

Online Appendix: The Long-run Effects of Teacher Collective Bargaining

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Table A-1: Summary Statistics of Analysis Variables

Variable	Men		Women	
	Mean	Std. Dev.	Mean	Std. Dev.
Age	42.426	4.307	42.456	4.308
Asian	0.010	0.033	0.010	0.033
Black	0.128	0.096	0.144	0.106
Hispanic	0.064	0.088	0.063	0.088
Other	0.010	0.021	0.010	0.023
DTB	0.625	0.484	0.619	0.486
Years Exposed	6.055	5.366	5.980	5.5369
Average EITC	0.001	0.011	0.001	0.011
Court-Ordered School Finance Reform	1.823	3.922	1.805	3.903
Legislative School Finance Reform	3.409	4.711	3.364	4.686
Food Stamp Exposure	0.625	0.325	0.621	0.326
Total Income	54,295.50	8,562.10	30,332.68	4,561.59
Hours Worked	38.964	2.112	29.552	1.685
Employed	0.822	0.046	0.730	0.043
Unemployed	0.057	0.025	0.048	0.020
Not in Labor Force	0.122	0.036	0.222	0.038
Years of Education	13.443	0.391	13.689	0.393
Occupational Skill Level	0.619	0.154	0.558	0.130
High School Degree	0.292	0.062	0.250	0.061
Some College	0.217	0.041	0.238	0.044
Associates Degree	0.081	0.023	0.109	0.026
Bachelors Degree	0.286	0.060	0.313	0.065

Notes: Authors' tabulations from 2005-2012 ACS data on 35-49 year old respondents. Tabulations are weighted by the number of individual observations that are used to calculate the averages in each state-cohort-year-gender cell.

Table A-2: Summary Statistics of Analysis Variables By Gender and Race/Ethnicity

Variable	Black &		White &		Black &		White &	
	Hispanic Men	Asian Men	Hispanic Women	Asian Women	Mean	Std. Dev.	Mean	Std. Dev.
Age	42.039	4.319	42.506	4.300	42.100	4.336	42.537	4.298
Duty-to-Bargain Law	0.503	0.500	0.650	0.477	0.491	0.500	0.648	0.478
Years Exposed	4.820	5.348	6.311	5.334	4.675	5.322	6.275	5.335
Average EITC	0.000	0.007	0.001	0.012	0.000	0.006	0.001	0.012
Court-Ordered School Finance Reform	2.121	4.278	1.761	3.841	2.012	4.181	1.758	3.836
Legislative School Finance Reform	2.901	4.468	3.514	4.753	2.855	4.430	3.480	4.734
Food Stamp Exposure	0.665	0.317	0.617	0.326	0.654	0.321	0.613	0.327
Total Income	34,434.89	7,630.40	59,326.87	9,233.07	26,149.84	5,273.62	31,486.16	4,861.68
Hours Worked	33.196	3.863	40.386	1.948	29.990	3.100	29.420	1.907
Employed	0.704	0.089	0.851	0.042	0.704	0.075	0.737	0.046
Unemployed	0.085	0.052	0.049	0.024	0.074	0.045	0.041	0.019
Not in Labor Force	0.211	0.074	0.100	0.032	0.222	0.069	0.222	0.043
Occupational Skill Level	0.652	0.151	0.614	0.154	0.585	0.133	0.553	0.129
Years of Education	12.641	0.485	13.644	0.397	13.042	0.486	13.870	0.411
High School Degree	0.332	0.098	0.281	0.064	0.277	0.088	0.243	0.065
Some College	0.239	0.077	0.212	0.043	0.275	0.073	0.227	0.047
Associates Degree	0.072	0.043	0.083	0.025	0.098	0.047	0.112	0.028
Bachelors Degree	0.155	0.063	0.319	0.063	0.201	0.069	0.344	0.072

Notes: Authors' tabulations from 2005-2012 ACS data on 35-49 year old respondents. Tabulations are weighted by the number of individual observations that are used to calculate the averages in each state-cohort-year-gender cell.

