ONLINE APPENDIX


"An Experiment in Candidate Selection"

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List of supplemental figures and tables:


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Figure A1: Example Voter Report (aspirant names redacted)



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Figure A2: SLPP Advance Announcement Flyer (constituency list redacted)



Dependent variable	Selected candidate is voters' first choice
	(1)
Primary intervention	33.18
	(11.81)
Swing seat	8.26
	(30.74)
Swing seat X Primary intervention	-33.18
	(24.55)
Observations (races)	91

Table A1: Heterogeneous Effects on Representation in Swing Races

Notes: i) this paper reports heterogeneous treatment effects on the likelihood that the party selected the aspirant who ranks first among voters by the expected level of competition in the general election; ii) ordinary least squares regression with robust standard errors; iii) specifications include fixed effects for 23 party-region strata used in the random assignments; and iv) the omitted category for the swing seat indicator is uncompetitive general election seats (i.e. safe and weak seats pooled together).

Professional qualifications	Mean	SD	Ν	Min	Max
Years of education	15.32	1.56	390	4	16
Current or most recently held job is white collar	0.76	0.43	390	0	1
Years spent serving in elected office	2.31	4.89	390	0	39
Is an incumbent member of parliament	0.06	0.25	390	0	1
Wealth	Mean	SD	Ν	Min	Max
Monthly income from current or most recently held job (in USD)	\$849.8	\$919.9	390	\$35.7	\$2,857.1
Assets and accounts (1 point for each that aspirant owns of: bicycle, DVD player, fan, generator, mobile phone, personal computer, radio, refrigerator, flashlight, television set, motor vehicle, national bank account, foreign bank account)	10.73	1.75	390	0	13
Economic development record					
Has been involved with or managed any development projects in their own constituency in the past 5 years	0.83	0.38	390	0	1
Number of development projects involved with or managed in the past 3 years (list up to 3 with detailed accounting of location, type, budget, source of funds)	1.89	1.17	390	0	3
Total funding for listed development projects (in log(Leones + 1))	12.51	8.64	390	0	26.94
Cognitive ability	Mean	SD	N	Min	Max
Addition and numeracy: indicator equals one if the sum of aspirant's answers to the question, 1) "How many members of the Parliament of Sierra Leone were directly elected from single member constituencies in 2012?" plus their answer to 2) "How many other members of the Parliament of Sierra Leone were there in 2012?" correctly sum to their answer to 3) "How many members were there in total in the Parliament of Sierra Leone in 2012?." Indicator equals zero if internally inconsistent or responds "Don't know."	0.31	0.46	390	0	1

Table A2: Aspirant Characteristics Summary Statistics

Addition and numeracy: indicator equals one if the sum of aspirant's answers to the question, 1) "How many members of the Parliament of Sierra Leone were directly elected from single member constituencies in 2017?" plus their answer to 2) "How many other members of the Parliament of Sierra Leone were there in 2017?" correctly sum to their answer to 3) "How many members were there in total in the Parliament of Sierra Leone in 2017?." Indicator equals zero if internally inconsistent or responds "Don't know."	0.25	0.43	390	0	1
Division: indicator equals one if aspirant's answers to how many women are in their constituency divided by how many total people are in their constituency is within the range 0.40 to 0.60.	0.42	0.49	390	0	1
Percentages: indicator equals one if aspirant's estimated percentage of women in their constituency matches their raw estimates for women and total population (within +/- 5 percentage points)	0.34	0.47	390	0	1
Percentages: indicator equals one if aspirant's estimated percentage of youth in their constituency matches their raw estimates for youth and total population (within +/- 5 percentage points)	0.36	0.48	390	0	1
Growth rates: indicator equals one if aspirant correctly estimated national population in 5 years given 3% growth rate and own raw population answer (within a wide margin of error)	0.48	0.5	390	0	1
Growth rates: indicator equals one if aspirant correctly estimated constituency population in 5 years given 3% growth rate and own raw population answer (within a wide margin of error)	0.47	0.5	390	0	1
Party Loyalty	Mean	SD	Ν	Min	Max
Preference for personal vs. campaign spending	3.17	0.90	390	1	5
Number of family relatives within the party leadership	0.93	1.27	390	0	7
Number of different party leaders the aspirant has met with	3.27	2.31	390	0	8
Number of meetings held with party leaders	14.92	21.53	390	0	195
Time spent as a member of party (years)	18.23	11.81	390	0	60
Has previously run for elected office as a member of their party	0.57	0.50	390	0	1
Number of party roles or positions held since joining the party	1.24	1.43	390	0	9

