

ONLINE APPENDIX: TABLES AND FIGURES

*Note:* Appendices denoted A are intended for posting on the journal and on the authors' websites. Appendices denoted B appear only on the authors' websites.

*A1. Additional Tables*

Table A1—: **Balance on 1872 Characteristics (Chef-lieux level)**

	Observations (chef-lieux)	Mean (sd)	Coeff (se)	p-value	Coeff (se)	p-value
Controls				None	Dept FE	
Demographics and Education(1872)						
Log population	407	9.152 (0.959)	0.029 (0.105)	0.783	0.303 (0.185)	0.103
Share Men	407	48.587 (3.277)	0.321 (0.402)	0.426	0.245 (0.667)	0.714
Share Women	407	51.414 (3.277)	-0.319 (0.402)	0.429	-0.245 (0.667)	0.714
Share Foreigners	407	2.888 (6.829)	2.018 (1.464)	0.170	0.818 (0.854)	0.340
Share Illiterate	407	17.714 (7.230)	0.871 (1.025)	0.397	0.907 (0.932)	0.332
Religious Characteristics(1872)						
Catholic places of worship	407	97.133 (7.308)	0.652 (0.903)	0.471	-0.861 (1.533)	0.575
Protestant places of worship	407	1.769 (5.413)	-1.382 (0.775)	0.077	-0.416 (0.766)	0.588
Jewish places of worship	407	0.200 (0.588)	0.056 (0.067)	0.404	0.014 (0.038)	0.702
Other places of worship	407	0.387 (1.625)	-0.075 (0.208)	0.718	-0.621 (0.789)	0.432
Occupation Shares(1872)						
Industrial workers	407	51.641 (28.392)	10.228 (4.086)	0.013	3.978 (5.894)	0.501
Farmers	407	27.900 (23.502)	-4.810 (3.241)	0.140	-6.235 (3.888)	0.111
Merchants	407	22.423 (11.401)	2.559 (1.291)	0.049	1.519 (1.771)	0.392
Liberal occupations	407	17.874 (10.552)	0.189 (1.309)	0.886	-2.836 (2.225)	0.204
Unemployed	407	1.999 (3.821)	0.000 (0.461)	1.000	3.052 (1.368)	0.027

*Note:* This Table displays 1872 characteristics in chef-lieux (the main town in each of France's arrondissements). The second Column shows the number of observations. The third shows the mean and standard deviation for each variable. The fourth to seventh Columns show the coefficients, standard errors, and p-values of OLS regressions of each characteristic on the Verdun under Pétain variable (which includes partial assignments) conditional on rotation to Verdun with no controls (Columns 4 and 5) and with 87 Department Fixed Effects (Columns 6 and 7). Standard errors clustered at military recruitment bureau level are reported in parentheses.

Table A2—: **Balance on Historical Characteristics from Squicciarini (2020) at Canton level**

	Observations (Cantons)	Mean (sd)	Coeff (se)	p-value	Coeff (se)	p-value
Controls			None		Dept FE	
1873						
Number of schools	2,101	3.137 (0.463)	0.055 (0.048)	0.249	0.087 (0.032)	0.008
Share Catholic schools	2,101	0.279 (0.167)	0.001 (0.022)	0.978	-0.023 (0.017)	0.198
Share schools in bad condition	2,088	0.069 (0.089)	0.009 (0.009)	0.299	0.023 (0.009)	0.016
1894						
Number of schools	1,979	3.331 (0.416)	0.089 (0.038)	0.021	0.038 (0.033)	0.244
Share Catholic schools	1,979	0.232 (0.129)	-0.012 (0.017)	0.485	-0.009 (0.013)	0.496
Share Catholic students	1,979	0.279 (0.160)	-0.013 (0.021)	0.547	-0.013 (0.015)	0.369
Share Male Catholic students	1,979	0.126 (0.149)	0.004 (0.016)	0.801	-0.014 (0.011)	0.190
Share Female Catholic students	1,979	0.435 (0.215)	-0.025 (0.029)	0.392	-0.012 (0.021)	0.553
1901						
Average HH expenditure	1,374	66.887 (6.648)	0.125 (0.764)	0.871	-1.168 (0.788)	0.140

*Note:* This Table displays historical characteristics from Squicciarini (2020) at the canton level. The variables shown in the table are the following: log number of schools in 1873 and 1894, share of Catholic schools in 1873 and 1894, share of schools' buildings in bad conditions in 1873, share of students in Catholic schools in 1894, share of male/female students in Catholic schools in 1894, average household expenditure in 1901. The second Column shows the number of observations. The third shows the mean and standard deviation for each variable. The fourth to seventh Columns show the coefficients, standard errors, and p-values of OLS regressions of each characteristic on the Verdun under Pétain variable (which includes partial assignments) conditional on rotation to Verdun with no controls (Columns 4 and 5) and with 87 Department Fixed Effects (Columns 6 and 7). Standard errors clustered at military recruitment bureau level are reported in parentheses.

**Source:** Squicciarini (2020).

Table A3—: **Balance on Historical Characteristics from Squicciarini (2020) at Baillage level**

	Observations (Baillages)	Mean (sd)	Coeff (se)	p-value	Coeff (se)	p-value
Controls			None		Dept FE	
Wheat suitability	380	3.669 (1.105)	-0.128 (0.116)	0.274	-0.262 (0.174)	0.132
Plague outbreaks (1517-1786)	391	0.071 (0.092)	0.021 (0.010)	0.031	0.034 (0.021)	0.111
Share of refractory clergy	391	0.432 (0.267)	-0.048 (0.028)	0.085	-0.051 (0.035)	0.139
Log average HH expenditure 1901	391	4.202 (0.084)	0.005 (0.009)	0.542	0.006 (0.016)	0.716
Subscrib. Encyclopédie (1777-1780)	391	0.719 (1.466)	-0.129 (0.153)	0.401	-0.555 (0.349)	0.113
Log number of firms in 1800	391	0.807 (0.914)	0.281 (0.094)	0.003	-0.127 (0.196)	0.518

*Note:* This Table displays historical characteristics (at the dates indicated) from Squicciarini (2020) at the baillage or sénéchaussée (historical district) level. The variables shown in the table are the following: soil suitability for wheat, total plague outbreaks (district-level shares) between 1517 and 1786, share of refractory clergy in 1791/1792, log average of canton household expenditure weighted by pop in 1901 at the district level, number of subscribers to the Encyclopédie between 1777 and 1780, log number of firms around 1800 in each district in cotton spinning, metallurgy and paper milling. The second Column shows the number of observations. The third shows the mean and standard deviation for each variable. The fourth to seventh Columns show the coefficients, standard errors, and p-values of OLS regressions of each characteristic on the Verdun under Pétain variable (which includes partial assignments) conditional on rotation to Verdun with no controls (Columns 4 and 5) and with 87 Department Fixed Effects (Columns 6 and 7).

**Source:** Squicciarini (2020).

Table A4—: Balance on Weather, Elevation and Presence of Natural Resources at Municipal Level

	Observations (Municipalities)	Mean (sd)	Coeff (se)	p-value	Coeff (se)	p-value
Controls			None		Dept FE	
Precipitation rate (mm/day)	34,942	2.601 (0.643)	0.149 (0.102)	0.147	0.078 (0.068)	0.256
Average temperature (°C)	34,942	11.805 (1.539)	-1.150 (0.226)	0.000	-0.065 (0.162)	0.692
Elevation(m)	34,942	276.909 (294.325)	75.643 (45.007)	0.095	17.021 (30.719)	0.580
Coal	34,942	0.030 (0.170)	0.007 (0.012)	0.574	-0.017 (0.012)	0.138
Silver	34,942	0.034 (0.182)	0.007 (0.012)	0.534	0.003 (0.011)	0.803
Copper	34,942	0.027 (0.163)	0.005 (0.009)	0.605	0.005 (0.010)	0.604
Lead	34,942	0.036 (0.185)	0.011 (0.012)	0.367	0.011 (0.012)	0.366
Zinc	34,942	0.029 (0.168)	0.011 (0.011)	0.318	0.006 (0.012)	0.599
Iron	34,942	0.025 (0.157)	-0.005 (0.008)	0.554	-0.016 (0.010)	0.110
Hydrocarbon	34,942	0.019 (0.138)	0.002 (0.011)	0.864	0.008 (0.007)	0.256

*Note:* This Table displays municipal-level data on weather, elevation, and presence of natural resources. The second Column shows the number of observations. The third shows the mean and standard deviation for each variable. The fourth to seventh Columns show the coefficients, standard errors, and p-values of OLS regressions of each characteristic on the Verdun under Pétain variable (which includes partial assignments) conditional on rotation to Verdun with no controls (Columns 4 and 5) and with 87 Department Fixed Effects (Columns 6 and 7). Standard errors clustered at military recruitment bureau level are reported in parentheses.

**Source:** Data on weather and elevation is from Centre National de Recherches Météorologiques and is based on 8,602 data points between 1976 and 2005. Data on presence of natural resources is from the Open Mineral Cadastre, French Ministry for Ecological Transition (downloaded May 10, 2021).

Table A5—: **Balance on Soil Characteristics at Grid-Cell Level**

	Observations (Square Grid 16km*16km)	Mean (sd)	Coeff (se)	p-value	Coeff (se)	p-value
Controls			None		Dept FE	
Clay	1,712	248.562 (132.323)	19.683 (14.381)	0.173	-1.643 (15.261)	0.914
Silt	1,712	411.891 (172.561)	26.323 (21.095)	0.214	-4.498 (20.322)	0.825
Sand	1,712	339.548 (226.732)	-46.007 (29.945)	0.127	6.141 (29.772)	0.837
Organic carbon	1,712	26.154 (20.736)	2.466 (1.932)	0.204	-1.271 (1.521)	0.405
Nitrogen	1,712	2.209 (1.579)	0.273 (0.155)	0.080	-0.110 (0.140)	0.433
Calcium carbonates	1,712	57.019 (137.930)	18.625 (14.976)	0.216	-9.582 (9.280)	0.303
pH	1,712	6.416 (1.313)	0.157 (0.150)	0.298	0.181 (0.128)	0.159

*Note:* This Table displays soil characteristics: average clay, silt, sand, organic carbon, nitrogen, and calcium carbonates soil content (g.kg-1) as well as the pH measured in water (1 to 5 soil to water ratio) at the 16 km x 16 km grid-cell level. The second Column shows the number of observations. The third shows the mean and standard deviation for each variable. The fourth to seventh Columns show the coefficients, standard errors, and p-values of OLS regressions of each characteristic on the Verdun under Pétain variable (which includes partial assignments) conditional on rotation to Verdun with no controls (Columns 4 and 5) and with 87 Department Fixed Effects (Columns 6 and 7). Standard errors clustered at military recruitment bureau level are reported in parentheses.

**Source:** Data is from INRAE French Soil Quality Monitoring Network (RMQS) (downloaded May 10, 2021) and Karimi et al. (2018). The RMQS is based on the monitoring of 2240 sites representative of French soils and their land use. These sites are spread over the French territory along a systematic square grid of 16 km x 16 km cells. The network covers a broad spectrum of climatic, soil and land-use conditions (croplands, permanent grasslands, woodlands, orchards and vineyards, natural or scarcely anthropogenic land and urban parkland). The physical, chemical and biological properties of the soil are measured on each site. These soil analyses were carried out by the Soil Analysis Laboratory of INRAE (Arras, France). Analyses used in this study only concern the surface layer (generally 0–30 cm layer) of samplings between 2000 and 2009.

