Column 2 consists of people who migrated before

age of 3. Comparing the coefficients of interaction terms in Column 1 and 2, we found that the effect for those who didn't migrated before 3 is still significant in terms of magnitude and significance, while the effect is minor (close to zero) for those who have migrated at 3. The pattern is similar when we consider migration status at age of 12. The results of Column 3 and 4 demonstrate that the effect for those who didn't migrated before 12 is significant, yet for the migrated sample the effect is small. Column 5 to 8 show the results for our full sample, and the basic pattern is very similar to that from the restricted sample (those who born before 1976).

F Heterogeneous Analysis

In this section, I conduct heterogeneous analysis based on variables with which the Cultural Revolution may have interactive effects on trust. Specifically, I will consider family class origin (black versus non-black), father's party membership, whether a county is a traditional revolutionary site (defined by the government), urban/rural dichotomy, and revolutionary ideology prevalence (measured by whether a prefecture's proportion of people with Red names is beyond or below median). Thus the DDD (triple differences) specification will be adopted, since now we have triple interaction terms between the heterogeneous variable, the Cultural Revolution intensity variable, as well as cohort exposure variable. The regression results are shown in Table 9.

>> *Table 9* <<

Column 1 in Table 9 presents the DDD results when we use individual family class origin is black or not as heterogeneous variable. Focusing on the DDD term, which is negative yet statistically insignificant, suggesting that there's only weak evidence that individuals with black family origin suffered more from the exposure to the Cultural Revolution. In terms of father's party membership as a heterogeneous variable in Column 2, we spot that the DDD term is positive, showing that father's party membership might be a protective factor during the revolution, yet again the protective effect is not statistically significant from zero. In the third column, I consider whether individuals from a county which is traditionally a revolutionary site experienced larger effect of the revolution. The triple interaction term does show the intensification of such counties, yet the difference is still not statistically significant. In the fourth column, I explore the possible differential effect of the revolution in urban and rural area. The DDD term in this column is close

to zero, revealing negligible difference of the effects between the two areas. Finally in the fifth column, I take advantage of the revolutionary name data from the 2005 mini census, and explore whether the effect of Cultural Revolution will be different across regions with strong or weak political ideology. The triple interaction term's coefficient in Column 5 stands out to be positive, yet is still not statistically significant. While the result here is informative, the prevalence of the Red names could be interpreted carefully since it may come from self-protection motive of people.

VII Robustness Checks

A Reporting Bias and Narrative Style

As we have discussed in previous section, a key challenge to the Cultural Revolution intensity measurement is reporting bias. Specifically, we are worried whether the county reporting more abnormal deaths during the Cultural Revolution is with higher revolution intensity, or it is a more honest county or a well-documented county. More specifically, if the measurement error is the classical measurement error with random noise, then the regression estimates would bias towards zero, thus our results would be the lower bound. However, if the reporting bias is not random and systematically correlated with individual trust, then our estimation will be biased.

In order to deal with the reporting bias issue, I constructed a dummy variable based on natural disasters records from county gazetteers. Specifically, while all counties have a section recording the natural disasters during the previous years, there is considerable variation in the thoroughness of the record. For instance, some counties list the natural disasters annalistically and record in detail by disaster category, yet some counties just describe the overall pattern and give frequency of on a limited set of natural disasters. Therefore, this dummy variable is coded as one if it has recorded natural disasters in detail, and zero if its not very detailed. I suggest this could be a proxy of the narrative style of the county gazetteers. Our hypothesis is that if the narrative style of a county gazetteer is detailed, and it possible that the county gazetteer is more likely to report the events on Cultural Revolution more detailed.

>> *Figure 5* <<

Figure 5 pictures the distribution of reported number of abnormal death by the narrative

style dummy. Two things can be observed from Figure 5: first, the means of number of abnormal death (in logarithm form) across two narrative styles are close to each other, and not statistically significant. However, the distribution of the revolution intensity in the counties with detailed narrative style is more concentrated, and that for counties with less detailed narrative style is more dispersed. Column 1 in Table 10 presents the results with controlling for narrative style for the restricted sample analysis. The coefficient of the interaction term between revolution intensity and interrupted years of schooling is very similar to the baseline DID estimates. Similarly, result in Column 7 for the full sample is close to that of Column 1. This practice provides evidence that the identified effect of Cultural Revolution is not driven by the reporting errors and narrative style.

