Appendix for online publication to "How do beliefs about the gender wage gap affect the demand for public policy?"

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A Summary of the online appendix

The online appendix is structured as follows: **Section B** contains details on the **experimental design and the data** referred to in Section 2 of the paper. It describes the calculation of the two treatment values (Section B.1), provides technical details on the implementation of the behavioral outcome measures (Section B.2) and screenshots of important survey elements (Section B.3). Moreover, it shows summary statistics and demonstrates the integrity of randomization (Section B.4).

Section C refers to Section 3 of the paper. It presents additional descriptive and **correlational evidence** on people's beliefs about the size of the gender wage gap, on closely related perceptions (Section C.1) and on behavior (Section C.2).

Section D presents additional **causal evidence** discussed in Section 4 of the paper. It shows results on the main treatment effect on beliefs about the wage gap and closely related perceptions (Section D.1) and on the behavioral outcome measures (D.2). It also presents additional exercises that facilitate the interpretation of the magnitude of the main treatment effect, such as 2SLS specifications and a back-of-the-envelope calculation (Section D.3). Lastly, it demonstrates the robustness of my results to an obfuscated follow-up survey (Section D.4), it rules out that the local average treatment effect is driven by a subset of the population that does not care about the wage gap (Section D.5), shows the robustness of the main treatment effect to alternative specifications (Section D.6) and presents technical details and additional evidence on multiple hypothesis adjustment (Section D.7).

Section E presents additional evidence discussed in Section 5 of the paper, such as heterogeneous treatment effects across gender-age cells (Section E.1) and evidence of the role of people's preferences in shaping policy demand (Section E.2).

Section F presents additional evidence on the **endogeneity of beliefs** about the wage gap discussed in Section 6 of the paper.

Section G refers to the pre-analysis plan (PAP). It first documents minor deviations from the PAP (Section G.1), then presents the main results separately for wave A and B of data collection (Section G.3) and finally shows pre-specified regressions where the main paper deviates from the PAP (Section G.5).

Section H contains the complete survey instrument.

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B Survey design and implementation

B.1 Calculation of the treatment values

I obtained the objective values of females' relative wages for the information treatment in T^{74} (T^{94}) from the most recent available data of the American Community Survey (Current Population Survey) as of the beginning of 2018 (Flood et al., 2018; Ruggles et al., 2018). The ACS is published on a yearly level and the CPS on a monthly level. In January 2018 the most recent available sample was the ACS of 2016 and the CPS of October 2017, respectively. Whereas in the ACS all survey respondents answer wage-related questions, in the CPS a sub-sample of around one fourth, the "Outgoing Rotation Group" or "Earner Study"-sample, receives questions on wages.

In the ACS, wage income is defined as each respondent's total pre-tax wage and salary income - that is, money received as an employee - for the previous calendar year. In the CPS I use weekly earnings, which is a variable that takes on the maximum of the following two values: 1) the respondent's answer to the question "How much do you usually earn per week at this job before deductions?", which refers to the individual's current job; and 2) the reported number of hours the respondent usually worked at the job, multiplied by the hourly wage rate. Due to the self-reported nature, the resulting variables in both surveys are subject to measurement error. Moreover, there is top coding, which differs between the two samples. Namely, in the ACS wage income above the 99.5th percentile in the state of residence is coded as the state mean of values above the top code value for the specific census year. In the CPS, weekly income is top-coded at \$2885.

I restrict both samples to individuals working 40 hours per week on average. For the ACS sample, I do so based on the number of hours per week that the respondent usually worked if she worked during the previous calendar year. The reference period for usual hours worked is the 12 months preceding the interview. In the CPS, I use a variable capturing the usual number of hours per week the respondent reports being at their main job. There is no concrete reference period specified. Lastly, I restrict both samples to those aged 45 who are employees and hold a Bachelor's degree, based on similar variables in both samples.

B.2 Technical details on the behavioral outcome measures

Donation decision: Respondents learn that they have been enrolled in a lottery to win \$300. Before they find out whether they won or not, they are asked to commit to an amount between \$0 and \$300 they want to donate to an NGO that supports women in the labor market under the condition that every dollar donated will be subsidized by another \$0.5 through the experimenter. (Without the subsidy, respondents would have no incentive to make the donation instantly but might instead decide to keep the full amount for themselves and make a donation privately after the survey has ended.) As soon as the participant enters an amount, a note appears summarizing the amount entered, the corresponding increase in payoff for the respondent and the total donation (including the 50 percent subsidy) that will be made in case the participant wins the lottery. The respondent has the option to adjust

her choice as many times as she likes before confirming it.

Facebook like button: Facebook offers "like"-buttons as easily implementable plug-ins which e.g. external users can integrate in their websites. As of 2018, Facebook does not allow external users to capture clicks on "like"-buttons. My aim was to construct a measure which proxies the respondent's actual decision to give a Facebook-"like" as closely as possible. At the same time I wanted to protect the individual respondent's data from facebook in case she was not interested in giving a "like".[2] In order to achieve both objectives, I implemented the following workaround: On the relevant page, survey respondents are told that if they want to give a "like" to the American Association of University Women (AAUW) on facebook, they should click on a button that says "Give facebook like to AAUW". There is also a notification that when clicking on the button, Facebook will link the respondent to her Facebook profile and will likely draw data such as her IP-address. When a respondent clicks on the square, two things happen: First, the click is captured in my data and second, the Facebook plug-in, i.e. the actual "like"-button is loaded and displayed. At the same time, the respondent is notified that one additional click on the newly appeared "like"-button is necessary in order to complete the "like".

The cost of this behavioral measure in terms of time and effort is comparatively low, it just takes two clicks to express one's support. The idea was to capture a different dimension of political behavior than the preceding donation decision or the petition before: Due to the "like" being visible to one's social network on Facebook, at least when standard settings are chosen, respondents' motivation to give a "like" may be to raise awareness and to motivate others in their social networks to follow their own opinion, thereby supporting the NGO's mission in a non-financial way (Brandtzaeg and Haugstveit, 2014).

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[2]It is possible that the Facebook plug-in already captures user data at the moment it is loaded, i.e. without a user clicking on it. This is legal in the US as of 2018. Nevertheless, I wanted to inform survey participants so that they could make a voluntary decision knowing that they might share data with facebook.

B.3 Screenshots of Survey Elements

Figure A.1: Welcome page of main survey

Figure A.2: Matrix question in main survey

Figure A.3: Welcome page of follow-up survey

Figure A.4: Matrix question in follow-up survey

The topic of this question is (pre-tax) wages of men and women in the United States. This question is not about how you think things should be but how you think they actually are.

Please think of all individuals in the U.S., men and women, who are 45 years old, hold a Bachelor degree and work 40 hours per week as full-time employees. How many dollars, do you think, does a woman with these characteristics make on average for every $100 made by a man with the same characteristics?

If your estimate deviates by less than $2 from the value found by the most recent American Community Survey as of the beginning of 2018 you will receive a bonus of $2.

Please use the slider at the bottom of this page to communicate your estimate.

Wages in the US

Here is the true value for the wage difference you have just estimated:

In fact, for every **$100** earned by a **male**, a **female** earned **$74** when both are 45 years old, hold a Bachelor degree and work 40 hours per week as employees.

Wages in the U.S.

Thank you for your estimate!

The actual value is based on the most recent available wage statistics from the American Community Survey as of January 2018. The American Community Survey is regularly conducted by the U.S. Census Bureau among households in the United States.

Figure A.5: Screenshots of survey screen.

Notes: The screenshots show the prior belief elicitation (left panel) and the information treatment (right panel). Both correspond to the incentivized condition and to the "high wage gap"-treatment (T^{74}).

Figure A.6: Screenshots of real online petitions on the White House Petition Website: Petition I (left panel) and Petition II (right panel).

Notes: The screenshots show the real online petitions on the White House Petition Website: Petition I (left panel) and Petition II (right panel).

B.4 Summary statistics, sample balance and attrition

Table B.1: Representativeness of the sample in terms of targeted variables

	Mean: Sample	Mean: U.S. population age 18-65
Northeast	0.18	0.18
Midwest	0.21	0.21
South	0.37	0.38
West	0.24	0.24
Age	42.06	41.05
Female	0.50	0.50
Male	0.50	0.50
Employed (full- or part-time or self-emp.)	0.71	0.71
Not employed (unempl., student, out of labor force)	0.29	0.29
Household inc $\leq$ \$50,000	0.39	0.39
Household inc. $>$ \$50,000	0.61	0.61
Democrat	0.33	0.33
Republican	0.27	0.26
Independent (including Indep. leaning Dem. or Rep.)	0.39	0.37

Notes: Sample size for the left-hand column: N = 4,065 (full sample). The right-hand column is based on 18-65-year-old individuals in the ACS 2016 except for political orientation which is based on Pew Research Center (2018).

Table B.2: Main survey: Integrity of randomization

	(1) Full Sample	(2) Treatment Groups	(3) Control Group	(4) T^{74}	(5) T^{94}	(6) Prior incentivized	(7) Prior not incentivized	(8) p-value (2) = (3)	(9) p-value (4) = (5)	(10) p-value (6) = (7)
						Main survey				
Female	0.52	0.52	0.53	0.52	0.51	0.51	0.53	0.574	0.561	0.463
Democrat	0.44	0.44	0.46	0.45	0.44	0.45	0.44	0.431	0.625	0.394
Republican	0.36	0.36	0.35	0.36	0.37	0.36	0.36	0.414	0.698	0.846
Independent	0.18	0.18	0.17	0.18	0.18	0.17	0.18	0.858	0.943	0.419
Other pol. orientation	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.619	0.832	0.132
Prior belief	83.36	83.38	83.30	83.34	83.43	83.25	83.51	0.918	0.915	0.704
Northeast	0.18	0.18	0.17	0.18	0.18	0.18	0.18	0.731	0.689	0.776
Midwest	0.21	0.21	0.21	0.20	0.22	0.20	0.22	0.948	0.295	0.275
South	0.37	0.37	0.38	0.38	0.37	0.38	0.37	0.649	0.694	0.486
West	0.24	0.24	0.24	0.24	0.24	0.24	0.23	0.884	0.844	0.610
Age 18-24	0.12	0.11	0.14	0.11	0.11	0.13	0.11	0.012	0.710	0.068
Age 25-34	0.24	0.24	0.24	0.24	0.24	0.24	0.24	0.734	0.883	0.810
Age 35-44	0.21	0.22	0.19	0.22	0.22	0.21	0.22	0.058	0.766	0.405
Age 45-54	0.21	0.20	0.22	0.21	0.20	0.20	0.21	0.420	0.538	0.606
Age 55-65	0.22	0.23	0.22	0.22	0.23	0.22	0.23	0.606	0.862	0.738
Has children	0.53	0.54	0.51	0.53	0.54	0.53	0.53	0.123	0.594	0.779
Log household income	10.90	10.91	10.88	10.89	10.93	10.90	10.90	0.323	0.118	0.884
Associate degree or more	0.61	0.61	0.60	0.61	0.61	0.61	0.61	0.601	0.940	0.995
Full-time employee	0.53	0.53	0.53	0.51	0.55	0.51	0.55	0.822	0.040	0.005
Part-time employee	0.11	0.11	0.11	0.12	0.09	0.12	0.09	0.852	0.012	0.001
Self-employed	0.08	0.07	0.08	0.07	0.07	0.08	0.07	0.346	0.904	0.160
Unemployed	0.06	0.06	0.06	0.05	0.06	0.06	0.06	0.850	0.282	0.933
Student	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.04	0.05	0.04	0.561	0.026	0.353
Out of labor force	0.19	0.19	0.17	0.19	0.19	0.18	0.19	0.352	0.994	0.756
Observations	4065	3031	1034	1531	1500	2294	1771			

Notes: Columns 1 to 8 show sample means for the denoted subgroups. Column 8 shows p-values from t-tests comparing the mean of each variable between subjects that received any information treatment to those that received none. A joint F-test based on regressing a dummy that takes on value one for respondents in T^{74} or T^{94} on all covariates gives a p-value of 0.87. Column 9 shows p-values from t-tests comparing the mean of each variable between subjects that were in T^{74} as compared to those in T^{94}. The p-value of a joint F-test when regressing a dummy for T^{74} on all covariates, omitting the pure control group is 0.35. Column 10 shows p-values from t-tests comparing the mean of each variable between subjects who received an incentive for a correct (prior) estimate of the size of the wage gap to those who did not receive any incentive. The p-value of a joint F-test when regressing the dummy for incentivized prior beliefs on all covariates is 0.15.

Figure A.7: Sample balance in terms of prior belief distributions

Notes: Data base: All observations. Graph shows the distribution of respondents' prior beliefs about the baseline wage statistic (women's average wage for every \$100 made by a man when both are 45 years old, hold a Bachelor degree and work 40 hours per week as full-time employees). The three panels show the prior belief distribution separately by across the three treatment groups T^{74}, T^{94} and the pure control group. For better readability, beliefs are winsorized at 59 and 101 in all subfigures. The median prior belief is 81 in all three conditions. The mean prior belief is statistically similar across the three conditions, too corresponding to 82.0, 82.4 and 82.1 respectively. A Kolmogorov Smirnov test confirms that the distribution of beliefs is statistically similar between T^{74} and T^{94} (p=0.65).

Table B.3: Follow-up survey: Attrition and integrity of randomization

	Follow-up survey (Eligible respondents only)					
	(1) In Stage II sample	(2) Not in Stage II sample	(3) T^{74} (Stage II sample)	(4) T^{94} (Stage II sample)	(5) p-value (1) = (2)	(6) p-value (3) = (4)
Female	0.50	0.53	0.51	0.49	0.110	0.489
Democrat	0.42	0.45	0.41	0.43	0.061	0.419
Republican	0.38	0.35	0.39	0.37	0.106	0.584
Independent	0.18	0.18	0.18	0.18	0.777	0.727
Other pol. orientation	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.735	0.990
Prior belief	83.80	83.15	83.94	83.66	0.426	0.841
Northeast	0.19	0.17	0.20	0.19	0.129	0.736
Midwest	0.21	0.21	0.22	0.20	0.929	0.692
South	0.35	0.38	0.35	0.36	0.097	0.657
West	0.24	0.23	0.24	0.25	0.548	0.848
Age 18-24	0.05	0.14	0.05	0.05	0.000	0.906
Age 25-34	0.20	0.27	0.20	0.20	0.000	0.976
Age 35-44	0.20	0.23	0.20	0.21	0.094	0.569
Age 45-54	0.21	0.20	0.22	0.20	0.316	0.493
Age 55-65	0.34	0.16	0.33	0.34	0.000	0.848
Has children	0.58	0.51	0.58	0.58	0.000	0.867
Log household income	10.92	10.90	10.91	10.94	0.460	0.499
Associate degree or more	0.61	0.62	0.60	0.62	0.588	0.467
Full-time employee	0.50	0.55	0.49	0.51	0.016	0.452
Part-time employee	0.10	0.11	0.13	0.08	0.591	0.014
Self-employed	0.09	0.07	0.09	0.08	0.058	0.294
Unemployed	0.06	0.06	0.05	0.06	0.927	0.427
Student	0.02	0.06	0.02	0.02	0.000	0.643
Out of labor force	0.24	0.16	0.22	0.25	0.000	0.332
Observations	1105	1926	554	551		

Notes: 36% of all eligible respondents participated in the follow-up survey. Columns 1 to 4 show sample means for the denoted subgroups. Column 5 shows p-values from t-tests comparing the mean of each variable between subjects who took part in the follow-up survey to those who were eligible but did not. The p-value of a joint F-test when regressing a dummy for participation in the follow-up survey on all covariates, omitting the pure control group, is <0.01. Column 6 shows p-values from t-tests comparing the mean of each variable between follow-up subjects that were in T^{74} as compared to those in T^{94}. The p-value of a joint F-test when regressing a dummy for T^{74} on all covariates in the follow-up sample is 0.91.

C Additional correlational evidence

C.1 People's beliefs about the gender wage gap

Figure A.8: Distribution of prior beliefs about women's relative wages

Notes: Data base: Both waves. Panel A: All observations (N=4,065), Panel B: non-incentivized priors (N=1,771), Panel C: priors incentivized based on ACS (N=1,142), Panel D: priors incentivized based on CPS (N=1,152). All graphs show the distribution of respondents' prior beliefs about the baseline wage statistic referring to women's average wage for every \$100 made by a man when both are 45 years old, hold a Bachelor degree and work 40 hours per week as full-time employees. Beliefs range between 0 and 200 by experimental design. The median belief corresponds to 81 in all four panels. The mean belief is 83.5 in panel a, 83.6 in Panel b, 83.7 in Panel c and 83.0 in Panel d. For better readability, beliefs in all figures are winsorized at 59 and 101.

Table C.1: Gender and partisan differences in beliefs about the gender wage gap compared to other politically relevant beliefs

Authors, year	Belief	Fem - male difference	Left - right difference	Left-right measure	Source of results
This paper	Women's wages as percentage of men's when both are 45 years old, hold a Bachelor's degree and work 40 hours per week on average	-.21 st.dev.	-.21 st.dev	Left (Right): Democrat (Republican) or Independent leaning Democrat (Republican)	Specification and sample restriction in Table 2, Column 3, N=2294
Alesina et al. (2018b)	Likelihood of remaining in bottom quintile of income distribution as adult when born into bottom quintile	insignif.	.24 st.dev	Left (Right): views on economic issues liberal (conservative) or very liberal (conservative)	Data_Experiment_Waves_BC.dta (available from replication files) US control group, N=1,730
	Likelihood of moving to the top or second quintile of income distribution as adult when born into bottom quintile	insignif.	-.14 st.dev.		
Haaland and Roth (2021)	Number of times resumes with black-sounding names had to be sent out in a correspondence study to receive one callback for a job interview	insignif.	.49 st.dev.	Left (Right): Non-Republican (Republican)	Figure 2 and information on standard deviation in beliefs provided by the authors

Notes: This table reports estimated gender and partisan differences in quantitative beliefs in politically relevant domains. All reported magnitudes are significant at least at the five percent level.

C.2 Correlates of behavioral measures of policy demand

Table C.2: Correlates of behavioral proxies of demand for government intervention

	Intention to sign Petition I	Intention to sign Petition II	Amount donated to supportive NGO	Facebook Like
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Panel A: Gender and political orientation				
Democrat	0.297***	-0.118***	21.375***	0.008
	(0.036)	(0.023)	(6.788)	(0.029)
Female	0.046	-0.068***	-11.384*	-0.007
	(0.032)	(0.019)	(5.990)	(0.026)
Panel B: Prior belief about wage gap				
Prior (z-scored)	-0.145***	0.087***	-2.337	-0.042
	(0.032)	(0.022)	(6.045)	(0.027)
Panel C: Prior, gender, pol. orientation				
Prior (z-scored)	-0.103***	0.072***	-0.778	-0.041
	(0.032)	(0.021)	(6.058)	(0.028)
Democrat	0.284***	-0.109***	21.275***	0.002
	(0.036)	(0.023)	(6.815)	(0.030)
Female	0.036	-0.061***	-11.464*	-0.011
	(0.032)	(0.019)	(5.996)	(0.026)
Panel D: Full set of controls				
Prior (z-scored)	-0.111***	0.077***	-1.159	-0.034
	(0.033)	(0.021)	(6.097)	(0.029)
Democrat	0.280***	-0.099***	22.567***	0.020
	(0.037)	(0.023)	(6.998)	(0.030)
Female	0.042	-0.062***	-9.393	-0.017
	(0.033)	(0.019)	(6.248)	(0.027)
Mean outcome (control group)	0.52	0.10	82.02	0.13
Observations	921	921	921	702

Notes: Data base: Pure control group, restricted to observations with prior beliefs between the 5th and the 95th percentile of the distribution. In Column 4 the sample is also restricted to respondents who self-report to have a Facebook account. The dependent variable in Column 1 (Column 2) is a dummy taking on value 1 for respondents who expressed their intention to sign Petition I (Petition II) in the survey. The dependent variable in Column 3 is the respondent's donation decision, ranging from \$0 to \$300. Column 4 looks at respondents' clicks on a Facebook "like"-button. Additional controls are included for census region, age group, parental status, log of total household income, two-year college degree or more, full-time employee, part-time employee, self-employed, unemployed, student, political orientation "other" and Independent. Democrats include Independents leaning Democrat. Robust standard errors are in parenthesis. Significant at *10%, **5%, ***1%.

(a) Panel A: Propensity to sign a petition

(b) Panel B: Donations made to an NGO

Figure A.9: Behavioral outcomes (pure control group)

Notes: (a): Data base: Control group, count data on the number of actual signatures of real online petitions. Evidence by gender was elicited in Wave A and B, evidence by political orientation in Wave A only. The height of the bars represents the fraction of respondents per group that signed Petition I (Petition II) in favor of increasing (decreasing) requirements for companies to report employee wages by gender to a public authority. Whiskers show 95% confidence intervals around the estimated fractions. Democrats include self-identified Democrats as well as Independents leaning Democrat. Non-Democrats refers to all remaining respondents. P-values refer to two-sided petition-specific proportion tests. (b): Data base: Control group, both waves. The graph shows the mean amounts donated to an NGO that lobbies for policies to support women in the labor market. Donations range between 0 and 300. Whiskers show the 95% confidence intervals calculated from a regression of the amount donated on a dummy for male or for Republican, using robust standard errors. Democrats include Independents leaning Democrat.