Table A6—: Robustness to Alternative Functional Form and Excluding Movers

	Collaborators - IHS		Log Collabos pc				Log collabos pc - w/o movers	
	(1) 1914 France	(2) Verdun only	(3) 1914 France	(4) Verdun only	(5) 1914 France	(6) Verdun only	(7) 1914 France	(8) Verdun only
Verdun under Pétain	0.048 (0.023)	0.070 (0.026)	0.055 (0.023)	0.076 (0.027)	0.055 (0.023)	0.076 (0.027)	0.057 (0.016)	0.084 (0.024)
Verdun	✓						✓	
1911 pop	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Pre-WWI vote shares	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Polynomial Lat/Long			✓	✓	✓	✓		
Log. dist. Cauchy					✓	✓		
R-squared	0.48	0.47	0.61	0.61	0.61	0.61	0.67	0.67
Observations	34,942	32,412	34,942	32,412	34,942	32,412	34,942	32,412
Mean DepVar	0.41	0.41	-5.75	-5.74	-5.75	-5.74	-5.82	-5.82
Sd DepVar	0.87	0.87	0.83	0.84	0.83	0.84	0.86	0.86
Number of clusters	158	145	158	145	158	145	158	145

*Note:* Columns 1 and 2 replicate Columns 2 and 4 of Table 4 using instead the inverse hyperbolic sine of the number of collaborators in each municipality as the dependent variable and controlling for 1936 municipal population. Columns 2 and 4 replicate Columns 2 and 4 of Table 4 with an additional control for a second order polynomial of latitude and longitude of each municipality. Columns 5 and 6 add a further control for the natural logarithm of the distance between each municipality and Pétain's municipality of birth Cauchy-à-la-Tour (department of Pas-de-Calais). Columns 7 and 8 replicate Columns 2 and 4 of Table 4 restricting the estimation sample to the subsample of collaborators whose residence in 1945 is not different from their municipality of birth (i.e. excluding movers from the estimation sample). All regressions are at the municipality level with department fixed effects and control for the Verdun rotation as well as the usual set of pre-WWI controls at the municipality level (log population in 1911, log vote shares for the Left in 1914 and log vote shares for the Right in 1914), as in Column 2 of Table 4. Robust standard errors clustered at military recruitment bureau level in parentheses.

Table A7—: Different Shares of Regiments assigned to Pétain at Verdun

	Log collabos pc					
	(1) 1914 France	(2) Verdun only	(3) 1914 France	(4) Verdun only	(5) 1914 France	(6) Verdun only
Half Verdun under Pétain	0.065 (0.031)	0.069 (0.019)				
More than half Verdun under Pétain	0.094 (0.021)	0.079 (0.019)				
Verdun under Pétain			0.083 (0.020)	0.077 (0.020)	0.099 (0.021)	0.079 (0.019)
1911 pop	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Pre-WWI vote shares	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
WWI death rate	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
R-squared	0.60	0.61	0.60	0.60	0.60	0.60
Observations	34,942	30,558	30,344	27,686	32,035	28,606
Mean DepVar	-5.75	-5.75	-5.80	-5.80	-5.78	-5.79
Sd DepVar	0.83	0.84	0.83	0.83	0.83	0.84
Number of clusters	158	136	143	129	149	132

*Note:* In this table, we compare the intensity of the effect with larger shares of regiments assigned to Verdun-under-Pétain and the robustness of our results to alternative definitions of the treatment. Even Columns use all municipalities of 1914 France as the estimation sample (controlling for the Verdun rotation), and odd Columns use the subset of municipalities rotated at Verdun. In Columns 1 and 2, the treatment is redefined as two categorical variables that take value 0 if strictly less than half of the regiments raised in a given municipality is rotated at Verdun under Pétain, and respectively 1 if half of the regiments raised in a given municipality are rotated at Verdun under Pétain, or 1 if strictly more than half of the regiments are rotated at Verdun under Pétain. In Columns 3 and 4, we exclude all municipalities that are split between more than one regiment. In Columns 5 and 6, we exclude municipalities where exactly half of the regiments raised in a given municipality is rotated at Verdun under Pétain, and redefined  $VerdunPétain_{i,1916}$  as an indicator variable equal to zero (respectively, one) if less (respectively, more) than half of the regiments raised in a given municipality is rotated at Verdun under Pétain. All regressions are at the municipality level with department fixed effects and control for the usual set of pre-WWI controls at the municipality level (log population in 1911, log vote shares for the Left in 1914 and log vote shares for the Right in 1914), as in Column 2 of Table 4, as well as a quadratic polynomial in latitude and longitude of the municipality centroid, when indicated. Robust standard errors clustered at military recruitment bureau level in parentheses.

Table A8—: Robustness of Table 4: Corrections for Spatial Correlations of the Error Term

	Log collaborators per capita (OLS)											
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Verdun under Pétain	All	Verdun	All	Verdun	All	Verdun	All	Verdun	All	Verdun	All	Verdun
	0.067 (0.027)	0.070 (0.028)	0.067 (0.024)	0.070 (0.026)	0.067 (0.028)	0.070 (0.029)	0.067 (0.025)	0.070 (0.028)	0.067 (0.024)	0.070 (0.027)	0.067 (0.022)	0.070 (0.024)
1911 pop	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Pre-WWI vote shares	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Conley cutoff	25	25	50	50	100	100	150	150	200	200	250	250
R-squared	0.48	0.48	0.48	0.48	0.48	0.48	0.48	0.48	0.48	0.48	0.48	0.48
Observations	34,942	32,412	34,942	32,412	34,942	32,412	34,942	32,412	34,942	32,412	34,942	32,412
Mean DepVar	-5.75	-5.74	-5.75	-5.74	-5.75	-5.74	-5.75	-5.74	-5.75	-5.74	-5.75	-5.74
Sd DepVar	0.83	0.84	0.83	0.84	0.83	0.84	0.83	0.84	0.83	0.84	0.83	0.84

**Notes:** The unit of observation is a municipality. This table provides OLS estimates of Equation (III) with standard errors corrected for arbitrary spatial correlation of the error term within spatial clusters defined for different cutoffs, from 25km, 50km and increments of 50km from 100 to 250km. The distance cutoffs for each specification are indicated in the bottom of the Table. Odd columns present regression results for all municipalities within the 1914 borders and even columns present regression results for all municipalities that raised at least one regiment that served at Verdun. The dependent variable is the log collaborators (1944-45) per capita (1936). All specifications control for department fixed effects (87 departments) and the usual set of pre-WWI controls at the municipality level (log population in 1911, log vote shares for the Left in 1914 and log vote shares for the Right in 1914), as in Column 2 of Table 4.

Table A9—: Regression Discontinuity across Regiment Catchment Borders

	First stage			Second stage								
	(1) Verdun under Pétain 0.017 (0.002)	(2) Verdun under Pétain 0.016 (0.002)	(3) Log Collabos per cap 0.102 (0.046)	(4) Log Collabos per cap 0.108 (0.049)	(5) Log sh Left 1914 0.165 (0.219)	(6) Log sh Left 1914 0.209 (0.234)	(7) Log sh Right 1914 -0.148 (0.288)	(8) Log sh Right 1914 -0.156 (0.297)	(9) WWI Death Rate -0.019 (0.269)	(10) WWI Death Rate -0.050 (0.271)	(11) Pop 1911 -0.059 (0.101)	(12) Pop 1911 -0.047 (0.103)
Distance from military boundary												
Verdun under Pétain	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Pop 1911	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Pre-WWI vote shares	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
RD polynomial	0.86	0.87	0.60	0.60	0.48	0.50	0.51	0.06	0.06	0.30	0.30	0.30
Observations	14,202	14,202	14,201	14,201	13,755	13,755	13,755	14,201	14,201	14,177	14,177	14,177
Number of clusters	139	139	138	138	138	138	138	139	139	139	139	139
SD of residuals	0.38	0.38	0.48	0.48	1.16	1.16	1.16	1.16	2.00	2.00	2.00	2.00
Number of clusters	139	139	138	138	138	138	138	139	139	139	139	139
F-stat first stage			51.73	54.25	50.74	53.44	53.44	51.73	54.25	51.89	54.41	54.41

**Notes:** This table shows the results of the first (Columns 1 and 2) and second (Columns 3 to 12) stage of a fuzzy spatial regression discontinuity design across regiment catchment borders. The specifications only use observations that fall within the optimal Calonico et al. (2014) bandwidth (17.5 km, or 10.87 miles, on the untreated side of the border and 22km, or 13.67 miles on the treated side). Columns 1 and 2 display the first-stage estimates. All regressions are at the municipality level with department fixed effects and control for the Verdun rotation. Additional controls include pre-WWI population and pre-WWI vote shares (as in Column 2 of Table 4) as well as a quadratic polynomial in latitude and longitude of the municipality centroid, when indicated. Robust standard errors clustered at military recruitment bureau level in parentheses.

Table A10—: Collaboration in WWII: Evidence from Alternative Data Sources

	OSS + LVF		Paillole + OSS + LVF	
	(1) 1914 France	(2) Verdun only	(3) 1914 France	(4) Verdun only
Verdun under Pétain	0.056 (0.015)	0.069 (0.018)	0.061 (0.018)	0.083 (0.023)
Verdun	✓		✓	
1911 pop	✓	✓	✓	✓
Pre-WWI vote shares	✓	✓	✓	✓
R-squared	0.89	0.89	0.58	0.58
Observations	34,947	32,417	34,947	32,417
Mean DepVar	-6.00	-5.99	-5.72	-5.71
Sd DepVar	0.95	0.95	0.83	0.83
Number of clusters	158	145	158	145

*Note:* The Table reproduces Columns 2 and 4 of Table 4. The dependent variables in Columns 1 and 2 are the log of collaborators per (1936) capita computed from alternative data sources on collaboration: the OSS and independently collected data on volunteers to the LVF. The dependent variables in Columns 3 and 4 are the log of collaborators per (1936) capita computed from all three data sources on collaboration: Paillole, the OSS, and volunteers to the LVF who are not already on the Paillole list. Robust standard errors clustered at military recruitment bureau level in parentheses.

Table A11—: Effects on Vote Shares in the Interwar Period

	Ext. Left		Left		Centre		Right		Ext Right		Turnout	
	(1) All	(2) Verdun	(3) All	(4) Verdun	(5) All	(6) Verdun	(7) All	(8) Verdun	(9) All	(10) Verdun	(11) All	(12) Verdun
Verdun under Pétain	-0.026 (0.039)	-0.024 (0.041)	-0.001 (0.069)	-0.008 (0.060)	-0.052 (0.020)	-0.080 (0.019)	0.182 (0.074)	0.206 (0.071)	0.013 (0.007)	0.014 (0.006)	-0.006 (0.010)	-0.003 (0.010)
Year Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Verdun	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
1911 pop	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Pre-WWI vote shares	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
R-squared	0.46	0.45	0.37	0.37	0.45	0.45	0.53	0.53	0.74	0.73	0.37	0.37
Observations	129,791	120,626	129,791	120,626	129,791	120,626	129,791	120,626	137,791	127,870	129,775	120,609
Mean DepVar	1.45	1.45	2.41	2.41	3.44	3.45	2.39	2.37	0.38	0.38	4.39	4.39
Sd DepVar	0.87	0.86	1.18	1.18	1.23	1.23	1.54	1.54	0.51	0.51	0.16	0.16
Number of clusters	158	145	158	145	158	145	158	145	158	145	158	145

**Notes:** This table provides OLS estimates of equation (III) with interwar (log) vote shares and turnout as the dependent variables. The estimation sample is the pooled cross section of vote shares and turnout over the four interwar legislative elections of 1919, 1924, 1932, and 1936. Odd columns presents results for all municipalities within France's 1914 borders; even columns restricts the estimation sample to municipalities that sent a regiment to Verdun. All regressions are at the municipality level with department fixed effects and the usual set of pre-WWI controls at the municipality level (as in Column 2 of Table 4). Robust standard errors two-way clustered at the military recruitment bureau and at the electoral district level are displayed in parentheses.