B Adding County and County-Year Control

The second set of robustness checks is targeted at dealing with omitted variable bias in the DID setting. One way to alleviate this concern is to control for more county characteristics. To begin with, I add contemporary county controls to our baseline DID specification. Those contemporary county controls include: population size, value-added of the primary and second industry at 2012, number of high school students and hospital beds at 2012, all in logarithm form. Column 2 and 8 in Table 10 show the regression results after adding those county controls with model (3), for restricted sample and full sample respectively. The coefficient of the interaction term between CR and missed years of schooling is very close to the DID baseline results in Table 3.

In Column 3 and 9, I also directly control for county fixed effects, so that all county-level unobserved characteristics are absorbed by the county dummies. Column 3 and 9 present the DID estimates with county fixed effects. The results show that the basic pattern is still the same across different samples, and the coefficients are slightly smaller than the baseline results.

In addition to the cross-sectional omitted variable bias, we may also worry about the unobserved county-year differential trends. A first possible concern is that the marketization process may be different across counties. Specifically, started from 1978 (shortly after the Cultural Revolution), China initialized its economic reforms and marketization process. As the trends of marketization have regional variation, one may concern about the differential trends of economic reform may confound our identification. Specifically, I use the interaction terms between provincial marketization

index and time trend¹⁴, as well as its quadratic and third order polynomial terms as additional controls. The regression results in Column 4 and 10 show that the DID estimates have barely changed with these controls.

Next, to achieve a more comprehensive control for the provincial trends, I directly add interactions between province dummies and linear, quadratic and polynomial time trend as additional controls. The results in Column 5 and 11, respectively for restricted sample and the full sample, illustrate that the estimates do not changed significantly compared with the baseline results. Finally, in addition to province level time trends, I also add county specific time trends. Specifically, I construct interaction terms between county characteristics and time trend, namely county population in 1966 and its interaction term with time trend, since population is oftentimes considered to capture economic prosperity¹⁵. The results with this are shown in Column 6 and 12, showing that the pattern is largely stable.

>> Table 10 <<

C Placebo Test

In this section, a placebo test is conducted whether the Cultural Revolution can affect certain outcome when it should not. Specifically, I use the following outcome variables in CFPS, with the wording of those questions as following: “*Have you ever experienced mistreatment of the following? Mistreatment due to gender and registration status (rural or urban).*” Since the Cultural Revolution is not targeted on either gender or registration status, I expect theres no statistical significant effect of exposure to the revolution on such outcomes. In other words, if there’re any significant effects of the revolution on those outcomes, then one may suspect that our Cultural Revolution variable may have captured something else. The regression results are shown in Table 11.

>> Table 11 <<

In Table 11, I adopted the baseline regression specification in (3), and mainly focus on the interaction term of revolution intensity and missed years of schooling, which are not statistically

¹⁴However, since county-level marketization indicators are not available, I adopt Fan et al. (2003)’s index of marketization on provincial level constructed in the 2000s.

¹⁵Population density is more often used as an indicator of economic development in the Malthusian regime. Though it’s less appropriate to use this as indicator for economic development in modern economy setting, the statistics of county-level economic development at the 1960s is not available.

significant across regressions. All of the interaction term coefficients are close to zero. This supports our conjecture that the exposure to Cultural Revolution should not affect the outcomes which the revolution was not tailored on.

VIII Conclusion and Discussion

In this paper, I examine the long-term effect of the Cultural Revolution on social trust. During the Cultural Revolution, individuals are under the political incentive system of mutual censorship, which is supposed to have played a destructive for social trust. To capture individual exposure to the Cultural Revolution, I take advantage of both cohort and regional variation. Specifically, to measure the regional intensity of revolution, I use the density of abnormal deaths due to Cultural Revolution from 1966 to 1976, and the cohort variation is captured by the interrupted years of schooling during the Cultural Revolution.