Aspirant is from a chiefly/ruling family	0.47	0.50	390	0	1
Has provided any monetary or in kind support to their party this election cycle	0.38	0.49	390	0	1
Has you received any monetary or in kind support from their party this election cycle	0.05	0.22	390	0	1
Local Networks	Mean	SD	Ν	Min	Max
Born in this constituency	0.81	0.39	390	0	1
Has primary residence in constituency	0.73	0.44	390	0	1
Is registered to vote in constituency	0.96	0.20	390	0	1
Member of constituency elderly group	0.67	0.47	390	0	1
Member of constituency employers group	0.28	0.45	390	0	1
Member of constituency environmental group	0.41	0.49	390	0	1
Member of constituency farmers group	0.54	0.50	390	0	1
Member of constituency fishing group	0.12	0.33	390	0	1
Member of constituency journalist group	0.08	0.28	390	0	1
Member of constituency savings group	0.33	0.47	390	0	1
Member of constituency workers' organizations and trade unions group	0.36	0.48	390	0	1
Member of constituency women's group	0.37	0.48	390	0	1
Member of constituency youth group	0.65	0.48	390	0	1
Campaign Expenditure	Mean	SD	Ν	Min	Max
Numer of rallies aspirant has held in their constituency over the past six weeks	1.14	2.35	389	0	20
Number of communities or villages have visited in constituency over the past six weeks	30.83	41.57	390	0	300
Number of times aspirant has interviewed or put a jingle on the radio over the past six	1.00	1.55	200	0	10
weeks	1.08	1.77	390	0	10
Aspirant has provided any in kind support to their campaign in the past six weeks	0.64	0.48	390	0	1
Amount of personal money aspirant has spent on their campaign in the past six weeks (in $log(Leones + 1)$)	16.08	4.58	390	0	20.37
Public Service Motivation (all coded from $1 =$ disagree strongly to $5 =$ Agree strongly; ** recoded so that disagreement signals higher PSM)	Mean	SD	Ν	Min	Max
a. I respect public officials who can turn a good idea into law	4.15	1.50	355	1	5

Returned any of up to 3 extra 10,000 Leone notes given in reimbursement for transport expenses	0.46	0.50	369	0	1
Conscientiousness Behavioral Measure	Mean	SD	Ν	Min	Max
r. I feel people should give back to society more than they get from it	4.10	1.49	355	1	5
q. Serving citizens would give me a good feeling even if no one paid me for it	4.11	1.48	355	1	5
p. Making a difference in society means more to me than personal achievements	4.12	1.48	355	1	5
o. I have little compassion for people in need who are unwilling to take the first step to help themselves**	3.14	1.59	355	1	5
n. I seldom think about the welfare of people whom I don't know personally**	3.35	1.66	355	1	5
m. Most social programs are too vital to do without	3.57	1.49	355	1	5
1. I have an obligation to look after those less well off	4.01	1.49	355	1	5
k. I believe everyone has a moral commitment to civic affairs no matter how busy they are	4.15	1.44	355	1	5
j. When public officials take an oath of office, I believe they accept obligations not expected of other citizens	3.85	1.59	355	1	5
i. I am not afraid to go to bat for the rights of others even if it means I will be ridiculed	4.06	1.44	355	1	5
h. If any group does not share in the prosperity of our society, then we are all worse off	3.58	1.60	355	1	5
g. I do not believe that government can do much to make society fairer**	3.59	1.56	355	1	5
f. An official's obligation to the public should always come before loyalty to superiors	3.93	1.52	355	1	5
e. I would prefer seeing public officials do what is best for the whole community	4.06	1.51	355	1	5
d. It is hard for me to get intensely interested in what is going on in my community**	3.97	1.42	355	1	5
c. Politicians can create a large impact to make society more equal and just	4.03	1.51	355	1	5
b. I would prefer seeing elected politicians do what is best for my constituency	4.15	1.47	355	1	5