## Exposure to Pétain and Vote in the Inter-war Period (cont'd)

### (c) 1932 elections

	Ext. Left	Left	Center Left		Center Right		Right	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	PCF	SFIO	REP-SOC	RAD-SOC	AD-RG	AD-IND	AD-PDP	FR-URD
Verdun under Pétain	-0.005 (0.063)	-0.073 (0.095)	-0.001 (0.031)	0.065 (0.098)	0.149 (0.070)	-0.044 (0.101)	-0.018 (0.059)	0.186 (0.048)
Verdun	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
1911 pop	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Pre-WWI vote shares	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
R-squared	0.56	0.68	0.85	0.86	0.90	0.82	0.88	0.88
Observations	29,118	29,118	29,118	29,118	29,118	29,118	29,118	29,118
Mean DepVar	1.07	2.04	0.36	2.18	1.44	1.35	0.16	0.93
Sd DepVar	1.03	1.52	1.47	1.91	2.05	1.92	1.37	1.90
Number of clusters	146	146	146	146	146	146	146	146

### (d) 1936 elections

	Ext. Left	Left	Center Left		Center Right		Right	Ext. Right
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	PCF	SFIO	USR	RAD-SOC	AD	PRN	AGR	Franciste
Verdun under Pétain	-0.035 (0.056)	-0.023 (0.084)	-0.034 (0.070)	-0.016 (0.076)	-0.098 (0.113)	-0.079 (0.072)	0.077 (0.034)	0.026 (0.008)
Verdun	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
1911 pop	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Pre-WWI vote shares	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
R-squared	0.57	0.65	0.81	0.84	0.85	0.89	0.84	0.83
Observations	34,216	34,216	34,216	34,216	34,216	34,216	34,216	34,216
Mean DepVar	1.96	2.41	1.35	2.36	2.60	1.83	0.91	0.74
Sd DepVar	0.90	1.16	1.16	1.39	1.47	1.48	0.77	0.45
Number of clusters	158	158	158	158	158	158	158	158

*Note:* This table provides the results of an OLS estimation of equation III. The dependent variable is the log of the vote share for different political parties in each first round of the legislative elections of 1919, 1924, 1932, and 1936, as indicated. All regressions are at the municipality level with department fixed effects and control for the Verdun rotation and the usual set of pre-WWI controls (as in Column 2 of Table 4). For 1919, due to the multitude of political parties running in this election (see more detail in Section B.B5), we only display the results for parties that obtained at least 10% of the vote, except, for illustration purposes, the Communists (Extreme Left), which obtained 1.65% of the vote, and Action Française (Extreme Right), which obtained 1.71% of the vote. For the other elections, we display the results for parties that obtained at least 3% of the vote, except for the Francist party (Extreme Right), which obtained 1.4% of the vote in 1936. Robust standard errors two-way clustered at military recruitment bureau level and at electoral district level are reported in parentheses.

Table A13—: References to Generals in Regimental Histories

	Pétain			Nivelle			Medal Citations	
	(1) 1914 France	(2) Verdun only	(3) 1914 France	(4) 1914 France	(5) Verdun only	(6) 1914 France	(7) 1914 France	(8) Verdun only
Verdun under Pétain	0.292 (0.097)	0.292 (0.097)	0.257 (0.115)	-0.060 (0.061)	-0.060 (0.061)	-0.150 (0.068)	0.238 (0.078)	0.148 (0.076)
Verdun	0.240 (0.108)		0.286 (0.138)	0.172 (0.062)		0.295 (0.093)	0.005 (0.158)	
Marne			0.052 (0.091)			0.110 (0.046)		
Somme			0.047 (0.110)			0.161 (0.063)		
Chemin des Dames			0.080 (0.095)			0.068 (0.051)		
R-squared	0.10	0.05	0.11	0.02	0.01	0.11	0.67	0.69
Observations	172	152	172	172	152	172	34,947	32,417
Mean DepVar	0.60	0.64	0.60	0.15	0.17	0.15	3.52	3.53
Sd DepVar	0.61	0.62	0.61	0.33	0.35	0.33	0.35	0.32

*Note:* OLS estimates. An observation in Columns 1 to 6 is a regiment. General Pétain was the commanding officer at Verdun between 26 February and May 1st, when he was replaced by General Nivelle until the end of the battle. The dependent variables are the log(+1) number of references to each General in the regimental history document of each line infantry regiment, excepted for one, the 97th Infantry Regiment, for which the source document is hand-written and cannot be systematically searched through. See Supplementary references for a full list of references. “Verdun under Pétain” is an indicator variable taking value one if the regiment was rotated at Verdun between 26 February and May 1st (no regiment left or arrived on these specific dates). “Verdun” is an indicator variable taking value one if the regiment was rotated at Verdun at any point of the battle. Similarly, “Marne”, “Somme”, and “Chemin des Dames” are an indicator variables that take value one if the regiment was rotated at those other major strategic battles. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. Columns 7 and 8 provide the results of an OLS estimation of Equation (III), where the dependent variable is the log number of medal citations in the municipality-regiment. The regressions in columns 7 and 8 control for the 87 department fixed effects, the Verdun rotation, and the usual set of pre-WWI controls (natural logarithm of the 1911 municipal population, log vote shares for the left or for the right in 1914), as in Column 2 of Table 4. Robust standard errors clustered at military recruitment bureau in parentheses in columns 7 and 8.

Table A14—: Other Heroic Commanders and Battles

	Log collabos pc			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Foch	0.035 (0.070)			0.012 (0.058)
Marne		0.010 (0.034)		0.005 (0.030)
Somme			-0.010 (0.019)	-0.016 (0.022)
Verdun under Pétain				0.067 (0.018)
Verdun				0.028 (0.039)
Sample	All	All	All	All
1911 pop	✓	✓	✓	✓
Pre-WWI vote shares	✓	✓	✓	✓
R-squared	0.60	0.60	0.60	0.60
Observations	34,942	34,942	34,942	34,942
Mean DepVar	-5.75	-5.75	-5.75	-5.75
Sd DepVar	0.83	0.83	0.83	0.83
Number of clusters	158	158	158	158

*Note:* This table shows that mere exposure to other charismatic commanders (Maréchal Foch) or rotation at other heroic battles during WWI do not in themselves explain collaboration later on. In Column 1, we investigate the relationship between collaboration and whether the regiment(s) raised in the municipality served directly under Foch command during WWI (mean: 0.10, s.d : 0.28). Columns 2 and 3 consider the influence of the other major theaters of operation for the French Army in WWI: the Battle of the Marne in 1914 that stopped the dramatic advance of German troops on French territory at the start of the war (see Figure ??) and the Battle of the Somme in the Summer of 1916. All regressions are at the municipality level with department fixed effects as well as the usual set of pre-WWI controls at the municipality level (log population in 1911, log vote shares for the Left in 1914 and log vote shares for the Right in 1914), as in Column 2 of Table 4. Robust standard errors clustered at military recruitment bureau level in parentheses.

Table A15—: Accounting for Differences in War Experiences and Excluding Fortress Regiments

	Log collabos pc					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Verdun under Pétain (VuP)	0.066 (0.018)	0.066 (0.018)	0.073 (0.020)	0.075 (0.021)	0.069 (0.017)	0.067 (0.018)
Verdun	0.035 (0.041)	0.034 (0.041)	-0.001 (0.041)	-0.002 (0.040)	-0.009 (0.032)	0.034 (0.042)
WWI fatal. rate	-0.017 (0.005)	-0.014 (0.008)				-0.017 (0.005)
VuP*WWI fatal. rate		-0.006 (0.012)				
Fat. in 1916			0.010 (0.009)	-0.001 (0.012)		
VuP*1916 fat.				0.028 (0.017)		
Log dist demarcation line						0.012 (0.008)
Vichy France						-0.062 (0.028)
Sample	All	All	All	All	No Fortress	All
1911 pop	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Pre-WWI vote shares	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
R-squared	0.60	0.60	0.61	0.61	0.61	0.61
Observations	34,942	34,942	34,255	34,255	32,269	34,942
Mean DepVar	-5.75	-5.75	-5.75	-5.75	-5.77	-5.75
Sd DepVar	0.83	0.83	0.83	0.83	0.83	0.83
Number of clusters	158	158	154	154	147	158

*Note:* This table shows that the effect associated with Pétain's leadership at Verdun on collaboration in WWII is robust to accounting for other potential differences in WWI military fatality rate, battle experience in 1916, or before. In Column 1, we add a control for the log (+1) military fatality rate in WWI in the municipality of birth of soldiers based on individual data on 1,270,942 military fatalities, 99.99% of which we are able to match to 34,782 municipalities of birth within France's 1914 borders. The mean rate is 4.03 ; and the mean log rate is 1.55. We standardize the log rate to have mean 0 and standard deviation of 1. In Column 2, we also include an interaction between Verdun-under-Pétain and the (standardized) log military fatality rate in WWI. In Columns 3 and 4, we repeat the same exercise with instead the log of military fatalities in the line infantry specifically in 1916, the year of the battle of Verdun. We also normalize the log number of fatalities in 1916 (mean: 6.16) to have mean 0 and standard deviation of 1. Column 5 excludes fortress regiments (the regiments numbered 145 and above, which manned the eastern fortifications, including Verdun, before the start of the Battle) from the estimation sample. In Column 6, we add controls for key factors related to the occupation of France during World War II. All regressions are at the municipality level with department fixed effects and control for the Verdun rotation as well as the usual set of pre-WWI controls at the municipality level (log population in 1911, log vote shares for the Left in 1914 and log vote shares for the Right in 1914), as in Column 2 of Table 4. Robust standard errors clustered at military recruitment bureau level in parentheses.

A2. *The role of inherited values: Evidence from movers*

We now present direct evidence on the relative roles of coordination versus internalized values in explaining our results.

To do so, we exploit information on the municipality of birth of movers in our collaboration dataset. We compare, within the same destination locality, the behaviors of movers born either in a Verdun-under-Pétain municipality or not. If the results were simply due to coordination, only characteristics of residence municipalities should matter. If, by contrast, they also reflected the role of internalized values which individuals carry with them when they move, birth municipalities should influence the behavior of movers, even within the same destination location.

Our analysis is now at the level of the municipality of residence of collaborators. We focus on the sub-sample of movers (i.e. those whose birth municipality is different from their residence in 1944-45,  $N=13,235$ ) and we retain information on the Verdun-under-Pétain exposure of both their birth and residence municipalities.<sup>89</sup> We then compute, within residence municipalities, the overall per capita share of collaborators who were not born locally but who were born in a Verdun-under-Pétain municipality (“*Collabo V-u-P*”) as well as their relative share among all local collaborators who are internal migrants (“*Share V-u-P*”). We proceed in the same way for collaborators who were born in a non Verdun-under-Pétain municipality (“*Collabo Not from V-u-P*” and “*Share Not V-under-P*”). We then estimate equation (III) using these shares as dependent variables.