To identify whether the negative association between the Cultural Revolution intensity and social trust is causal, I employ the Difference-in-Differences strategy. The major finding is that individuals from counties with higher Cultural Revolution intensity and exposed to more years of interrupted schooling trust significantly less. This finding is based on two arguments: (1) there has been regional variation of the intensity of the Cultural Revolution, and we can illustrate such variation with density of abnormal deaths during the revolution years; and (2) the interrupted years of schooling can capture the extent to which an individual has been affected by the Cultural Revolution, e.g. being a Red Guard. I also examined several alternative channels that the Cultural Revolution may affect one's social trust, including human capital accumulation, send-down experience, intergenerational transmission, and migration. Specifically, by exploring the intergenerational transmission of this effect, I find only weak evidence that children of parents with more intensive exposure to the Revolution would trust less. Finally, robustness checks are conducted considering measurement error, omitted variable bias, heterogeneous effects, as well as a placebo test. The basic findings do not change with the those checks. While this paper has illustrated an important consequence of the Cultural Revolution, future work would be necessary to explain the local variation of the Cultural Revolution.

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
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
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Figure 1: Regional variation of Cultural Revolution Intensity: CFPS county sample




Note: The variable is defined as: $\text{Log}(\text{number of abnormal deaths due to the Cultural Revolution} / \text{population in 1966} + 1)$.

Figure 2: The Changing Naming Fashion of the Cultural Revolution




Note: Author's calculation based on subsample of 2005 Mini census. The revolutionary names reflecting the Cultural Revolution ideology include: Cultural Revolution (Wen-Ge), Protecting Chairman Mao (Wei-dong), the Red (Hong), Protecting the Red (Wei-hong), Forever Red (Yong-Hong), Learn from the Red (Xue-Hong), Loyal to Red (Zhong-Hong), Love the Red (Ai-Hong), Loyalty (Zhong), Forever Loyal (Yong-Zhong), Loyal to the Army (Zhong-Jun), Learn from the Army (Xue-Jun).

Figure 3: Number of Interrupted Years of Schooling by Year of Birth



Note: Plotted based on the Table 1 of Meng and Gregory (2002).

Figure 4: Interaction Terms of Birth Year Dummies and CR Intensity



Note: Plot of coefficients of the interaction terms between the Cultural Revolution intensity ($\log(1+\text{death}/\text{pop})$) and birth year dummies (every five years). Control variables include gender, provincial dummies, etc. This specification has no constant and age. So we have full interactions for all birth year dummies.

Figure 5: Narrative Style and Reported Cultural Revolution Deaths




Table 1: Descriptive statistics

Variable Name	Low Intensity Counties (below median)		High Intensity Counties (above median)		T-test
	N1	Mean1	N2	Mean2	p-value
<i>A. Individual Characteristics</i>					
Trust (dummy)	15951	0.555	14407	0.531	0
Male	15951	0.49	14407	0.486	0.47
Age	15951	45.117	14407	45.128	0.95
Urban Hukou	15951	0.276	14407	0.29	0.01
At work	15951	0.513	14407	0.536	0
Married	15951	0.794	14407	0.809	0
Years of Schooling at 2012	15951	6.613	14407	6.588	0.65
Party membership	15951	0.077	14407	0.076	0.58
Send-down Experience	12453	0.021	11349	0.026	0
Fathers education	11646	1.847	10686	1.838	0.5
Fathers Party Membership	12057	0.166	11035	0.154	0.01
Father is a Professional	10784	0.018	9942	0.017	0.62
Black Family Origin	9662	0.053	8735	0.054	0.78
Red Family Origin	9662	0.773	8735	0.776	0.62
Middle Family Origin	9662	0.174	8735	0.17	0.47
<i>B. County characteristics</i>					
Log (Abnormal death/pop66+1)	15951	0.089	14407	1.523	0
Log (Abnormal death+1)	15951	1.1	14407	4.507	0
Log (population at 1966)	15951	3.526	14407	3.36	0
Log (hospital beds)	15951	7.804	14407	7.916	0
Log (High school Population)	15951	1.52	14407	1.468	0
Log (Agricultural Sector GRP at 2012)	15951	3.461	14407	3.361	0
Log (Industrial Sector GRP at 2012)	15951	4.72	14407	4.791	0
Log (Population at 2012)	15951	4.508	14407	4.46	0

