Replication data for: The Impact of Monitoring in Infinitely Repeated Games: Perfect, Public, and Private
Principal Investigator(s): View help for Principal Investigator(s) Masaki Aoyagi; V. Bhaskar; Guillaume R. Fréchette
Version: View help for Version V1
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Project Citation:
Aoyagi, Masaki, Bhaskar, V., and Fréchette, Guillaume R. Replication data for: The Impact of Monitoring in Infinitely Repeated Games: Perfect, Public, and Private. Nashville, TN: American Economic Association [publisher], 2019. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor], 2019-10-12. https://doi.org/10.3886/E114360V1
Project Description
Summary:
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This paper uses a laboratory experiment to study the effect of the monitoring structure on the play of the infinitely repeated prisoner's dilemma. Keeping the strategic form of the stage game fixed, we examine the behavior of subjects when information about past actions is perfect (perfect monitoring), noisy but public (public monitoring), and noisy and private (private monitoring). We find that the subjects sustain cooperation in every treatment, but that their strategies differ across the three treatments. Specifically, the strategies under imperfect
monitoring are both more complex and more lenient than those under perfect monitoring. The results show how the changes in strategies across monitoring structures mitigate the effect of noise in monitoring on efficiency.
Scope of Project
JEL Classification:
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C72 Noncooperative Games
C73 Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games; Repeated Games
C92 Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Group Behavior
D82 Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
D83 Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
C72 Noncooperative Games
C73 Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games; Repeated Games
C92 Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Group Behavior
D82 Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
D83 Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
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