	Control Races Only			Strong	Stronghold Races Only			All Races V1 versus P1			
	Aspirant's	Aspirant's	p-value	Aspirant's	Aspirant's	<i>p</i> -value	Aspirant's	Aspirant's	p-value		
	share in V2	share in P1	(1 vs 2)	share in V2	share in P1	(4 vs 5)	share in V1	share in P1	(7 vs 8)		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)		
Professional qual.	0.01	0.10	0.21	0.08	0.10	0.75	0.03	0.11	0.03		
	(0.05)	(0.06)		(0.03)	(0.06)		(0.03)	(0.04)			
Wealth	0.04	0.05	0.91	0.02	0.03	0.70	0.03	0.03	0.92		
	(0.02)	(0.04)		(0.02)	(0.03)		(0.02)	(0.03)			
Development	0.04	0.06	0.48	0.06	0.06	0.78	0.06	0.04	0.47		
	(0.02)	(0.03)		(0.02)	(0.03)		(0.01)	(0.02)			
PSM	0.05	0.00	0.29	0.01	0.02	0.85	0.03	0.03	0.94		
	(0.04)	(0.04)		(0.02)	(0.04)		(0.02)	(0.03)			
Party loyalty	-0.03	-0.02	0.87	-0.05	-0.06	0.92	0.03	0.02	0.84		
	(0.05)	(0.09)		(0.03)	(0.06)		(0.03)	(0.06)			
Cognitive ability	-0.00	0.04	0.44	0.04	0.08	0.27	-0.02	0.06	0.03		
	(0.04)	(0.05)		(0.03)	(0.04)		(0.03)	(0.04)			
Local network	0.09	0.11	0.77	-0.02	0.02	0.35	0.01	0.04	0.42		
	(0.05)	(0.08)		(0.03)	(0.06)		(0.04)	(0.05)			
Campaign	-0.00	0.02	0.68	0.01	0.01	0.94	0.01	-0.01	0.54		
	(0.03)	(0.05)		(0.02)	(0.04)		(0.02)	(0.04)			
Conscientiousness	0.07	0.13	0.07	0.02	0.08	0.13	0.02	0.09	0.02		
	(0.03)	(0.04)		(0.03)	(0.04)		(0.03)	(0.04)			
Observations	179	166		235	226		380	367			

Table A3: Alternative Specifications for Preferences over Aspirant Characteristics

Notes: i) this table uses aspirant characteristics to predict their popularity among voters in the V2 opinion polls (columns 1 and 4) or V1 opinion poll (column 7) and among party officials in the P1 survey (columns 2, 5 and 8); ii) columns 1 to 3 use control group races only, columns 4 to 6 use stronghold races only, columns 7 to 9 use all races; iii) columns 3, 6 and 9 test for differences in preferences between voters and party officials, reporting the p-value from chi-squared tests of equality of coefficients across specifications from a seemingly unrelated regression framework; iv) robust standard errors clustered by party-constituency; v) specifications include fixed effects for 23 party-region randomization strata; and vi) the 8 indices are equally weighted sums of underlying traits expressed in standard deviation units (following Kling, Liebman and Katz 2007) and conscientiousness is a binary indicator. A9

Panel A: Aspirant Vote Share in Voter Polls	Panel B: Aspirant Vote Share in Party Official Survey			
Variable	Frequency	Variable	Frequency	
Number of development projects	395	Number of development projects	287	
Incumbent MP	196	Number of meetings with party leaders	266	
Binary measure of any development projects	155	Number of relatives in party leadership	266	
Years of schooling	149	Incumbent MP	250	
Number of Relatives in Party Leadership	149	Years spent serving in elected office	250	
PSM politicians can make society more just	133	PSM cares about welfare of strangers	224	
Party versus own campaign expenditure	133	Party versus own campaign expenditure	205	
Number of meetings with party leaders	66	Conscientiousness	193	
Conscientiousness	49	Received campaign support from party	193	
Time spent as member of party	42	PSM compassion for passive citizens	193	
Total (out of 10) local groups membership	42	From a chiefly "ruling" family	161	
PSM supports obligation in oath of office	31	PSM government can make a difference	161	
Years spent serving in elected office	13	PSM officials act in best community interests	134	
Registered to vote in this constituency	2	Mean score of 7 cognitive ability questions	101	
PSM believes government can make society fairer	2	Has primary residence in constituency	3	
Number of Iterations	400	Provided in-kind support to own campaign	1	
		Number of Iterations	400	