Table 2: Descriptive Regressions: The Effect of Cultural Revolution Regional Intensity on Trust

	Dependent Variable: Trust							
	Before 1976				After 1976			
	OLS	PROBIT	OLS	PROBIT	OLS	PROBIT	OLS	PROBIT
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Log(death+1)	-0.009* (0.005)	-0.023* (0.012)	-0.008* (0.004)	-0.020* (0.011)				
Log(death/pop66+1)					-0.024** (0.012)	-0.062** (0.03)	-0.019* (0.011)	-0.048* (0.027)
Observations	21,197	21,197	30,358	30,357	21,197	21,197	30,358	30,357
R-squared	0.033		0.031		0.034		0.031	
Pseudo R2		0.0245		0.0224		0.0247		0.0224
<i>Control Variables</i>								
County type	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Provincial Dummies	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Birth Year Dummies	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Individual Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y

Note: Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by county.*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Individual controls include gender, age, living in urban area in 2012. County type indicates whether this county is a county, county-level city, or a district of city.

Table 3: The Effect of Cultural Revolution on Trust: DID Baseline

	Dependent Variable: Trust					
	Born before 1976			FULL		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Interrupted Education Dummy X CR Intensity	-0.0168** (0.008)			-0.0173** (0.008)		
Interrupted Years of Schooling X CR Intensity		-0.0029** (0.001)			-0.0031** (0.002)	
Interrupted Primary School X CR Intensity			-0.028** (0.011)			-0.0286*** (0.011)
Interrupted Primary and Junior School X CR Intensity			-0.02 (0.013)			-0.0207 (0.014)
Interrupted Junior and High School X CR Intensity			-0.016 (0.011)			-0.0168 (0.01)
Interrupted High School X CR Intensity			0.01 (0.019)			0.0095 (0.019)
CR Intensity	-0.0172 (0.012)	-0.0189 (0.012)	-0.017 (0.012)	-0.0135 (0.011)	-0.0145 (0.011)	-0.0135 (0.011)
Observations	21,197	21,197	21,197	30,358	30,358	30,358
R-squared	0.034	0.034	0.034	0.031	0.031	0.031
<i>Control Variables</i>						
County type	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Provincial Dummies	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Birth Year Dummies	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Individual Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y

Note: Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by county.*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Individual controls include gender, age, living in urban area in 2012. County type indicates whether this county is a county, county-level city, or a district of city. The Cultural Revolution intensity variable here is Log(abnormal death/pop66+1).

Table 4: The Effect of Cultural Revolution on Trust: DID Controlling for Education

	Dependent Variable: Trust					
	Before 1976			All		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Interrupted Education Dummy X CR Intensity	-0.0156* (0.008)			-0.0153* (0.008)		
Interrupted Years of Schooling X CR Intensity		-0.0028** (0.001)			-0.0029** (0.001)	
Interrupted Primary School X CR Intensity			-0.0245** (0.011)			-0.0234** (0.011)
Interrupted Primary and Junior School X CR Intensity			-0.0202 (0.013)			-0.021 (0.014)
Interrupted Junior and High School X CR Intensity			-0.016 (0.01)			-0.0159 (0.01)
Interrupted High School X CR Intensity			0.0095 (0.02)			0.0101 (0.02)
CR Intensity	-0.0179 (0.012)	-0.0192 (0.012)	-0.0179 (0.012)	-0.0147 (0.011)	-0.0154 (0.01)	-0.0147 (0.011)
Observations	21,197	21,197	21,197	30,358	30,358	30,358
R-squared	0.047	0.047	0.047	0.047	0.047	0.048
<i>Control Variables</i>						
County type	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Provincial Dummies	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Birth Year Dummies	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Individual Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Extra Individual Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y

Note: Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by county.*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Individual controls include gender, age, living in urban area in 2012. County type indicates whether this county is a county, county-level city, or a district of city. Extra individual controls include employment status, marital status, Communist Party membership, as well as years of schooling at 2012. The Cultural Revolution intensity variable here is Log(abnormal death/pop66+1).