Table A16 presents the results. They show that the treatment status of both birth and residence municipalities influence whether people collaborate. The coefficient associated with the Verdun-under-Pétain status of residence municipalities is positive and significant in explaining both the numbers of collaborators from “V-u-P” municipalities (Column 1) and from other municipalities (Column 2). In other words, both people from Verdun-under-Pétain municipalities and non Verdun-under-Pétain municipalities are more likely to collaborate when they reside in a Verdun-under-Pétain location.<sup>90</sup> However, migrants born in “V-u-P” municipalities are over represented compared to those born in other municipalities, both in absolute and relative shares. The coefficient associated with Verdun-under-Pétain is larger in Column 1 than in Column 3, and this difference is statistically significant at the 4.43% level. Collaborators from “V-u-P” municipalities are also overrepresented among local collaborators who are also migrants (Column 2), as opposed to those from non “V-u-P” municipalities (Column 4).<sup>91</sup> Overall these results reinforce our interpretation that the effect of exposure to Pétain operates at least partly through internalized values and preferences that individuals carry with them, even when they move, rather than through pure bandwagon effects.

**Table A16—: Collaboration among Movers in the Same Destination, as a Function of Treatment Status of the Municipality of Birth**

	Collab. V-u-P	Sh. V-u-P	Collab. Not V-u-P	Sh. Not V-u-P
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Verdun under Pétain	0.072 (0.016)	0.010 (0.003)	0.058 (0.016)	0.000 (0.004)
Verdun	✓	✓	✓	✓
1911 pop	✓	✓	✓	✓
Pre-WWI vote shares	✓	✓	✓	✓
R-squared	0.91	0.14	0.91	0.14
Observations	34,947	34,947	34,947	34,947
Mean DepVar	-6.03	0.02	-6.03	0.02
Sd DepVar	0.98	0.12	0.99	0.11
Number of clusters	149	149	149	149

*Note:* The unit of observation is a municipality of residence. “V-u-P” stands for “Verdun-under-Pétain”. This table provides an OLS regression of the log number of collaborators per capita (“Collab.”) who were born elsewhere and migrated either from a “Verdun-under-Pétain” municipality (Col 1) or from another municipality (Col 3). In Col 2 (resp. 4), the dependent variable is the share of collaborators (“Sh.”) who migrated from a Verdun-under-Pétain (resp. not Verdun-under-Pétain) municipality among local collaborators who are internal migrants. All regressions are at the municipality level with department fixed effects and the usual set of pre-WWI controls at the municipality level (as in Column 2 of Table 4). Robust standard errors clustered at recruitment bureau level in parentheses.

<sup>89</sup>About half of collaborators who migrated originate from a Verdun-under-Pétain municipality, which is consistent with the share of municipalities rotated at Verdun under Pétain, and suggests no selective outmigration from Verdun-under-Pétain municipalities. We consider a municipality of birth as a “Verdun under Pétain” municipality if more than a third of home regiments has been rotated at Verdun under Pétain.

<sup>90</sup>Since we now focus on movers within residence municipalities, this effect could be driven both by selection – people inclined to collaborate are more likely to move to a Verdun-under-Pétain municipality where they find like-minded people, or by a treatment effect of destination location – people absorb local values and are more likely to follow others around them into collaboration in Verdun-under-Pétain municipalities. In either case, this suggests that local coordination is important: either in driving location choices or, conditional on location choices, in driving collaboration behavior.

<sup>91</sup>The difference between the coefficients in Columns 2 and 4 is itself statistically different from 0 at the 5.54% level.

A3. *The two rounds of the 1936 legislative elections*

The hypothesis is that Verdun-under-Pétain municipalities will react more to Pétain’s intervention and we should observe a largest shift away from the left in those municipalities. To test this hypothesis, we collected data on the second round of the 1936 legislative elections at the municipal level to augment our dataset that already included the first round. The voting system is described in pages B.B5 and B.B5 in the Appendix. Constituencies are single-member constituencies. If a candidate obtains the absolute majority in the first round, as well as a minimum of 25% of all the registered voters, then she is elected. If no candidate obtains the absolute majority in the first round, then there is a second round where the two most-voted candidates and the candidates who obtained more than 12.5% of the registered voters can take part. The candidate who obtains most votes win.

Some departments (Corse, Lozère, Meuse) are missing from the second round data available at the Archives. Moreover, some municipalities did not organize a second round, if a candidate had obtained the absolute majority in the first round. Overall, we have data on both rounds for all 24,813 municipalities in France in which a second round was held and for which these data still exist, including 23,795 municipalities within France’s 1914 borders.

Our specification regresses the change in the vote share for a given party in between the two rounds of the elections (simple difference) on  $VerdunPetain_{i(b,e),1916}$ , the share of regiment(s) raised in municipality  $i$  raising troops for military recruitment bureau  $b$  that served under Pétain at the Battle of Verdun, controlling for usual municipality characteristics (including vote shares in 1914). We estimate the following specification:

$$\Delta(Y_{i(b,e)j}^t) = \alpha + \beta VerdunPetain_{i(b,e),1916} + \nu \log(Y_{i(b,e)j}^1) + \gamma Verdun_{i(b,e),1916} + \mathbf{X}_{i(b,e),<1916} \phi' + \eta_{Di} + \epsilon_{i(b,e)j}$$

where our unit of analysis  $i$  is a municipality within France’s 1914 borders, which raised troops for military recruitment bureau  $b$  in WWI, belongs to electoral district  $e$  and is observed in both rounds  $t = 1, 2$  of the 1936 elections.  $\Delta(Y_{i(b,e)j}^t)$  is the simple difference in vote shares in between the two rounds of the 1936 elections for party  $j$  in municipality  $i$ , where a round is indexed by  $t$ . We also examine differences in turnout as an outcome. In addition to  $\eta_{Di}$ , a set of 87 department-level fixed effects, and our usual controls included in  $X_{i(b,e),<1916}$ , we control in the robustness specifications displayed below for the (log) vote share for party  $j$  (or log turnout) in municipality  $i$  in the first round  $\log(Y_{i(b,e)j}^1)$ . We also present specifications estimated in the subsample of municipalities that were rotated at the Battle of Verdun, dropping  $Verdun_{i(b,e),1916}$  as a control.

Given the two-rounds system, the estimation sample is restricted to municipalities where party  $j$  ran for the second round. We thus restrict our analysis to four major parties which ran for second rounds in a meaningful number of municipalities (ordered from left to right): the SFIO (socialist party, 17% of the vote in the first round, see Table B5), the Radicaux Socialistes (RAD-SOC, centre left, 19% of the vote in the first round), Alliance Démocratique (AD, 27% of the vote in the first round) and the Parti Républicain National (PRN, 16% of the vote in the first round). We provide more information on each of these party and summary statistics in Section B.B5 of the Appendix.

Regression results are displayed in Table 5 in the paper for the full sample of 1914 municipalities and in Table A17 in the subsample of municipalities that were rotated at Verdun. Robustness specifications for which we also control for the (log) vote share for party  $j$  (or log turnout) in municipality  $i$  in the first round are displayed in Table A18.

Table A17— **Timing of the political shift : Changes in vote shares between the two rounds of the 1936 elections: Replica of Table 5 in Verdun municipalities**

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	SFIO	RADSOC	AD	PRN	Turnout
Verdun under Pétain	-8.504 (2.596)	-1.420 (2.608)	6.640 (3.366)	2.783 (2.299)	0.256 (0.471)
1911 pop	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Pre-WWI vote shares	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
R-squared	0.33	0.39	0.28	0.28	0.22
Observations	9,639	10,124	13,155	6,320	22,001
Mean DepVar	15.62	12.43	6.66	7.22	0.34
Sd DepVar	17.10	20.07	13.89	12.73	5.04
Number of clusters	118	109	126	90	141


*Note:* This Table reproduces Table 5 in the subsample of municipalities that were rotated at Verdun. The unit of observation is a municipality. The Table displays the OLS estimation results of Equation (A.A3) (see Appendix Section A.A3) for each major party  $j$  present in both rounds of the elections in municipality  $i$ . The estimation sample is restricted to municipalities that were rotated at Verdun and where party  $j$  ran in both rounds of the 1936 elections. All specifications control for department fixed effects (87 departments) and the usual set of pre-WWI controls at the municipality level (as in Column 2 of Table 4). Robust standard errors clustered at the military recruitment bureau and electoral district (arrondissement) level are reported in parentheses.

Table A18—: Timing of the political shift : Changes in vote shares between the two rounds of the 1936 elections, controlling for vote shares in first round

	SFIO		RADSOC		AD		PRN		Turnout	
	(1) 1914 France	(2) Verdun only	(3) 1914 France	(4) Verdun only	(5) 1914 France	(6) Verdun only	(7) 1914 France	(8) Verdun only	(9) 1914 France	(10) Verdun only
Verdun under Pétain	-6.117 (2.750)	-7.348 (2.755)	-0.297 (2.948)	-1.383 (2.693)	7.057 (3.018)	5.755 (3.000)	1.779 (2.723)	1.796 (2.580)	0.355 (0.402)	0.082 (0.422)
1911 pop	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Pre-WWI vote shares	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Vote share for party j in round 1	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
R-squared	0.38	0.38	0.41	0.42	0.35	0.36	0.34	0.35	0.28	0.28
Observations	10,472	9,639	10,712	10,124	14,164	13,155	6,954	6,320	23,791	22,001
Mean DepVar	15.81	15.62	12.26	12.43	6.65	6.66	7.43	7.22	0.42	0.34
Sd DepVar	16.90	17.10	19.98	20.07	13.85	13.89	12.38	12.73	4.94	5.04
Number of clusters	128	118	118	109	138	126	99	90	153	141


Notes: The unit of observation is a municipality. The Table displays the OLS estimation results of Equation (A.A3) for each major party  $j$  present in both rounds of the elections in municipality  $i$ , controlling for the log vote share for party  $j$  in the first round.. The estimation sample is restricted to municipalities where party  $j$  ran in both rounds. All specifications control for department fixed effects (87 departments) and the usual set of pre-WWI controls at the municipality level (as in Column 2 of Table 4). Robust standard errors clustered at the military recruitment bureau and electoral district (arrondissement) level are reported in parentheses.

A4. Additional Figures




**Notes:** The figure shows the evolution of the front at the battle of Verdun between 21 February 1916 and 15 December 1916. Source: 'Carte ©IGN – Grande Guerre – Bataille de Verdun 1916 – Les lignes de front', Institut national de l'information géographique et forestière (IGN), 2016.

Figure A1. : Evolution of the front: Verdun, 21 February - 15 December 1916




**Notes:** The figure shows the average number of French line infantry regiments engaged in combat at Verdun during each month of the Battle of Verdun (February-December 1916). The vertical line corresponds to the date of replacement of Pétain by Nivelle as the general in command of the Battle. The Figure only deals with Metropolitan Troops. Source: *Historiques des Régiments*.

Figure A2. : Number of French Line Infantry Regiments Engaged in Combat at Verdun During Each Month of the Battle (February - December 1916)




**Notes:** The figure shows exposure to German artillery bombardment and infantry attacks as well as participation in French-led attacks among the line infantry regiments that were engaged in the Battle of Verdun, for each month of the Battle. The vertical line corresponds to the date of replacement of Pétain by Nivelle as the general in command of the Battle. Source: Historiques des Régiments.

Figure A3. : Combat at Verdun During Each Month of the Battle (February - December 1916)



**Notes:** The top panel displays the boundaries of the 158 recruitment bureaus in 1914. The bottom panel adds départements boundaries. Source: *Dictionnaire des Communes* (Baron and Lassalle, 1915) and © les contributeurs d'OpenStreetMap sous licence ODbL (department shapefile).