Table A4: Aspirant Traits Selected via Regularized Regression

Notes: i) this table ranks aspirant traits by the number of times each was selected across 400 iterations of regularized regression; ii) the dashed line indicates the median number of traits selected over the 400 iterations, where traits above this frequency are carried forward into the post-regularization regressions of main text Table 5; iii) to tune the penalization parameters, each iteration uses k-fold cross validation, making ten random subsets of the data, using nine to train the model and the tenth as the validation sample; iv) with an eye toward sparsity, we instruct the algorithm to search for optimal α values in the range (0.5, 1), where $\alpha=1$ corresponds to LASSO with zero traits retained and $\alpha=0$ corresponds to ridge regression with all traits retained; and v) to reduce dimensionality slightly, the 10 local group membership indicators are entered together as a total and the 7 cognitive ability questions are entered together as a mean.

	Mean in controls	Treatment effect	Standard error
Dependent variables:	(1)	(2)	(3)
Proportion male	0.85	0.07	(0.07)
Age	46.35	-0.02	(1.95)
Observations	92		

Table A5: Null Effects of the Primary Intervention on Candidate Demographics

Notes: i) this table reports estimated treatment effects on the demographic characteristics of selected candidates; ii) each row reports results from a separate ordinary least squares regression; and iii) specifications include fixed effects for 23 party-region strata used in the random assignments.

	Mean in controls	Mean in treated	Primary intervention effect	Standard error	N				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)				
Panel A: Proportion of Voters Who Can Name Aspirants Unprompted									
All voters in post-convention V2 data	0.47	0.57	0.12	0.03	8824				
All voters in pre-convention V1 data	0.40	0.41	0.01	0.03	2123				
Panel B: Proportion of Voters Who Ca	n Name As	pirants by	y General Elec	ction Comp	etition				
Proportion of voters in safe seat races	0.59	0.70	0.10	0.04	4600				
Proportion of voters in swing seat races	0.38	0.51	0.12	0.06	2587				
Proportion of voters in weak seat races	0.23	0.35	0.13	0.09	1637				
Panel C: Total Primary "Votes" Cast per Race by General Election Competition									
Total "votes" cast per safe seat race	71.39	90.29	18.96	6.19	47				
Total "votes" cast per swing seat race	54.00	81.93	27.93	8.18	28				
Total "votes" cast per weak seat race	34.13	76.75	42.63	12.58	16				

Table A6: Voter Learning and Casting Primary "Votes"

Notes: i) this table shows that voter knowledge and engagement with the candidate selection process increase with the primary intervention treatment and for races where the party is more likely to win the general election; ii) Panel A reports estimates for the proportion of voters who could state the names of aspirants unprompted as a measure of knowledge in post-convention V2 data and pre-convention V1 data, the latter as a robustness check; iv) Panel B breaks these V2 knowledge estimates out by level of general election competition; v) Panel C reports estimates for the number of voters who expressed a preference about which aspirant should be given the symbol in the V2 opinion polls; v) columns 3 and 4 report the estimated treatment effect and robust standard error from OLS regressions that include the party-region strata from the random assignment; and vi) standard errors are clustered by party-constituency in Panels A and B.

