RFE: Conference Listings
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Arne Ryde Foundation, Department of Economics, Lund University
- September 12-13, 2008
- 27th Arne Ryde Symposium 2008 "Properties of Allocation Mechanisms and Voting Rules"
- Lund, HC ekonomicentrum/School of Economics and Management, Sweden
- The ambition to design allocation mechanisms and voting rules that satisfy various desirable criteria (efficiency, strategy-proofness, fairness, equality, anonymity, neutrality, etc.) has a long tradition and also been high on the agenda of economic research in recents decades. The research has been successful in characterizing various mechanisms in terms of their elementary properties, and thus made them transparent and comparable, but also pointed to the difficulty of constructing a mechanism with the capacity of simultaneously satisfying several such desirable criteria in general settings. Furthermore, the theoretical results have provided the foundation for the real life design of, e.g., major auctions, school entrance and kidney exchange schemes, and the US National Residents Matching Program.With an emphasis on the property of non-manipulability, the 27th Arne Ryde Syposium aims at taking stock of current research in this area and to provide a forum for researchers in the field to exchange ideas and results. [gem?_?? den Informationen des Anbieters - according to site editor's information]The website is no longer available.[Redaktion EconBiz - editors EconBiz]
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