Table A-3: The Effect of Collective Bargaining Laws At 10 Years on Years of Education, 2008-2012 ACS Years Only

Exposure Time	All Men	Black & Hispanic Men	White & Asian Men	All Women	Black & Hispanic Women	White & Asian Women
	(i)	(ii)	(iii)	(iv)	(v)	(vi)
At 10 Years	-0.081** (0.040)	-0.151 (0.094)	-0.066* (0.036)	0.030 (0.060)	-0.107** (0.048)	0.057 (0.075)

Notes: Authors' estimation of equation (1) as described in the text using 2008-2012 ACS data on 35-49 year old respondents. 10-year estimates from the full event study model are shown. Regressions are based on 6,000 birth state-cohort-year observations. All estimates include birth state, year, and birth cohort-by-year fixed effects as well as controls school finance reform, EITC and food stamp measures as described in the text. Estimates in columns (i) and (iv) include controls for race/ethnicity. Regressions are weighted by the number of individual observations that are used to calculate the averages in each state-cohort-year-gender cell. Standard errors clustered at the birth state level are in parentheses: *** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** indicates significance at the 5% level and * indicates significance at the 10% level.

Table A-4: The Effect of Collective Bargaining Laws At 10 Years After Passage for Men – Robustness Checks

Panel A: Excluding States that Allow Teachers to Strike						
Exposure Time	Earnings (i)	Hours Worked (ii)	Employed (iii)	Not in Labor Force (iv)	Years of Education (v)	Occup. Skill (vi)
At 10 Years	-2303.25*** (668.61)	-0.561*** (0.196)	-0.012** (0.005)	0.010** (0.004)	-0.042 (0.038)	-0.002 (0.002)
Panel B: Controlling for Total Union Membership at Age 18						
Exposure Time	Earnings (i)	Hours Worked (ii)	Employed (iii)	Not in Labor Force (iv)	Years of Education (v)	Occup. Skill (vi)
At 10 Years	-2124.68*** (603.01)	-0.407** (0.185)	-0.009* (0.005)	0.008* (0.004)	-0.051 (0.037)	-0.003 (0.002)
Panel C: Controlling for Proportion Living in Urban Areas						
Exposure Time	Earnings (i)	Hours Worked (ii)	Employed (iii)	Not in Labor Force (iv)	Years of Education (v)	Occup. Skill (vi)
At 10 Years	-2106.37*** (624.75)	-0.421** (0.188)	-0.010** (0.005)	0.008** (0.004)	-0.048 (0.037)	-0.003 (0.002)
Panel D: Controlling for Riots and Violent Protests						
Exposure Time	Earnings (i)	Hours Worked (ii)	Employed (iii)	Not in Labor Force (iv)	Years of Education (v)	Occup. Skill (vi)
At 10 Years	-2162.89*** (590.13)	-0.421** (0.189)	-0.010** (0.005)	0.008** (0.004)	-0.053 (0.037)	-0.003 (0.002)
Panel E: Controlling for Current State Fixed Effects (Individual-level Data)						
Exposure Time	Earnings (i)	Hours Worked (ii)	Employed (iii)	Not in Labor Force (iv)	Years of Education (v)	Occup. Skill (vi)
10 Years	-2495.28*** (561.39)	-0.437** (0.185)	-0.009** (0.005)	0.008* (0.004)	-0.072* (0.040)	-0.004 (0.002)
Panel F: Including Birth State-by-Year Effects						
Exposure Time	Earnings (i)	Hours Worked (ii)	Employed (iii)	Not in Labor Force (iv)	Years of Education (v)	Occup. Skill (vi)
At 10 Years	-2218.16*** (690.71)	-0.627** (0.253)	-0.011** (0.005)	0.012** (0.005)	-0.068* (0.037)	-0.003 (0.002)
Panel G: Including Census Region-by-Cohort Fixed Effects						
Exposure Time	Earnings (i)	Hours Worked (ii)	Employed (iii)	Not in Labor Force (iv)	Years of Education (v)	Occup. Skill (vi)
At 10 Years	-2216.91*** (631.54)	-0.523** (0.225)	-0.011** (0.005)	0.010** (0.004)	-0.054 (0.037)	-0.003 (0.002)
Panel H: Controlling for Democratic Control of State Legislature						
Exposure Time	Earnings (i)	Hours Worked (ii)	Employed (iii)	Not in Labor Force (iv)	Years of Education (v)	Occup. Skill (vi)
10 Years	-1926.84*** (639.86)	-0.334* (0.177)	-0.008 (0.005)	0.006 (0.004)	-0.044 (0.038)	-0.003 (0.002)