Table 5: The Effect of Cultural Revolution on Trust: DID Controlling for Send-Down experience

	Dependent Variable: Trust					
	Before 1976			ALL		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Interrupted Education Dummy X CR Intensity	-0.0111 (0.009)			-0.0108 (0.009)		
Interrupted Years of Schooling X CR Intensity		-0.0016 (0.002)			-0.0017 (0.002)	
Interrupted Primary School X CR Intensity			-0.0231* (0.012)			-0.0222* (0.012)
Interrupted Primary and Junior School X CR Intensity			-0.0098 (0.014)			-0.0103 (0.015)
Interrupted Junior and High School X CR Intensity			-0.0106 (0.011)			-0.0102 (0.011)
Interrupted High School X CR Intensity			0.0093 (0.02)			0.0099 (0.021)
CR Intensity	-0.0196* (0.012)	-0.0213* (0.012)	-0.0196* (0.012)	-0.017 (0.011)	-0.0182* (0.011)	-0.0171 (0.011)
Observations	18,506	18,506	18,506	23,802	23,802	23,802
R-squared	0.048	0.048	0.048	0.05	0.05	0.05
<i>Control Variables</i>						
County type	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Provincial Dummies	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Birth Year Dummies	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Individual Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Extra Individual Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Send-down Experience	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y

Note: Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by county.*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Individual controls include gender, age, living in urban area in 2012. County type indicates whether this county is a county, county-level city, or a district of city. Extra individual controls include employment status, marital status, Communist Party membership, as well as years of schooling at 2012. Send-down experience is a dummy variable indicating whether one has been sent-down before. The Cultural Revolution intensity variable here is Log(abnormal death/pop66+1).

Table 6: The Effect of Cultural Revolution on Trust: the Impressionable Years Hypothesis

	Dependent Variable: Trust							
	Impressionable ages: 12-18				Impressionable ages: 12-25			
	Born before 1976		ALL		Born before 1976		ALL	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Impressionable Year Dummy X CR Intensity	-0.0148* (0.008)		-0.0145* (0.008)		-0.0148* (0.008)		-0.0137 (0.009)	
Num. of Impressionable Years X CR Intensity		-0.0030** (0.001)		-0.0031** (0.001)		-0.0014 (0.001)		-0.0015 (0.001)
CR Intensity		-0.0178 (0.012)		-0.0146 (0.011)		-0.0161 (0.012)		-0.0137 (0.011)
Observations		21,197		30,358		21,197		30,358
R-squared		0.047		0.047		0.047		0.047
<i>Control Variables</i>								
County type	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Provincial Dummies	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Birth Year Dummies	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Individual Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Extra Individual Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y

Note: Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by county.*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Individual controls include gender, age, living in urban area in 2012. County type indicates whether this county is a county, county-level city, or a district of city. Extra individual controls include employment status, marital status, Communist Party membership, as well as years of schooling at 2012. The Cultural Revolution intensity variable here is Log(abnormal death/pop66+1).

Table 7: The Effect of Parental Exposure to CR on Childrens trust outcomes: Intergenerational Transmission

	Sample: Coresident parents and children (born after 1977)					
	Dependent Variable: Trust					
	Father	Mother	Father	Mother	Father	Mother
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Parent Interrupted Edu. Dummy X CR Intensity	-0.012 (0.016)	-0.004 (0.014)				
Parent Interrupted Edu. Years X CR Intensity			-0.001 (0.003)	-0.001 (0.003)		
Parent Interrupted Primary School X CR Intensity					-0.014 (0.02)	-0.005 (0.016)
Parent Interrupted Primary and Junior School X CR Intensity					-0.022 (0.023)	-0.005 (0.025)
Parent Interrupted Junior and High School X CR Intensity					0.008 (0.024)	-0.001 (0.022)
Parent Interrupted High X CR Intensity					0.027 (0.041)	-0.04 (0.052)
CR Intensity	-0.012 (0.016)	-0.018 (0.013)	-0.011 (0.014)	-0.017 (0.013)	-0.012 (0.016)	-0.018 (0.013)
Observations	4,767	5,255	4,767	5,255	4,767	5,255
R-squared	0.057	0.049	0.056	0.049	0.058	0.051
<i>Control Variables</i>						
County type	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Provincial Dummies	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Birth Year Dummies	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Individual Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Extra Individual Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y

Note: Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by county.*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Individual controls include gender, age, living in urban area in 2012. County type indicates whether this county is a county, county-level city, or a district of city. Extra individual controls include employment status, marital status, Communist Party membership, as well as years of schooling at 2012. The Cultural Revolution intensity variable here is Log(abnormal death/pop66+1).