D Additional causal evidence

D.1 First stage treatment effect

Table D.1: Treatment effect on posterior beliefs

	High school Degree	Age 25	Same occupation	Parent	Same job	Posterior (pooled)
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Panel A: Avg. Treatment Effect						
T^{74}	-13.0***	-11.4***	-13.7***	-11.9***	-15.4***	-12.9***
	(1.4)	(1.1)	(1.1)	(1.5)	(1.3)	(0.6)
Observations	676	670	657	523	496	3022
Panel B: Het by Gender						
T^{74}	-13.0***	-9.7***	-14.3***	-9.9***	-14.6***	-12.1***
	(1.9)	(1.7)	(1.7)	(2.1)	(2.3)	(0.9)
T^{74} * Female	-0.1	-3.4	1.1	-4.0	-1.6	-1.6
	(2.8)	(2.3)	(2.5)	(2.9)	(2.9)	(1.2)
p-value [T^{74} + T^{74} x Female]	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
Female	-1.7	-0.3	-0.1	0.6	-3.4*	-0.8
	(1.9)	(1.5)	(1.6)	(2.0)	(1.9)	(0.8)
Observations	676	670	657	523	496	3022
Panel C: Het by pol. attitude						
T^{74}	-14.2***	-10.8***	-17.5***	-9.6***	-15.8***	-13.8***
	(2.4)	(1.8)	(1.8)	(2.1)	(2.7)	(1.0)
T^{74} * Democrat	3.1	0.5	6.0**	-5.1	0.1	1.6
	(3.2)	(2.6)	(2.4)	(3.1)	(3.4)	(1.3)
p-value [T^{74} + T^{74} x Democrat]	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
Democrat	-1.7	0.3	-1.9	2.1	-1.1	-0.7
	(2.1)	(1.7)	(1.5)	(2.5)	(2.4)	(0.9)
T^{74} * Independent	-1.5	-4.6	8.6**	0.9	1.1	1.3
	(4.3)	(3.1)	(3.6)	(4.0)	(3.8)	(1.6)
p-value [T^{74} + T^{74} x Independent]	0.000	0.000	0.003	0.014	0.000	0.000
Independent	1.8	2.5	-3.6**	0.3	-0.3	-0.3
	(3.2)	(2.4)	(1.8)	(2.6)	(2.7)	(1.1)
Observations	662	660	643	513	487	2965

Notes: Data base: Treatment groups, both waves. In Panel C, respondents with "other" political orientation are excluded. The dependent variables correspond to posterior beliefs about females' wages as a percentage of male wages proxied by five different wage statistics, one of which each respondent was randomly assigned to estimate. The five wage statistics are similar to the baseline wage statistic employed in the prior belief elicitation (referring to 45-year-old employees with a Bachelor's degree who work 40 hours per week) but differ in one of the following (randomized) characteristics: i) high school degree (elicited in wave A only) i) age 25 (wave A only), iii) working in the same occupation group (wave A only), iv) parent (wave B only) and v) working in the same job for the same employer (wave B only). Beliefs take on values between 0 and 200. Columns 1-3 (4-5) are based on wave A (wave B), whereas Column 6 pools observations from Columns 1-5 and includes dummies to control for the specific wage statistic. Additional controls in Panels A and B: Democrat (including Independents leaning Democrat) and Independent. Additional controls in Panels A and C: gender. Additional controls in all panels: survey wave, prior belief, census region, age group, has children, log household income, has at least 2-year college degree, full-time, part-time employment, self-employed, student, unemployed, "other" political orientation. Robust standard errors are in parenthesis. Significant at *10%, **5%, ***1%.

Figure A.10: Distribution of posterior beliefs in both treatment groups

Notes: Data base: Both treatment groups, Wave A and B, except for nine observations for which posterior beliefs were not recorded due to a bug in the survey. The figure shows the distribution of posterior beliefs in T^{74} (upper panel) and in T^{94} (lower panel). The vertical lines in the top and the bottom panel mark the treatment values of 74 and 94, respectively. Each respondent was randomly asked about her posterior belief about one out of five posterior wage statistics. The five subfigures in the upper as well as the lower panel show the beliefs of respondents assigned to these five groups. The leftmost subfigure in both panels shows the distribution of posterior beliefs about females' relative wages compared to males' when both are 25 years old, hold a Bachelor's degree and work on average 40 hours per week (Wave A only, N=673, incentivized). The second subfigure from the left refers to corresponding beliefs about the group of 45-year-olds with a high school degree working 40 hours per week (Wave A, N= 678, incentivized). The subfigure in the middle refers to beliefs about 45-year-old men and women with a Bachelor's degree who work in the same broad occupation group (using the occupation classification of the Bureau of Labor Statistics) for an average of 40 hours per week (Wave A, N=661, incentivized). The second subfigure from the right refers to beliefs about 45-year-olds with a Bachelor's degree working 40 hours per week in the same job for the same employer (Wave B, N=523, not incentivized). The rightmost subfigure in each panel refers to females' relative wages in the group of 45-year-olds with a Bachelor's degree who work 40 hours per week and have at least one child living in the same household with them (Wave B, N=496, incentivized). Relative wages refer to women's average wage for every \$100 made by a man who is comparable along the described dimensions. Beliefs originally range between 0 and 200 by experimental design and are winsorized at 49 and 101 for better readability.

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D.2 Treatment effect on behavior

Figure A.11: Donation Decision

Notes: Data base: Treatment groups, both waves. The graph shows, by treatment group, the mean amounts donated to an NGO that lobbies for policies to support women in the labor market. Donations range between 0 and 300. Whiskers show the 95% confidence interval calculated from a regression of the outcome on an indicator for T^{94} using robust standard errors and controlling for survey wave, prior belief, census region, age group, parental status, log of household income, associate degree or more, full-time, part-time, self-, and unemployed, student and, when possible, gender and political orientation. Democrats include Independents leaning Democrat.

(a) Petition I (Increase reporting)

(b) Petition II (Decrease reporting)

Figure A.12: Signatures on real online petitions

Notes: Data base: Count data on the number of actual signatures of real online petitions made by respondents, both treatment groups. The height of the bars represents the fraction of respondents per group that signed Petition I (Petition II) in favor of increasing (decreasing) requirements for companies to report employee wages by gender to a public authority. Whiskers show the 95% confidence intervals around the estimated fractions. Results for the full sample (N=3,031) for men (N=1,467) and for women (N=1,564) are based on both wave A and wave B. Results for Democrats (including Independents leaning Democrat) (N=897) and Non-Democrats (N=1,115) are based on wave A only. P-values refer to two-sided petition-specific proportion tests.

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D.3 Magnitude of the main treatment effect

This section refers to Section 4.2 of the main paper, where I discuss the magnitude of the main estimated effect of beliefs about the gender wage gap on policy demand. It presents details on the 2SLS specification, the estimated elasticities of policy demand to beliefs, and the back-of-the-envelope calculation discussed in Section 4.2.

Table 5, Panel C of the main paper presents 2SLS results. The idea is to scale the reduced form treatment effect by the first-stage effect on respondents' beliefs about females' relative wages. I apply the following IV regression framework:

$$1^{st} Stage : \text{Belief}_i = \pi_0 + \pi_1 T_i^{74} + \Theta' X_i + u_i \tag{3}$$

$$2^{nd} Stage : Y_i = \gamma_0 + \gamma_1 \widehat{\text{Belief}}_i + \Gamma' X_i + \epsilon_i \tag{4}$$

In the first stage, I instrument respondents' z-scored beliefs about females' relative wages, i.e. the first-stage outcome corresponds to the dependent variable in Table 5, Panel A, column 2 in the main paper. Random assignment to T^{74} or T^{94}, respectively, serves as exogenous instrument. In the second stage, I estimate the causal effect of beliefs about the females' relative wages on specific policy demand. The vector of controls, X_i includes census region, age group, has children, log household income, has at least 2-year college degree, full-time, part-time employment, self-employed, unemployed, student, prior belief, survey wave, Independent and "other" political orientation.

Monotonicity should hold because one would expect a given respondent assigned to T^{74} to perceive a higher (or at least not a lower) wage gap than she would in a counterfactual scenario in which she had been assigned to T^{94}. The first-stage F-statistic corresponds to 41.26, lending credence to instrument relevance. Regarding the exclusion restriction, one should note that beliefs do not exist in isolation but generally consist of several related aspects. For instance, shifting beliefs about the wage gap among 30-year-olds will have spillover effects on beliefs about the wage gap among 40-year-olds. Therefore, the IV approach should be carefully interpreted as a scaling exercise that allows us to better understand the magnitude of estimated effects.[3]

Finally, in a back-of-the-envelope calculation, I estimate the share of the Democrat-Republican difference and the gender difference in policy demand that can be explained by the causal effect of differences in (prior) beliefs about the size of the wage gap between these groups. Based on the pure control group and on the four measures of the wage gap for which beliefs were incentivized, I find that the average Democrat-Republican gap in these beliefs corresponds to $4.5 and the average gender gap corresponds to $1.8 (Table D.2, Panel A). The treatment effect on the same four beliefs amounts to $13.36 (Panel B) on average.

Table D.3 illustrates the actual back-of-the-envelope calculation based on the two mea-

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[3]For another application of a 2SLS framework to interpret the order of magnitude of causal belief effects, see Haaland and Roth (2020) who study the effect of beliefs about the labor market impact of immigrants on preferences over immigration policy.

Table D.2: Correlates of beliefs and treatment effect on beliefs about the wage gap

	Outcome: (Incentivized) beliefs about the size of the wage gap				
	(1) Age 25	(2) HS degree	(3) Same occu.	(4) Parent	(5) Average
Panel A: Correlations					
Female	-0.97 (3.53)	-0.20 (4.71)	-5.13* (2.75)	-0.90 (2.73)	-1.80
Democrat	-5.02 (3.61)	-5.89 (5.39)	-3.11 (3.36)	-4.02 (3.14)	-4.50
Observations	164	149	181	269	763
Panel B: Treatment effect					
T^{74}	-11.39*** (1.15)	-12.99*** (1.40)	-13.70*** (1.15)	-15.38*** (1.34)	-13.36
Observations	670	676	657	496	2,499

Notes: Sample for Panel A: Pure control group. Sample for Panel B: Treatment groups. Columns 1-3 are based on wave A, columns 4 and 5 on wave B. The dependent variables correspond to posterior beliefs about females' wages as a percentage of male wages proxied by four different wage statistics. The four wage statistics are similar to the baseline wage statistic employed in the prior belief elicitation (referring to 45-year-old employees with a Bachelor's degree who work 40 hours per week) but differ in one of the following (randomized) characteristics: age 25 (column 1), high school degree (column 2), working in the same occupation group (column 3), parent (column 4). Beliefs take on values between 0 and 200. Additional controls in Panel A: Independent and "other" pol. orientation. Additional controls in Panel B: census region, age group, has children, log household income, has at least 2-year college degree, full-time, part-time employment, self-employed, unemployed, student, prior belief, Democrat, Independent and "other" pol. orientation. Democrats include Independents leaning Democrat. Robust standard errors are in parenthesis. Significant at *10%, **5%, ***1%.

sures of specific policy demand for which the estimated treatment effect is significant, namely demand for affirmative action programs and for equal pay legislation. For each of the two measures, I scale the treatment effect such that it corresponds in size to the difference in beliefs between Democrats and Republicans (females and males). Subsequently, I compare the resulting causal effect to the difference in policy demand in the control group between Democrats and Republicans (females and males). I find that the causal effect of Democrat-Republican (female-male) differences in beliefs about the size of the wage gap can account for between 5% and 6% of the Democrat-Republican (4% and 9% of the female-male) difference in policy demand, depending on the specific policy. Note that these shares correspond

Table D.3: Back-of-the-envelope calculations

	Affirmative Action	Equal Pay Legislation	Average
Treatment effect T^{74}	0.112	0.115	0.11
Dem. - Rep. difference in policy demand (control group)	0.760	0.685	0.72
Predicted causal effect of Dem. - Rep. difference in prior belief about the wage gap	4.51/13.36 * 0.112 = 0.038	4.51/13.36 * 0.115 = 0.039	0.04
Share of Dem. - Rep. difference in policy demand that is explained by causal effect of Dem. - Rep. diff. in prior	0.038 / 0.760 = 0.05	0.039/0.685 = 0.06	**0.06**
Gender difference in policy demand (control group)	0.176	0.338	0.26
Predicted causal effect of gender difference in prior belief about the wage gap	1.80/13.36 * 0.112 = 0.015	1.80/13.36 * 0.115 = 0.015	0.02
Share of gender difference in policy demand that is explained by causal effect of gender diff. in prior belief	0.015/0.176= 0.09	0.015/0.338= 0.04	**0.07**

Notes: The block titled "Treatment effect T^{74}" replicates the effect of the information treatment on the two self-reported measures of demand for specific government intervention with statistically significant treatment effects. In the remaining two blocks, I conduct the following steps separately for the political and the gender dimension: First, I list the raw difference in policy demand, based on the control group. In the subsequent row, I calculate the predicted causal effect on policy demand resulting from the raw difference in beliefs about the gender wage gap. Finally, I calculate the share of the raw difference in policy demand that is accounted for by the predicted causal effect of the raw difference in prior beliefs.

to upper bounds and that in the case of demand for wage transparency, public subsidies for child care and gender quotas the causal effect of beliefs plays an even smaller role in explaining differences in policy demand across the political spectrum and between genders.

D.4 Additional evidence from the follow-up survey

If the obfuscation of the link between the main and the follow-up survey did not work and experimenter demand effects were a concern, respondents might try to guess the political orientation of the experimenter based on the treatment information received during the main survey and answer accordingly in the follow-up survey. Table D.4 illustrates the treatment effect on a set of placebo outcomes that are unrelated to gender differences in wages but related to wage inequality between high- and low-skilled employees. Reassuringly, there is no significant treatment effect on these outcomes. In addition, Table D.5 shows that there is no systematic selection into the follow-up survey based on the initial treatment effect in the main survey.

Table D.4: Follow-up survey: No treatment effect on placebo outcomes

	Wage differences btw high- and low-skilled are a prob.	Low skilled workers's wages are fair	Government should support low-skilled workers more
	(1)	(2)	(3)
T^{74}	-0.031	-0.042	0.042
	(0.059)	(0.056)	(0.057)
Female	0.199***	-0.050	0.066
	(0.062)	(0.058)	(0.059)
Democrat	0.411***	-0.333***	0.597***
	(0.067)	(0.063)	(0.066)
Observations	1105	1105	1105

Notes: Data base: Follow-up sample (treatment groups only), both waves. Outcomes are based on ratings of agreement with three statements on wage differences between high- and low-skilled employees. They are z-scored using the mean and standard deviation of the full follow-up sample. Additional controls: survey wave, census region, age group, parenthood, log of total household income, at least a two-year college degree, full-time, part-time employment, self-employed, student, unemployed, prior belief, Independent and "other" political orientation. Democrats include Independents leaning Democrat. Robust standard errors are in parenthesis. Significant at *10%, **5%, ***1%.

Table D.5: Follow-up survey: No role for attrition

	Posterior belief about fem.rel.wage (percent)	Gender differences in wages are a problem	Women's wages are fair	Government should mitigate gender wage gap	Statutory affirmative action	Stricter equal pay legislation
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Panel A: Main results						
T^{74}	-12.955***	0.422***	-0.304***	0.243***	0.112***	0.115***
	(0.594)	(0.035)	(0.034)	(0.035)	(0.034)	(0.035)
Female	-1.623***	0.297***	-0.342***	0.309***	0.179***	0.237***
	(0.615)	(0.036)	(0.035)	(0.036)	(0.035)	(0.036)
Democrat	0.048	0.656***	-0.435***	0.803***	0.669***	0.618***
	(0.705)	(0.040)	(0.041)	(0.041)	(0.040)	(0.040)
Observations	3022	3031	3031	3031	3031	3031
Panel B: Main results (follow-up sample)						
T^{74}	-13.044***	0.418***	-0.352***	0.236***	0.157***	0.098
	(1.085)	(0.059)	(0.058)	(0.059)	(0.059)	(0.060)
Female	-1.934*	0.222***	-0.210***	0.277***	0.174***	0.243***
	(1.107)	(0.060)	(0.061)	(0.059)	(0.059)	(0.061)
Democrat	0.447	0.707***	-0.481***	0.819***	0.741***	0.626***
	(1.239)	(0.066)	(0.067)	(0.066)	(0.068)	(0.068)
Observations	1102	1105	1105	1105	1105	1105
Panel C: Follow-up results						
T^{74}	-10.668***	0.186***	-0.110**	0.183***	0.009	0.096
	(1.177)	(0.057)	(0.055)	(0.057)	(0.078)	(0.079)
Female	-2.292*	0.272***	-0.121**	0.174***	0.150*	0.197**
	(1.248)	(0.060)	(0.058)	(0.058)	(0.080)	(0.083)
Democrat	0.554	0.547***	-0.430***	0.686***	0.583***	0.642***
	(1.319)	(0.065)	(0.065)	(0.063)	(0.091)	(0.091)
Observations	1089	1105	1105	1105	606	606

Notes: This table shows that there is no systematic selection into the follow-up survey based on the treatment response in the main survey. The sample in Panel A is based on the main survey, treatment groups, both waves. Panel B shows results from the main survey, but the sample is restricted to those who participated in the follow-up. Panel C reports the results from the follow-up survey based on the follow-up sample. Outcomes are z-scored using the mean and standard deviation in the control group in Panels A and B and using the mean and standard deviation of the full follow-up sample in Panel C. Additional controls: survey wave, census region, age group, has children, log household income, has at least 2-year college degree, full-time, part-time employment, student, self-employed and unemployed, prior belief, Independent and "other" political orientation. Democrats include Independents leaning Democrat. Missing observations in Column 1 are due to a bug in the survey software that inhibited the recording of posterior beliefs in a few cases. Robust standard errors are in parenthesis. Significant at *10%, **5%, ***1%.

D.5 Compliant subpopulation

Table D.6: First stage, reduced form and 2SLS: Heterogeneity by interest in topic

	Posterior belief about fem. rel. wage	Gender diff. in wages are large	Gender diff. in wages are a problem	Policy Demand Index
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Panel A: First Stage/Reduced Form				
T^{74}	-13.928***	0.645***	0.492***	0.070**
	(0.632)	(0.042)	(0.042)	(0.028)
T^{74} x read	4.167**	-0.187**	-0.249***	-0.039
	(1.756)	(0.090)	(0.089)	(0.068)
p-value $[T^{74} + T^{74}$ x read]	0.000	0.000	0.002	0.625
Observations	2788	2796	2796	2796

	Policy Demand Index		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Panel B: 2SLS			
$\widehat{\text{Perception}}$	-0.005**	0.108***	0.142***
	(0.002)	(0.042)	(0.053)
$\widehat{\text{Perception}}$ x read	0.002	-0.042	-0.017
	(0.007)	(0.138)	(0.251)
p-value $[\widehat{\text{Perception}} + \widehat{\text{Perception}}$ x read]	0.642	0.618	0.613
Perception measure	Posterior belief about wage gap	Gender diff. in wages are large	Gender diff. in wages are a problem
Observations	2788	2796	2796

Notes: Data base: Treatment groups, both waves, sample restricted to those who reported that they either read or did not read about gender differences in wages in the three weeks prior to taking the survey. 235 individuals who reported "not sure" are not included. T^{74} is a dummy that takes value one for those who received the high wage gap-treatment and zero for those who received the low wage gap treatment. The variable "read" is a dummy that takes value one for those who self-report that they read about the gender wage gap at some point in the three weeks prior to taking the survey. Panel A reports reduced first stage effects of T^{74} on (raw) posterior beliefs ranging from 0 to 200 (column 1), z-scored perceptions of the wage gap as large (column 2) and as a problem (column 3). Column 4 shows reduced form evidence. The dependent variable is a summary index, following Anderson (2008), over demand for the following specific policies: Gender quotas for leading positions, statutory affirmative action programs such as training and outreach programs targeted at women, equal pay legislation, wage transparency within companies, a website where gender-related wage statistics of large companies are published, and publicly financed subsidies to childcare. Panel B reports 2SLS results with the first stage corresponding to the regressions reported in the same column of Panel A. In the second stage, the outcome variable corresponds to the same summary index of policy demand used in Panel A, column 4. Additional controls in all regressions: survey wave, prior belief, census region, age group, has children, log household income, has at least 2-year college degree, full-time, part-time employment, self-employed, student, unemployed, Independent and "other" political orientation. Democrats include Independents leaning Democrat. Robust standard errors are in parenthesis. Significant at *10%, **5%, ***1%.

D.6 Alternative specifications

In this section I consider several alternative specifications to further explore the updating of respondents' beliefs and policy demand in the two treatment arms compared to the pure control group, which has not received any information. The alternative specifications allow me i) to study the role of prior beliefs in the response of policy demand to information and ii) to study potential differences between the effects of the two signals on respondents' beliefs and attitudes. In addition, these exercises serve as robustness checks of my main findings to using alternative sources of variation.

D.6.1 The role of prior beliefs

I start with the following specification, which allows me to shed light on the role of prior beliefs in driving the effect of the two treatments:

$$
\begin{aligned}
Y_i =& \beta_0 T_i^{74} \text{ x } (74{\leq}\text{Prior}{\leq}94)_i + \beta_1 T_i^{94} \text{ x } (74{\leq}\text{Prior}{\leq}94)_i + \\
& \beta_2 T_i^{74} \text{ x } (\text{Prior} < 74)_i + \beta_3 T_i^{94} \text{ x } (\text{Prior} < 74)_i + \\
& \beta_4 T_i^{94} \text{ x } (\text{Prior} < 74)_i + \beta_5 T_i^{94} \text{ x } (\text{Prior} > 94)_i + \Theta^T X_i + u_i
\end{aligned}
$$

where $(74{\leq}\text{Prior}{\leq}94)$, $(\text{Prior} < 74)$ and $(\text{Prior} > 94)$ are dummies indicating the range into which respondent i's prior belief falls.

Table D.7, Column 1 documents that in all three prior belief brackets respondents adjust their beliefs about females' relative wages in the expected directions in response to either of the treatments, and the effect sizes increase with the distance of the treatment signal from the prior belief bracket. In other words, respondents exposed to the same information converge in terms of their beliefs about the wage gap. The results are more nuanced for general perceptions related to the wage gap: Respondents with "moderate" beliefs between 74 and 94, who make up roughly 60 percent of the sample, react significantly and in the expected direction in response to either treatment (Columns 2-4). Those with more "extreme" prior beliefs below 74 and above 94, however, react significantly only to signals that imply a very large information shock, i.e. the signal implied by T^{74} for those with very high prior beliefs and the signal implied by T^{94} for those with very low prior beliefs about women's relative wages.

Table D.8 reports corresponding results for policy demand. As expected, individuals with moderate beliefs between 74 and 94 significantly decrease their demand for statutory affirmative action programs (Column 2) and for equal pay legislation (Column 3) in response to T^{94}. There is no significant reaction in response to T^{74} for the same group, even though the coefficient estimates go into the expected direction.

One potential explanation for why the treatment effect on policy demand of T94 compared to the control group is more pronounced than the effect of T74 compared to the control group lies in the differential composition of the compliant subpopulations for the two treatments.

For instance, the compliant subpopulation for T^{74} consists of individuals with relatively high prior beliefs about females' relative wages, among which Republicans are over-represented (Section 3). At the same time, Republicans' policy demand is inelastic to their beliefs about the gender wage gap (Section 5). Conversely, in the case of T^{94} the "first stage" updating of beliefs in response of the treatment is likely driven by individuals with relatively low beliefs about females' relative wages to start with. In this group, Democrats are over-represented, whose policy demand is more elastic to beliefs (Section 5).

In Section D.6.2 below, I use a specification that explicitly accounts for the size of the information shock received by each respondent. It sheds light on whether T^{94} per se has a stronger effect on policy demand than T^{74} or whether respondents react similarly to an information shock of a given size, regardless of whether the source of this shock is information about a high or a small gender wage gap.

Regardless of the more pronounced reaction to T^{94} compared to T^{74} in Table D.8, I find that the *difference* between the two treatment effects is highly significant for respondents' demand for affirmative action and equal pay legislation, and for the summary index (Column 7), confirming robustness of my main estimated treatment effect for the group with moderate prior beliefs.

