Law and economics textbooks discuss negligence, tort, and to some extent fraud, which is an important topic in accounting, especially forensic accounting. You are correct that economics textbooks rarely say much about these matters, largely because economics has traditionally assumed that the legal system works perfectly, and usually costlessly, in the background to prevent such activities. But research that brings together economics, law, politics, and other social sciences is flourishing; hopefully it will lead to useful analyses of the issues you raise.
The issues of asymmetric information and principal-agent problems you identify are surely important, but an equally important politico-economic problem in this context is one of collective action. The benefits of fraudulence and negligence are concentrated in firms and their senior management; the benefits of exposing such activities are spread out over a large number of consumers. Only a few people, for example investigative journalists, have any direct incentive to incur the costs of detection (and those may include retribution from those they seek to expose!). A good whistleblower law may help here.
Of course governments are instituted to solve collective action problems, but they have their own defects, and getting them to perform their supposed functions is itself a difficult collective action problem. Many aspects of this have been extensively studied in economics and political economy.
As you can see, studying these issues is a huge and difficult endeavor, requiring a combination of knowledge and skills from many disciplines. As far as I know, a thorough treatment with any coherence or unification doesn’t even exist at the research level and seems well beyond the scope of economics textbooks, especially undergraduate ones. But you are correct that they should recognize the importance of the problems, and perhaps spur some student readers to go on to do useful research on them.
By the way, fining firms 110% of their profits earned through malfeasance won’t help if the probability of detection and conviction is small; Becker’s classic analysis of crime is relevant here.