Table 8: Robustness Check: Analysis on Migration Subsamples

	Dependent Variable: Trust							
	Born before 1976				All			
	Migrated before 3		Migrated before 12		Migrated before 3		Migrated before 12	
	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Interrupted Years of Schooling X CR Intensity	-0.0044** (0.002)	0 (0.007)	-0.0046** (0.002)	0.0031 (0.004)	-0.0039** (0.002)	-0.0005 (0.007)	-0.0042** (0.002)	0.0043 (0.004)
Observations	17,983	498	17,489	1,020	23,099	675	22,495	1,309
R-squared	0.048	0.197	0.047	0.137	0.05	0.199	0.049	0.138
<i>Control Variables</i>								
County type	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Provincial Dummies	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Birth Year Dummies	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Individual Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Extra Individual Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y

Note: Note: Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by county.*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Individual controls include gender, age, living in urban area in 2012. County type indicates whether this county is a county, county-level city, or a district of city. Extra individual controls include employment status, marital status, Communist Party membership, as well as years of schooling at 2012. The Cultural Revolution intensity variable here is Log(abnormal death/pop66+1).

Table 9: Heterogeneous Analysis

	Dependent Variable: Trust				
	Black Family Origin	Father's Party Membership	Revolutionary Site	Urban	Revolutionary Ideology
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
CR Intensity	-0.022* (0.012)	-0.017 (0.011)	-0.019* (0.01)	-0.009 (0.012)	-0.023 (0.016)
Interrupted Years of Schooling X CR Intensity	-0.002 (0.002)	-0.002 (0.002)	-0.002 (0.002)	-0.003 (0.002)	-0.004** (0.002)
Het. Variable	-0.019 (0.023)	0.025* (0.013)	0.002 (0.026)	0.014 (0.013)	-0.001 (0.02)
CR Intensity X Het. Variable	0.016 (0.02)	-0.006 (0.01)	0.009 (0.02)	-0.015 (0.012)	0.013 (0.018)
Het. Variable X Interrupted Years of Schooling	0.001 (0.008)	-0.009 (0.005)	0.001 (0.004)	-0.004 (0.003)	0.000 (0.004)
Het. Variable X Interrupted Years of Schooling X CR Intensity	-0.001 (0.006)	0.005 (0.004)	-0.002 (0.003)	0.000 (0.003)	0.001 (0.003)
Observations	18,397	23,092	30,358	30,358	30,358
R-squared	0.048	0.051	0.047	0.048	0.048
<i>Control Variables</i>					
County type	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Provincial Dummies	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Birth Year Dummies	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Individual Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Extra Individual Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y

Note: Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by county.*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Individual controls include gender, age, living in urban area in 2012. County type indicates whether this county is a county, county-level city, or a district of city. Extra individual controls include employment status, marital status, Communist Party membership, as well as years of schooling at 2012. The Cultural Revolution intensity variable here is Log(abnormal death/pop66+1).