Dependent variable:	Correctly identify most educated	Correctly identify most experienced	Correctly identify most development spending
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Primary intervention	-0.067	0.189	0.135
(standard error)	(0.076)	(0.083)	(0.094)
Control mean	0.675	0.326	0.423
<i>p</i> -value on joint significance	>0.001		
Observations	1611	1608	1600

Table A7: Voter Learning about Aspirant Qualifications

Notes: i) this table reports estimates for the effects of the primary intervention on voter knowledge of aspirant qualifications; ii) dependent variables capture voter ability to correctly identify which aspirant in the pool is the most qualified in terms of years of education, public office experience and local development spending; iii) due to an inconsistently applied skip pattern that linked the response to naming aspirants unprompted to whether these qualification questions were posed, which created more missing values for control races, consideration is limited to strata where in all races at least 75% of respondents were asked this question, regardless of whether or not the respondent could name aspirants unprompted (overall only 7% of observations are missing in this subsample); and iv) all specifications include fixed effects for the party-region strata used in the random assignments and report robust standard errors clustered by party-constituency.

Panel A: Estimates using pre- versus post-convention data									
		V2 data			V1 data				
Selected candidate is	Ties set to	Ties set to	Stronghold	Ties set to	Ties set to	Stronghold			
voters' first choice	zero	one	races only	zero	one	races only			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)			
Primary Intervention	22.96	20.75	27.44	31.49	23.87	29.30			
	(10.61)	(10.75)	(14.70)	(10.36)	(10.74)	(13.27)			
Mean in controls	37.78	40.00	30.43	21.43	33.33	13.64			
Observations (races)	91	91	47	88	88	46			

Table A8: Alternative Specifications for the Effects of Primaries on Representation

Panel B: Estimates imposing a minimum total vote threshold for inclusion by strata

	All races in included strata have at least this many primary votes cast:							
Selected candidate is	Twenty-	Thirty-	Forty-	Fifty-	Sixty-	Seventy-		
voters' first choice	five	five	five	five	five	five		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)		
Primary Intervention	20.97	23.33	38.10	36.84	42.86	100.00		
	(12.41)	(13.47)	(14.91)	(15.92)	(27.43)	(0.00)		
Mean in controls	34.29	33.33	23.81	26.32	14.29	0.00		
Observations (races)	71	60	42	38	14	6		

Notes: i) this table presents alternative specifications for measuring the effect of the primary intervention on representation; ii) in panel A, columns 1 to 3 use post-convention V2 data while columns 4 to 6 use preconvention VI data; iii) in Panel B, the columns exclude strata where any race within the strata has fewer total primary votes cast in the V2 survey than the number indicated; iv) in Panel A, as there were a small number of races where the selected candidate was tied for first place with another aspirant in the opinion polls, columns 1 and 4 resolve these ties to zero, indicating the selected candidate was not the voters' first choice, while columns 2 and 5 resolve the same ties to 100, indicating that the selected candidate was the voters' first choice; iv) columns 3 and 6 limit the sample to stronghold races only where voter knowledge and engagement with the candidate selection process was highest; and v) all specifications are OLS with robust standard errors and include fixed effects for the party-region strata used in the random assignments.

	Mean, safe seats (1)	Mean, swing seats (2)	Mean, weak seats (3)	<i>p</i> -value (1) vs (2) (4)	<i>p</i> -value (2) vs (3) (5)	<i>p</i> -value (1) vs (3) (6)
Number of aspirants	5.00	4.04	2.31	0.08	<0.01	< 0.01
Years of education	15.58	14.96	14.70	< 0.01	0.50	< 0.01
Percent with some university education	0.86	0.74	0.62	< 0.01	0.16	< 0.01
Asset ownership (of 11 household items)	9.66	9.63	8.24	0.85	< 0.01	< 0.01
Proportion that have a bank account	0.99	0.96	0.92	0.15	0.26	< 0.01
Proportion male	0.90	0.86	0.95	0.20	0.16	0.41
Years of age	48.24	45.39	49.76	0.01	0.03	0.40
Average contribution to party (controls only)	\$2,930	\$1,527	\$1,151	0.15	0.65	0.26
Observations (party-races)	48	28	16			
Observations (all aspirants)	240	113	37			
Observations (aspirants, control races only)	119	49	16			

Table A9: Aspirant Characteristics by Type of Race

Notes: i) this table compares characteristics of aspirants across races where the general election is expected to be a safe, swing or weak seat for the aspirant's party; ii) p-values refer to t-tests rejecting equality of means across columns; iii) the list of assets includes radio, personal computer, mobile phone, DVD player, refrigerator, bicycle, motor vehicle, generator, television, electric fan, and flashlight; iv) bank account includes either domestic or foreign accounts; and v) payment refers to self-reported official and unofficial fees paid by aspirants to party leaders in control group races only.