Notes: Authors' estimation of equation (1) as described in the text using 2005-2012 ACS data on 35-49 year old respondents. 10-year estimates from the full event study model are shown. All estimates include birth state, year and birth cohort-by-year fixed effects. Occupational skill results and estimates in Panel E are based on individual data and control for race/ethnicity. Other outcomes are estimated using aggregated data and control for racial/ethnic composition of the state-cohort-year-gender cell. Regressions using aggregated data are weighted by the number of individual observations that are used to calculate the averages in each state-year-cohort-gender cell. The construction of each analysis sample and control variable is described in the text. Standard errors clustered at the birth state level are in parentheses: *** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** indicates significance at the 5% level and * indicates significance at the 10% level.

Table A-5: The Effect of Collective Bargaining Laws At 10 Years After Passage for Women – Robustness Checks

Panel A: Excluding States that Allow Teachers to Strike						
Exposure Time	Earnings (i)	Hours Worked (ii)	Employed (iii)	Not in Labor Force (iv)	Years of Education (v)	Occup. Skill (vi)
At 10 Years	-377.26 (430.54)	-0.510* (0.292)	-0.013** (0.005)	0.008 (0.007)	-0.034 (0.035)	-0.001 (0.002)
Panel B: Controlling for Total Union Membership at Age 18						
Exposure Time	Earnings (i)	Hours Worked (ii)	Employed (iii)	Not in Labor Force (iv)	Years of Education (v)	Occup. Skill (vi)
At 10 Years	-205.10 (344.29)	-0.434 (0.276)	-0.011** (0.005)	0.007 (0.006)	-0.017 (0.033)	-0.002 (0.002)
Panel C: Controlling for Proportion Living in Urban Areas						
Exposure Time	Earnings (i)	Hours Worked (ii)	Employed (iii)	Not in Labor Force (iv)	Years of Education (v)	Occup. Skill (vi)
At 10 Years	-206.96 (355.69)	-0.433 (0.264)	-0.011** (0.005)	0.007 (0.006)	-0.016 (0.032)	-0.002 (0.002)
Panel D: Controlling for Riots and Violent Protests						
Exposure Time	Earnings (i)	Hours Worked (ii)	Employed (iii)	Not in Labor Force (iv)	Years of Education (v)	Occup. Skill (vi)
At 10 Years	-237.42 (369.05)	-0.442 (0.272)	-0.011** (0.005)	0.007 (0.006)	-0.017 (0.033)	-0.002 (0.002)
Panel E: Controlling for Current State Fixed Effects (Individual-level Data)						
Exposure Time	Earnings (i)	Hours Worked (ii)	Employed (iii)	Not in Labor Force (iv)	Years of Education (v)	Occup. Skill (vi)
At 10 Years	-342.45 (323.43)	-0.413 (0.263)	-0.011** (0.005)	0.008 (0.006)	-0.032 (0.033)	-0.001 (0.002)
Panel F: Including Birth State-by-Year Effects						
Exposure Time	Earnings (i)	Hours Worked (ii)	Employed (iii)	Not in Labor Force (iv)	Years of Education (v)	Occup. Skill (vi)
At 10 Years	-235.67 (389.14)	-0.466 (0.317)	-0.011* (0.006)	0.010 (0.007)	-0.015 (0.035)	-0.002 (0.002)
Panel G: Including Census Region-by-Cohort Fixed Effects						
Exposure Time	Earnings (i)	Hours Worked (ii)	Employed (iii)	Not in Labor Force (iv)	Years of Education (v)	Occup. Skill (vi)
At 10 Years	-272.98 (378.26)	-0.460 (0.286)	-0.011** (0.005)	0.008 (0.007)	-0.013 (0.033)	-0.002 (0.002)
Panel H: Controlling for Democratic Control of State Legislature						
Exposure Time	Earnings (i)	Hours Worked (ii)	Employed (iii)	Not in Labor Force (iv)	Years of Education (v)	Occup. Skill (vi)
At 10 Years	-181.48 (356.55)	-0.353 (0.271)	-0.010* (0.005)	0.005 (0.006)	-0.018 (0.033)	-0.002 (0.002)

Notes: Authors' estimation of equation (1) as described in the text using 2005-2012 ACS data on 35-49 year old respondents. 10-year estimates from the full event study model are shown. All estimates include birth state, year and birth cohort-by-year fixed effects. Occupational skill results and estimates in Panel E are based on individual data and control for race/ethnicity. Other outcomes are estimated using aggregated data and control for racial/ethnic composition of the state-cohort-year-gender cell. Regressions using aggregated data are weighted by the number of individual observations that are used to calculate the averages in each state-year-cohort-gender cell. The construction of each analysis sample and control variable is described in the text. Standard errors clustered at the birth state level are in parentheses: *** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** indicates significance at the 5% level and * indicates significance at the 10% level.