Figure A4. : Military Recruitment Bureaus and Départements Boundaries



**Notes:** The figure displays whether all (vertical lines), some (horizontal lines) or none of the regiments from each municipality were rotated through Verdun. Thin blue lines indicate department boundaries and illustrate our within-department identifying variation. 92.76% of 1914 France's municipalities sent troops that served at Verdun. 56.86% sent troops that served at Verdun under Pétain. Source: *Historiques des Régiments, Dictionnaire des Communes* (Baron and Lassalle, 1915) and © les contributeurs d'OpenStreetMap sous licence ODbL (department shapefile).

Figure A5. : Municipalities raising regiments under Pétain at Verdun

# LE MOT D'ORDRE du maréchal Pétain :

## Rassemblement national

— Monsieur, me dit le maréchal Pétain, je ne vois pas très bien ce que vous attendez de moi et je m'étonne même que les portes se soient ouvertes devant vous. Je me suis fait une règle absolue de ne jamais accorder d'interview et de ne pas faire de politique.

— Monsieur le maréchal, répondis-je, il n'est point question de politique. La *Revue des deux Mondes* s'appête à publier de vous un article sur la défense nationale et sur le commandement unique. J'aurais été heureux de vous poser quelques questions à ce sujet.

— Asseyez-vous. Je vous écoute.

— Vous dites dans cet article, monsieur le maréchal, que nous avons un ministre de la guerre, un ministre de la marine, un ministre de l'air...

— Mais que nous n'avons pas un ministre de la défense nationale, chargé de coordonner les efforts de ces trois départements et d'imprimer à tout cela une direction unique. Je dis cela pour le regretter. Il m'a semblé que le moment était venu d'aborder le problème, que demain il serait peut-être trop tard. La France, monsieur, est menacée.

— N'estimez-vous pas, monsieur le maréchal, que le pacte franco-soviétique nous a rendu un bien mauvais service en accordant au communisme la reconnaissance officielle que nos gouvernements lui avaient jusqu'alors refusée ?

— Vous êtes bien indiscret, monsieur. Je le crois, en effet. En tendant la main à Moscou, nous l'avons tendue au communisme et nous avons amené à lui quantité de braves gens de chez nous qui, jusqu'alors, s'en défendaient. Nous avons fait entrer le communisme dans le cercle des doctrines avouables. Nous aurons vraisemblablement l'occasion de le regretter.

— Monsieur le maréchal, dois-je en conclure que les sentiments que vous inspire la situation actuelle...

— Je suis inquiet, monsieur. Inquiet pour le salut de la France et pour les libertés des Français. Car ce n'est pas seulement la collectivité qui est en jeu. C'est chacun de nous, dans ses droits. C'est le bourgeois. C'est l'ouvrier. C'est le paysan.

— J'aurais été heureux de vous entendre juger un mouvement qui s'est attaché à servir la France en s'élevant au-dessus des partis, le mouvement Croix de feu...

— A mon avis, tout ce qui est international est



néfaste. Tout ce qui est national est utile et fécond. Les Croix de feu représentent l'un des éléments les plus sains de ce pays.

Ils veulent défendre la famille, lui garantir ses conditions indispensables d'existence. J'approuve cela. Tout part d'elle. La famille française a été expropriée, frappée de droits exorbitants. On dirait que nos législateurs n'ont eu d'autre but que de rompre la chaîne de l'effort et de décourager le père de travailler pour ses enfants. Je vois que les Croix de feu se préoccupent aussi du perfectionnement moral et spirituel de la jeunesse. Vous savez que c'est une idée qui est mienne depuis longtemps. *On ne peut rien faire d'une nation qui manque d'âme. C'est à nos instituteurs, à nos professeurs*

*de la forger. Nous ne leur demandons pas de faire de nos enfants des savants. Nous leur demandons d'en faire des hommes et des Français.*

— Monsieur le maréchal, le peuple français est allé voter dimanche dernier et il y retournera dimanche prochain. J'aurais voulu recueillir votre mot d'ordre.

— Non, monsieur, car ce serait de la politique.

— Monsieur le maréchal, vous représentez la victoire française et la plus noble fusion qu'il y ait jamais eu entre le peuple et ses chefs. Il n'y a pas en France de personnalité plus symbolique que la vôtre pour transmettre aux hommes d'aujourd'hui le sens du sacrifice consenti par les hommes d'hier.


— Alors, dites ceci. Dites que la France est moins malheureuse que l'Allemagne, moins malheureuse que l'Italie. La question du pain se pose chez nous moins qu'ailleurs. Pourtant ni l'Allemagne ni l'Italie ne doutent. Nous, nous doutons. C'est que la crise n'est pas chez nous une crise matérielle. Nous avons perdu la foi dans nos destinées, voilà tout. Nous sommes comme des marins sans pilote, sans gouvernail. C'est contre cela qu'il faut lutter. C'est cela qu'il faut retrouver : une mystique. Appelez-la comme vous voudrez : mystique de la patrie ou, plus simplement, du souvenir : hors de cela, point de salut. Nous ne venons qu'après des millions d'êtres qui ont peiné et souffert pour que nous soyons ce que nous sommes. Ils ont droit d'exiger de nous qu'au moins nous poursuivions leur tâche.

— Si vous aviez à résumer votre pensée en un mot, monsieur le maréchal ?

— RASSEMBLEMENT NATIONAL.


**Notes:** The figure reproduces the interview of the Maréchal Pétain that was published on the front page of *Le Journal* newspaper on Thursday April 30, 1936. This document is taken from the RetroNews website and is accessible at [www.retronews.fr](http://www.retronews.fr). Any reuse of this document must comply with the subscription conditions provided by the RetroNews website.

Figure A6. : Maréchal Pétain's interview published in the front page of *Le Journal* on April 30th 1936.




**Notes:** The figure shows coefficients and 95% confidence intervals in separate regressions in which we drop each region one by one, as indicated. All regressions are at the municipality level with department fixed effects and control for the Verdun rotation and the usual set of pre-WWI controls (as in Column 2 of Table 4). Standard errors are clustered at the military recruitment bureau level.

Figure A7. : Robustness to Dropping each Region One by One




**Notes:** The histogram shows the distribution of coefficients obtained from permutation inference based on 1,000 replications. The distribution of t-statistics is shown in Figure A9. We perform permutation inference by reassigning treatment status, alternatively, at two different levels: 1) at the regiment level, keeping the allocation of each municipality to its regiment as the real allocation, 2) at the municipal level. The top panel displays results for the permutation inference at the regiment level conditional on the Verdun rotation and department fixed effect (left) (as in Column 1 of Table 4) and controlling additionally the usual set of pre-WWI controls (right) (as in Column 2 of Table 4). The bottom panel displays similar results for the permutation inference at the municipal level. The vertical bars indicate the coefficients obtained from the real assignment (see Columns 1 and 2 of Table 4).

Figure A8. : Permutation Inference: Distribution of Coefficients




**Notes:** See notes to Table A8. The vertical bars indicate the t-statistics obtained from the real assignment (see Columns 1 and 2 of Table 4).

Figure A9. : Permutation Inference: Distribution of t-statistics



**Notes:** The figure shows coefficients obtained from separate regressions of the log share of collaborators in the municipality on consecutive months of fighting at Verdun, as indicated, controlling for the full set of controls and department fixed effects. All regressions are at the municipality level and include department fixed effects as well as controls for the natural logarithm of the 1911 municipal population, log vote shares for the left or for the right in 1914, and municipal fatality death rate in WWI (as in Column 9 of Table 4). Standard errors are clustered at the military recruitment bureau level. Horizontal bars indicate 95% CI. The figure shows that the positive and significant effect of fighting at Verdun on collaboration is only observed for the months during which Pétain was the general in command of the battle (i.e. February, March, April).

Figure A10. : Estimated effect of fighting at Verdun in different months on the share of collaborators



**Notes:** The figure plots the number of collaborators in the main groups, ordered by membership size. The main group by membership is the RNP (National Popular Rally, or *Rassemblement National Populaire*, a Fascist collaborationist political party created in 1941 by Marcel Déat, former number 2 of the socialist party SFIO together with former leaders of veteran organizations in the occupied zone). The other major Fascist collaborationist party, the PPF (French Popular Party, or *Parti Populaire Français*, created by the former number 2 of the communist party Jacques Doriot) comes third in total membership in our collaborators list. Secondary collaborationist parties are the MSR (the Revolutionary Social Movement) and the Francist Movement, two parties that were the direct continuation of Fascist right-wing leagues from the 1930s. Groupe Collaboration (11th on our list in terms of total membership) were a more elite and less violent political organization that supported collaboration with Nazi Germany for a new European order. The second major paramilitary organization that supported collaboration with Nazi Germany for a new European order. The second major paramilitary organization is the Legion of French Volunteers against Bolshevism (or LVF), created in July 1941 whose volunteers fought in the Wehrmacht uniform on the Eastern front. Other collaborators directly supported the Nazi occupation by joining the Gestapo (the 5th most predominant form of collaboration in our list), working for the German Intelligence Service (7th), the German security services (12th) or the SS (13th). Economic collaboration is also recorded in our list. 1,550 (1.62% of the total) collaborators are listed as economic collaborators, and the vast majority of them are listed only for this reason (only 37 of them are also listed as members of a collaborationist political party, 20 as Nazi collaborators (Gestapo, SS, Intelligence or Security services), and 14 as Milice members). This suggests that these economic collaborators are distinct from the others, ideological collaborators, but that only serious cases of profiteering, as opposed to day-to-day exchange, are included. Source: Authors' dataset on collaboration.

Figure A11. : Number of Collaborators by Category, Main Categories

## SUPPLEMENTARY ONLINE APPENDIX

*B1. Forms of Collaboration in our Data*

*Les dates d'engagement des Français qui ont choisi de servir dans la SS méritent réflexion: très tard, en 1944, alors que l'Allemagne a déjà perdu évidemment la guerre.* [The dates of engagement of the French who chose to serve in the SS merits reflection: very late, in 1944, when it was clear that Germany had lost the war] – Jean François Deniau, “Mémoire de trois vies”, Plon, 1954, cited in Forbes (p. viii 2006).

## COLLABORATIONIST POLITICAL PARTIES.

A range of political parties and organizations in France provided opportunities for different forms and intensities of collaboration. This diversity was in sharp contrast with other European fascist regimes, which tended to impose a unique party; and with other occupied countries, where political parties were not tolerated by the German occupiers.

Collaborationist parties distributed newspapers, held meetings, and organized demonstrations. But they also engaged in spying, informing, denunciation, and violence against Jews and opponents, including the Resistance.

The two main collaborationist parties were the French Popular Party (PPF) and the People's National Rally (RNP).<sup>92</sup> Both parties were created by two former prominent left-wing politicians (respectively former number two of the Communist and Socialist parties), both heroic veterans of the first World War: Jacques Doriot and Marcel Déat.<sup>93</sup> Alongside them were parties that were direct emanations of the right-wing fascist leagues of the 1930's, chief among which the Francisme movement and the MSR, the resurfaced *Cagoule*.<sup>94</sup>

Such a wide political spectrum of collaborationist parties shows how people from all sides of the polarized and radicalized 1930s rallied behind collaboration. A common perspective was to be against the Republic, against Bolshevism, and against liberalism. Although critical of Vichy for what they judged a too tepid stance on collaboration, all the parties' leaders claimed Pétain's support (Burrin, 1996, p.382), and some, such as the leader of the RNP, accepted positions at Vichy.<sup>95</sup>

## PARAMILITARY GROUPS.

Immediately after the signature of the Armistice, Xavier Vallat, the state secretary in charge of veteran affairs grouped all Great War veteran organizations under the single umbrella of the *Légion Française des Combattants* (The Legion). Its statutes plainly stipulated the Legion was to substitute for all existing associations of veterans (Journal Officiel, Art. 5, 30 August 1940, p.4845). The Legion swore its allegiance to Marshal Pétain and was officially charged with the implementation of Pétain's "National Revolution". The role of the Legion and the central influence of Pétain's prestige is clear: veterans "must form groups down up the uttermost village in order to have the wise counsels of their leader of Verdun heeded and carried out."<sup>96</sup> However, the Legion never engaged in violent actions. This became the prerogative of two other groups, the *Service d'Ordre de la Légion* (SOL) and, later on, of the *Milice*.