Next, I focus on respondents with "extreme" beliefs below 74 for whom we would, ex ante, expect a decrease in policy demand in response to both information treatments. Empirically, there is no significant decrease in the demand for affirmative action, nor for equal pay legislation (Columns 2 and 3). Similarly, for those with extremely optimistic beliefs above 94 we do not observe the expected increase in demand for specific policies. One plausible reason for the muted treatment response of respondents with extreme prior beliefs about the wage gap is that beliefs are linked to other characteristics that determine how individuals react to information. The patterns I document are consistent with a world in which those with extreme beliefs to start with are at the same time "dogmatic" about their policy views.

Table D.7: Treatment effect on beliefs about the wage gap and related perceptions

	Posterior belief	Gender diff. in wages are large	Gender diff. in wages are a problem	Government should promote gender wage equality	Index (2)-(4)
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
T^{74} x (74 ≤ prior ≤ 94)	-6.831***	0.299***	0.180***	0.101**	0.194***
	(0.664)	(0.044)	(0.044)	(0.047)	(0.040)
T^{94} x (74 ≤ prior ≤ 94)	7.677***	-0.421***	-0.314***	-0.193***	-0.306***
	(0.656)	(0.050)	(0.050)	(0.052)	(0.046)
p-value [T^{74} x (74 ≤ prior ≤ 94) = T^{94} x (74 ≤ prior ≤ 94)]	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
T^{74} x (prior < 74)	4.598***	0.056	0.028	0.006	0.030
	(1.728)	(0.067)	(0.063)	(0.066)	(0.057)
T^{94} x (prior < 74)	16.382***	-0.336***	-0.279***	-0.180***	-0.260***
	(1.799)	(0.071)	(0.067)	(0.070)	(0.062)
p-value [T^{74} x (prior < 74) = T^{94} x (prior < 74)]	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
T^{74} x (prior > 94)	-10.604***	0.344***	0.347***	0.131	0.256***
	(2.367)	(0.109)	(0.104)	(0.106)	(0.097)
T^{94} x (prior > 94)	-0.610	-0.068	0.075	-0.002	-0.014
	(2.015)	(0.107)	(0.105)	(0.103)	(0.096)
p-value [T^{74} (prior > 94) = T^{94} x (prior > 94)]	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.15	0.00
p-value [T^{74} x (74 ≤ prior ≤ 94) = T^{74} x (prior < 74)]	0.00	0.00	0.04	0.24	0.02
p-value [T^{74} x (74 ≤ prior ≤ 94) = T^{74} x (prior > 94)]	0.12	0.70	0.14	0.79	0.56
p-value [T^{74} x (prior < 74) = T^{74} x (prior > 94)]	0.00	0.02	0.01	0.31	0.04
p-value [T^{94} x (74 ≤ prior ≤ 94) = T^{94} x (prior < 74)]	0.00	0.32	0.67	0.88	0.55
p-value [T^{94} x (74 ≤ prior ≤ 94) = T^{94} x (prior > 94)]	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.10	0.01
p-value [T^{94} x (prior < 74) = T^{94} x (prior > 94)]	0.00	0.04	0.00	0.15	0.03
Control group mean (74 ≤ prior ≤ 94)	83.00	0.05	0.10	0.03	0.05
	605	607	607	607	607
Control group mean (prior < 74)	67.57	0.40	0.36	0.31	0.35
	225	226	226	226	226
Control group mean (prior > 94)	103.45	-0.62	-0.73	-0.47	-0.58
	200	201	201	201	201
Observations	4052	4065	4065	4065	4065

Notes: Data base: Full sample, both waves. The dependent variable in Column 1 ranges between 0 and 200, those in Columns 2-4 are z-scored, using the mean and standard deviation in the control group. The dependent variable in Column 5 is a summary index over the outcomes in Columns 2-4. T^{74} (T^{94}) is a dummy that takes on value one for those who received the high wage gap (low wage gap) treatment. (prior < 74) ((prior > 94)) is a dummy that takes value one if the respondent's prior belief is below 74 (above 94), and zero otherwise. (74 ≤ prior ≤ 94) takes the value one for all remaining respondents. Additional controls: (prior < 74), (prior > 94), (74 ≤ prior ≤94), census region, age group, has children, log household income, has at least 2-year college degree, full-time, part-time employment, self-employed, unemployed, student, prior belief, survey wave, Independent and "other" political orientation. Democrats include Independents leaning Democrat. Robust standard errors are in parenthesis. Significant at *10%, **5%, ***1%.

Table D.8: Treatment effect on the demand for specific policies

	Introduce Gender quotas	Increase Affirm. action	Increase Equ. pay legislation	Introduce Wage transp.	Introduce Public website	Increase Publ. child care	Index
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
T^{74} x ($74 \leq$ prior ≤ 94)	0.047	-0.009	0.050	-0.062	0.066	-0.070	0.002
	(0.050)	(0.048)	(0.048)	(0.067)	(0.072)	(0.050)	(0.034)
T^{94} x ($74 \leq$ prior ≤ 94)	-0.038	-0.109**	-0.112**	-0.088	-0.068	-0.083*	-0.078**
	(0.051)	(0.050)	(0.048)	(0.067)	(0.081)	(0.050)	(0.035)
p-value [T^{74} x ($74 \leq$ prior ≤ 94) = T^{94} x ($74 \leq$ prior ≤ 94)]	0.07	0.02	0.00	0.64	0.09	0.76	0.01
T^{74} x (prior < 74)	0.085	0.069	0.117	-0.190*	-0.012	-0.025	0.027
	(0.080)	(0.080)	(0.086)	(0.103)	(0.125)	(0.079)	(0.056)
T^{94} x (prior < 74)	0.081	-0.080	0.019	-0.232**	0.059	-0.000	-0.010
	(0.080)	(0.080)	(0.086)	(0.104)	(0.119)	(0.079)	(0.055)
p-value [T^{74} x (prior < 74) = T^{94} x (prior < 74)]	0.95	0.03	0.18	0.64	0.57	0.74	0.48
T^{74} x (prior > 94)	0.044	0.115	-0.003	0.026	0.048	-0.062	0.018
	(0.099)	(0.100)	(0.100)	(0.138)	(0.155)	(0.100)	(0.073)
T^{94} x (prior > 94)	0.013	0.024	0.032	0.234*	-0.035	-0.035	0.033
	(0.096)	(0.098)	(0.097)	(0.135)	(0.140)	(0.098)	(0.071)
p-value [T^{74} (prior > 94) = T^{94} x (prior > 94)]	0.72	0.29	0.69	0.05	0.59	0.75	0.81
p-value [T^{74} x ($74 \leq$ prior ≤ 94) = T^{74} x (prior < 74)]	0.68	0.39	0.49	0.29	0.59	0.62	0.70
p-value [T^{74} x ($74 \leq$ prior ≤ 94) = T^{74} x (prior > 94)]	0.98	0.26	0.63	0.56	0.92	0.95	0.84
p-value [T^{74} x (prior < 74) = T^{74} x (prior > 94)]	0.74	0.72	0.36	0.20	0.76	0.77	0.92
p-value [T^{94} x ($74 \leq$ prior ≤ 94) = T^{94} x (prior < 74)]	0.20	0.76	0.18	0.23	0.38	0.37	0.29
p-value [T^{94} x ($74 \leq$ prior ≤ 94) = T^{94} x (prior > 94)]	0.64	0.22	0.18	0.03	0.84	0.66	0.15
p-value [T^{94} x (prior < 74) = T^{94} x (prior > 94)]	0.58	0.41	0.92	0.01	0.61	0.78	0.63
Control group mean ($74 \leq$ prior ≤ 94)	-0.04	0.03	0.08	0.05	0.10	0.02	0.03
	607	607	607	299	308	607	607
Control group mean (prior < 74)	0.23	0.22	0.06	0.23	0.05	0.12	0.15
	226	226	226	111	115	226	226
Control group mean (prior > 94)	-0.15	-0.34	-0.35	-0.46	-0.38	-0.24	-0.29
	201	201	201	88	113	201	201
Observations	4065	4065	4065	2510	1555	4065	4065

Notes: Data base: Full sample, both waves. (Column 4 is based on wave A only, column 5 is based on wave B only.) The dependent variables in Columns 1-6 are z-scored, using the mean and standard deviation in the control group. The dependent variable in Column 7 is a summary index over the outcomes in Columns 1-6. T^{74} (T^{94}) is a dummy that takes on value one for those who received the high wage gap (low wage gap) treatment. (prior < 74) ((prior > 94)) is a dummy that takes value one if the respondent's prior belief is below 74 (above 94), and zero otherwise. ($74 \leq$ prior ≤ 94) takes the value one for all remaining respondents. Additional controls: (prior < 74), (prior > 94), ($74 \leq$ prior ≤ 94), census region, age group, has children, log household income, has at least 2-year college degree, full-time, part-time employment, self-employed, unemployed, student, prior belief, survey wave, Independent and "other" political orientation. Democrats include Independents leaning Democrat. Robust standard errors are in parenthesis. Significant at *10%, **5%, ***1%.

D.6.2 Information shocks and policy demand

Specification Next, I estimate the following alternative specification which examines how changes in beliefs and policy demand depend on the information shock an individual receives:

$$Y_i = \beta_0 (Signal - Prior)_i + \beta_1 Prior_i + \Theta^T X_i + u_i$$

Pooling both treatment groups and the pure control group, this specification combines the variation generated by the two treatments into one single, continuous variable denoted (Signal – Prior), which captures the "information shock" a respondent receives. It is defined as (74 – prior) for respondents assigned to T^{74}, as (94 – prior) for those assigned to T^{94}, and as 0 for those assigned to the pure control group, which does not receive any information. Since the information shock negatively depends on prior beliefs, which are not randomly assigned, I control for the respondent's prior. The vector X_i includes the same set of control variables I include throughout the paper. The main coefficient of interest, β_0, is expected to be positive when the outcome, Y_i, corresponds to posterior beliefs about women's relative wages and negative for all other outcomes such as policy demand.[4]

Robustness of main results Tables D.9 and D.10 report the results for perceptions of the gender wage gap and for policy demand, respectively. Table D.9, Panel A, Column 1 indicates a learning rate of 60 percent, i.e. for each unit of deviation between prior belief and signal, respondents update by .6 units, on average, towards the provided signal. There are similar effects on general perceptions related to the gender wage gap (Columns 2-4 of Table D.9). Moreover, the information shock has significant effects on the respondents' demand for affirmative action and equal pay legislation (Columns 2 and 3 of Table D.10), in line with my baseline results reported in Section 4.2 of the paper.

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[4]Due to the sensitivity of the linear specification to outliers, I focus on respondents with prior beliefs between the 5th and 95th percentile of the distribution, as I do throughout the correlational regressions reported in the paper. When I instead keep the full sample, the estimated effects become smaller and more noisily measured, in line with the finding that those with extreme prior beliefs react less to information (Table D.8). The results are not sensitive to the exact cutoffs I choose to define outliers.

Table D.9: Treatment effect on beliefs about the wage gap and related perceptions

	Posterior belief about fem. rel. wage (percent)	Gender differences in wages are large	Gender differences in wages are a problem	Gov. should promote gender wage equality	Index (2)-(4)
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Panel A: Baseline Specification					
(Signal – Prior)	0.595***	-0.028***	-0.021***	-0.012***	-0.020***
	(0.026)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.001)
Prior	17.998***	-0.989***	-0.851***	-0.603***	-0.802***
	(0.688)	(0.045)	(0.042)	(0.042)	(0.039)
Observations	3596	3607	3607	3607	3607
Panel B: Interaction with T^{74} and T^{94}					
(Signal – Prior) x T^{74} (a)	0.597***	-0.030***	-0.023***	-0.013***	-0.021***
	(0.040)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.002)
(Signal – Prior) x T^{94} (b)	0.594***	-0.026***	-0.020***	-0.011***	-0.018***
	(0.034)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
p-value [(a) – (b) = 0]	0.955	0.154	0.356	0.628	0.295
Prior	18.003***	-0.995***	-0.855***	-0.605***	-0.806***
	(0.681)	(0.045)	(0.043)	(0.043)	(0.040)
Observations	3596	3607	3607	3607	3607
Panel C: Interact. with pos./neg. Signal					
(Signal – Prior) x **1**(Signal – Prior > 0) (a)	0.629***	-0.029***	-0.024***	-0.013***	-0.022***
	(0.037)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
(Signal – Prior) x **1**(Signal – Prior < 0) (b)	0.551***	-0.026***	-0.018***	-0.010***	-0.017***
	(0.045)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
p-value [(a) – (b) = 0]	0.220	0.323	0.099	0.304	0.217
Prior	17.982***	-0.988***	-0.850***	-0.603***	-0.802***
	(0.687)	(0.045)	(0.043)	(0.042)	(0.039)
Observations	3596	3607	3607	3607	3607

Notes: Data base: Full sample except five percent outliers in terms of prior beliefs at the top and bottom of the distribution respectively, both waves. The outcome in Column 1 is the raw posterior belief about females' relative wages, pooling across the different versions of the posterior wage statistic employed in the survey. The different versions are similar to the baseline wage statistic employed in the prior belief elicitation (referring to 45-year-old employees with a Bachelor's degree who work 40 hours per week) but differ in one of the following (randomized) characteristics: i) high school degree i) age 25, iii) parent, iv) working in the same occupation group, and v) working in the same job for the same employer. The dependent variables in Columns 2-4 are z-scored, using the mean and standard deviation in the control group. The dependent variable in Column 5 is a summary index over the outcomes in Columns 2-4, following Anderson (2008). T^{74} (T^{94}) is a dummy that takes on value one for those who received the high wage gap (low wage gap) treatment. (Signal - Prior) is defined as (74 - prior) for those respondents assigned to T^{74}, as (94 - prior) for those assigned to T^{94}, and as 0 for those assigned to the pure control group which does not receive any information. Prior corresponds to the respondent's prior belief about women's relative wages in percent of men's wages. **1**(Signal - Prior > 0) is a dummy that takes the value one whenever the information signal exceeds the respondent's prior and zero otherwise. Conversely, **1**(Signal - Prior < 0) is a dummy that takes the value one whenever the respondent's prior is higher than the information signal. Additional controls: census region, age group, has children, log household income, has at least 2-year college degree, full-time, part-time employment, self-employed, unemployed, student, prior belief, survey wave, Democrat (including Independents leaning Democrat), Independent and "other" political orientation. Robust standard errors are in parenthesis. Significant at *10%, **5%, ***1%.

Table D.10: Treatment effect on the demand for specific policies

	Introduce Gender quotas	Increase Affirm. action	Increase Equ. pay legislation	Introduce Wage transp.	Introduce Public website	Increase Publ. child care	Index
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Panel A: Baseline Specification							
(Signal − Prior)	-0.001	-0.005***	-0.005***	-0.001	-0.004	-0.000	-0.002**
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.001)
Prior	-0.248***	-0.319***	-0.269***	-0.225***	-0.224***	-0.198***	-0.245***
	(0.042)	(0.042)	(0.043)	(0.055)	(0.065)	(0.042)	(0.030)
Observations	3607	3607	3607	2223	1384	3607	3607
Panel B: Interaction with T^{74} and T^{94}							
(Signal − Prior) x T^{74} (a)	-0.002	-0.005**	-0.005**	0.000	-0.004	-0.001	-0.003
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.002)	(0.002)
(Signal − Prior) x T^{94} (b)	0.000	-0.004**	-0.005***	-0.002	-0.004	0.000	-0.002
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.001)
p-value [(a) − (b) = 0]	0.531	0.864	0.974	0.578	0.942	0.785	0.858
Prior	-0.251***	-0.320***	-0.269***	-0.221***	-0.223***	-0.199***	-0.246***
	(0.042)	(0.042)	(0.043)	(0.056)	(0.066)	(0.043)	(0.031)
Observations	3607	3607	3607	2223	1384	3607	3607
Panel C: Interact. with pos./neg. Signal							
(Signal − Prior) x $\mathbf{1}$(Signal − Prior > 0) (a)	0.001	-0.004*	-0.007***	-0.004	-0.008**	-0.001	-0.003**
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.002)	(0.002)
(Signal − Prior) x $\mathbf{1}$(Signal − Prior < 0) (b)	-0.003	-0.006**	-0.003	0.003	0.001	0.001	-0.001
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.005)	(0.003)	(0.002)
p-value [(a) − (b) = 0]	0.301	0.551	0.335	0.114	0.111	0.662	0.519
Prior	-0.249***	-0.319***	-0.269***	-0.222***	-0.224***	-0.197***	-0.245***
	(0.042)	(0.042)	(0.043)	(0.055)	(0.066)	(0.042)	(0.030)
Observations	3607	3607	3607	2223	1384	3607	3607

Notes: Data base: Full sample except five percent outliers in terms of prior beliefs at the top and bottom of the distribution respectively, both waves. Column 4 is based on wave A only, column 5 is based on wave B only because the underlying survey items were elicited in only one of the waves, respectively. The dependent variables in Columns 1-6 are z-scored, using the mean and standard deviation in the control group. The dependent variable in Column 7 is a summary index over the outcomes in Columns 1-6, following Anderson (2008). T^{74} (T^{94}) is a dummy that takes on value one for those who received the high wage gap (low wage gap) treatment. (Signal - Prior) is defined as (74 - prior) for those respondents assigned to T^{74}, as (94 - prior) for those assigned to T^{94}, and as 0 for those assigned to the pure control group which does not receive any information. Prior corresponds to the respondent's prior belief about women's relative wages in percent of men's wages. $\mathbf{1}$(Signal - Prior > 0) is a dummy that takes the value one whenever the information signal exceeds the respondent's prior and zero otherwise. Conversely, $\mathbf{1}$(Signal - Prior < 0) is a dummy that takes the value one whenever the respondent's prior is higher than the information signal. Additional controls: census region, age group, has children, log household income, has at least 2-year college degree, full-time, part-time employment, self-employed, unemployed, student, prior belief, survey wave, Democrat (including Independents leaning Democrat), Independent and "other" political orientation. Robust standard errors are in parenthesis. Significant at *10%, **5%, ***1%.

Symmetry of treatment responses to T^{74} and to T^{94} Next, I examine whether, conditional on the size of the information shock, its effects differ between the high wage gap signal, T^{74}, and the low wage gap signal, T^{94}. In Panel B of Tables D.9 and D.10 I estimate the following specification:

$$Y_i = \beta_0(Signal - Prior)_i T_i^{74} + \beta_1(Signal - Prior)_i T_i^{94} + \beta_2 Prior + \Theta^T X_i + u_i$$

I find that learning about the size of the gender wage gap from an information shock of a given size (Table D.9, Panel B, Column 1) and updating of general perceptions (Columns 2-4) are similar for respondents who received the T^{74} signal and those who received the T^{94} signal. Also, the effects on the demand for affirmative action and equal pay legislation do not differ between the two treatments (Table D.10, Panel B, Columns 2-3). Finally, the effect on the summary index for policy demand is similarly large for both treatments (Column 7), although more noisily measured.

Symmetry of treatment response to positive and negative information shocks Finally, I examine whether there is an asymmetric response to positive and negative information shocks. I estimate the following specification:

$$
\begin{aligned}
Y_i = &\beta_0(Signal - Prior)_i \mathbf{1}(Signal - Prior > 0)+ \\
&\beta_1(Signal - Prior)_i \mathbf{1}(Signal - Prior < 0) + \beta_2 Prior + \Theta^T X_i + u_i
\end{aligned}
$$

where $\mathbf{1}$(Signal - Prior > 0) and $\mathbf{1}$(Signal – Prior < 0) are indicators for positive and negative information shocks, respectively.

The updating of beliefs and general perceptions is quantitatively similar for positive and negative information shocks (Table D.9, Panel C, Columns 1-4). There is no clear pattern for policy demand, as reported in Table D.10, Panel C: Changes in the demand for affirmative action are driven by respondents who received a negative shock (Column 2), whereas changes in the demand for stricter equal pay legislation (Column 4) as well as the overall effect on the summary index (Column 7) are driven by those who received positive shocks, but the estimated differences between the groups are noisily measured. In addition, positive shocks decrease the demand for a public website on which gender-related wage statistics of large companies are published, while negative shocks have no effect (Column 6).

D.7 Correction for multiple hypothesis testing

To adjust for multiple inference, I follow Anderson (2008) in applying a combined approach: First, I group the main outcome variables of interest into families and test for an overall treatment effect in a highly conservative way. Second, I test for a treatment effect on disaggregated outcomes within each family, allowing for more power in exchange for a small number of Type I errors. In the remainder of this section I describe the implementation of this combined approach and the intuition behind it.

First, I start by reducing the number of outcomes by creating summary indices for the three main pre-specified families of outcomes: i) people's general perceptions related to the gender wage gap, ii) self-reported demand for specific policies and iii) beliefs about the prevalence of external factors that may be seen as drivers of the wage gap. When constructing an index, I weight its inputs by the inverse of the covariance matrix of the standardized outcomes such that outcomes that are highly correlated with each other receive less weight, while outcomes that are uncorrelated, and thus contain new information, receive more weight. Even though the set of outcomes is now reduced, I am still testing multiple hypothesis. I adjust for this fact by applying the conservative method of **family-wise error rate (FWER)** control. Its idea is to fix the probability of *any* Type I error similar to a simple Bonferroni correction but with higher statistical power due to the following differences: First, an algorithm – the free step-down resampling methodology (Westfall and Young, 1993) – computes the exact probability of rejecting any true null hypothesis whereas a Bonferroni correction delivers an upper bound. Second, when a hypothesis is rejected, the algorithm removes it from the family being tested, increasing the power of the remaining tests. Third, it takes into account the dependence between outcomes. For instance, when all outcomes are perfectly correlated, the FWER-adjusted p-values and regular p-values will be identical. In general, FWER-adjusted p-values can be interpreted similar to standard p-values except that they reflect the probability that *at least one* true null hypothesis is rejected across the three regressions, when the corresponding null-hypothesis is rejected. As Table D.11 illustrates, the overall treatment effect is robust to FWER-adjustment.

Second, for the larger sets of more disaggregated outcomes, I control for the **false discovery rate (FDR)** or the *proportion* of rejections within the relevant family of outcomes that are "false discoveries", i.e. Type I errors (Benjamini et al., 2006). The method delivers sharpened q-values, which can be interpreted similar to regular p-values. They reflect the proportion of Type I errors as a share of all rejections of null hypotheses within the family that has to be allowed, such that the respective null hypothesis can still be rejected. Compared to FWER-control, this method allows a small number of Type I errors in exchange for more statistical power. I present sharpened q-values for all tests of a treatment effect on the disaggregated variables within each of the three main families of outcomes. The corresponding results are reported in Tables 5 and 8 in the main paper.