Table A-6: The Correlation of Duty-to-Bargain Exposure with Fixed Individual Characteristics and State Observables Unrelated to Collective Bargaining

Panel A: Men							
	Age (x100) (i)	Black (ii)	Hispanic (iii)	Asian (iv)	Other Race (v)	Fraction Homeowner (vi)	Fraction State Male (vii)
Relative Years to DTB	-0.0000** (0.0000)	0.0028*** (0.0010)	0.0012 (0.0016)	0.0005*** (0.0002)	-0.0000 (0.0002)	0.0002 (0.0006)	-0.0011*** (0.0003)
I(DTB)	0.0000** (0.0000)	0.0104** (0.0040)	-0.0008 (0.0062)	-0.0008 (0.0011)	-0.0008 (0.0007)	0.0021 (0.0024)	0.0030*** (0.0010)
Relative Years to DTB)	0.0000	-0.0005	0.0008	-0.0002	0.0001	-0.0002	0.0009**
*I(DTB)	(0.0000)	(0.0010)	(0.0011)	(0.0001)	(0.0001)	(0.0006)	(0.0003)
Panel B: Women							
	Age (x100) (i)	Black (ii)	Hispanic (iii)	Asian (iv)	Other Race (v)	Fraction Homeowner (vi)	Fraction State Male (vii)
Relative Years to DTB	-0.0000* (0.0000)	0.0034* (0.0018)	0.0007 (0.0015)	0.0004** (0.0001)	0.0000 (0.0002)	0.0002 (0.0003)	-0.0010*** (0.0003)
I(DTB)	0.0000** (0.0000)	0.0063 (0.0042)	0.0003 (0.0051)	0.0008 (0.0014)	-0.0013* (0.0007)	-0.0039 (0.0028)	0.0034*** (0.0009)
Relative Years to DTB)	0.0000	-0.0012	0.0010	-0.0001	0.0001	-0.0001	0.0008**
*I(DTB)	(0.0000)	(0.0018)	(0.0010)	(0.0001)	(0.0002)	(0.0003)	(0.0003)

Notes: Authors' estimation of equation (2) as described in the text using 2005-2012 ACS data on 35-49 year old respondents. Relative Years to DTB Law is the number of years relative to the passage of a duty-to-bargain law when each cohort was 6 years old, which is set to zero for states that never pass such a law. I(DTB Law) is an indicator for whether a duty-to-bargain law has been passed in the state when each cohort was 6 years old. All estimates include state, year and birth cohort-by-year fixed effects. Regressions are weighted by the number of individual observations that are used to calculate the averages in each state-cohort-year-gender cell. State-specific outcomes are averaged over the individual ACS observations, which is why the male and female estimates differ numerically for these outcomes. Standard errors clustered at the birth state level are in parentheses: *** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** indicates significance at the 5% level and * indicates significance at the 10% level.

Table A-7: The Effect of Collective Bargaining Laws At 10 Years on Long-Run Outcomes for Men – Accounting for Mobility

Panel A: Dropping Those Who do not Live in State of Birth						
Exposure Time	Earnings (i)	Hours Worked (ii)	Employed (iii)	Not in Labor Force (iv)	Years of Education (v)	Occup. Skill (vi)
At 10 Years	-2206.06** (1060.57)	-0.604* (0.303)	-0.007 (0.006)	0.010* (0.005)	-0.080 (0.049)	-0.005** (0.002)

Panel B: Weighting by Childhood Mobility						
Exposure Time	Earnings (i)	Hours Worked (ii)	Employed (iii)	Not in Labor Force (iv)	Years of Education (v)	Occup. Skill (vi)
At 10 Years	-1817.32*** (653.11)	-0.163 (0.181)	-0.004 (0.003)	0.003 (0.003)	-0.037 (0.038)	