To provide shock troops for Pétain within the Legion, which was seen as too ideologically disparate and, given its anti-German sentiments, hard to mobilise, the SOL was constituted in January 1942. Elements of the SOL further formed into the Milice at Hitler's insistence by January 1943. The SOL and the Milice were paramilitary organizations as well as political movements.<sup>97</sup>

The "Légion des Volontaires Français contre le Bolchevisme" was co-created in 1941 by Marcel Bucard to raise volunteers to fight alongside the Wehrmacht on the Eastern front. By 1943, with Germany's disastrous losses on manpower on the Eastern Front, French volunteers were allowed to directly join the German forces as part of the volunteer Sturm-Brigade and later the so-called "*Charlemagne*" division of the *Waffen-SS*.

<sup>92</sup>Respectively in French: "Parti Populaire Français" and "Rassemblement National Populaire". In the absence of our data, many estimates have tended to use very round numbers, placing total membership at between 40,000 and 50,000 for the PPF (Burrin, 1996, p. 417, 469), and between 20,000 (Burrin, 1996, p. 393) and 30,000 (Paxton, 2001, p. 253) for the RNP.

<sup>93</sup>An active combatant for the whole duration of the war, Déat had been awarded the highest French order of merit (the Légion d'Honneur) and received five bravery citations. Doriot, 4 years his junior, joined active combat in 1917 and was made prisoner. He was awarded the *Croix de Guerre* for valor. Doriot eventually joined the the *Légion des Volontaires Français contre le Bolchevisme* (LVF). He was killed by an Allied plane in Germany in 1945. After a short appointment in the Vichy government, Déat joined the SS, and fled to Germany and then Italy at the end of the War.

<sup>94</sup>Both movements had also been formed by WWI veterans, Marcel Bucard and Eugène Deloncle, see below.

<sup>95</sup>As Burrin describes: "The Paris leaders were rivals, not opponents, extremists of Pétainism, not anti-Pétainists" (Burrin, 1996, p.383).

<sup>96</sup>Xavier Vallat, quoted in *D'Ordre du maréchal Pétain. Documents officiels réunis et commentés par Jean Thouvenin* (Paris, n.d.1940 in Paxton (2001), p.190).

<sup>97</sup>The political objectives of the SOL are set against: "bourgeois selfishness", "egalitarianism", "individualism", "global capitalism", "gaullist dissidence", "Bolshevism", "the Jewish plague", "free-masonry" and in favor of: "discipline", "authority", "truth", "nationalism", and "Christian civilization" (21 points of the SOL, in Germain (1997). The SOL and the Milice informed on, executed and helped deport Jews, free masons, anybody suspected of Resistance as well as those seeking to escape the order to work in Germany under the Compulsory Labour Service. Some historians believe 45,000 people volunteered for the Milice and the SOL (Paxton, 2001, p.298).

## NAZI COLLABORATION

An estimated total of 22,000 French people directly served Germany in combat or auxiliary units (Burrin, 1996, p.433). They joined the Gestapo, fought alongside the Wehrmacht on the Eastern front under the “Légion des Volontaires Français contre le Bolchevisme” or directly joined the Waffen SS. Twice as many had volunteered but were not deemed fit for service, many of them veterans of the First World War who were too old. Pétain had actively encouraged them, by declaring in November 1941: “You are responsible for part of our military honour” (in Burrin, 1996, p.433).

Although the classification between political, paramilitary and Nazi collaboration was made by historians, in practice, the delimitations between these groups were porous and unclear. Political parties engaged in violent demonstrations and violent action, often alongside the SOL, the Milice, or French and German Gestapo members. The SOL and the Milice were originally intended as a unique political party, which would eventually absorb the collaborationist parties. They were armed by the SS. The “Légion des Volontaires Français contre le Bolchevisme” was created and controlled by collaborationist parties but originally fought in a French uniform.

*B2. An example: Joseph Darnand*

Joseph Darnand provides a useful illustration of our mechanism. Born in 1897 in Coligny (Ain), in February 1916, he was assigned to the 35th regiment, which happened to be dispatched to Verdun shortly thereafter to serve under Pétain’s command. Darnand received the *Médaille Militaire* from Pétain himself in 1918 and was further inducted into the *Légion d’Honneur* in 1925, with President Poincaré citing him as one of the “*artisans of victory*”. Darnand actively invested his time and energies in various veterans organizations, including the *Croix de Feu* and particularly *La Cagoule* (see below), between the wars. Darnand would reenlist and garner further combat decorations fighting the Germans in 1940. Escaping from a POW camp in August 1940, like other members of the *Légion française des combattants*, he swore revenge against the Nazis. Following Pétain’s overt collaboration, Darnand instead forged a sub-group- the SOL- loyal to Pétain and willing to follow him into cooperation with the Nazis. However, as late as 1943, Darnand was still in negotiations with the Resistance to fight the Germans. And yet, he became the leader of the main paramilitary organization, the Milice, and despite some misgivings, agreed to continue at Pétain’s personal request. Despite the shifting natures of the war, he would later join the Waffen SS in 1943, swearing fealty to Adolf Hitler himself. He fled to Germany and Italy at the end of the war, soon to be captured, repatriated back to France and executed for his crimes (Forbes, 2006, p. 32-42).

Darnand’s remarkable reversal of loyalties was shared in varying degrees by many, in a manner consistent with the legitimization of previously-repugnant values by Pétain and the escalating commitment of the heroes who shared his heroic credentials at Verdun. As Darnand wrote to De Gaulle, just two days before his execution: “these men [*Miliciens*] are authentic Frenchmen ... Their only mistake is to have been faithful to a great soldier [Pétain]” (Cointet, 2017, p. 257-258).

*B3. Marcel Bucard*

Marcel Bucard, was also a Verdun veteran and war hero. Though Bucard had not served at Verdun under Pétain, he had served at Verdun (in October-December, as part of the 4th regiment) and he had developed ties with Pétain explicitly related to heroism. When Pétain awarded Bucard the Croix de Guerre for valor in 1917, he told him “Je sais votre conduite héroïque et ce que vos hommes pensent de vous, ce sera votre plus belle récompense.” [I know your heroic behavior and what your men think of you, it will be your greatest reward.]” (Deniel, 1979, p.7). For his “legendary heroism”, Bucard would also be inducted into the *Légion d’Honneur* following the Armistice in 1919. Though like Darnand, strongly anti-German, Bucard saw in Mussolini’s example a blueprint for France. He created the blueshirt *Francisme* movement in 1933. Along with other Francisme members, he was present at the Place de la Concorde during the events of February 6, 1934. In his journal, Bucard spoke of the left as the “*gravediggers of the Republic*” and discussed his intent in January 1934: “*we will set up the guillotines in the four corners of Paris and we will cut off heads. And we will be careful not to show them to the people, because they are not worth it.*” (Deniel, 1979, p.81)” But he held back on February 6, because, as he later wrote: “*it was impossible to storm the Palais-Bourbon*” (Deniel, 1979, p.83). He then sought to withdraw his Francisme comrades to look for another opportunity. As we show in the paper, Francist candidates received significantly higher vote shares in Verdun-under-Pétain municipalities during the subsequent elections in 1936.

Banned in 1936 following a wave of violence, the outbreak of the Second World War in 1939 brought a rehabilitation of extreme-right groups willing to fight Germany. Bucard re-joined the army, as a Capitaine in the 35e Infantry Regiment and was recognized for attempts to resist the German air force flying low over Belfort (Deniel, 1979, p.138-139).

With the Armistice, Bucard went to Vichy on July 16 and 17 [1940], where he was personally received by Marshal Pétain. Bucard assured Pétain that the Francists were “*resolutely in the vanguard, under (his) prestigious flag*” (Deniel, 1979, p.141). He subsequently co-founded the LVF to assist the Germans on the Eastern Front. Bucard would be shot for treason in 1946.

Individual members of Bucard’s *Francisme* organization would be recorded by French army intelligence in our 1944 dataset, with the correlation between the local share of votes for the 1936 party and the local density of collaborators affiliated with the recomposed movement during the Second World War is reassuringly high: 0.89. This indicates both the persistence of sentiment from the inter-war period to the Vichy era and acts an independent verification of the quality of our individual level collaborationist dataset, given its strong relationship with administrative voting sources.

#### B4. *La Cagoule: More detail*

Both Darnand and Bucard were members of the *Cagoule* or “the Hood”, which was the name given to the underground terrorist organization, the *Comité Social d’Action Révolutionnaire* (CSAR), the followers of Eugène Deloncle, by right-wing writers Charles Maurras and Maurice Pujo of the *Action Française* (Gordon, 1975, p. 261). The name was chosen precisely because even to these right-wing writers, the secretive terror tactics of this organization reminded Maurras of the American Ku Klux Klan (Gordon, 1975, p. 261). The CSAR was responsible for a number of political assassinations, including the anti-fascist refugees, the Rosselli brothers in 1937. As the historian Bertram Gordon writes: “With a number of military men in its ranks, the CSAR was by 1937 in contact with Commander George Loustaunau-Lacau, the organizer of the anti-Communist *Corvignolles* intelligence network within the French army. The *Corvignolles* had been established to root out Communist subversion with the French army, but their leaders plotted with the men of Deloncle to overthrow the Popular Front government then in power.” (Gordon, 1975, p. 261).<sup>98</sup> The CSAR’s members were infiltrated and the coup prevented, with several members entering exile. However, they were released in 1939.

The *Mouvement Social Révolutionnaire* (MSR) resurfaced under Vichy. Deloncle himself wrote that the MSR represented the ‘*visible projection of the secret organization that I had established in 1936-1937.*’ (Gordon, 1975, p. 265). We have data on 3,448 of its members. Not all former *Corvignolle* and CSAR members joined the MSR: in fact Loustaunau-Lacau himself would join the Resistance. However, as Column 3 in Table 7 shows, there is a positive and statistically significant coefficient associated with Verdun-under-Pétain in explaining membership in the MSR.

#### B5. *Electoral data*

To study the effect of combat exposure to Pétain on political preferences and to control for pre-WWI political preferences, we collected, digitized, and consistently coded the results of 23 legislative elections in France since 1914. In this Section, we provide institutional details on elections and political parties over that period. The French political system is characterized by a lot of entries and exits of parties, and parties regularly change their name. One of the main empirical challenges is therefore to classify the different political parties from the Extreme Left to the Extreme Right over such a long period of time. To do so, we rely mainly on Agrikoliansky (2016), Poirmeur (2014), and Haegel (2007) for the pre-WWII period. Here, we briefly describe the data for three crucial time periods in our analysis: 1914, in order to control for pre-WWI vote; the interwar, when an alignment in political preferences along Pétain’s conservative right-wing agenda emerged; and the post World War II period, after the fall of the Vichy regime and the restoration of the French Republic.

Please note: the fact that there are more observations, for each of the elections, in the tables below than in the tables in the body of the paper, is due to the fact that for some large cities (such as Paris, but also Marseille, Lyon, Bordeaux, Toulouse, Nice, etc.), we collect the electoral data at the finest possible level we have and report the electoral results at a geographical level smaller than the municipality. However, to perform the regression analyses in the paper, we collapse the electoral data at the municipality level so as to match it with our other observables.