Table D.11: Robustness of main treatment effect to FWER control

	Outcome: Summary Index over...		
	(1) General Perceptions	(2) Spec. Policy Demand	(3) Perceived Imp. Reasons
T[74]	0.417***	0.056**	0.111***
Standard p-value	(0.000)	(0.025)	(0.001)
FWER-adjusted p-value	[0.000]	[0.013]	[0.002]
Female	0.277***	0.203***	0.251***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Democrat	0.665***	0.594***	0.442***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Observations	3031	3031	2012

Notes: Data base: Treatment groups, both waves. Column 3 is based on wave A only. The table demonstrates the robustness of the overall treatment effect on the pre-specified main sets of outcomes to family-wise error rate (FWER)-control (Anderson, 2008). I apply FWER control to the following summary indices: i) general perceptions of gender differences in wages and unspecific policy demand (Column 1), ii) self-reported demand for specific policies (Column 2) and iii) the perceived prevalence of impersonal reasons that potentially drive the gender wage gap (Column 3). Additional controls: census region, age group, has children, log household income, has at least 2-year college degree, full-time, part-time employment, self-employed and unemployed, student, prior belief, Independent and "other" political orientation. Democrats include Independents leaning Democrat. Robust p-values are in parenthesis and FWER-adjusted p-values are in squared brackets. Significant at *10%, **5%, ***1%.

E Additional evidence on mechanisms

E.1 The role of self-interest

Figure A.13: Heterogeneity by gender x age

Notes: Data base: All observations, wave A and B. Left panel: male respondents; right panel: female respondents. The bars represent control group means and the point estimates represent treatment effects (i.e. differences in means between T^{74} and T^{94}), including 90% confidence intervals. Dependent variable: Summary index over self-reported demand for the following specific policies: Gender quotas for leading positions, statutory affirmative action programs such as training and outreach programs targeted at women, equal pay legislation, wage transparency within companies, a website where gender-related wage statistics of large companies are published, and publicly financed subsidies to childcare. Additional controls for the treatment effects are survey wave, prior belief, census region, age group, has children, log household income, has at least 2-year college degree, full-time, part-time employment, self-employed and unemployed, student, Democrat (including Independents leaning Democrat), Independent and "other" political orientation.

E.2 The role of other beliefs and preferences

Beliefs about the size of the gender wage gap do have a meaningful and significant effect on policy demand. Quantitatively, however, this causal effect cannot account for the strong disagreement about the optimal degree of government intervention between Democrats and Republicans and between females and males.

In Table E.1, I compare the role of beliefs about the size of the wage gap to the role of other beliefs and preferences in accounting for the political polarization around government intervention to support women in the labor market. Using the summary index of self-reported demand for specific policies as the outcome of interest, I start by documenting that Democrats and females in the control group are, on average, 0.6 and 0.3 of a standard deviation more in favor of specific government intervention to support women in the labor market than Republicans and men, respectively (Column 1). In a correlational exercise,

people's quantitative beliefs about the size of the wage gap account for a mere 2% of the political and 7% of the gender difference in policy demand (Column 2).

I subsequently account for measures of people's beliefs about potential costs of government intervention to different stakeholders: In column 3, I add a summary index of beliefs about the costs of polices that support women in the labor market in the form of monetary costs for the public and bureaucracy and distortions created for companies. In column 4, I add a summary index of beliefs about adverse effects for men through the advancement of women in the labor market and through policies that actively support women. Accounting for either of these measures in addition to prior beliefs brings the partisan difference in policy demand down to two thirds and the gender difference to around 60 to 75% of its initial value, respectively. Both measures of perceived costs of government intervention have a large and direct impact on respondents' policy demand, i.e. a one standard deviation increase in either of them leads to a decrease of around 25% of a standard deviation in policy demand. The interaction effects with prior beliefs about females' relative wages point in the expected direction, i.e. higher perceived costs mute the effect of the perceived size of the wage gap on policy demand. The interaction terms are small and noisy, however, whereas the direct effect of perceived costs is precisely estimated.

Next, I separately control for aspects of people's preferences that may potentially be important in shaping policy views in the gender context. I find that people's gender role attitudes, i.e. whether they prefer a traditional division of labor between men and women, accounts for some of the polarization in policy demand (Column 5), but the coefficient becomes insignificant when I jointly control for all additional measures of beliefs and preferences (Column 7). A measure of people's preferred role for the government in the context of inequality, in contrast, is highly predictive for policy demand. It is based on respondents' agreement with the statement "Some people are tall, others are short. Some people are smart, others not. Inequalities exist and it is not the government's job to compensate for them." A one standard deviation increase in agreement with this statement is associated with a decrease of almost 0.3 standard deviations in policy demand (Column 6). Maybe surprisingly, this effect is independent of beliefs about the wage gap. The unaccounted partisan gap and the gender gap in policy demand shrink to around 65% of their original values when I account for this measure in addition to prior beliefs about the wage gap.

Together, the described measures of beliefs and preferences have substantial explanatory power for the political polarization around gender policies, i.e. they account for around half of the partisan and the gender difference in policy demand. Moreover, the total share of explained variation increases by 100% through the full set of controls, whereas beliefs about the size of the wage gap lead to an increase in the R^2 of only 1% compared to the simple specification in Column 1.

Given that this exercise is only correlational, it should be interpreted cautiously. Also, it does not imply that individuals do not take the extent of gender-based wage inequality into account. In fact, the causal evidence presented in Section 4 illustrates that there is a meaningful and statistically significant role of beliefs about the wage gap in shaping people's

Table E.1: Importance of other beliefs and preferences

	Policy Demand (Index)						
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Democrat	0.614***	0.599***	0.414***	0.393***	0.522***	0.401***	0.305***
	(0.071)	(0.071)	(0.071)	(0.073)	(0.072)	(0.068)	(0.070)
Female	0.311***	0.290***	0.233***	0.185***	0.244***	0.207***	0.174***
	(0.061)	(0.063)	(0.058)	(0.058)	(0.061)	(0.060)	(0.056)
Prior belief		-0.152**	-0.154**	-0.156**	-0.150**	-0.080	-0.114*
(z-scored)		(0.068)	(0.064)	(0.063)	(0.068)	(0.063)	(0.059)
High costs			-0.249***				-0.118***
			(0.038)				(0.045)
High costs x prior			0.095				0.085
			(0.069)				(0.102)
Adverse effects men				-0.271***			-0.124**
				(0.038)			(0.049)
Adv. effects x prior				0.075			-0.044
				(0.071)			(0.108)
Traditional gender role attitudes					-0.147***		0.002
					(0.036)		(0.038)
Traditional GRA x prior					0.126*		0.097
					(0.064)		(0.074)
No role for government						-0.287***	-0.175***
						(0.033)	(0.036)
No role for gov. x prior						0.018	-0.075
						(0.063)	(0.079)
R²	0.21	0.22	0.33	0.33	0.27	0.34	0.40
Observations	478	478	478	478	478	478	478

Notes: Data base: Wave B, pure control group. The sample is restricted to respondents with prior beliefs about female's relative wages between the 5th and the 95th percentile of the distribution. The outcome variable is a summary index over the six self-reported z-scored measures of demand for specific policies (see the notes of Table 1 for the underlying survey items). Additional controls: Independent and "other" political orientation. Democrats include Independents leaning Democrat, the omitted group is Republicans, including Independents leaning Republican. The measure of prior beliefs introduced in column 2 is a z-scored measure of beliefs about the baseline wage statistic referring to the wage of a female for every $100 made by a male, when both are 45-year-old full-time employees with a Bachelor's degree. Column 3 introduces a z-scored summary index of beliefs about i) monetary costs, ii) distortions and iii) bureaucracy caused by government intervention to support women in the labor market. Column 4 introduces a z-scored summary index of beliefs that i) an advancement of women negatively affects men in the labor market and ii) policies that support women in the labor market lead to a reverse discrimination of men. Column 5 introduces a z-scored measure of preference for traditional gender roles and Column 6 introduces a z-scored measure of a preference for a limited role of the government in the context of inequality. Robust standard errors are in parenthesis. Significant at *10%, **5%, ***1%.

demand for some policies. However, the correlational evidence is consistent with a world in which people's deeply-rooted preferences and world views are more important than their beliefs about factual inequality in shaping their demand for specific government intervention. This finding is in line with concurrent evidence on an important role for stable "cultural" values in shaping policy views (Fernández, 2011).

F   Additional results on beliefs and their origins

Table F.1: Incentivized vs. unincentivized beliefs about the wage gap

	Outcome variable: Prior belief about gender wage gap					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Incentive	-0.375	1.614*	-0.469	1.798	1.631*	1.811
	(0.689)	(0.908)	(1.006)	(1.302)	(0.912)	(1.305)
Incentive x male		-3.992***		-4.738**	-3.885***	-4.492**
		(1.358)		(2.002)	(1.365)	(2.000)
Incentive x Republican			0.438	-0.705		-0.823
			(1.547)	(2.016)		(2.029)
Inc. x male x Republican				2.664		2.570
				(3.083)		(3.100)
Male	6.025***	8.268***	6.025***	8.214***	8.692***	9.070***
	(0.675)	(1.027)	(0.675)	(1.511)	(1.086)	(1.624)
Republican	4.485***	4.480***	4.233***	5.205***	4.472***	4.704***
	(0.792)	(0.791)	(1.178)	(1.450)	(0.791)	(1.557)
Male x Republican				-2.105		-2.283
				(2.305)		(2.521)
Constant	66.784***	65.619***	66.890***	66.034***	65.954***	66.300***
	(5.383)	(5.397)	(5.420)	(5.488)	(5.414)	(5.520)
Baseline controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Control for response time x gender	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes
Control for resp. time x (Repub. and gender x Repub.)	No	No	No	No	No	Yes
Observations	4065	4065	4065	4065	4065	4065

Notes: Data base: Full sample, both waves. The dependent variable is the prior belief about females' relative wages, ranging between 0 and 200 (mean=83,5; median=81). "Incentive" is a dummy that takes value one whenever the prior belief was incentivized with a $2 accuracy incentive. Additional control variables in all columns are survey wave, census region, age group, has children, log household income, has at least 2-year college degree, full-time, part-time employment, student, self-employed and unemployed, Independent and "other" political orientation. Republicans include Independents leaning Republican. The omitted group, Democrats, include Independents leaning Democrat. Columns 3, 4 and 6 also control for "Incentive x Independent" and "Incentive x other political orientation". Columns 4 and 6 in addition control for "Male x Independent", "Male x other pol. orientation", "Incentive x male x Indep." and "Incentive x male x other pol. orientation." The additional control for response time in Columns 5 and 6 is based on the time, in seconds, the respondent spent on the prior belief elicitation during the survey (5th percentile corresponds to 18 seconds, 95th percentile corresponds to 3 minutes, the maximum is 46 minutes). In Column 5, this measure is interacted with the male-dummy, in Column 6 with the male-dummy, with a dummy for Republican, Independent, other pol. orientation, the interaction of male x Republican, of male x Independent and of male x other pol orientation. Robust standard errors are in parenthesis. Significant at *10%, **5%, ***1%.

Figure A.14: Willingness to pay for additional information.

Notes: Data base: Control group, wave A. The left bars, titled "Supportive Information", reflect the number of times (between 0 and 3) respondents choose information when faced with the choice to either receive information from a "source that favors government intervention to support women's progress in the labor market" or a payoff increase of $0.01/$0.3/$0.5. The bars to the right, titled "Traditional Information", reflect the corresponding willingness to pay (WTP) for information from a source that "favors a traditional role for women as caregivers for the family and argues against related government intervention". Whiskers show the 95% confidence interval calculated from a regression of WTP on an indicator for male/Republican using robust standard errors. Republicans (Democrats) include Independents leaning Republican (Democrat).

G Compliance with the pre-analysis-plan

G.1 Description of minor deviations from the pre-analysis-plan

- **Additional data collection:** In the pre-analysis-plan (PAP) as of 31st of August 2018 I had pre-specified a follow-up response rate of at least 50%. Due to internal problems at the survey company I collaborated with, only 25% were achieved. The survey company offered to collect a second wave of data through a partner company in compensation, which I accepted. In an addendum to the PAP as of 21st of November 2018 I set out the details. The results replicate remarkably well. **Tables G.3 and G.4** show the main treatment effect on general perceptions and self-reported policy demand separately by wave. **Tables G.6 and G.7** show the numbers of signatures on real online petitions and **Table G.5** replicates the main results based on the follow-up survey by wave. Further results by wave are available on request.

- **Oversampling of women, adjustment through probability weights:** In wave B, the age group 18-24 was filled by female respondents to a large degree due to a mistake of the survey company. Sticking to the pre-specified quotas would have implied a gender imbalance across age groups. I decided to allow for a minor increase in the total sample size to boost the number of young males. The youngest age group in wave B consists of 181 women and 78 men, and I use probability weights of 0.6298 and 1.4615, respectively, to account for the fact that 114 observations per gender were pre-specified. A similar but smaller imbalance occurred in the age group 55-65, resulting in a final 191 female and 163 male observations and probability weights of 0.8691 and 1.0184, respectively. Tables G.1 and G.2 show that dropping the probability weights leaves the main results literally unaffected.

- **Correlational analysis without outliers:** I exclude prior beliefs below the 5th and above the 95th percentile of the distribution from the correlational analysis in Section 3. The cutoffs correspond to a relative wage of female employees of 50 and 116 percent of male wages, respectively. **Tables G.8, G.9 and G.10** replicate the analysis based on the pre-specified full sample. Bin scatter plots in Figure A.15 illustrate how outliers lead to considerable attenuation, given the sensitivity of OLS to outliers.

- **Heterogeneity by political orientation:** In had pre-specified to report heterogeneity in the treatment effect by Democrats vs. Non-Democrats. It turned out that the treatment response of Independents is quite different from that of Republicans, making Non-Democrats a heterogeneous group. I therefore use a more differentiated specification, based on Republicans as the baseline group, and report separate differential effects for Democrats and Independents. The pre-specified, more aggregated regression results are reported in Table G.11.

G.2 Main results unweighted

Table G.1: Treatment effect on general views without probability weights

	Post. belief about fem. rel. wage (0-200)	Post. belief about fem. rel. wage (z-scored)	Gender diff. in wages are large	Gender diff. in wages are a problem	Government should mitigate gender wage gap	Perception Index ((2)-(4))
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
T[74]	-13.009***	-0.662***	0.598***	0.421***	0.244***	0.417***
	(0.590)	(0.030)	(0.035)	(0.035)	(0.035)	(0.032)
Sharpened q-value			[0.001]	[0.001]	[0.001]	
Female	-1.608***	-0.082***	0.232***	0.296***	0.306***	0.275***
	(0.619)	(0.032)	(0.036)	(0.036)	(0.036)	(0.033)
Democrat	-0.008	-0.000	0.523***	0.653***	0.795***	0.661***
	(0.701)	(0.036)	(0.040)	(0.040)	(0.040)	(0.037)
Observations	3022	3022	3031	3031	3031	3031

Notes: This Table shows the same specification as Table 5, Panel A without probability weights.

Table G.2: Treatment effect on policy demand without probability weights

	Introduce gender quotas	Statutory affirmative action	Stricter equal pay legislation	Wage transp. within companies	Introduce reporting website	Increase subsidies to child care	Policy demand index
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
T[74]	0.055	0.116***	0.122***	-0.015	0.114*	0.012	0.062**
	(0.035)	(0.034)	(0.035)	(0.042)	(0.061)	(0.035)	(0.025)
Sharpened q-value	[0.131]	[0.002]	[0.002]	[0.322]	[0.085]	[0.322]	
Female	0.255***	0.180***	0.236***	0.197***	0.307***	0.110***	0.203***
	(0.036)	(0.035)	(0.036)	(0.044)	(0.062)	(0.036)	(0.026)
Democrat	0.557***	0.662***	0.619***	0.565***	0.584***	0.583***	0.592***
	(0.041)	(0.039)	(0.040)	(0.048)	(0.072)	(0.040)	(0.029)
Observations	3031	3031	3031	2012	1019	3031	3031

Notes: This Table shows the same specification as Table 5, Panel B without probability weights.

G.3 Main results separately for wave A and wave B

Table G.3: Treatment effect on views related to the gender wage gap (by wave)

	Gender diff. in wages are large	Gender diff. in wages are a problem	Government should mitigate gender wage gap	Perception Index ((1)-(1))
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Panel A: Both waves				
T^{74}	0.597***	0.422***	0.243***	0.417***
	(0.036)	(0.035)	(0.035)	(0.032)
Sharpened q-value	[0.001]	[0.001]	[0.001]	
Democrat	0.525***	0.656***	0.803***	0.665***
	(0.041)	(0.040)	(0.041)	(0.037)
Female	0.235***	0.297***	0.309***	0.277***
	(0.036)	(0.036)	(0.036)	(0.033)
Observations	3031	3031	3031	3031
Panel B: Wave A				
T^{74}	0.585***	0.383***	0.228***	0.399***
	(0.043)	(0.043)	(0.043)	(0.039)
Sharpened q-value	[0.001]	[0.001]	[0.001]	
Democrat	0.506***	0.660***	0.814***	0.663***
	(0.049)	(0.049)	(0.050)	(0.045)
Female	0.213***	0.316***	0.319***	0.276***
	(0.044)	(0.044)	(0.044)	(0.040)
Observations	2012	2012	2012	2012
Panel C: Wave B				
T^{74}	0.628***	0.504***	0.280***	0.460***
	(0.064)	(0.061)	(0.063)	(0.057)
Sharpened q-value	[0.001]	[0.001]	[0.001]	
Democrat	0.540***	0.630***	0.754***	0.646***
	(0.073)	(0.070)	(0.070)	(0.064)
Female	0.280***	0.266***	0.299***	0.286***
	(0.064)	(0.062)	(0.063)	(0.057)
Observations	1019	1019	1019	1019

Notes: Data base: treatment groups. Panel A pools the two waves, Panel B is restricted to wave A and Panel C to wave B. The dependent variables in Columns 1-3 are z-scored, using the mean and standard deviation in the control group. The dependent variable in Column 4 is a summary index over the outcomes in Columns 1 - 3. T^{74} is a dummy that takes on value one for those who received the high wage gap-treatment and zero otherwise. Additional controls: census region, age group, has children, log household income, has at least 2-year college degree, full-time, part-time employment, self-employed, unemployed, student, prior belief, survey wave, Independent and "other" political orientation. Democrats include Independents leaning Democrat. Robust standard errors are in parenthesis. Sharpened q-values in Columns 1-3 are based on FDR-adjustment. Significant at *10%, **5%, ***1%.

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Table G.4: Treatment effect on demand for specific policies (by wave)

	Introduce gender quotas	Statutory affirmative action	Stricter equal pay legislation	Wage transp. within companies	Introduce reporting website	Increase subsidies to child care	Index
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Panel A: Both waves							
T^{74}	0.056	0.112***	0.115***	-0.015	0.098	0.003	0.056**
	(0.036)	(0.034)	(0.035)	(0.042)	(0.063)	(0.035)	(0.025)
Sharpened q-value	[0.133]	[0.003]	[0.003]	[0.413]	[0.085]	[0.455]	
Female	0.254***	0.179***	0.237***	0.197***	0.310***	0.112***	0.203***
	(0.037)	(0.035)	(0.036)	(0.044)	(0.063)	(0.036)	(0.026)
Democrat	0.559***	0.669***	0.618***	0.565***	0.596***	0.578***	0.594***
	(0.041)	(0.040)	(0.040)	(0.048)	(0.074)	(0.040)	(0.029)
Observations	3031	3031	3031	2012	1019	3031	3031
Panel B: Wave A							
T^{74}	0.044	0.129***	0.098**	-0.015		0.011	0.046
	(0.043)	(0.041)	(0.042)	(0.042)		(0.042)	(0.030)
Sharpened q-value	[0.440]	[0.008]	[0.038]	[0.926]		[0.926]	
Female	0.251***	0.169***	0.224***	0.197***		0.120***	0.193***
	(0.045)	(0.043)	(0.043)	(0.044)		(0.045)	(0.031)
Democrat	0.556***	0.678***	0.644***	0.565***		0.580***	0.597***
	(0.049)	(0.047)	(0.048)	(0.048)		(0.048)	(0.035)
Observations	2012	2012	2012	2012		2012	2012
Panel C: Wave B							
T^{74}	0.076	0.071	0.156**		0.098	-0.018	0.075
	(0.064)	(0.062)	(0.064)		(0.063)	(0.061)	(0.046)
Sharpened q-value	[0.327]	[0.327]	[0.080]		[0.315]	[0.445]	
Female	0.266***	0.221***	0.285***		0.310***	0.098	0.235***
	(0.065)	(0.062)	(0.065)		(0.063)	(0.064)	(0.046)
Democrat	0.554***	0.640***	0.557***		0.596***	0.580***	0.581***
	(0.074)	(0.074)	(0.073)		(0.074)	(0.073)	(0.053)
Observations	1019	1019	1019		1019	1019	1019

Notes: Data base: treatment groups. Panel A pools the two waves, Panel B is restricted to wave A and Panel C to wave B. The dependent variables in Columns 1-6 are z-scored, using the mean and standard deviation in the control group. The dependent variable in Column 7 is a summary index over the outcomes in Columns 1-6. T^{74} is a dummy that takes on the value one for those who received the high wage gap-treatment and zero otherwise. Additional controls: survey wave, census region, age group, has children, log household income, has at least 2-year college degree, full-time, part-time employment, self-employed, student, unemployed, prior belief, Independent and "other" political orientation. Democrats include Independents leaning Democrat. Robust standard errors are in parenthesis. Sharpened q-values in Columns 1-6 are based on FDR-adjustment. Significant at *10%, **5%, ***1%.

Table G.5: Persistence of first stage treatment effect after 2-4 weeks (by wave)

	Posterior belief about fem.rel.wage (percent)	Gender differences in wages are a problem	Gender diff. in wages are a problem among high-skilled	Gender diff. in wages are a problem among low-skilled	Women's wages are fair	Government should mitigate gender wage gap	Anti-discrimination policy	Supportive policy	Statutory affirmative action	Stricter equal pay legislation
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)

Panel A: Wave A

T^{74}	-10.121***	0.196**	0.144*	0.210**	-0.132	0.282***	0.114	0.241***		
	(1.851)	(0.085)	(0.086)	(0.089)	(0.082)	(0.082)	(0.089)	(0.085)		
Sharpened q-value	[0.001]	[0.022]	[0.048]	[0.022]	[0.048]	[0.002]	[0.081]	[0.009]		
Female	-0.956	0.180**	0.075	0.063	0.109	0.191**	0.240***	0.178**		
	(1.972)	(0.091)	(0.090)	(0.096)	(0.086)	(0.085)	(0.090)	(0.088)		
Democrat	2.125	0.551***	0.482***	0.456***	-0.392***	0.693***	0.640***	0.753***		
	(2.102)	(0.091)	(0.096)	(0.097)	(0.092)	(0.092)	(0.096)	(0.095)		
Observations	494	499	499	499	499	499	499	499		

Panel B: Wave B

T^{74}	-11.195***	0.184**	0.116	0.107	-0.091	0.096	0.073	0.075	0.009	0.096
	(1.520)	(0.079)	(0.080)	(0.078)	(0.074)	(0.078)	(0.076)	(0.077)	(0.078)	(0.079)
Sharpened q-value	[0.001]	[0.098]	[0.346]	[0.346]	[0.346]	[0.346]	[0.429]	[0.429]	[0.474]	[0.346]
Female	-3.294**	0.337***	0.284***	0.311***	-0.294***	0.184**	0.229***	0.205***	0.150*	0.197**
	(1.576)	(0.081)	(0.083)	(0.081)	(0.077)	(0.080)	(0.078)	(0.079)	(0.080)	(0.083)
Democrat	-0.511	0.550***	0.526***	0.361***	-0.466***	0.698***	0.728***	0.618***	0.583***	0.642***
	(1.695)	(0.093)	(0.093)	(0.093)	(0.091)	(0.089)	(0.085)	(0.087)	(0.091)	(0.091)
Observations	595	606	606	606	606	606	606	606	606	606

Notes: Data base: Follow-up sample (treatment groups). Panel A is restricted to wave A and Panel B to wave B. The dependent variable in Column 1 ranges between 0 and 200. The remaining outcomes in Columns 2 - 10 are z-scored using the mean and standard deviation in the full follow-up sample. T^{74} is a dummy that takes on the value one for those who received the high wage gap-treatment and zero otherwise. Additional controls: census region, age group, has children, log household income, has at least 2-year college degree, full-time, part-time employment, self-employed, student, unemployed, prior belief, Independent and "other" political orientation. Democrats include Independents leaning Democrat. Robust standard errors are in parenthesis. Sharpened q-values are based on FDR-adjustment for Panel A and B separately. Significant at *10%, **5%, ***1%.