Notes: Authors' estimation of equation (1) as described in the text using 2005-2012 ACS data on 35-49 year old respondents. 10-year estimates from the full event study model are shown. All estimates include state, year and birth cohort-by-year fixed effects, as well as controls for the racial/ethnic composition of the state-cohort-year-gender cell, exposure to school finance reforms, average state EITC and average food stamp availability during school years. Regressions are weighted by the number of individual observations that are used to calculate the averages in each state-cohort-year-gender cell. In Panel (A), we exclude the 37.7% of respondents who do not live in their state of birth. In Panel (B), we expand the data to be at the state of birth-cohort-potential migration state level and weight each observation by the proportion of 17 year olds in the 1990 census who were born in the birth state and lived in the migration state. All variables are defined using the migration state. Standard errors clustered at the birth state level in Panel (A) and two-way clustered at the birth state and migration state in Panel (B) are in parentheses: *** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** indicates significance at the 5% level and * indicates significance at the 10% level.

Table A-8: The Effect of Collective Bargaining Laws At 10 Years on Long-Run Outcomes for Women – Accounting for Mobility

Panel A: Dropping Those Who do not Live in State of Birth						
Exposure Time	Earnings	Hours Worked	Employed	Not in Labor Force	Years of Education	Occup. Skill
	(i)	(ii)	(iii)	(iv)	(v)	(vi)
At 10 Years	-133.99 (377.78)	-0.368 (0.298)	-0.013** (0.006)	0.009 (0.007)	-0.003 (0.048)	-0.0001 (0.003)

Panel B: Weighting by Childhood Mobility						
Exposure Time	Earnings	Hours Worked	Employed	Not in Labor Force	Years of Education	Occup. Skill
	(i)	(ii)	(iii)	(iv)	(v)	(vi)
At 10 Years	-442.57 (369.62)	-0.252 (0.219)	-0.005 (0.004)	0.003 (0.005)	-0.014 (0.029)	


Notes: Authors' estimation of equation (1) as described in the text using 2005-2012 ACS data on 35-49 year old respondents. 10-year estimates from the full event study model are shown. All estimates include state, year and birth cohort-by-year fixed effects, as well as controls for the racial/ethnic composition of the state-cohort-year-gender cell, exposure to school finance reforms, average state EITC and average food stamp availability during school years. Regressions are weighted by the number of individual observations that are used to calculate the averages in each state-cohort-year-gender cell. In Panel (A), we exclude the 37.7% of respondents who do not live in their state of birth. In Panel (B), we expand the data to be at the state of birth-cohort-potential migration state level and weight each observation by the proportion of 17 year olds in the 1990 census who were born in the birth state and lived in the migration state. All variables are defined using the migration state. Standard errors clustered at the birth state level in Panel (A) and two-way clustered at the birth state and migration state in Panel (B) are in parentheses: *** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** indicates significance at the 5% level and * indicates significance at the 10% level.

Table A-9: The Relationship Between Duty-to-Bargain Laws and School Resources

Independent Variable	Dependent Variable: Log of				
	Teacher Salary Expenditures (i)	Administrative Salary Expenditures (ii)	Other Salary Expenditures (iii)	Teacher-Student Ratio (iv)	Operating Expenditures per Student (v)
Relative Years to DTB	-0.038*** (0.011)	-0.064 (0.038)	0.053*** (0.012)	-0.005 (0.003)	-0.005 (0.020)
I(DTB)	0.080 (0.066)	0.470* (0.269)	-0.196*** (0.066)	0.044 (0.031)	0.057 (0.059)
(Relative Years to DTB)	0.038***	0.089**	-0.043***	-0.005	0.008
*I(DTB)	(0.010)	(0.022)	(0.007)	(0.009)	(0.019)


Notes: Authors' estimation of equation (2) as described in the text using 1972-1991 Census/Survey of Governments Data. The data vary at the state-year level and all estimates include state and year fixed effects. Regressions are weighted by total enrollment in each state. Relative Years to DTB Law is the number of years relative to the passage of a duty-to-bargain law, which is set to zero for states that never pass such a law. I(DTB Law) is an indicator for whether a duty-to-bargain law has been passed in the state. All outcome variables are in logs, and salary expenditures reflect total expenditures on each category including part-time and full-time teachers. Standard errors clustered at the state level are in parentheses: *** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** indicates significance at the 5% level and * indicates significance at the 10% level.