### THE 1914 ELECTIONS

Elections took place in April 1914, three months before the outbreak of WW1.<sup>99</sup> The voting system was the “*scrutin uninominal à deux tours par arrondissements*”, a two-round system. There were 586 electoral districts in Metropolitan France. 2,904 candidates ran in the first round of the elections.

We collect and digitize the 1914 electoral results at the municipality level (more than 34,000 municipalities) from the paper archives of the Interior Ministry.<sup>100</sup> Figure B1 shows an example of the data. As it appears on the picture, the Interior Ministry data only reports the name of the candidates but not their political party. To obtain information on the political party of all the candidates, we digitize the official results at the district level and manually match the candidates using the district where they run and their name.

To classify the candidates, we mostly rely on Georges Lachapelle (“Les élections législatives des 26 avril et 10 mai 1914. Résultats officiels”), and rank the main parties on the Left-Right political spectrum as follows (from Left to Right) in 7 different categories:

- 1) Parti Socialiste Unifié (**SFIO**). It includes the Socialiste Unifiés and the Parti Ouvrier Révolutionnaire.
- 2) Républicain Socialiste (**REP-SOC**). It includes the Républicain Socialiste and the Socialistes indépendants.
- 3) Radical Unifié (**RAD-SOC**);
- 4) Radical Indépendant (**RAD-IND**). It includes the Radical Indépendant (ou Gauche Radicale)<sup>101</sup>, the Républicains indépendants and Républicain de gauche.

<sup>98</sup>Note that George Loustaunau-Lacau had been Pétain’s chief aide in the 1920s, replacing De Gaulle.

<sup>99</sup>More precisely, the first round took place on April 26 1914 and the second round on May 10 1914.

<sup>100</sup>These results are available in the boxes C//7241 to C//7254 at the National Archives. To the extent of our knowledge, we are the very first to digitize these data.

<sup>101</sup>The Radical Indépendant splintered from other “Radicals” over the alliance with the Socialists.



Table B1—: 1914 Legislative Elections: Summary Statistics

	Mean	St.Dev	Median	P75	Max
<b>Vote share - Left</b>					
SFIO	9.6	16.5	0.6	11.9	100
<b>Vote share - Center left</b>					
REP-SOC	3.6	13.2	0.0	0.0	100
RAD-SOC	28.8	29.7	24.6	51.7	100
<b>Vote share - Center right</b>					
RAD-IND	11.8	23.6	0.0	8.5	100
<b>Vote share - Right</b>					
PRDS	20.3	29.4	0.0	38.7	100
Progressistes	9.3	21.1	0.0	0.0	100
ALP	12.7	23.3	0.0	18.1	100
Vote share - Miscellaneous	3.8	14.3	0.0	0.0	100
<b>Turnout</b>	<b>79.5</b>	<b>9.9</b>	<b>81.4</b>	<b>86.2</b>	<b>100</b>
Observations	33743				

**Notes:** This table provides summary statistics on the 1914 legislative elections results. An observation is a municipality. The different political parties are described in the text.

as the independent radicals and the Socialist Republicans won the 1924 elections. The second *Cartel des gauches* won the 1932 elections.<sup>104</sup> The 1936 elections were won by a more radical left-wing alliance. For the first time, the communist party was included in the winning coalition. The victorious “*Front Populaire*” (Popular Front) consisted of the SFIO (Socialist Party), the Radical-Socialists, the Communist Party, as well as a number of other smaller parties on the Left.

The Right included a number of parties over that period. Although fascist and extreme-right leagues were active during the interwar period, they rejected participation in elections, until the 1936 elections. The Francisme and the Jeunesses Patriotes ran in the 1936 elections, but obtained a very low electoral score.

Uniquely, as for the 1914 elections, we are the very first to have collected the electoral results for the 1919, 1924, 1932, and 1936 elections at the municipality level, directly from paper-format archival data.<sup>105</sup>

## THE 1919 ELECTIONS

Figure B2 shows an example of the data for the 1919 elections. The elections took place in November. The voting system was the “*scrutin mixte à un tour*”.<sup>106</sup> The “*scrutin mixte à un tour*” is a mixed-member voting system, combining multi-member majority and multi-member proportional ballot in only one election round, in the departmental framework. The department is the electoral district, with the election of one deputy for every 75,000 inhabitants; however, if there are more than 6 deputies to be elected, the department is divided into constituencies which must elect at least 3 deputies each. A minimum floor is also established: each department must have at least 3 deputies.

Candidates must organize themselves into lists. The number of candidates per list cannot exceed the number of deputies to be elected in the constituency. Isolated candidates are also allowed, if they have the support of 100 voters in the constituency. It is forbidden to stand for election in more than one constituency. In practice, majority voting takes precedence over proportional representation as any candidate who obtains an absolute majority is declared elected within the limit of the seats to be filled. The seats are, in each list, allocated to the candidates who have won the most votes. If seats remain to be filled, only then the ballot becomes proportional. The electoral quotient is determined by dividing the number of voters by that of the deputies to be elected; and the average of each list by dividing the total number of votes obtained by the number of candidates. Each list is allocated as many seats as its average contains the electoral quotient.

<sup>104</sup>The main parties constituting this Cartel are, as in 1924, the “*Radicaux Indépendants*” (Independent Radicals), the “*Parti Républicain Socialiste*” (Republican-Socialist Party), the SFIO (the French Socialist Party), and the Radical Party.

<sup>105</sup>These results are available in the boxes C//10001 to C//10009 at the National Archives for 1919; C//10010 to C//10019 for 1924; and in the boxes C//10030 to C//10041 for 1932.

<sup>106</sup>This voting system has been used only twice under the Third Republic (in 1919 and 1924) following the enactment of the law of July 12, 1919. To describe this system, we rely here on Chevallier (2009).

For candidates to be elected, they must have won a number of votes greater than half the average number of votes on the list of which they are part. In the event of an equal number of votes, the oldest candidate wins.

A number of different lists run during the 1919 elections. The archival data, as illustrated in Figure B2, only provides information on the name of the candidates running for each list. We collect the information on the name of each list as well as of the associated political party from Georges Lachapelle (*“Elections législatives du 16 Novembre 1919”*, and complete when necessary this information with the *“Tableau des élections à la chambre des députés”* (the so-called *“Tableau Electoral”*).

RECEPTEMENT GÉNÉRAL DES VOTES.								Extraits des procès-verbaux des opérations électorales de chaque commune.						
CANTON	NOMS							DES COMMUNES (1)						OBSERVATIONS.
	Champagne	153	154	155	156	157	158	159	160	161	162	163	164	
Electeurs inscrits.....	112	265	94	59	65	94	42	16	53	108	46	984		
Votes (après les bulletins égarés).....	112	200	70	22	33	68	32	15	34	61	34	681		
Nombre de bulletins blancs sans enveloppe.....														
Nombre de bulletins blancs dans les enveloppes.....														
Bulletins en cas de réimpression.....	0	3	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	5		
Bulletins et enveloppes détruits par les électeurs.....														
Bulletins déposés avant de leur en avoir eu le total de la commune.....	112	197	70	22	33	68	31	15	34	61	34	676		
LISTES DES CANDIDATS (2)														
M. Chantal	130	56	18	4	5	24	8	5	14	25	8	226		
Messimy	26	75	14	4	4	24	8	3	14	25	10	207		
Cipiel	29	83	18	4	3	24	8	6	14	25	10	224		
M. Boccand	26	83	18	4	4	24	8	4	14	24	10	219		
M. Laine	25	87	18	4	3	25	8	6	15	23	9	224		
Requet	25	86	18	4	3	24	8	4	15	23	8	221		
M. M. Nicod	24	55	15	3	4	11	5	5	5	12	7	149		
Nicollé	24	55	15	3	4	10	5	2	4	12	7	137		
Geoffroy	23	46	13	3	4	10	5	3	4	10	7	129		
Brayer	25	45	13	3	4	10	5	2	5	10	7	129		
Lery	25	46	13	3	4	10	5	2	5	10	7	130		
Ortu	25	51	13	3	4	10	5	2	5	11	7	136		
M. M. Mermol	61	59	40	15	25	33	18	7	17	26	19	320		
de Lonicault	61	59	39	15	25	33	18	7	14	26	17	314		
Fibony	57	61	39	15	23	33	18	7	14	26	19	312		
Mauguiron	56	59	40	15	24	33	18	7	14	26	16	310		
Bernier	60	64	39	15	23	33	18	8	15	26	17	318		
Combe	58	58	39	15	24	33	18	8	15	26	19	310		

Figure B2. : Example of the 1919 Municipal-level Election Data. Archives Nationales (France), C//10001 - C//10009.

The main political forces running are (from Left to Right of the political spectrum):

- The **Communistes**.
- The Parti Socialiste (**SFIO**). It includes the Socialiste Unifiés.
- The Parti républicain radical et radical socialiste (**PRRS**).
- The Républicain Socialiste (**REP-SOC**).
- The Radical Indépendant (**RAD-IND**).
- The **“Gauche Radicale”**, which is very close from the Radical Indépendant – they often sit together.
- The **“Alliance Républicaine Démocratique” (ARD)**.
- The **“Gauche républicaine démocratique” (GRD)**, whose members sit together with the ARD.
- The **“Républicains de gauche” (RG)**.

- The “Fédération Républicaine - Union Républicaine et Démocratique” (**FR-URD**).
- The “Union Nationale Républicaine” (**UNR**), which is part of the “Bloc National”.
- The “Action républicaine et sociale” (**ARS**), also part of the “Bloc National”.
- The “Entente Républicaine Démocratique” (ERD), also part of the “Bloc National”.
- The “**Bloc National**”, which is made on different parties, but for which some candidates ran directly.
- A number of lists led by “**Anciens Combattants**” (veterans), which were part of the “Bloc National”.
- The “**Action Française**”, on the Extreme Right.

Table B2—: 1919 Legislative Elections: Summary Statistics

	Mean	St.Dev	Median	P75	Max
<b>Vote share - Extreme Left</b>					
PCF	0.043	0.7	0.000	0.00	45
<b>Vote share - Left</b>					
SFIO	12.51	15.0	6.90	17.65	100
Miscellaneous left	0.62	4.9	0.00	0.00	83
<b>Vote share - Center left</b>					
PRRS	12.55	20.8	0.00	22.22	100
REP-SOC	2.55	9.6	0.00	0.00	100
<b>Vote share - Center right</b>					
RAD-IND (Bloc National)	0.91	6.5	0.00	0.00	98
Gauche Radicale	1.27	8.1	0.00	0.00	100
ARD (Bloc National)	3.32	13.9	0.00	0.00	100
GRD (Bloc National)	2.75	10.6	0.00	0.00	100
RG	2.59	11.4	0.00	0.00	98
<b>Vote share - Right</b>					
FR-URD (Bloc National)	11.72	21.6	0.00	15.75	100
UNR (Bloc National)	14.13	25.2	0.00	23.75	100
ARS (Bloc National)	4.11	15.0	0.00	0.00	100
ERD (Bloc National)	10.55	21.1	0.00	7.96	100
Bloc National (other)	1.08	8.6	0.00	0.00	100
Anciens Combattants (Veterans)	2.24	7.6	0.00	0.00	97
Miscellaneous right	1.13	6.5	0.00	0.00	92
<b>Vote share - Extreme Right</b>					
Action Francaise	0.06	0.6	0.00	0.00	24
Vote share - Miscellaneous	6.42	14.9	0.00	0.64	100
<b>Turnout</b>	72.60	11.3	73.94	79.69	100
Observations	35279				

**Notes:** This table provides summary statistics on the 1919 legislative elections results. An observation is a municipality. The different political parties are described in the text.