	Male	Female	p-value (diff)
Petition I	23/248	51/250	<0.001
Petition II	7/248	3/250	0.20
	Non-Democrat	Democrat	p-value (diff)
Petition I	24/268	50/230	<0.001
Petition II	8/268	2/230	0.09

(a) Wave a

	Male	Female	p-value (diff)
Petition I	35/242	50/294	0.42
Petition II	10/242	0/294	<0.001

(b) Wave b

Table G.6: Signatures on petitions by survey wave, control group

Notes: Data base: Count data on actual numbers of signatures in the control group, separately by wave. The tables show the ratio between the number of actual signatures and the maximum number of possible signatures by gender and political orientation. The column denoted "p-value (diff)" shows p-values from two-sided proportion tests comparing the shares of signatures between male and female (Non-Democrat and Democrat) respondents.

	T^{74}	T^{94}	p-value ($T^{74} = T^{94}$)	p-value ($T^{74} \lessgtr T^{94}$)
Overall				
Petition I	169/1005	159/1007	0.53	0.27
Petition II	13/1005	20/1007	0.22	0.11
Men				
Petition I	63/499	58/503	0.60	0.30
Petition II	8/499	11/503	0.50	0.25
Women				
Petition I	106/506	101/504	0.72	0.36
Petition II	5/506	9/504	0.28	0.14
Democrats				
Petition I	106/447	99/450	0.54	0.27
Petition II	3/447	2/450	0.65	0.68
Non-Democrats				
Petition I	63/558	60/557	0.78	0.39
Petition II	10/558	18/557	0.12	0.06

(a) Wave a

	T^{74}	T^{94}	p-value ($T^{74} = T^{94}$)	p-value ($T^{74} \lessgtr T^{94}$)
Overall				
Petition I	90/526	61/493	0.03	0.02
Petition II	6/526	15/493	0.03	0.02
Men				
Petition I	35/234	28/231	0.37	0.19
Petition II	5/234	8/231	0.39	0.19
Women				
Petition I	55/292	33/262	0.04	0.02
Petition II	1/292	7/262	0.02	0.01

(b) Wave b

Table G.7: Signatures on petitions by survey wave, treatment effect

Notes: Data base: Count data on actual numbers of signatures in the treatment groups, separately by wave. The columns denoted T^{74} (T^{94}) show the number of actual signatures divided by the number of respondents in the high wage gap (low wage gap)-treatment group. The upper block in each table, denoted "Overall", shows aggregate numbers of signatures, whereas subsequent blocks show disaggregated numbers by gender and by self-reported political orientation. The columns denoted "p-value ($T^{74}=T^{94}$)" reports p-values from two-sided proportion tests comparing the shares of signatures between the treatment group. The column denoted "p-value ($T^{74} \lessgtr T^{94}$)" reports p-values from one-sided proportion tests with the alternative hypothesis corresponding to the expected result, i.e. $T^{74} > T^{94}$ for Petition I and $T^{94} > T^{74}$ for Petition II.

G.4 Correlational analysis including outliers

Table G.8: Correlates of views related to the wage gap (including outliers)

	Gender diff. in wages are large	Gender diff. in wages are a problem	Government should mitigate gender wage gap	Perception Index
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Panel A				
Democrat	0.563***	0.655***	0.754***	0.660***
	(0.069)	(0.069)	(0.069)	(0.062)
Female	0.192***	0.263***	0.186***	0.202***
	(0.061)	(0.060)	(0.059)	(0.054)
Panel B				
Prior (z-scored)	-0.165***	-0.184***	-0.119***	-0.149***
	(0.043)	(0.042)	(0.036)	(0.038)
Panel C				
Prior (z-scored)	-0.135***	-0.147***	-0.081**	-0.115***
	(0.041)	(0.040)	(0.035)	(0.036)
Democrat	0.538***	0.627***	0.739***	0.638***
	(0.070)	(0.069)	(0.069)	(0.062)
Female	0.171***	0.240***	0.173***	0.185***
	(0.060)	(0.059)	(0.059)	(0.053)
Observations	1034	1034	1034	1034

Notes: Table notes to Table 3 apply with one exception: The sample is based on all control group observations, including outliers below the 5th and above the 95th percentile of the distribution (following the pre-analysis plan).

Table G.9: Correlates of specific policy demand (including outliers)

	Introduce gender quotas	Statutory affirmative action	Stricter equal pay legislation	Wage transp. within companies	Introduce reporting website	Increase subsidies to child care	Policy demand index
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Panel A							
Democrat	0.675***	0.726***	0.654***	0.658***	0.545***	0.625***	0.650***
	(0.068)	(0.069)	(0.069)	(0.097)	(0.096)	(0.070)	(0.049)
Female	0.238***	0.166***	0.307***	0.413***	0.384***	0.234***	0.276***
	(0.060)	(0.059)	(0.060)	(0.084)	(0.084)	(0.060)	(0.042)
Panel B							
Prior (z-scored)	-0.056	-0.096**	-0.056	-0.186***	-0.091	-0.051	-0.078***
	(0.037)	(0.039)	(0.040)	(0.047)	(0.055)	(0.037)	(0.030)
Panel C							
Prior (z-scored)	-0.018	-0.060	-0.017	-0.134***	-0.062	-0.016	-0.040
	(0.035)	(0.037)	(0.039)	(0.046)	(0.055)	(0.035)	(0.028)
Democrat	0.671***	0.715***	0.651***	0.616***	0.542***	0.622***	0.643***
	(0.069)	(0.069)	(0.069)	(0.097)	(0.096)	(0.070)	(0.049)
Female	0.235***	0.157***	0.304***	0.392***	0.375***	0.232***	0.270***
	(0.060)	(0.059)	(0.060)	(0.083)	(0.084)	(0.060)	(0.042)
Observations	1034	1034	1034	498	536	1034	1034

Notes: Table notes to Table 4 apply with one exception: The sample is based on all control group observations, including outliers below the 5th and above the 95th percentile of the distribution (following the pre-analysis plan).

Table G.10: Correlates of beliefs about underlying reasons (including outliers)

	Impersonal Factors				Personal Factors			
	(1) Discrimination	(2) Socialization	(3) Work-Family	(4) Index	(5) Ambitions	(6) Talents	(7) Preferences	(8) Index
Panel A: Priors only								
Prior (z-scored)	-0.182***	-0.087*	-0.010	-0.093**	0.144***	0.144***	0.148***	0.146***
	(0.051)	(0.048)	(0.049)	(0.040)	(0.053)	(0.052)	(0.050)	(0.046)
Observations	498	498	498	498	498	498	498	498
Panel B: Prior, gender, pol. orient.								
Prior (z-scored)	-0.129***	-0.050	0.003	-0.059	0.108**	0.102*	0.108**	0.106**
	(0.048)	(0.045)	(0.049)	(0.037)	(0.053)	(0.055)	(0.052)	(0.048)
Female	0.195**	0.275***	0.099	0.185***	-0.482***	-0.471***	-0.403***	-0.447***
	(0.083)	(0.087)	(0.089)	(0.060)	(0.086)	(0.086)	(0.085)	(0.071)
Democrat	0.709***	0.413***	0.149	0.423***	-0.232**	-0.339***	-0.375***	-0.319***
	(0.097)	(0.098)	(0.101)	(0.070)	(0.099)	(0.102)	(0.099)	(0.084)
Observations	498	498	498	498	498	498	498	498

Notes: Data base: Pure control group, wave A. The dependent variables in Columns 1-3 and 5-7 as well as the variable prior are z-scored, using the mean and standard deviation in the control group. The dependent variable in Column 4 (Column 8) is a summary index over the dependent variables in Columns 1-3 (Columns 5-7). Democrats include Independents leaning Democrat. Robust standard errors are in parenthesis. Significant at *10%, **5%, ***1%.

Figure A.15: Non-linearity in correlation between beliefs about the gender wage gap and outcomes

Notes: Data base: Control group, both waves. The graph shows bin scatter plots on the correlation between prior beliefs about females' relative wages and the main outcome variables of interest. The dependent variables in the top row are people's perception of whether the gender wage gap is large, whether it is a problem and their unspecific demand for government intervention. In the remaining two rows, the dependent variables are the six measures of demand for specific policy intervention. See Table 1 for the exact survey items. Each scatter plot contains a linear fit which allows for a discontinuity at the 5th and the 95th percentile of the prior belief distribution.

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G.5 Heterogeneity by political orientation as pre-specified

Table G.11: Heterogeneity in the treatment effect by Democrat vs. Non-Democrat

	First Stage		Policy Demand						
	(1) Posterior belief about fem. rel. wage	(2) Perception index	(3) Introduce gender quotas	(4) Statutory affirmative action	(5) Stricter equal pay legislation	(6) Wage transp. within companies	(7) Introduce reporting website	(8) Increase subsidies to child care	(9) Policy demand index
T^{74}	-13.467***	0.431***	0.058	0.104**	0.032	0.005	0.092	-0.020	0.036
	(0.791)	(0.049)	(0.049)	(0.048)	(0.047)	(0.059)	(0.090)	(0.048)	(0.036)
T^{74} x Democrat	1.165	-0.031	-0.005	0.020	0.189***	-0.043	0.014	0.052	0.045
	(1.208)	(0.062)	(0.071)	(0.068)	(0.070)	(0.084)	(0.124)	(0.068)	(0.049)
p-value [T^{74} + T^{74} x Democrat]	0.000	0.000	0.303	0.010	0.000	0.519	0.213	0.516	0.017
Democrat	-0.542	0.681***	0.562***	0.659***	0.523***	0.586***	0.589***	0.552***	0.571***
	(0.869)	(0.051)	(0.054)	(0.052)	(0.052)	(0.063)	(0.101)	(0.053)	(0.038)
Observations	3022	3031	3031	3031	3031	2012	1019	3031	3031

Notes: Data base: Treatment groups, both waves. All regressions apply the specification outlined in Section 5, with the dimension of heterogeneity corresponding to Democrat (including Independents leaning Democrat), i.e. the omitted group is Non-Democrats. The outcome in Column 1 is the respondent's posterior belief about females' relative wages, pooling across five different wage statistics (see notes of Table 5 for details). Z-scored outcomes in columns 2-8 are based on the respondent's support of the specific policies (see Table 1 for the exact items). The outcome in Column 2 is the summary index over people's perceptions related to the wage gap, corresponding to the outcome in Table 5, Panel A, Column 6. Column 9 uses a summary index over Columns 2-8. Both indices follow the method described in Anderson (2008). Additional controls: gender, survey wave, census region, age group, has children, log household income, has at least 2-year college degree, full-time, part-time employment, self-employed, student, unemployed, prior belief. Democrats include Independents leaning Democrat. Robust standard errors are in parenthesis. Significant at *10%, **5%, ***1%.

H Survey Instrument

Overview

This project was pre-registered in the AEA RCT Registry under "AEARCTR-0003252", see http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/3252. The data was collected in two waves. Wave A was conducted between August 31st and October 9th, 2018 and Wave B between 21st of November 2018 and 2nd of January, 2019. Each wave consisted of a main survey (duration 15 minutes) and a follow-up survey (duration 5 minutes).

Section H.1 describes the main survey of Wave A, Section H.2 the follow-up survey of Wave A, Section H.3 the main survey of Wave B and Section H.4 the follow-up survey of Wave B. Wave A and Wave B were very similar. Changes in Wave B as compared to Wave A are flagged in Sections H.3 and H.4 below.

H.1 Main Experiment (Wave A)

H.1.1 Welcome Page, including consent

Dear participant!

This study is conducted by researchers from Goethe University Frankfurt, Germany.

In this survey we will ask questions on your views regarding public policy issues. The most important factor for the success of our research is that **you answer honestly**. No matter what your political views are, by completing this survey, you are contributing to our knowledge as a society. Anytime you don't know an answer, just give your best guess.

Participation in this study typically takes **15 minutes** and is **strictly anonymous**. Close **attention** is **required** for your responses to count. In this survey you will have several opportunities to **receive a bonus** in addition to your fix payoff!

Note: This study has received ethics approval from the Institutional Review Board of Goethe University, Frankfurt. Your participation in this study is purely voluntary. Your name will never be recorded and you will never be identified. If you have any questions about this study or if you want to have your responses deleted, you may contact us at economicsresearch@gmail.com.

You must be U.S. resident of at least 18 years of age in order to participate in this survey.

- Yes, I would like to take part in this study, and confirm that I am a U.S. resident and am 18 or older.

- No, I would not like to participate.

H.1.2 Screening Questions

In which region do you currently reside?

- Northeast (CT, ME, MA, NH, RI, VT, NJ, NY, PA)

- Midwest (IL, IN, MI, OH, WI, IA, KS, MN, MO, NE, ND, SD)

- South (DE, DC, FL, GA, MD, NC, SC, VA, WV, AL, KY, MS, TN, AR, LA, OK, TX)

- West (AZ, CO, ID, NM, MT, UT, NV, WY, AK, CA, HI, OR, WA)

What is your age?

- 18-24

- 25-34

- 35-44

- 45-54

- 55-65

- Older than 65

Which of these describes you more accurately?

- Male

- Female

Which of the following best describes your current employment status?

- Full-time employee

- Part-time employee

- Self-employed or business owner

- Unemployed or looking for work

- Student

- Retired

- Out of the labor force, i.e. not working and not looking for work (homemaker,...)

What was your **household's income from all sources**, before taxes and subsidies, in 2017 in US-Dollars?

By household we mean yourself and any family living with you but not renters and roommates.

- Less than 15,000$

- Between 15,000$ and 25,000$

- Between 25,000$ and 50,000$

- Between 50,000$ and 75,000$

- Between 75,000$ and 100,000$

- Between 100,000$ and 150,000$

- Between 150,000$ and 200,000$

- More than 200,000$

In politics today, do you consider yourself a **Republican**, a **Democrat**, or an **Independent**?

- Republican

- Independent, leaning Republican

- Independent

- Independent, leaning Democrat

- Democrat

- Other: *[request to enter political orientation manually]*

H.1.3 Attention screener

This question is about the following problem. In questionnaires like ours, sometimes there are participants who do not carefully read the questions and just quickly click through the survey. This means that there are a lot of random answers which compromise the results of research studies. To show that you read our questions carefully, please choose both "Very strongly interested" and "Not interested at al" as your answer in the next question.

How interested are you in politics?

- Very strongly interested

- Interested

- A little bit interested

- Almost not interested

- Not interested at all

H.1.4 Belief elicitation

The topic of this question is **(pre-tax) wages of men and women in the United States**. This question is **<u>not</u>** about how you think **things should be** but how you think they actually are.

Please think of all individuals in the U.S., men and women, who are **45 years old**, hold a **Bachelor degree** and **work 40 hours per week** as **full-time employees**. How many dollars, do you think, does a **woman with these characteristics** make on

average for every $100 made by a man with the **same characteristics?**

[The following sentence is only shown to those individuals whose beliefs are incentivized. Name of survey is "American Community Survey" in case of T^{74} and "Current Population Survey" in case of T^{94}.]

If your estimate deviates by less than $2 from the value found by the most recent <*name of survey*> as of the beginning of 2018 you will receive a bonus of $2.

Please use the slider at the bottom of this page to communicate your estimate.

[There is a bar chart with two bars. Men's wages are represented by a yellow bar that is fixed to the value $100. Women's wages are represented by an interactive pink bar that responds to a slider at the bottom of the page. The slider ranges from $0 to $200 and the pink bar takes on values between $0 and $200 accordingly.]

H.1.5   Notification

[Individuals in both treatment groups see the following message:]

On the next screen we would like to provide you with the objective value of the described wage difference based on **survey data collected by the United States Census Bureau.**

We would like you to carefully review this information as you will not be able to go back.

Press "Next" to continue.

H.1.6   Information treatment

[This page is shown to individuals in any of the two treatment groups. Value corresponds to "$74" in case of T^{74} and to "$94" in case of T^{94}. Name of survey corresponds to "American Community Survey" in case of T^{74} and to "Current Population Survey" in

case of T^{94}.]

Here is the true value for the wage difference you have just guessed:

In fact, for every \$100 earned by a male, a female earned *<value>* when both are 45 years old, hold a Bachelor degree and work 40 hours per week as employees.

[There is a bar chart with three bars: One yellow bar set to a value of \$100, one pink bar representing the respondent's previously made estimate and one red bar representing either \$74 or \$94, depending on the treatment group.]

In case their previously made estimate deviates by more than \$2 from the objective value in their treatment group or in case the estimate was not incentivized previously, respondents see the following message below the graph:

Thank you for your estimate!

Alternatively, in case their estimate deviates by less than \$2 from the objective value and the guess was incentivized, respondents see the following below the graph:

Congratulations! Your estimate is close to the value reported by the *<name of survey>*. You will receive a bonus of \$2.

The actual value is based on the most recent available wage statistics from the *<name of survey>* as of January 2018. The *<name of survey>* is regularly conducted by the U.S. Census Bureau among households in the United States.

H.1.7 Reminder

[Individuals in the pure control group see the following:]

You just stated that you believe a 45-year-old full-time working **female** employee who holds a Bachelor degree and works 40 hours per week earns ***\$<guess made previously>*** for every **\$100** earned by a comparable **male individual**.

At the end of this survey we will let you know about the objective value based on data from the U.S. Census Bureau and you will find out whether you won the \$2 bonus.

[The following is again shown to all individuals:]

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On the following pages we will ask you questions on your **personal opinions**. There are **no right or wrong answers.** We are just interested in your subjective views.

Press "Next" in order to continue.

H.1.8 General perceptions and unspecific policy demand

How do you feel about the following statements where 1 means you **fully disagree** and 10 means you **fully agree**?

Gender differences in wages are **large** in the United States.

- Answer on a scale from 1 to 10

Gender differences in wages are a **problem** in the United States.

- Answer on a scale from 1 to 10

The government should do more to **promote wage equality** between men and women.

- Answer on a scale from 1 to 10

H.1.9 Perceived fairness of women's wages

Which of the following best describes your opinion on the **fairness of wages** received by **women** in the U.S.?

- Much less than fair

- Less than fair

- Fair

- More than fair

- Much more than fair

H.1.10 Specific self-reported policy demand

What is your **opinion** on the following labor market policies? When making your choice, please think of all potential **costs** and **benefits**.

[The order of the following items is randomized:]

Currently, federal law requires that men and women **get equal pay** for work that is comparable in terms of **skill, effort, responsibility** and **working conditions** in the same establishment. In case of suspected discrimination employees may file a lawsuit against their employers. If they win the case, then they are to be compensated by their employers.

Should the government give **more freedom in wage setting** to companies by making legislation **less strict** or would you like to see **stricter enforcement of the existing legislation**?

- A lot less strict

- Somewhat less strict

- Keep status quo

- Somewhat stricter

- A lot stricter

Large public contractors are legally required to have so-called **"Affirmative Action Plans"**, i.e. they have to **support women** and minorities at all levels of the hierarchy through measures such as training programs and outreach efforts.

Do you think the government should **strengthen or soften** this **requirement** in terms of strictness and the set of companies that have to comply?

- Soften a lot

- Soften somewhat

- Neither strengthen nor soften

- Strengthen somewhat

- Strengthen a lot

Wage transparency within firms provides a basis for wage negotiations and may discipline companies by making discriminatory wages visible. Currently, wage transparency is **not legally required**. However, **employees are protected** by law from retaliation through employers in case they share information on their wages.

Would you like the government to enforce **more or less wage transparency**?

- A lot less

- Somewhat less

- Keep current level

- Somewhat more

- A lot more

Many countries currently have **gender quotas** in place in order to increase the representation of women in leading positions.

Are you **in favor or against** the introduction of similar **statutory gender quotas** in the United States?

- Strongly against

- Somewhat against

- Neither in favor nor against

- Somewhat in favor

- Strongly in favor

Child day care may enable mothers as well as fathers to work full-time if they want to.

Should the government increase or decrease the **amount of public resources** spent on making **child care available and affordable**?

- Decrease strongly

- Decrease somewhat

- Neither increase nor decrease

- Increase somewhat

- Increase strongly

H.1.11 Intention to sign a petition

Reporting requirements for companies may facilitate the detection of gender-based wage discrimination. Currently, **companies with at least 100 employees** have to file **yearly reports to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission**, including information on **number of employees they employ** by gender and job category but **not on wages**.

You now have the opportunity to sign a **real petition** on the **White House Petition Website**. If enough people sign the petition, the White House will consider it and post an official response. Consider the following **two petitions** and decide whether you would like to sign one of them:

Petition I: Increase reporting requirements

This petition suggests that **employers with at least 100 employees** have to include

information on **average wages** and hours worked **by gender and position** in their annual reports to the **Equal Employment Opportunity Commission** (EEOC). Such information **helps detecting discriminatory pay** while keeping employee information **confidential**.

Petition II: Abolish reporting requirements

This petition suggests that the **obligatory annual reports to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC)** should be **abolished** for private employers in order to **reduce bureaucracy**.

Would you like to sign one of the petitions?

- I want to sign Petition I (Increase requirements).

- I want to sign Petition II (Abolish requirements).

- I do not want to sign any of the petitions.

H.1.12 Link to petition

[This page is only shown to individuals who expressed their intention to sign one of the petitions. <Petition name> corresponds to "Petition I" or "Petition II", depending on the previous choice. Correspondingly, <description> corresponds to "Increase reporting requirements" or "Abolish reporting requirements".]

In order to sing **<petition name>** (<Petition description>), click on the following link:

Link **<petition name>**

The petition will open in a new tab. After signing do not forget to come back and finish the survey.

In order to continue the survey press "Next".

H.1.13 External Content: Petition

[The following content appears in a new tab opening an external website, the White House Petition Website, in case the respondent clicks on the link on the previous survey page. (For a screenshot see Figure A.6.)]