Figure A-1: Event Study Estimates by Gender and Race/Ethnicity - Hours Worked




Notes: Authors' estimation of equation (1) as described in the text using 2005-2012 ACS data on 35-49 year old respondents. Relative year -1 is omitted, so all estimates are in relationship to this year. Relative year -11 includes all observations with relative time ≤ -11 and relative year 21 includes all observations with relative time ≥ 21 . All estimates include birth cohort-by-year, birth state, and year fixed effects as well as controls for exposure to school finance reforms, state EITC rates, and food stamps. Regressions are weighted by the number of individual observations that are used to calculate the averages in each state-cohort-year-race-gender cell. Each point is a relative time parameter estimate, while the bars extending from each point show the bounds of the 95% confidence interval calculated from standard errors that are clustered at the state level.

Figure A-2: Event Study Estimates by Gender and Race/Ethnicity - Employment




Notes: Authors' estimation of equation (1) as described in the text using 2005-2012 ACS data on 35-49 year old respondents. Relative year -1 is omitted, so all estimates are in relationship to this year. Relative year -11 includes all observations with relative time ≤ -11 and relative year 21 includes all observations with relative time ≥ 21 . All estimates include birth cohort-by-year, birth state, and year fixed effects as well as controls for exposure to school finance reforms, state EITC rates, and food stamps. Regressions are weighted by the number of individual observations that are used to calculate the averages in each state-cohort-year-race-gender cell. Each point is a relative time parameter estimate, while the bars extending from each point show the bounds of the 95% confidence interval calculated from standard errors that are clustered at the state level.

Figure A-3: Event Study Estimates by Gender and Race/Ethnicity - Not in Labor Force




Notes: Authors' estimation of equation (1) as described in the text using 2005-2012 ACS data on 35-49 year old respondents. Relative year -1 is omitted, so all estimates are in relationship to this year. Relative year -11 includes all observations with relative time ≤ -11 and relative year 21 includes all observations with relative time ≥ 21 . All estimates include birth cohort-by-year, birth state, and year fixed effects as well as controls for exposure to school finance reforms, state EITC rates, and food stamps. Regressions are weighted by the number of individual observations that are used to calculate the averages in each state-cohort-year-race-gender cell. Each point is a relative time parameter estimate, while the bars extending from each point show the bounds of the 95% confidence interval calculated from standard errors that are clustered at the state level.

Figure A-4: Event Study Estimates by Gender and Race/Ethnicity - Occupational Skill



Notes: Authors' estimation of equation (1) as described in the text using 2005-2012 ACS data on 35-49 year old respondents. Relative year -1 is omitted, so all estimates are in relationship to this year. Relative year -11 includes all observations with relative time ≤ -11 and relative year 21 includes all observations with relative time ≥ 21 . All estimates include birth cohort-by-year, birth state, and year fixed effects as well as controls for exposure to school finance reforms, state EITC rates, and food stamps. Each point is a relative time parameter estimate, while the bars extending from each point show the bounds of the 95% confidence interval calculated from standard errors that are clustered at the state level.

Figure A-5: Event Study Estimates by Gender and Race/Ethnicity - Years of Education




Notes: Authors' estimation of equation (1) as described in the text using 2005-2012 ACS data on 35-49 year old respondents. Relative year -1 is omitted, so all estimates are in relationship to this year. Relative year -11 includes all observations with relative time ≤ -11 and relative year 21 includes all observations with relative time ≥ 21 . All estimates include birth cohort-by-year, birth state, and year fixed effects as well as controls for exposure to school finance reforms, state EITC rates, and food stamps. Regressions are weighted by the number of individual observations that are used to calculate the averages in each state-cohort-year-race-gender cell. Each point is a relative time parameter estimate, while the bars extending from each point show the bounds of the 95% confidence interval calculated from standard errors that are clustered at the state level.

Figure A-6: Sensitivity of Results to Excluding Each State - Men


(a) Income

(b) Hours Worked



(c) Employment

(d) Not in Labor Force



Notes: Authors' estimation of equation (1) as described in the text using 2005-2012 ACS data on 35-49 year old respondents. Each point represents a point estimate excluding a given state from the regression and the lines extending from each point show the 95% confidence interval calculated using standard errors that are clustered at the state level.