Table 10: Robustness checks

	Dependent Variable: Trust											
	Sample: Born before 1976						Sample: All					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Interrupted Years of Schooling	-0.0028**	-0.0028**	-0.0025*	-0.0024*	-0.0028*	-0.0027*	-0.0030**	-0.0029**	-0.0025*	-0.0024*	-0.0030**	-0.0030**
X CR Intensity	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Observations	21,197	21,197	21,197	21,197	21,197	21,197	30,358	30,358	30,358	30,358	30,358	30,358
R-squared	0.047	0.047	0.074	0.074	0.078	0.078	0.047	0.048	0.069	0.069	0.073	0.073
Birth Year Dummies	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
All Individual Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Reporting Bias	Y	Y	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	N	N	N
County controls	N	Y	N	N	N	N	N	Y	N	N	N	N
County dummies	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y
Marketization trend	N	N	N	Y	N	N	N	N	N	Y	N	N
Provincial trend	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	N	N	N	Y	Y
County trend	N	N	N	N	N	Y	N	N	N	N	N	Y

Note: Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by county.*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Individual controls include gender, age, living in urban area in 2012, employment status, marital status, Communist Party membership, as well as years of schooling at 2012.. County type indicates whether this county is a county, county-level city, or a district of city. Reporting bias is a dummy variable indicating whether the county gazetteer is comprehensive in the natural disaster section. County controls include the logarithm form of population size, value-added of the primary and second industry at 2012, number of high school students and hospital beds at 2012. Marketization trend includes interaction terms between provincial marketization index and linear, quadratic and polynomial time trend. Provincial trends include provincial specific linear, quadratic and polynomial time trend. County trend is the interaction term between log population at 1966 with time trend. The Cultural Revolution intensity variable here is $\text{Log}(\text{abnormal death}/\text{pop66}+1)$.

Table 11: Placebo Test

	Dependent Variables: Mistreatment Due to			
	Hukou		Gender	
	Before 1976	Sample All	Before 1976	All
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Interrupted Years of Schooling X CR Intensity	0.0011 (0.001)	0.0006 (0.001)	0.0003 (0.001)	0.0002 (0.001)
Observations	20,710	29,828	20,814	29,951
R-squared	0.059	0.049	0.048	0.044
<i>Control Variables</i>				
County type	Y	Y	Y	Y
Birth Year Dummies	Y	Y	Y	Y
All Individual Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y
County dummies	Y	Y	Y	Y
Provincial trend	Y	Y	Y	Y
County trend	Y	Y	Y	Y

Note: Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by county.*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Individual controls include gender, age, living in urban area in 2012, employment status, marital status, Communist Party membership, as well as years of schooling at 2012.. County type indicates whether this county is a county, county-level city, or a district of city. Provincial trends include provincial specific linear, quadratic and polynomial time trend. County trend is the interaction term between log population at 1966 with time trend. The Cultural Revolution intensity variable here is Log(abnormal death/pop66+1).

Appendix Table A1: Revolutionary Names Reflecting CR Political Ideology

Given Name in Chinese	Translation
Wen-Ge	Cultural Revolution
Wei-Dong	Protecting Chairman Mao
Hong	Red
Wei-Hong	Protecting Red
Yong-Hong	Forever Red
Xue-Hong	Learn from Red
Zhong-Hong	Loyal to Red
Ai-Hong	Love Red
Zhong	Loyalty
Yong-Zhong	Forever Loyal
Zhong-Jun	Loyal to Army
Xue-Jun	Learn from Army

Appendix Table A2: Mapping of CFPS Family Class Origin list to Deng and Treiman (1997)

	Deng and Treiman (1997)	CFPS Classification
<i>Good-class origins</i>		
1. Revolutionary cadres		
2. Revolutionary army men		28
3. Revolutionary martyrs		14, 15
4. Pre-Liberation industrial workers and their families		11, 12, 13
5. Former poor and lower-middle peasant families		
<i>Middle-class origins</i>		
1. Families of pre-Liberation peddlers and store clerks, etc.		16, 17, 18, 24, 25, 26
2. Former middle-peasant families		3, 6, 10
3. Intelligentsia middle class (families of pre-Liberation clerks, teachers, professionals, etc.)		
4. others		4(bankrupt landlords, Pochan Dizhu)
<i>Bad-class origins</i>		
A. Families of former capitalists		20,21,22 (capitalists)
B. Families of rightists (a label denoting those who were too outspoken in the Hundred Flowers campaign of 1957)		5,7,8,9(rich peasants)
C. Pre-Liberation rich peasant families		
D. Families of bad elements (a label denoting criminal offenders)		
E. Pre-Liberation landlord families		1,2 (landlord)
F. Families of counterrevolutionaries		