[If the respondent previously chose Petition I:]

WE THE PEOPLE ASK THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT TO CHANGE AN EXISTING ADMINISTRATION POLICY:

Revise employer information report "EEO-1": Add information on wages by gender and job category.
Created by S.S. on August 29, 2018

We request that employers with 100 or more employees report information about W-2 earnings and hours worked of their employees, organized by income category, gender and ethnicity in their annual reports to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"). So far, these reports have to include information on demographics of employees, but not on their earnings and hours worked.

The objective of the change we request is to better position federal agencies to enforce pay discrimination laws, while respecting concerns about confidentiality and minimizing employers' data collection burden.

[If the respondent previously chose Petition II:]

WE THE PEOPLE ASK THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT TO CHANGE AN EXISTING ADMINISTRATION POLICY:

Decrease reporting requirements for companies:

Abolish annual employer information report

"EEO-1".
Created by S.S. on August 29, 2018

We request that employers with 100 or more employees no longer have to report information about number of employees, organized by income category, gender and ethnicity.

The annual reports to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") pose an undue burden for employers. By reducing this burden, companies can invest their resources into more productive activities.

[The remainder of the page is identical for both Petition I and Petition II:]

ECONOMY & JOBS

Sign This Petition

[Text entry fields (mandatory):]

First Name*

Last Name*

Email Address*

[Checkbox:]

☐ THE WHITE HOUSE MAY SEND ME EMAILS ABOUT THIS AND OTHER ISSUES

[Button:]

Sign Now

BY SIGNING THIS PETITION YOU AGREE TO THE <u>TERMS AND CONDITIONS</u>.

H.1.14 Donation decision

By taking this survey, you are automatically enrolled in a **lottery to win $300**. In a few days you will know whether you won the $300.

You now get to decide how much of the $300 you want to **donate** to the **American Association of University Women** and how much to **keep** in case you win the lottery.

The American Association of University Women (AAUW) is an NGO that advocates public policy in order to advance **equity of women and men in the labor market**. Moreover, it **supports girls' and women's education financially and**

intellectually and provides **case support** to women facing **discrimination at the workplace**.

For every Dollar you donate to AAUW, **we donate another \$0.5** in addition. If you are the winner of the lottery, you will be notified and will **receive your payoff via the survey platform**, so no further action is required on your part. You will also receive a **proof of the donation** made to AAUW. (This proof will be sent by the survey platform provider, so we will never know your identity.)

Please let us know how much you would like to **donate to AAUW** by filling in your **preferred donation amount** in the following field. (Please note, your answer must be a **whole number** between 0 and 300.):

- Entry field (only integers between 0 and 300 accepted).

[As soon as an answer is entered in the entry field above, the following message appears with <donation amount> corresponing to the amount chosen, <payoff amount> corresponding to 300 - donation amount and <total donation> corresponding to the donation amount:]

You decided to **donate \$<donation amount>** to AAUW and to have the remaining **\$<payoff amount> added to your payoff**. Together with our subsidy the **total amount donated** will be **\$<total donation>** in case you win the lottery.

You can still adjust your donation decision above. Click "next" in order to confirm your decision and continue.

H.1.15 Facebook like

Do you want to **"like"** the **American Association of University Women** (AAUW) on **Facebook**? Click below to do so!

(Please note: By clicking, Facebook will link you to your profile (if you have one) and will likely draw data such as your IP-address.)

[There is a button that says "Give Facebook LIKE to AAUW!". As soon as the respondent clicks on it, the rest of the page is loaded:]

Please click on the "like" symbol in the box below to complete your facebook like:

[There is an actual facebook plug-in that allows to give a facebook like.]

H.1.16 Perceived factors contributing to gender differences in wages

Now we would like to learn **to what extent you agree** with the **following statements**:

[The order of the following items is randomized.]

   i. Men are <u>inherently more talented</u> for highly demanding tasks such as strategic decision-making, working under pressure and leading others.

  ii. Women are facing <u>discrimination</u> in the labor market.

 iii. Women and men are <u>inherently interested</u> in different fields of work, for instance women on average may be more interested in "social" work and men in "technical" work.

 iv. Men are <u>inherently more ambitious</u> in their careers than women.

  v. Men have been <u>encouraged</u> more than women to pursue ambitious careers, especially in fields such as mathematics, science and engineering.

 vi. It is <u>more difficult</u> for women than for men to combine work and family responsibilities in today's society. This leads to less steep careers of women.

- Completely disagree

- Disagree

- Neither agree nor disagree

- Agree

- Completely agree

H.1.17 Introduction to information acquisition

On the following page you have the opportunity to choose between **receiving additional information** relevant for the debate on gender differences in wages or **increasing your payoff** under **six different scenarios**.

Please note that there are **actual stakes involved**: For every 5th participant in this study, we are going to **implement** one of the six decisions later in the survey. In case you are selected, you get a notification and you will receive either the information (3-minute read) or the additional payoff.

Each of the six scenarios is **equally likely to get implemented**, so we advise you to consider each of them carefully.

H.1.18 Endogenous information acquisition

[The order of the "progressive" and the "traditional" institution is randomized.]
We offer additional information either from

- Institution A: An institution favoring government intervention to support women's progress in the labor market or from

- Institution B: An institution favoring a traditional role for women as caregivers for the family and arguing against related government intervention.

Both institutions offer **arguments in support of their view** in the form of a 3-minute read. The purpose of the text is to inform the general public and to **convince the reader of the institutions's view**. Please let us know under the following six scenarios whether you want to **receive additional insights within this survey** from either of the two institutions or whether you want to **increase your payoff** instead. Remember that each of the scenarios is equally likely to get implemented.

Scenario 1: Would you like to receive information from institution A or $0.01?

- Info from institution A (favoring public policy to support women in the labor market)

- Receive $0.01 and no info

Scenario 2: Would you like to receive information from institution A or $0.3?

- Info from institution A (favoring public policy to support women in the labor market)

- Receive $0.3 and no info

Scenario 3: Would you like to receive information from institution A or $0.5?

- Info from institution A (favoring public policy to support women in the labor market)

- Receive $0.5 and no info

Scenario 4: Would you like to receive information from institution B or $0.01?

- Info from institution B (favoring <u>no</u> government intervention and a traditional role for women)

- Receive $0.01 and no info

Scenario 5: Would you like to receive information from institution B or $0.3?

- Info from institution B (favoring <u>no</u> government intervention and a traditional role for women)

- Receive $0.3 and no info

Scenario 6: Would you like to receive information from institution B or $0.5?

- Info from institution B (favoring <u>no</u> government intervention and a traditional role for women)

- Receive $0.5 and no info

H.1.19 Extrapolation to related belief about gender difference in wages

[The following belief is randomized, i.e. only one of the following three is shown to each respondent.]

[Version A: Different age group:]

This question asks about a different age group than the one before:

Please think of all individuals in the U.S., men and women, who are **25 years old**, work **40 hours per week** as full-time employees and hold a **Bachelor degree**. How much, do you think, does a woman with these characteristics make on average for every $100 made by a man with the **same characteristics**?

[Version B: Different education group:]

This question asks about a different education group than the one before:

Please think of all individuals in the U.S., men and women, who are **45 years old**, work **40 hours per week** as full-time employees and hold a **high school degree**, but did **not** go to college? How much, do you think, does a woman with these characteristics make on average for every $100 made by a man with the **same characteristics**?

[Version C: Controlling for occupation group:]

This question asks about a slightly different statistic than the one before:

The United States Bureau of Labor Statistics distinguishes between 22 **broad occupation groups**.

Within each of these occupation groups, we have compared men and women who are **45 years old**, hold a **Bachelor degree** and work **40 hours per week** as full-time employees.

How many dollars, do you think, does a **woman with these characteristics** make **on average** for every $100 made by a man with the **same characteristics** if both work in the **same occupation group**?

[In the following sentence, which is shown to everybody, <name of survey> again corresponds to "American Community Survey" for T^{74} and half of the control group and to "Current Population Survey" for T^{94} and the other half of the control group.]

If your estimate deviates by less than $2 from the value found by the most recent *<name of survey>* as of the beginning of 2018 you will receive a bonus of $1.

Please use the slider at the bottom of this page to communicate your estimate.

[There is a bar chart with two bars. Men's wages are represented by a yellow bar that is fixed to the value $100. Women's wages are represented by an interactive pink bar that responds to a slider. The slider ranges from $0 to $200 and the pink bar takes on values between $0 and $200 accordingly.]

H.1.20   Related world views

[This page is shown only to individuals in the control group.]

To what extent do you **agree or disagree** with the following two **statements**?

   i. A husband's job is to earn money, a wife's job is to look after the home and family.

   ii. When women advance in the labor market, some men are pushed out or lose.

- Strongly disagree

- Disagree

- Neither agree nor disagree

- Agree

- Strongly agree

H.1.21 Work-related questions, education, ethnicity

Where do you see yourself in **10 years from now**?

- 10 years from now I will be working full-time.

- 10 years from now I will be working part-time.

- 10 years from now I will not be working for money (retirement, student, home-maker,...)

Which of the following best describes your **expectations** for the **coming 10 years**? My **wage** is going to...

- ...decrease considerably over the next 10 years.

- ...decrease a little over the next 10 years.

- ...neither increase nor decrease over the next 10 years.

- ...increase a little over the next 10 years.

- ...increase considerably over the next 10 years.

Which of the following best describes your opinion on the **fairness** of your **own personal wage** in your current job (or in your previous job, in case you are currently not working)?

- Much less than fair

- Less than fair

- Fair

- More than fair

- Much more than fair

- I have never worked for a wage

What category best describes your **highest level of education**?

- Eighth grade or less

- Some high school

- High school degree/GED

- Some college

- 2-year College degree/Associate degree

- 4-year College degree/Bachelor's degree

- Master's degree

- Doctoral degree

- Professional degree (JD,MD,MBA)

How would you describe your race?

- White/Caucasian

- Black/African American

- Asian American

- Other [**Text entry requested**]

Are you of Hispanic, Latino, or Spanish origin?

- Yes

- No

H.1.22 Industry, occupation, income, working hours

In which of the following industries do you work or did you last work in your main job?

- Construction

- Nondurable manufacturing (food, textiles, apparel, paper products, printing and publishing, chemicals, plastic products, ...)

- Durable manufacturing (lumber and wood products, furniture, metal industries, machinery and computing equipment, motor vehicles, aircraft, medical instruments, ...)

- Finance, insurance, real estate

- Health, education and social services (Hospitals, schools, universities, child day care, nursing and personal care,...)

- Wholesale trade

- Retail trade (grocery stores, eating and drinking places, department stores, motor vehicle dealers,...)

- Business and repair services (computer and data processing services, advertising, services to dwellings and other buildings, personnel supply services, automotive repair and related services,...)

- Professional services (legal services, engineering/architectural services, management/public relations services, accounting/auditing/bookkeeping services, research/development/te services, religious organizations,...)

- Public administration

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- Personal services (hotels and motels, private households, beauty shops, laundry, cleaning, and garment services,...)

- Transportation and communication (trucking service, postal service, radio and television broadcasting, telephone communications, electric light and power, sanitary services,...)

- Other *[Text entry required.]*

Please give a more detailed description of your current industry or last industry, in case you are currently not working, using your own words. (Examples: restaurant, hospital, automotive repair, retail bakery, manufacturing of chemicals, postal service, banking, insurance, legal services,...)

- *[free text entry]*

Please describe your current occupation/job description. (Examples: photographer, dental assistant, firefighter, cook, painting worker, financial analyst, Š). In case you are currently not working, refer to your last job please

- *[free text entry]*

[The following question is only shown to employed individuals.]

How many employees are currently employed at the company you are working for?

- Fewer than 10 employees

- Between 10 and 100 employees

- Between 100 and 500 employees

- More than 500 employees

What is your **own** **personal** current **yearly** labor income in US Dollars, before taxes, deductions and subsidies?

- *[free text entry (only numbers)]*

What is your **current <u>yearly</u> household labor income** in US Dollars, before taxes, deductions and subsidies?

By household we mean yourself and any family living with you but not renters and roommates.

- *[free text entry (only numbers)]*

How many hours do you usually work for pay per week?

- 0

- 1-10

- 11-20

- 21-25

- 26-30

- 31-35

- 36-40

- 41-45

- 46-50

- 51-55

- 56-60

- more than 60 hours per week

H.1.23 Control group information

[This screen is only shown to individuals in the control group and correspond to the "information treatment" described above.]

H.1.24 Demographic and background questions

Which of the following best describes your marital status?

- Single

- Married

- Divorced

- Widowed

- Other: *[Text entry required.]*

How many children do you have?

i. Number of boys

ii. Number of girls

- 0

- 1

- 2

- 3

- 4

- 5 or more

What is the zip code of your current residence?

- *[Text entry field (only 5-digit numbers)]*

What is your year of birth?

- 1951

- 1952

- .

- .

- 1999

- 2000

Are your facebook "likes" visible or private?

- They are visible (standard settings).

- I have restricted visibility.

- I do not have a facebook account.

H.1.25 Perception of survey, trust in official statistics

Do you feel this survey was biased?

- Yes, left-wing bias.

- Yes, right-wing bias.

- No, it did not feel biased.

[Shown to subjects in the treatment groups:]

Did you find the statistic about gender differences in wages we provided you with **relevant** for the discussion about related policies?

- Absolutely irrelevant

- Somewhat irrelevant.

- Somewhat relevant.

- Highly relevant.

[Shown to subjects in the treatment groups:]

In the past three weeks, have you read in newspapers, magazines or online about gender differences in wages?

- Yes.

- No.

- I am not sure.

[Shown to subjects in the control group:]

Did you find the **statistic about gender differences in wages** we provided you with trustworthy?

- Untrustworthy.

- Somewhat untrustworthy.

- Somewhat trustworthy.

- Trustworthy.

[Shown to subjects in the control group:] How much do you generally **trust survey data** published by the **U.S. Census Bureau**?

- I do not trust them at all.

- I do not fully trust them.

- I trust them somewhat.

- I largely trust them.

- I fully trust them.

- I don't know.

Is there anything you would like to add?

[Free text entry.]

H.1.26 Final screen

[Shown to every fifth respondent: <relevant scenario> corresponds to one of the six information acquisition scenarios the respondent was facing before. <decision> corresponds to the respondent's decision in this specific scenario.]

Every 5th participant is chosen for the implementation of his/her decision to acquire additional information or to increase one's payoff. Congratulations, you were chosen!

The following decision was randomly chosen for implementation for you:

<relevant scenario>

Your choice was: *<decision>*

[In case the respondent previously chose the payoff in the respective scenario she receives the following message, with <amount> corresponding to the relevant amount.]

<amount> will be added to your payoff.

[In case the respondent chose to receive information in the respective scenario she receives the following message, where <Link to more information> is a link that leads to a website with additional information.]

Here is a link to the information you have chosen (The link will open in a new tab. Do not forget to come back and click submit in order to submit your survey responses.):*<Link to more information>*

[All respondents again see the following message.]

Thank you for participating in this survey. We will shortly calculate your final payoff including the participation fee and any bonus for correct guesses made before. All additional payments will be made in the same way as your regular survey pay.

Moreover, the winner of the lottery will be determined as soon as all responses are in and will be contacted by the survey platform.

H.1.27 External Content: 3-minute read

[The following content appears in a new tab opening an external website in case the respondent clicks on the link on the previous survey page.]

[If the respondent previously chose to see the 3-minute read from the progressive institution in favor of women in the labor market and related government intervention, the following content appeared:][a]

The Business Case for Childcare

Almost one in 10 of the world's population, 679 million, are children younger than five years old. To thrive and develop, these children and their older siblings need care. Yet in many parts of the world, childcare remains scarce. Globally, just over half of the children under age five benefit from a preschool program. Formal childcare is often outside the reach of low and middle-income employees. For those who can afford it, available options are often limited and poorly aligned with full-time working hours. Access to care is particularly lacking for children younger than three.

For employers, the lack of good quality and affordable childcare for their employees can translate into higher turnover and absenteeism, lower productivity, and difficulty recruiting skilled employees. This is because the unavailability or unaffordability of care affects the choices that parents make regarding the type of work that they do, whether they stay at home, or how they combine work with care. For families, gaps in access to quality care can mean less paid working time and lower household incomes.

Because women are more likely than men to bear childcare responsibilities, lack of childcare is a major barrier to women's full and equal participation in paid work. According

to the International Labour Organization, globally, women's labor force participation rate is just over 49 percent, nearly 27 percentage points lower than the rate for men. A McKinsey Global Institute study estimated that closing gender gaps in economic participation would increase global gross domestic product (GDP) by 26 percent by 2025, adding $12 trillion. Evidence from the Caribbean, Latin America, and Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries suggests that access to subsidized childcare can have a significant positive impact on women's employment rates and the number of hours that women work.

Policymakers internationally are recognizing the importance of access to childcare for both economic and gender equality. To date, 192 nations have signed the Global Goals for Sustainable Development, which include the target, "By 2030, ensure that all girls and boys have access to quality early childhood development, care and preprimary education so that they are ready for primary education." In countries such as Brazil, Chile, Ecuador, India, Japan, Jordan, and Turkey, statutes require employers to provide or support childcare. Even when not driven by regulatory compliance, many employers are providing childcare supports as part of their general compensation strategy to achieve better business outcomes. Yet there is a lot more that can be done through partnerships and collaboration between the public and private sectors and civil society organizations. For the International Finance Corporation (IFC), a member of the World Bank Group and the largest global development institution focused exclusively on the private sector in developing countries, improving access to childcare goes hand in hand with fostering workplace gender diversity and helping parents enter and advance in the workforce while enabling companies to strengthen their bottom line. IFC's focus on removing barriers, such as lack of childcare, to women's (and men's) access to more and better jobs is embedded in the World Bank Group's Gender Strategy and IFC's vision focused on creating markets, particularly in fragile, conflict-affected, and low-income countries. In countries where employer supported childcare is mandatory, IFC is working with its clients to substantiate the business case and to help them go beyond compliance and implement childcare strategies best suited to their business needs, thus resulting in better

business results.

[If the respondent previously chose to see the 3-minute read from the institution described as more conservative and in favor of a traditional role for women outside the labor market the following content appeared:][b]

The Real Pay Gap

Apr 10th, 2014 3 min read

COMMENTARY BY Stephen Moore @StephenMoore

The Equal Pay Act, sponsored by Senator Barbara Mikulski (D., Md.), is a laughably bad idea — almost a parody of liberal interventionism in the market. Under the law, there is federal funding for girls' negotiation training and grant awards for reducing gender discrimination. It bestows on disgruntled employees yet more grounds on which to sue their employers for alleged discrimination – when, in most cases, the malcontents are just sub-par employees. But that's not even the major flaw of this latest Democratic measure against gender discrimination. The crisis in America today isn't about women's wages; it's about men's wages. Men are still the chief breadwinners in most families, and their wages are not moving much at all. If we look at Census Bureau data, we find that while men's wages have risen by about 6 percent in real terms since 1980, women's wages have risen by about 60 percent. Any gap in pay — real or imagined — is rapidly shrinking.

President Obama uses the figure of 77 cents earned by a woman for every dollar earned by a man. But that is a comparison of all women with all men (and even Mr. Obama's own economists say a woman earns 81 cents for every dollar earned by her male counterpart). In fact, a 2009 Labor Department study found that, when we control for work experience and education, the gap is only about 5 percent. And when we account for the fact that men are more likely to be injured or suffer an accident on the job, and do riskier work and often more unpleasant jobs than women, the gap virtually disappears. My friend Mark Perry, an economist who runs the Carpe Diem blog at the American Enterprise Institute, has documented all this.

Furthermore, the latest surveys of college graduates find virtually no pay discrepancy between men and women, so for this generation the 77-cents mantra is as outdated as bell-bottom jeans.

The real wage crisis has to do with men. The latest education statistics show that women are about 53 percent of college enrollees and almost 60 percent of those pursuing advanced degrees. Pay rises with educational attainment. There is almost no gender gap for the latest generation entering the workforce; if the current educational trends continue, it is quite possible that women will start having higher earnings than men, and this will be especially true of women who do not have children.

What are the implications of a society in which women earn more than men? We don't really know, but it could be disruptive to family stability. If men aren't the breadwinners, will women regard them as economically expendable? We saw what happened to family structure in low-income and black households when a welfare check took the place of a father's paycheck. Divorce rates go up when men lose their jobs.

The problem here is especially acute with respect to black families. Black women have been on a 30-year trend of outpacing black men in terms of education and thus earnings. Men are becoming financially expendable. It is also true that the decline in men's wages is necessitating women to work to supplement family income. Sometimes this is by the woman's choice, but in this rough economy it is less a matter of free will than of economic necessity.

Gender gaps in pay are also a distraction from the other real financial problem, which is declining pay for almost all groups. Between 2009 and 2012, every racial group and both genders have done worse. Actually, women's paychecks have fallen slightly more than men's in this phony recovery — and that is despite the fact that one of Mr. Obama's first acts as president was to sign the Lilly Ledbetter paycheck-equality act. So much for the government's being able to equalize incomes through edict.

Since more and more families have two earners — the husband and the wife — women are hardly going to cheer if the gender gap falls only because their husbands are earning less. But that is the way Mr. Obama has pursued equality — by devising policies that

make us all a little poorer.

Income, race, and gender inequality have been clever distractions for the president. The gap that matters most he chooses to ignore: the gap between what middle-class people should be earning and what they are in fact taking home. Wages are falling for nearly everyone, Mr. President: for men, women, blacks, whites, the poor, and the middle class.

The $1,800 decline in middle-class incomes since the recovery began is the issue that matters to most Americans, and this is what Republicans should be shouting from the rooftops.

 - *Stephen Moore is chief economist at the Heritage Foundation.*

Originally appeared in the National Review

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[a][The article was provided by the Institute for Women's Policy Research (IWPR). Since the IWPR restructured its website after January 2019, the article is no longer available under the original link.]
[b][See `https://www.heritage.org/poverty-and-inequality/commentary/the-real-pay-gap`.]

H.2   Follow-up Survey (Wave A)

H.2.1   Welcome Page, including consent

Work Life Survey 2018

This is a study conducted by a team of researchers from different universities in Europe. The purpose of the study is to gain insights into workplaces. By dedicating 5 minutes of your time, you contribute to our knowledge about organizations.

All answers you give will be fully confidential. We will not ask for information related to your identity. You may withdraw from the study or request the deletion of your data at any time via contact@worklifesurvey.eu .

If you are at least 18 years old and freely consent to participate in this study please klick Next to start the survey.

    This survey is anonymous.

The record of your survey responses does not contain any identifying information about

you, unless a specific survey question explicitly asked for it.

If you used an identifying token to access this survey, please rest assured that this token will not be stored together with your responses. It is managed in a separate database and will only be updated to indicate whether you did (or did not) complete this survey. There is no way of matching identification tokens with survey responses.

H.2.2 Demographic Questions (obfuscation)

Please let us know your age.

- 18-24

- 25-34

- 35-54

- 55-70

What is your gender?