## THE 1924 ELECTIONS

The 1924 elections were held in May. Like for the 1919 elections, the voting system was the “*scrutin mixte à un tour*”. A number of different lists ran during the 1924 elections. The archival data, as illustrated in Figure B3, only provides information on the name of the list; given candidates from the same party gather together on different lists depending on the districts, to classify the lists, we complete the Interior Ministry information with information collected from Georges Lachapelle (“*Elections législatives du 11 Mai 1924*”).

The image shows a handwritten document titled "RECENSEMENT GÉNÉRAL DES VOTES" (General Census of Votes). It is a table with multiple columns and rows, detailing election results for various political lists. The lists are categorized into "LISTES DES CANDIDATURES" and "LISTES DES CANDIDATURES". The columns represent different districts or areas, and the rows represent the different political lists. The data is handwritten in ink on aged paper. The lists include names like "Liste du Bloc Ouvrier Paysan-Parti communiste", "Liste du parti socialiste", "Liste Républicaine Socialiste", "Liste radicale-socialiste", "Républicains radicaux nationaux", "Liste des républicains de gauche", "Entente Républicaine Démocratique", and "Conservateurs". The table also includes a column for "Observations" and a column for "Total".

Figure B3. : Example of the 1924 Municipal-level Election Data. Archives Nationales (France), C//10010 - C//10019.

The main political forces running are (from the Left to the Right):

- 1) The “*Liste du Bloc Ouvrier Paysan-Parti communiste*” (**BOP**). This list is formed of the Communist Party and of some members of the Socialist Party.
- 2) The “*Liste du parti socialiste*” (**SFIO**).
- 3) The “*Liste Républicaine Socialiste*” (**REP-SOC**).
- 4) The “*Liste radicale-socialiste*” (**RAD-SOC**).
- 5) The “*Républicains radicaux nationaux*” or dissidents (**REP-RAD**).
- 6) The “*Liste des républicains de gauche*” (**RG**).<sup>107</sup>
- 7) The “*Entente Républicaine Démocratique*” (**ERD**).
- 8) The “**Conservateurs**”.

Candidates from smaller parties on the Left are classified as “Miscellaneous Left”. The remaining candidates are classified in a “**Divers**” category. Table B3 provides summary statistics at the municipal level on these elections.<sup>108</sup>

<sup>107</sup>This list is on the Right despite the name.

<sup>108</sup>Note that, given the electoral system used – the “*scrutin mixte à un tour*” where, as described above, citizens were given as many votes as there were MPs to elect, and where they could distribute those votes as they wished among the various candidates on all lists –, one cannot compute as usual the vote share obtained by each list using the number of votes cast.

Just as for 1914, we also group the candidates into political positions, including for 1924 the Extreme Left category (we rely on Guillaume, 1998, Dubasque and Kocher-Marboeuf, 2014). We include in the Right the ERD and the Conservateur. The REP-RAD and the RG are classified as Center Right. The Center Left includes the RAD-SOC and the REP-SOC; the Left the SFIO; and the Extreme Left the BOP.

Table B3—: 1924 Legislative Elections: Summary Statistics

	Mean	St.Dev	Median	P75	Max
<b>Vote share - Extreme left</b>					
BOP	5.1	8.3	2.0	5.9	98
<b>Vote share - Left</b>					
SFIO	24.1	24.4	15.6	43.9	100
Miscellaneous left	0.2	1.2	0.0	0.0	48
<b>Vote share - Center left</b>					
RAD-SOC	12.1	20.3	0.0	18.2	100
REP-SOC	1.5	7.6	0.0	0.0	100
<b>Vote share - Center right</b>					
REP-RAD	2.0	8.6	0.0	0.0	97
RG	13.4	19.8	0.0	22.9	100
<b>Vote share - Right</b>					
ERD	34.9	26.6	33.7	53.2	100
Conservateur	1.4	6.8	0.0	0.0	100
Vote share - Miscellaneous	0.7	5.3	0.0	0.0	94
<b>Turnout</b>	84.4	8.0	85.5	89.5	100
Observations	34343				

**Notes:** This table provides summary statistics on the 1924 legislative elections results. An observation is a municipality. The different political parties are described in the text.

### THE 1932 ELECTIONS

The 1932 (as well as the 1936 elections) took place with the “*scrutin uninominal majoritaire à deux tours*” (two-round system). The constituencies are single-member constituencies. If a candidate obtains the absolute majority in the first round, as well as a minimum of 25% of all the registered voters, then she is elected. If no candidate obtains the absolute majority in the first round, then there is a second round where the two most-voted candidates and the candidates who obtained more than 12.5% of the registered voters can take part. The candidate who obtains most votes win.

Candidates in the legislative elections of 1932 are often difficult to classify, especially candidates from the Right half of the political spectrum, who are often characterized more by their opposition to the three major parties and the Left and Centre Left (PCF, SFIO, Radicals) than by their membership of a particular party, especially since the boundaries between the many right-wing parliamentary organizations and groups are often quite fluid and frequently change during the course of a legislature. Based on Lachapelle’s classifications, the main parties are, from the Extreme Left to the Right:

- The Communist party (**PCF**);
- The Socialist party (**SFIO**);
- The Républicains Socialistes (**REP-SOC**);
- The Radicaux Socialistes (**RAD-SOC**);
- The Républicains de gauche (**AD-RG**) (that are part of the “Alliance Démocratique”);
- The Radicaux Indépendants (**AD-IND**) (which also include candidates from the “gauche radicale”, the “gauche sociale et radicale”, and the “indépendants de gauche”), that are part of the “Alliance Démocratique”;

- The Parti Démocrate Populaire (**AD-PDP**) (Christian-democrats), that is also part of the “Alliance Démocratique”;
- The Union Républicaine Démocratique (**FR-URD**), that also includes candidates presented by the Fédération Républicaine.

Besides, there were also a number of “Miscellaneous Right” candidates, mostly under the label “Conservative”, and as well as “Miscellaneous Left” candidates. Table B4 provides summary statistics at the municipal level on the 1932 elections.

Table B4—: 1932 Legislative Elections: Summary Statistics

	Mean	St.Dev	Median	P75	Max
<b>Vote share - Extreme left</b>					
PCF	4.2	7.7	1.4	4.5	93
<b>Vote share - Left</b>					
SFIO	16.2	19.9	7.3	26.6	100
Miscellaneous left	0.2	2.4	0.0	0.0	68
<b>Vote share - Center left</b>					
REP-SOC	4.0	12.6	0.0	0.0	97
RAD-SOC	23.1	24.7	15.8	41.9	100
<b>Vote share - Center right</b>					
AD-RG	17.8	25.3	0.0	35.4	100
AD-IND	15.6	24.6	0.0	26.3	100
<b>Vote share - Right</b>					
AD-PDP	3.6	12.7	0.0	0.0	100
FR-URD	12.7	23.7	0.0	16.4	100
AGR	1.3	5.7	0.0	0.0	84
Miscellaneous right	0.8	6.2	0.0	0.0	99
Vote share - Miscellaneous	0.5	6.6	0.0	0.0	100
<b>Turnout</b>	85.0	8.0	86.2	90.1	100
Observations	30720				

**Notes:** This table provides summary statistics on the 1932 legislative elections results. An observation is a municipality. The different political parties are described in the text. The number of observations is lower for the 1932 elections than for the other legislatives elections. It is due to the fact that for that year, the national archives have lost the electoral results in the departments whose first letter is A and B (i.e. Ain, Aisne, Allier, Alpes Maritimes, Ardèche, Ardennes, Ariège, Aube, Aude, Aveyron, and Basses Alpes.)

## 1936 ELECTIONS

The 1936 legislative elections took place on 26 April and 3 May, to fill 618 seats in the Chamber of Deputies. There were won by the “*Front Populaire*” (Popular Front) composed of the SFIO, the RAD-SOC, the Communist Party (PCF), as well as a number of other smaller parties on the left. The voting system was similar to the one used in 1932 (single-member, two-round ballot). The “*Front Populaire*” fell in 1938, when the RAD-SOC forced the SFIO out of cabinet and the Communists broke with the coalition over the vote for the Munich agreement (which the Communists voted against). A general strike ensued in 1938, which the RAD-SOC crushed, before joining a political alliance with conservative Right-wing parties, the AD and the URD.

In the continuation of 1932, candidates in the 1936 elections, particularly in the opposition, on the Right, are often difficult to classify. We adopt the following classification, from the Extreme Left to the Extreme Right:

- The Communist party (**PCF**);
- The Socialist party (**SFIO**);

- The Union Socialiste Républicaine (**USR**);
- The **RAD-SOC**;
- The Alliance Démocratique (**AD**);
- The Fédération Républicaine - Union Républicaine et Démocratique (**FR-URD**);
- The Parti Républicain National (**PRN**);
- The Parti **Franciste** (Francisme).

Table B5 provides summary statistics at the municipal level on the first round of the 1936 elections.

Table B5—: 1936 Legislative Elections, First round: Summary Statistics

	Mean	St.Dev	Median	P75	Max
<b>Vote share - Extreme left</b>					
PCF	8.63	11.4	4.29	11.43	90
<b>Vote share - Left</b>					
SFIO	16.75	18.6	9.37	28.26	100
Miscellaneous left	0.22	2.7	0.00	0.00	73
<b>Vote share - Center left</b>					
USR	6.65	15.1	0.00	1.76	100
RAD-SOC	19.03	21.0	12.24	34.48	100
<b>Vote share - Center right</b>					
AD	26.87	27.3	21.74	46.34	100
FR-URD	0.28	2.6	0.00	0.00	93
PRN	15.84	25.1	0.00	28.26	100
<b>Vote share - Right</b>					
AGR	1.94	8.3	0.00	0.00	88
Miscellaneous right	2.16	10.0	0.00	0.00	100
<b>Vote share - Extreme right</b>					
Franciste	0.05	0.9	0.00	0.00	53
Vote share - Miscellaneous	1.59	9.7	0.00	0.00	100
<b>Turnout</b>	84.85	7.2	85.82	89.41	100
Observations	35845				

**Notes:** This table provides summary statistics on the first round of the 1936 legislative elections results. An observation is a municipality. The different political parties are described in the text.

Table B6 presents the results for the second round of the election.

Table B6—: 1936 Legislative Elections, Second round: Summary Statistics

	Mean	St.Dev	Median	P75	Max
<b>Vote share - Extreme left</b>					
PCF	4.23	14.0	0.00	0.00	100
<b>Vote share - Left</b>					
SFIO	20.66	28.0	0.00	45.75	100
Miscellaneous left	0.35	4.3	0.00	0.00	84
<b>Vote share - Center left</b>					
USR	7.77	19.2	0.00	0.00	100
RAD-SOC	20.64	28.4	0.00	45.18	100
<b>Vote share - Center right</b>					
AD	27.85	28.5	26.92	50.00	100
FR-URD	0.19	3.0	0.00	0.00	100
PRN	13.46	23.3	0.00	26.26	100
<b>Vote share - Right</b>					
AGR	2.19	10.7	0.00	0.00	100
Miscellaneous right	1.65	9.1	0.00	0.00	100
<b>Vote share - Extreme right</b>					
Franciste	0.00	0.1	0.00	0.00	15
Vote share - Miscellaneous	1.01	7.8	0.00	0.00	100
<b>Turnout</b>	85.59	7.2	86.60	90.20	100
Observations	24813				

**Notes:** This table provides summary statistics on the second round 1936 legislative elections results. An observation is a municipality. The different political parties are described in the text.