- Male

- Female

What is your current employment status?

- I am working as an employee.

- I am running my own business.

- I am currently not working.

H.2.3 Job satisfaction (obfuscation)

[This page deviates slightly for self-employed and non-working individuals]

You indicated that you are currently working as an employee. We would like to learn

more about your job satisfaction on a scale from 1 to 7.

i) How attractive is your current employer?

ii) How attractive is your current job ?

- 1 (not attractive)

- 2

- 3

- 4

- 5

- 6

- 7 (very attractive)

H.2.4 Questions on job referrals (obfuscation)

[This page deviates slightly for self-employed and non-working individuals]

Think of your current main job. Assume your employer has an open job in your department. One of your relatives or friends would probably match the requirements of the job.

On a scale from 1 (very unlikely) to 7 (very likely): Would you...

i) ...try to refer your relative/friend to your employer?

ii) ...receive a reward from your employer for a successful referral?

- 1 (very unlikely)

- 2

- 3

- 4

- 5

- 6

- 7 (very likely)

H.2.5 Hypothetical choice scenario on job referrals (obfuscation)

Suppose your employer is willing to pay a bonus tantamount to one week's salary to you if you refer someone and they get hired. You have a friend who is looking for work. You think it would take about 60 minutes to do the referral paperwork, and there is a 50% chance that your friend will receive an offer.

Would you refer your friend?

- Yes

- No

H.2.6 Perception of wage differences as a problem

Now think of American workplaces at a more general level.

Do you think **wage differences** between the following groups are a **problem** in the **United States today**? Please answer the question on a scale from **"Not at all a problem"** to **"A very substantial problem"**.

  i) High-skilled and low-skilled employees

 ii) Men and women

iii) Men and women who are high-skilled

 ii) Men and women who are low-skilled

- Not at all a problem

- Hardly a problem

- Somewhat a problem

- A problem

- A substantial problem

- A very substantial problem

H.2.7 Perceived fairness of wages

How fair do you generally find the wages received by the following groups?

  i) Low-skilled workers

 ii) Women

- Much less than fair

- Less than fair

- Fair

- More than fair

- Much more than fair

H.2.8 Demand of for government intervention (general)

Do you think the government should increase or decrease efforts to **support women** in the labor market?

- Decrease strongly

- Decrease considerably

- Decrease somewhat

- Neither increase nor decrease

- Increase somewhat

- Increase considerably

- Increase strongly

Do you think the government should increase or decrease efforts to **support low-skilled workers** in the labor market?

- Decrease strongly

- Decrease considerably

- Decrease somewhat

- Neither increase nor decrease

- Increase somewhat

- Increase considerably

- Increase strongly

H.2.9 Demand of for more specific government intervention to support women

Do you think the government should increase or decrease the level of anti-discrimination policies for women?

- Decrease a lot

- Decrease somewhat

- Keep current level

- Increase somewhat

- Increase a lot

Do you think the government should increase or decrease policy efforts to compensate disadvantages women may have in the labor market due to family responsibilities?

- Decrease a lot

- Decrease somewhat

- Keep current level

- Increase somewhat

- Increase a lot

H.2.10 Belief elicitation

The topic of this question is **(pre-tax) wages of men and women in the United States**. This question is **not** about how you think **things should be** but how you think they actually are.

Please think of all individuals in the U.S., men and women, who are **45 years old**, hold a **Bachelor degree** and **work 40 hours per week** as **full-time employees**. How many dollars, do you think, does a **woman with these characteristics** make on average for every $100 made by a man with the **same characteristics?**

If your guess corresponds to the objective value based on recent data provided by the U.S. Census Bureau, you will receive a bonus of $0.2.

Please use the slider right below this text to communicate your best guess.

(Scroll down a little in case the interactive graph below the slider is not fully displayed.)

[There is a bar chart with two bars. Men's wages are represented by a yellow bar that is

fixed to the value $100. Women's wages are represented by an interactive pink bar that responds to a slider at the bottom of the page. The slider ranges from $0 to $200 and the pink bar takes on values between $0 and $200 accordingly.]

H.2.11 Additional information acquisition

Since the last time you took a survey on gender differences in wages, have you read in newspapers, magazines or online about the topic?

- Yes.

- No.

- I am not sure.

- I have never taken a survey on this topic before.

Since the last time you took a survey on gender differences in wages, have you had any conversations about the topic?

- Yes.

- No.

- I am not sure.

- I have never taken a survey on this topic before.

H.3 Main Experiment (Wave B)

H.3.1 Welcome Page, including consent (minor change)

Dear participant!

This study is conducted by researchers from Goethe University Frankfurt, Germany. Participants will be asked to answer a few questions on their opinions, as well as a set of demographic questions.

The most important factor for the success of our research is that **you answer honestly**. No matter what your political views are, by completing this survey, you are contributing to our knowledge as a society. Anytime you don't know an answer, just give your best guess.

Participation in this study typically takes **15 minutes** and is **strictly anonymous**. You may participate in the survey **once**. Close **attention** is **required** for your responses to count. In this survey you will have several opportunities to **receive a bonus** in addition to your fixed payoff!

Note: This study has received ethics approval from the Institutional Review Board of Goethe University, Frankfurt. Your participation in this study is purely voluntary. Your name will never be recorded and you will never be identified. If you have any questions about this study or if you want to have your responses deleted, you may contact us at econresearch.frankfurt@gmail.com.

You must be U.S. resident of at least 18 years of age in order to participate in this survey.

- Yes, I would like to take part in this study, and confirm that I am a U.S. resident and am 18 or older.

- No, I would not like to participate.

H.3.2 Screening Questions (changed: dropped political orientation)

In which region do you currently reside?

- Northeast (CT, ME, MA, NH, RI, VT, NJ, NY, PA)

- Midwest (IL, IN, MI, OH, WI, IA, KS, MN, MO, NE, ND, SD)

- South (DE, DC, FL, GA, MD, NC, SC, VA, WV, AL, KY, MS, TN, AR, LA, OK, TX)

- West (AZ, CO, ID, NM, MT, UT, NV, WY, AK, CA, HI, OR, WA)

What is your age?

- 18-24

- 25-34

- 35-44

- 45-54

- 55-65

- older than 65

Which of these describes you more accurately?

- Male

- Female

Which of the following best describes your current employment status?

- Full-time employee

- Part-time employee

- Self-employed or business owner

- Unemployed or looking for work

- Student

- Retired

- Out of the labor force, i.e. not working and not looking for work (homemaker,...)

What was your **household's income from all sources**, before taxes and subsidies, in 2017 in US-Dollars?

By household we mean yourself and any family living with you but not renters and roommates.

- Less than 15,000$

- Between 15,000$ and 25,000$

- Between 25,000$ and 50,000$

- Between 50,000$ and 75,000$

- Between 75,000$ and 100,000$

- Between 100,000$ and 150,000$

- Between 150,000$ and 200,000$

- More than 200,000$

H.3.3 Attention screener (no change)

This question is about the following problem. In questionnaires like ours, sometimes there are participants who do not carefully read the questions and just quickly click through the survey. This means that there are a lot of random answers which compromise the results of research studies. To show that you read our questions carefully, please choose both "Very strongly interested" and "Not interested at al" as your answer in the next

question.

How interested are you in politics?

- Very strongly interested

- Interested

- A little bit interested

- Almost not interested

- Not interested at all

H.3.4 Belief elicitation (no change)

The topic of this question is **(pre-tax) wages of men and women in the United States**. This question is **not** about how you think **things should be** but how you think they actually are.

Please think of all individuals in the U.S., men and women, who are **45 years old**, hold a **Bachelor degree** and **work 40 hours per week** as **full-time employees**. How many dollars, do you think, does a**woman with these characteristics** make on average for every $100 made by a man with the **same characteristics?**

[The following sentence is only shown to those individuals whose beliefs are incentivized. Name of survey is "American Community Survey" in case of T^{74} and "Current Population Survey" in case of T^{94}.]

If your estimate deviates by less than $2 from the value found by the most recent *<name of survey>* as of the beginning of 2018 you will receive a bonus of $2.

Please use the slider at the bottom of this page to communicate your estimate.

[There is a bar chart with two bars. Men's wages are represented by a yellow bar that is fixed to the value $100. Women's wages are represented by an interactive pink bar that

responds to a slider at the bottom of the page. The slider ranges from $0 to $200 and the pink bar takes on values between $0 and $200 accordingly.]

H.3.5 Notification (no change)

[Individuals in both treatment groups see the following message:]

On the next screen we would like to provide you with the objective value of the described wage difference based on **survey data collected by the United States Census Bureau.**

We would like you to carefully review this information as you will not be able to go back.

Press "Next" to continue.

H.3.6 Information treatment (no change)

[This page is shown to individuals in any of the two treatment groups. Value corresponds to "$74" in case of T^{74} and to "$94" in case of T^{94}. Name of survey corresponds to "American Community Survey" in case of T^{74} and to "Current Population Survey" in case of T^{94}.]

Here is the true value for the wage difference you have just guessed:

In fact, for every $100 earned by a male, a female earned *<value>* when both are 45 years old, hold a Bachelor degree and work 40 hours per week as employees.

[There is a bar chart with three bars: One yellow bar set to a value of $100, one pink bar representing the respondent's previously made estimate and one red bar representing either $74 or $94, depending on the treatment group.]

[In case their previously made estimate deviates by more than $2 from the objective value in their treatment group or in case the estimate was not incentivized previously, respondents see the following message below the graph:]

Thank you for your estimate!

[Alternatively, in case their estimate deviates by less than $2 from the objective value and the guess was incentivized, respondents see the following below the graph:]

Congratulations! Your estimate is close to the value reported by the *<name of survey>*. You will receive a bonus of $2.

The actual value is based on the most recent available wage statistics from the *<name of survey>* as of January 2018. The *<name of survey>* is regularly conducted by the U.S. Census Bureau among households in the United States.

H.3.7   Reminder (no major change)

[Individuals in the pure control group see the following:]

You just stated that you believe a 45-year-old full-time working **female** employee who holds a Bachelor degree and works 40 hours per week earns ***$<guess made previously>*** for every **$100** earned by a comparable **male individual**.

[Individuals in the pure control group who are in the incentivized condition see the following sentence:]

At the end of this survey we will let you know about the objective value based on data from the U.S. Census Bureau and you will find out whether you won the $2 bonus.

[Individuals in the pure control group who are in the unincentivized condition see the following sentence:]

At the end of this survey we will let you know about the objective value based on data from the U.S. Census Bureau.

[The following is again shown to all individuals:]

On the following pages we will ask you questions on your **personal opinions**. There are **no right or wrong answers.** We are just interested in your subjective views.

Press "Next" in order to continue.

H.3.8   General perceptions and unspecific policy demand (no change)

How do you feel about the following statements where 1 means you **fully disagree** and 10 means you **fully agree**?

Gender differences in wages are **large** in the United States.

- Answer on a scale from 1 to 10

Gender differences in wages are a **problem** in the United States.

- Answer on a scale from 1 to 10

The government should do more to **promote wage equality** between men and women.

- Answer on a scale from 1 to 10

H.3.9 Perceived fairness of women's wages (no change)

Which of the following best describes your opinion on the **fairness of wages** received by **women** in the U.S.?

- Much less than fair

- Less than fair

- Fair

- More than fair

- Much more than fair

H.3.10 Specific self-reported policy demand (changed: transparency policy)

What is your **opinion** on the following labor market policies? When making your choice, please think of all potential **costs** and **benefits**.

[The order of the following items is randomized:]

Currently, federal law requires that men and women **get equal pay** for work that is comparable in terms of **skill, effort, responsibility** and **working conditions** in the same establishment. In case of suspected discrimination employees may file a lawsuit against their employers. If they win the case, then they are to be compensated by their employers.

Should the government give **more freedom in wage setting** to companies by making equal pay legislation **less strict** or would you like to see **stricter enforcement of the existing legislation**?

- A lot less strict

- Somewhat less strict

- Keep status quo

- Somewhat stricter

- A lot stricter

Large public contractors are legally required to have so-called **"Affirmative Action Plans"**, i.e. they have to **support women** and minorities at all levels of the hierarchy through measures such as training programs and outreach efforts.

Do you think the government should **strengthen or soften** this **requirement** in terms of strictness and the set of companies that have to comply?

- Soften a lot

- Soften somewhat

- Neither strengthen nor soften

- Strengthen somewhat

- Strengthen a lot

Wage transparency within firms provides a basis for wage negotiations and may discipline companies by making discriminatory wages visible. Currently, wage transparency is **not legally required**. However, **employees are protected** by law from retaliation through employers in case they share information on their wages.

Would you like the government to enforce **more or less wage transparency**?

- A lot less

- Somewhat less

- Keep current level

- Somewhat more

- A lot more

Many countries currently have **gender quotas** in place in order to increase the representation of women in leading positions.

Are you **in favor or against** the introduction of similar **statutory gender quotas** in the United States?

- Strongly against

- Somewhat against

- Neither in favor nor against

- Somewhat in favor

- Strongly in favor

Child day care may enable mothers as well as fathers to work full-time if they want to.

Should the government increase or decrease the **amount of public resources** spent on making **child care available and affordable**?

- Decrease strongly

- Decrease somewhat

- Neither increase nor decrease

- Increase somewhat

- Increase strongly

[Newly added item:[a]]

In the **U.K.** large companies have to report their **gender pay gap** and the information is made **publicly available on a website**.

Are you **in favor or against** the introduction of a **similar website** in the **U.S.**?

- Strongly against

- Somewhat against

- Neither in favor nor against

- Somewhat in favor

- Strongly in favor

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[a]Dropped instead: Statutory wage transparency within firms.

H.3.11   Intention to sign a petition (unchanged)

Reporting requirements for companies may facilitate the detection of gender-based wage discrimination. Currently, **companies with at least 100 employees** have to file **yearly reports to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission**, including information on **number of employees they employ** by gender and job category but

not on wages.

You now have the opportunity to sign a **real petition** on the **White House Petition Website**. If enough people sign the petition, the White House will consider it and post an official response. Consider the following **two petitions** and decide whether you would like to sign one of them:

Petition I: Increase reporting requirements

This petition suggests that **employers with at least 100 employees** have to include information on **average wages** and hours worked **by gender and position** in their annual reports to the **Equal Employment Opportunity Commission** (EEOC). Such information **helps detecting discriminatory pay** while keeping employee information **confidential**.

Petition II: Abolish reporting requirements

This petition suggests that the **obligatory annual reports to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC)** should be **abolished** for private employers in order to **reduce bureaucracy**.

Would you like to sign one of the petitions?

- I want to sign Petition I (Increase requirements).

- I want to sign Petition II (Abolish requirements).

- I do not want to sign any of the petitions.

H.3.12 Link to petition (unchanged)

[This page is only shown to individuals who expressed their intention to sign one of the petitions. <Petition name> corresponds to "Petition I" or "Petition II", depending on

the previous choice. Correspondingly, <description> corresponds to "Increase reporting requirements" or "Abolish reporting requirements".]

In order to sing **<petition name>** (<Petition description>), click on the following link:

Link **<petition name>**

The petition will open in a new tab. After signing do not forget to come back and finish the survey.

In order to continue the survey press "Next".

H.3.13 External Content: Petition (unchanged)

[The following content appears in a new tab opening an external website, the White House Petition Website, in case the respondent clicks on the link on the previous survey page. (For a screenshot see Figure A.6.)]

[If the respondent previously chose Petition I:]

WE THE PEOPLE ASK THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT TO CHANGE AN EXISTING ADMINISTRATION POLICY:

Revise employer information report "EEO-1": Add information on wages by gender and job category.

Created by S.S. on November 19, 2018

We request that employers with 100 or more employees report information about W-2 earnings and hours worked of their employees, organized by income category, gender and ethnicity in their annual reports to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"). So far, these reports have to include information on demographics of employees, but not on their earnings and hours worked.

The objective of the change we request is to better position federal agencies to enforce pay discrimination laws, while respecting concerns about confidentiality and minimizing employers' data collection burden.

[If the respondent previously chose Petition II:]

Decrease reporting requirements for companies: Abolish annual employer information report "EEO-1".

Created by S.S. on November19, 2018

We request that employers with 100 or more employees no longer have to report information about number of employees, organized by income category, gender and ethnicity.

The annual reports to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") pose an undue burden for employers. By reducing this burden, companies can invest their resources into more productive activities.

[The remainder of the page is identical for both Petition I and Petition II:]

ECONOMY & JOBS

Sign This Petition

[Text entry fields (mandatory):]

First Name*

Last Name*

Email Address*

[Checkbox:]

☐ THE WHITE HOUSE MAY SEND ME EMAILS ABOUT THIS AND OTHER ISSUES

[Button:]

Sign Now

BY SIGNING THIS PETITION YOU AGREE TO THE <u>TERMS AND CONDITIONS</u>.

H.3.14 Donation decision (no major change)

By taking this survey, you are automatically enrolled in a **lottery to win \$300**. In a few days you will know whether you won the \$300.

You now get to decide how much of the \$300 you want to **donate** to the **American Association of University Women** and how much to **keep** in case you win the lottery.

The American Association of University Women (AAUW) is an NGO that advocates public policy in order to advance **equity of women and men in the labor market**. Moreover, it **supports girls' and women's education financially and intellectually** and provides **case support** to women facing **discrimination at the workplace**.

For every Dollar you donate to AAUW, **we donate another \$0.5** in addition. If you are the winner of the lottery, you will be notified and will **receive your payoff via the survey platform in panel points**, so no further action is required on your part. You will also receive a **proof of the donation** made to AAUW. (This proof will be sent by the survey platform provider, so we will never know your identity.)

Please let us know how much you would like to **donate to AAUW** by filling in your **preferred donation amount** in the following field. (Please note, your answer must be a **whole number** between 0 and 300.):

- Entry field (only integers between 0 and 300 accepted).

[As soon as an answer is entered in the entry field above, the following message appears with <donation amount> corresponding to the amount chosen, <payoff amount> corresponding to 300 - donation amount and <total donation> corresponding to the donation amount:]

You decided to **donate \$<donation amount>** to AAUW and to have the remaining **\$<payoff amount> added to your payoff**. Together with our subsidy the **total amount donated** will be **\$<total donation>** in case you win the lottery.

You can still adjust your donation decision above. Click "next" in order to confirm your decision and continue.

H.3.15 Facebook like (unchanged)

Do you want to **"like"** the **American Association of University Women** (AAUW) on **Facebook**? Click below to do so!

(Please note: By clicking, Facebook will link you to your profile (if you have one) and will likely draw data such as your IP-address.)

[There is a button that says "Give Facebook LIKE to AAUW!". As soon as the respondent clicks on it, the rest of the page is loaded:]

Please click on the "like" symbol in the box below to complete your facebook like:

[There is an actual facebook plug-in that allows to give a facebook like.]

[Dropped: Perceived factors contributing to gender differences in wages]

H.3.16 Introduction to information acquisition (only visibility changed)

[In contrast to the main wave, this screen is no longer visible to the pure control group but only to those subjects in one of the two treatment groups.]

On the following page you have the opportunity to choose between **receiving additional information** relevant for the debate on gender differences in wages or **increasing your payoff** under **six different scenarios**.

Please note that there are **actual stakes involved**: For every 5th participant in this study, we are going to **implement** one of the six decisions later in the survey. In case you are selected, you get a notification and you will receive either the information (3-minute read) or the additional payoff.

Each of the six scenarios is **equally likely to get implemented**, so we advise you to consider each of them carefully.

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H.3.17 Endogenous information acquisition (only visibility changed)

[In contrast to the main wave, this screen is no longer visible to the pure control group but only to those subjects in one of the two treatment groups.]

[The order of the "progressive" and the "traditional" institution is randomized.]
We offer additional information either from

- Institution A: An **institution favoring government intervention to support women's progress in the labor market** or from

- Institution B: An **institution favoring a traditional role for women as caregivers for the family and arguing against related government intervention.**

Both institutions offer **arguments** in **support of their view** in the form of a 3-minute read. The purpose of the text is to inform the general public and to **convince the reader of the institution's view**. Please let us know under the following six scenarios whether you want to **receive additional insights within this survey** from either of the two institutions or whether you want to **increase your payoff** instead. Remember that each of the scenarios is equally likely to get implemented.

<u>**Scenario 1**</u>: Would you like to receive information from institution A or $0.01?

- Info from institution A (favoring public policy to support women in the labor market)

- Receive $0.01 and no info

<u>**Scenario 2**</u>: Would you like to receive information from institution A or $0.3?

- Info from institution A (favoring public policy to support women in the labor market)

- Receive $0.3 and no info

Scenario 3: Would you like to receive information from institution A or $0.5?

- Info from institution A (favoring public policy to support women in the labor market)

- Receive $0.5 and no info

Scenario 4: Would you like to receive information from institution B or $0.01?

- Info from institution B (favoring no government intervention and a traditional role for women)

- Receive $0.01 and no info

Scenario 5: Would you like to receive information from institution B or $0.3?

- Info from institution B (favoring no government intervention and a traditional role for women)

- Receive $0.3 and no info

Scenario 6: Would you like to receive information from institution B or $0.5?

- Info from institution B (favoring no government intervention and a traditional role for women)

- Receive $0.5 and no info

H.3.18   Perceived effectiveness of government intervention and trust in the government (newly added))

We would like you to think about the **effectiveness** of **government intervention** aimed at supporting women in the labor market. **How effective**, do you think, are the following types of policies in increasing **women's wages**?

[The order of the following items is randomized.]

   i. Policies that help to detect and prevent discrimination, such as equal pay legislation, reporting requirements for companies and wage transparency.

  ii. Policies that actively support women's progress in the labor market, such as statutory training and outreach programs targeted at women.

 iii. Policies that help women combine work and family responsibilities, such as public subsidies to child care.

- Strongly counterproductive

- Somewhat counterproductive

- Neither effective nor counterproductive

- Somewhat effective

- Highly effective

This is a question about the government. It does **not refer to Democrats or Republicans** in particular, but just to the **government in general**. To what extent do you agree with the following statement?

    Generally, the **government's** willingness to **do what is right** can be **trusted.**

- Strongly disagree

- Somewhat disagree

- Neither agree nor disagree

- Somewhat agree

- Strongly agree

H.3.19   Extrapolation to related belief about gender differences in wages (changed)

[The following belief is randomized, i.e. only one of the following two is shown to each respondent.]

[Version A: Presence of at least one child in the household:]

This question asks about a different statistic than the one before:

Please think of all individuals in the U.S., men and women, who are **45 years old**, hold a **Bachelor degree**, work **40 hours per week** as full-time employees and have **at least one child living in their household**. How much, do you think, does a woman with these characteristics make on average for every $100 made by a man with the **same characteristics**?

[Version B: Same job in same company:]

This question asks about a different statistic than the one before:

Please think of all individuals in the U.S., men and women, who are **45 years old**, hold a **Bachelor degree** and work **40 hours per week** as full-time employees. How much, do you think, does a woman with these characteristics make on average for every $100 made by a man with the **same characteristics** if both **work for the same company**, doing the **same job**?

[In the following sentence, which is shown to those respondents in Version A, <name of survey> again corresponds to "American Community Survey" for T^{74} and half of the control group and to "Current Population Survey" for T^{94} and the other half of the control group.]

If your estimate deviates by less than $2 from the value found by the most recent *<name*

of survey> as of the beginning of 2018 you will receive a bonus of $1.

Please use the slider at the bottom of this page to communicate your estimate.

[There is a bar chart with two bars. Men's wages are represented by a yellow bar that is fixed to the value $100. Women's wages are represented by an interactive pink bar that responds to a slider. The slider ranges from $0 to $200 and the pink bar takes on values between $0 and $200 accordingly.]

H.3.20 Perceived costs of government intervention (newly added)

To what extent do you **agree or disagree** with the following statements about **(potential) costs** of **policies designed to support women** in the labor market?

Policies to reduce gender differences in earnings...

[The order of the following items is randomized.]

i. ...impose administrative costs by creating additional **bureaucracy** and thereby **harm the economy**.

ii. ...lead to **distortions** such as **not having the most qualified persons** in important positions and thereby **harm the economy**.

iii. ...lead to additional **government expenditures** and thereby unduly **increase the tax burden**.

- Strongly disagree

- Somewhat disagree

- Neither agree nor disagree

- Somewhat agree

- Strongly agree

H.3.21 Related world views (extended)

[The following items are shown only to individuals in the pure control group.]

To what extent do you **agree or disagree** with the following two **statements**?

[The order of the following items is randomized:]

   i. A husband's job is to earn money, a wife's job is to look after the home and family.

   ii. When women advance in the labor market, some men are pushed out or lose.

   iii. Everyone can make it in this country, men as well as women, if they work hard enough.

   iv. Gender equality is so important that the government should take active steps wherever it can to support women in the labor market even if this is costly.

   v. Some people are tall, others are short. Some people are smart, others not. Inequalities exist and it is not the government's job to compensate for them.

   vi. Fighting discrimination against women by measures such as gender quotas is wrong because it creates discrimination against men.

- Strongly disagree

- Disagree

- Neither agree nor disagree

- Agree

- Strongly agree

H.3.22 Work-related questions, education, ethnicity (visibility changed)

[Treatment groups only:]

Where do you see yourself in **10 years from now**?

- 10 years from now I will be working full-time.

- 10 years from now I will be working part-time.

- 10 years from now I will not be working for money (retirement, student, home-maker,...)

[Treatment groups only:]

Which of the following best describes your **expectations** for the **coming 10 years**? My **wage** is going to...

- ...decrease considerably over the next 10 years.

- ...decrease a little over the next 10 years.

- ...neither increase nor decrease over the next 10 years.

- ...increase a little over the next 10 years.

- ...increase considerably over the next 10 years.

[Treatment groups only:]

Which of the following best describes your opinion on the **fairness** of your **own personal wage** in your current job (or in your previous job, in case you are currently not working)?

- Much less than fair

- Less than fair

- Fair

- More than fair

- Much more than fair

- I have never worked for a wage

What category best describes your **highest level of education**?

- Eighth grade or less

- Some high school

- High school degree/GED

- Some college

- 2-year College degree/Associate degree

- 4-year College degree/Bachelor's degree

- Master's degree

- Doctoral degree

- Professional degree (JD,MD,MBA)

How would you describe your race?

- White/Caucasian

- Black/African American

- Asian American

- Other [**Text entry requested**]

Are you of Hispanic, Latino, or Spanish origin?

- Yes

- No

H.3.23 Politics (newly added)

In politics today, do you consider yourself a **Republican**, a **Democrat**, or an **Independent**?

- Republican

- Independent, leaning Republican

- Independent

- Independent, leaning Democrat

- Democrat

- Other *(Please specify.)*

[Control group only:]
How important are the following topics when it comes to your personal voting decisions?

[The order of the following items is randomized.]

i. Climate change

ii. Gender equality in labor markets

iii. Health care

iv. Immigration

- Not important at all

- Hardly important

- A little bit important

- Important

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- Very important

[All respondents:] Which candidate did you vote for in the 2016 presidential election?

- Donald Trump.

- Hilary Clinton.

- I did not vote.

- I voted but prefer not to tell.

- Other *(Please specify.)*

H.3.24   Control group information (unchanged)

[This screen is only shown to individuals in the control group and corresponds to the "information treatment" described above for the treatment groups.]

H.3.25   Industry, occupation, income, working hours (unchanged)

In which of the following industries do you work or did you last work in your main job?

- Construction

- Nondurable manufacturing (food, textiles, apparel, paper products, printing and publishing, chemicals, plastic products, ...)

- Durable manufacturing (lumber and wood products, furniture, metal industries, machinery and computing equipment, motor vehicles, aircraft, medical instruments, ...)

- Finance, insurance, real estate

- Health, education and social services (Hospitals, schools, universities, child day care, nursing and personal care,...)

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- Wholesale trade

- Retail trade (grocery stores, eating and drinking places, department stores, motor vehicle dealers,...)

- Business and repair services (computer and data processing services, advertising, services to dwellings and other buildings, personnel supply services, automotive repair and related services,...)

- Professional services (legal services, engineering/architectural services, management/public relations services, accounting/auditing/bookkeeping services, research/development/te services, religious organizations,...)

- Public administration

- Personal services (hotels and motels, private households, beauty shops, laundry, cleaning, and garment services,...)

- Transportation and communication (trucking service, postal service, radio and television broadcasting, telephone communications, electric light and power, sanitary services,...)

- Other *[Text entry required.]*

Please give a more detailed description of your current industry or last industry, in case you are currently not working, using your own words. (Examples: restaurant, hospital, automotive repair, retail bakery, manufacturing of chemicals, postal service, banking, insurance, legal services,...)

- *[free text entry]*

Please describe your current occupation/job description. (Examples: photographer, dental assistant, firefighter, cook, painting worker, financial analyst, Š). In case you are currently not working, refer to your last job please.

- *[free text entry]*

[The following question is only shown to employed individuals.]

How many employees are currently employed at the company you are working for?

- Fewer than 10 employees

- Between 10 and 100 employees

- Between 100 and 500 employees

- More than 500 employees

What is your **own** **personal** **current** **yearly** **labor income in US Dollars**, before taxes, deductions and subsidies?

- *[free text entry (only numbers)]*

What is your **current** **yearly** **household labor income** in US Dollars, before taxes, deductions and subsidies?

By household we mean yourself and any family living with you but not renters and roommates.

- *[free text entry (only numbers)]*

How many hours do you usually work for pay per week?

- 0

- 1-10

- 11-20

- 21-25

- 26-30

- 31-35

- 36-40

- 41-45

- 46-50

- 51-55

- 56-60

- more than 60 hours per week

H.3.26 Demographic and background questions (unchanged)

Which of the following best describes your marital status?

- Single

- Married

- Divorced

- Widowed

- Other: *[Text entry required.]*

How many children do you have?

i. Number of boys

ii. Number of girls

- 0

- 1

- 2

- 3

- 4

- 5 or more

What is the zip code of your current residence?

- *[Text entry field (only 5-digit numbers)]*

What is your year of birth?

- 1951

- 1952

- .

- .

- 1999

- 2000

Are your facebook "likes" visible or private?

- They are visible (standard settings).

- I have restricted visibility.

- I do not have a facebook account.

[Shown to subjects in the treatment groups:]

In the past three weeks, have you read in newspapers, in magazines or online about gender differences in wages?

- Yes.

- No.

- I am not sure.

Is there anything you would like to add?

[Free text entry.]

[Dropped: Perceived trustworthiness of information, trust in survey data collected by the census, perceived relevance of information, perceived political bias of survey]

H.3.27 Final screen (visibility changed, minor changes)

[Shown to every fifth respondent in the treatment groups: <relevant scenario> corresponds to one of the six information acquisition scenarios the respondent was facing before. <decision> corresponds to the respondent's decision in this specific scenario.]

Every 5th participant is chosen for the implementation of his/her decision to acquire additional information or to increase one's payoff. Congratulations, you were chosen!

The following decision was randomly chosen for implementation for you:

<relevant scenario>

Your choice was: *<decision>*

[In case the respondent previously chose the payoff in the respective scenario she receives the following message, with <amount> corresponding to the relevant amount.]

<amount> will be added to your payoff.

[In case the respondent chose to receive information in the respective scenario she receives the following message, where <Link to more information> is a link that leads to a website with additional information.]

Here is a link to the information you have chosen (The link will open in a new tab. Do not forget to come back and click submit in order to submit your survey responses.):*<Link to more information>*

[All respondents again see the following message.]

Thank you for participating in this survey. We will shortly calculate your final payoff including the participation fee and any bonus, if applicable. Moreover, the winner of the lottery will be determined as soon as all responses are in and will be contacted by the survey platform.

All additional payments will be made in the same way as your regular survey pay.

H.3.28 External Content: 3-minute read (unchanged)

[The following content appears in a new tab opening an external website in case the respondent clicks on the link on the previous survey page.]

[If the respondent previously chose to see the 3-minute read from the progressive institution in favor of women in the labor market and related government intervention, the following content appeared:][a]

The Business Case for Childcare

Almost one in 10 of the world's population, 679 million, are children younger than five years old. To thrive and develop, these children and their older siblings need care. Yet in many parts of the world, childcare remains scarce. Globally, just over half of the children under age five benefit from a preschool program. Formal childcare is often outside the reach of low and middle-income employees. For those who can afford it, available options are often limited and poorly aligned with full-time working hours. Access to care is particularly lacking for children younger than three.

For employers, the lack of good quality and affordable childcare for their employees can translate into higher turnover and absenteeism, lower productivity, and difficulty recruiting skilled employees. This is because the unavailability or unaffordability of care affects the choices that parents make regarding the type of work that they do, whether they stay at home, or how they combine work with care. For families, gaps in access to quality care can mean less paid working time and lower household incomes.

Because women are more likely than men to bear childcare responsibilities, lack of childcare is a major barrier to women's full and equal participation in paid work. According

to the International Labour Organization, globally, women's labor force participation rate is just over 49 percent, nearly 27 percentage points lower than the rate for men. A McKinsey Global Institute study estimated that closing gender gaps in economic participation would increase global gross domestic product (GDP) by 26 percent by 2025, adding \$12 trillion. Evidence from the Caribbean, Latin America, and Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries suggests that access to subsidized childcare can have a significant positive impact on women's employment rates and the number of hours that women work.

Policymakers internationally are recognizing the importance of access to childcare for both economic and gender equality. To date, 192 nations have signed the Global Goals for Sustainable Development, which include the target, "By 2030, ensure that all girls and boys have access to quality early childhood development, care and preprimary education so that they are ready for primary education." In countries such as Brazil, Chile, Ecuador, India, Japan, Jordan, and Turkey, statutes require employers to provide or support childcare. Even when not driven by regulatory compliance, many employers are providing childcare supports as part of their general compensation strategy to achieve better business outcomes. Yet there is a lot more that can be done through partnerships and collaboration between the public and private sectors and civil society organizations. For the International Finance Corporation (IFC), a member of the World Bank Group and the largest global development institution focused exclusively on the private sector in developing countries, improving access to childcare goes hand in hand with fostering workplace gender diversity and helping parents enter and advance in the workforce while enabling companies to strengthen their bottom line. IFC's focus on removing barriers, such as lack of childcare, to women's (and men's) access to more and better jobs is embedded in the World Bank Group's Gender Strategy and IFC's vision focused on creating markets, particularly in fragile, conflict-affected, and low-income countries. In countries where employer supported childcare is mandatory, IFC is working with its clients to substantiate the business case and to help them go beyond compliance and implement childcare strategies best suited to their business needs, thus resulting in better

business results.

[If the respondent previously chose to see the 3-minute read from the institution described as more conservative and in favor of a traditional role for women outside the labor market the following content appeared:][b]

The Real Pay Gap

Apr 10th, 2014 3 min read

COMMENTARY BY Stephen Moore @StephenMoore

The Equal Pay Act, sponsored by Senator Barbara Mikulski (D., Md.), is a laughably bad idea — almost a parody of liberal interventionism in the market. Under the law, there is federal funding for girls' negotiation training and grant awards for reducing gender discrimination. It bestows on disgruntled employees yet more grounds on which to sue their employers for alleged discrimination – when, in most cases, the malcontents are just sub-par employees. But that's not even the major flaw of this latest Democratic measure against gender discrimination. The crisis in America today isn't about women's wages; it's about men's wages. Men are still the chief breadwinners in most families, and their wages are not moving much at all. If we look at Census Bureau data, we find that while men's wages have risen by about 6 percent in real terms since 1980, women's wages have risen by about 60 percent. Any gap in pay — real or imagined — is rapidly shrinking.

President Obama uses the figure of 77 cents earned by a woman for every dollar earned by a man. But that is a comparison of all women with all men (and even Mr. Obama's own economists say a woman earns 81 cents for every dollar earned by her male counterpart). In fact, a 2009 Labor Department study found that, when we control for work experience and education, the gap is only about 5 percent. And when we account for the fact that men are more likely to be injured or suffer an accident on the job, and do riskier work and often more unpleasant jobs than women, the gap virtually disappears. My friend Mark Perry, an economist who runs the Carpe Diem blog at the American Enterprise Institute, has documented all this.

Furthermore, the latest surveys of college graduates find virtually no pay discrepancy between men and women, so for this generation the 77-cents mantra is as outdated as bell-bottom jeans.

The real wage crisis has to do with men. The latest education statistics show that women are about 53 percent of college enrollees and almost 60 percent of those pursuing advanced degrees. Pay rises with educational attainment. There is almost no gender gap for the latest generation entering the workforce; if the current educational trends continue, it is quite possible that women will start having higher earnings than men, and this will be especially true of women who do not have children.

What are the implications of a society in which women earn more than men? We don't really know, but it could be disruptive to family stability. If men aren't the breadwinners, will women regard them as economically expendable? We saw what happened to family structure in low-income and black households when a welfare check took the place of a father's paycheck. Divorce rates go up when men lose their jobs.

The problem here is especially acute with respect to black families. Black women have been on a 30-year trend of outpacing black men in terms of education and thus earnings. Men are becoming financially expendable. It is also true that the decline in men's wages is necessitating women to work to supplement family income. Sometimes this is by the woman's choice, but in this rough economy it is less a matter of free will than of economic necessity.

Gender gaps in pay are also a distraction from the other real financial problem, which is declining pay for almost all groups. Between 2009 and 2012, every racial group and both genders have done worse. Actually, women's paychecks have fallen slightly more than men's in this phony recovery — and that is despite the fact that one of Mr. Obama's first acts as president was to sign the Lilly Ledbetter paycheck-equality act. So much for the government's being able to equalize incomes through edict.

Since more and more families have two earners — the husband and the wife — women are hardly going to cheer if the gender gap falls only because their husbands are earning less. But that is the way Mr. Obama has pursued equality — by devising policies that

make us all a little poorer.

Income, race, and gender inequality have been clever distractions for the president. The gap that matters most he chooses to ignore: the gap between what middle-class people should be earning and what they are in fact taking home. Wages are falling for nearly everyone, Mr. President: for men, women, blacks, whites, the poor, and the middle class.

The $1,800 decline in middle-class incomes since the recovery began is the issue that matters to most Americans, and this is what Republicans should be shouting from the rooftops.

 - *Stephen Moore is chief economist at the Heritage Foundation.*

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[a][The article was provided by the Institute for Women's Policy Research (IWPR). Since the IWPR restructured its website after January 2019, the article is no longer available under the original link.]
  [b][See `https://www.heritage.org/poverty-and-inequality/commentary/the-real-pay-gap`.]

H.4 Follow-up Survey (Wave B)

H.4.1 Welcome Page, including consent (no major change)

Work Life Survey 2018

This is a study conducted by a team of researchers from different universities in Europe and North America. The purpose of the study is to gain insights into workplaces. By dedicating 5 minutes of your time, you contribute to our knowledge about organizations.

All answers you give will be fully confidential. We will not ask for information related to your identity. You may withdraw from the study or request the deletion of your data at any time via contact@worklifesurvey.eu .

If you are at least 18 years old and freely consent to participate in this study please click Next to start the survey.

   This survey is anonymous.

The record of your survey responses does not contain any identifying information about

you, unless a specific survey question explicitly asked for it.

If you used an identifying token to access this survey, please rest assured that this token will not be stored together with your responses. It is managed in a separate database and will only be updated to indicate whether you did (or did not) complete this survey. There is no way of matching identification tokens with survey responses.

H.4.2   Demographic Questions (obfuscation)

Please let us know your age.

- 18-24

- 25-34

- 35-54

- 55-70

- Older than 70

What is your gender?

- Male

- Female

What is your current employment status?

- I am working as an employee.

- I am running my own business.

- I am currently not working.

H.4.3   Hypothetical scenario on job referrals (obfuscation, unchanged)

An employee is working at a firm where an **employee referral program** is introduced. Under the program, employees are asked to refer their friends for jobs, and they are paid a **bonus** if their friend is hired. In addition, under the referral program, the firm will provide **special consideration** in the hiring process to referred candidates. Do you think the firm having the employee referral program would make the employee feel more respected?

- It is very unlikely to make the worker feel more respected.

- It is unlikely to make the worker feel more repected.

- It is somewhat unlikely to make the worker feel more respected.

- It is uncertain whether it will make the worker feel more respected.

- It is somewhat likely to make the worker feel more respected

- It is likely to make the worker feel more respected.

- It is very likely to make the worker feel more respected.

H.4.4   Job satisfaction (obfuscation, unchanged)

[The following is shown to employed individuals. The screen is different for self-employed and non-working individuals.]

You indicated that you are currently working as an employee. We would like to learn more about your job satisfaction on a scale from 1 to 7.

i) How attractive is your current employer?

ii) How attractive is your current job?

- 1 (not attractive)

- 2

- 3

- 4

- 5

- 6

- 7 (very attractive)

[Only shown for those who selected "I am working as an employee" before:]

How many employees are currently employed at your workplace (i.e. the plant, store or restaurant at which you are working)?

- Fewer than 100 employees

- Between 100 and 500 employees

- More than 500 employees

H.4.5 Questions on job referrals (obfuscation, unchanged)

[The following is shown to employed individuals. The screen is different for self-employed and non-working individuals.]

Think of your current main job. Assume your employer has an open job in your department. One of your relatives or friends would probably match the requirements of the job.

On a scale from 1 (very unlikely) to 7 (very likely): Would you...

  i) ...try to refer your relative/friend to your employer?

 ii) ...receive a reward from your employer for a successful referral?

- 1 (very unlikely)

- 2

- 3

- 4

- 5

- 6

- 7 (very likely)

H.4.6 Hypothetical choice scenario on job referrals (obfuscation, unchanged)

[The following is shown to employed individuals. The screen is slightly different for self-employed and non-working individuals.]

Suppose your employer is willing to pay a bonus tantamount to one week's salary to you if you refer someone and they get hired. You have a friend who is looking for work. You think it would take about 60 minutes to do the referral paperwork, and there is a 50% chance that your friend will receive an offer.

Would you refer your friend?

- Yes

- No

H.4.7 Perception of wage differences as a problem (no major change)

Now think of American workplaces at a more general level.

Do you think **wage differences** between the following groups are a **problem** in the **United States today**? Please answer the question on a scale from **"Not at all a problem"** to **"A very substantial problem"**.

[In the following, the order of items iii) and iv) is randomized.]

  i) High-skilled and low-skilled employees

ii) Men and women

iii) Men and women who are high-skilled

iv) Men and women who are low-skilled

- Not at all a problem

- Hardly a problem

- Somewhat a problem

- A problem

- A substantial problem

- A very substantial problem

H.4.8 Perceived fairness of wages (unchanged)

How fair do you generally find the wages received by the following groups?

i) Low-skilled workers

ii) Women

- Much less than fair

- Less than fair

- Fair

- More than fair

- Much more than fair

H.4.9 Demand of for unspecific government intervention (no major changes)

[The order of the following items is randomized:]

Do you think the government should increase or decrease efforts to **support women** in the labor market?

- Decrease strongly

- Decrease considerably

- Decrease somewhat

- Neither increase nor decrease

- Increase somewhat

- Increase considerably

- Increase strongly

Do you think the government should increase or decrease efforts to **support low-skilled workers** in the labor market?

- Decrease strongly

- Decrease considerably

- Decrease somewhat

- Neither increase nor decrease

- Increase somewhat

- Increase considerably

- Increase strongly

H.4.10 Demand for more specific government intervention to support women (no major changes)

[The order of the following items is randomized:]

Do you think the government should increase or decrease the level policies designed to reduce discrimination against women?

- Decrease a lot

- Decrease somewhat

- Keep current level

- Increase somewhat

- Increase a lot

Do you think the government should increase or decrease policy efforts to compensate disadvantages women may have in the labor market due to family responsibilities?

- Decrease a lot

- Decrease somewhat

- Keep current level

- Increase somewhat

- Increase a lot

H.4.11 Demand for specific government intervention to support women (newly added)

[The order of the following items is randomized:]

Do you think the government should **strengthen or soften** requirements for companies to have **"Affirmative Action Plans"** in place, i.e. plans to support women and

minorities through measures such as training programs and outreach efforts?

- Soften a lot

- Soften somewhat

- Neither strengthen nor soften

- Strengthen somewhat

- Strengthen a lot

Should the government give **more freedom in wage setting** to companies by making equal pay legislation l**less strict** or would you like to see a **stricter enforcement of the existing legislation**?

- A lot less strict

- Somewhat less strict

- Keep status quo

- Somewhat stricter

- A lot stricter

H.4.12   Posterior belief elicitation (no major change)

The topic of this question is **(pre-tax) wages of men and women in the United States**. This question is <u>**not**</u> about how you think **things should be** but how you think they actually are.

Please think of all individuals in the U.S., men and women, who are **45 years old**, hold a **Bachelor's degree** and **work 40 hours per week** as **full-time employees**. How many dollars, do you think, does a **woman with these characteristics** make on average for every $100 made by a man with the **same characteristics?**

If your guess corresponds to the objective value based on recent data provided by the U.S. Census Bureau, you will receive a bonus of $0.5.

Please use the slider right below this text to communicate your best guess.

(Scroll down a little in case the interactive graph below the slider is not fully displayed.)

[There is a bar chart with two bars. Men's wages are represented by a yellow bar that is fixed to the value $100. Women's wages are represented by an interactive pink bar that responds to a slider at the bottom of the page. The slider ranges from $0 to $200 and the pink bar takes on values between $0 and $200 accordingly.]

H.4.13 Additional information acquisition (unchanged)

Since the last time you took a survey on gender differences in wages, have you read in newspapers, in magazines or online about the topic?

- Yes.

- No.

- I am not sure.

- I have never taken a survey on this topic before.

Since the last time you took a survey on gender differences in wages, have you had any conversations about the topic?

- Yes.

- No.

- I am not sure.

- I have never taken a survey on this topic before.

References for the Appendix

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