	Treatment effect	Standard error	Naïve <i>p</i> -value	FDR q value
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Panel A: Primary Effects on Indices of Ca	ndidate Traits			
Personal qualifications index	0.05	(0.17)	0.76	0.99
Wealth index	-0.10	(0.16)	0.52	0.99
Economic development index	0.24	(0.18)	0.20	0.88
Public service motivation index	0.01	(0.21)	0.97	0.99
Party loyalty index	0.00	(0.12)	0.99	0.99
Cognitive ability index	-0.07	(0.18)	0.69	0.99
Local networks index	0.33	(0.13)	0.02	0.22
Campaign expenditure index	-0.14	(0.17)	0.42	0.99
Conscientiousness indicator	0.25	(0.14)	0.07	0.39
Panel B: Primary Effects on Candidate Ti	raits Identified	by Regulariz	ation Meth	ods
Number of development projects	0.38	(0.28)	0.19	0.99
Incumbent MP	-0.13	(0.13)	0.35	0.99
Years of public office experience	-0.17	(1.97)	0.93	0.99
Party versus own campaign expenditure	0.17	(0.27)	0.54	0.99
Number of relatives in party leadership	-0.38	(0.46)	0.42	0.99
Number of meetings with party officials	-12.08	(7.47)	0.11	0.99
PSM welfare of strangers question	0.41	(0.46)	0.38	0.99
Observations	48			

Table A10: Effects of the Primary Intervention on Candidate Selection in Strongholds

Notes: i) this table limits the sample to stronghold races only and reports treatment effect estimates on the characteristics of selected candidates for 9 indices of traits in Panel A and for the 7 individual traits selected via regularized regression in Panel B; ii) each row reports results from a separate OLS regression with robust standard errors that includes fixed effects for 12 party-region randomization strata; iii) in Panel A, all indices are equally weighted sums of underlying traits expressed in standard deviation units (following Kling, Liebman and Katz 2007), while in Panel B, all traits are in natural units; iv) party versus own expenditure indicates an affirmative response to the question "Are you willing to spend more money on your party's campaign versus your own?;" v) the PSM welfare of strangers question indicates strength of disagreement with the statement "I seldom think about the welfare of people whom I don't know personally," with missing values imputed at the control group mean; and vi) column 4 presents false discovery rate (FDR)-sharpened q-values that adjust for multiple inference over all estimates by panel, following Benjamini, Krieger and Yekutieli (2006) and Anderson (2008).

Dependent variable:	Total development	MP has a	Total community	
	expenditure, verified	constituency office,	meetings, average of	
	by field audit	verified by field audit	key informant reports	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	
Primary intervention	32.15	-0.15	0.05	
(standard error)	(45.30)	(0.12)	(0.33)	
Mean in controls	110.99	0.30	1.59	
Observations	42			
Observations lost to COVID tracking	13%			

Table A11: Effects of the Primary Intervention on Elected MP Performance in Strongholds

Notes: i) this table explores the impacts of the primary intervention on the longer run performance in office of elected MPs from stronghold races; ii) specifications include party-region randomization strata with robust standard errors; iii) column one reports the total amount of expenditure on development projects in the MPs home constituency over the first 18 months in office, as verified by field audits; iv) column 2 is an indicator variable for whether the MP has an office in his/her home constituency that is accessible to the public, as verified by field audit; v) column 3 reports the total number of public meetings the MP has held with constituents as reported by a standard set of four key informants in the constituency (the relevant Paramount chief, the Local Councillor who represents the headquarter town, a staff member at the most centrally located health clinic in the headquarter town, and the head teacher of the primary school that is most centrally located in the headquarter town); and vi) due to disruptions of the COVID19 pandemic, data collection halted before 13 percent of the sample could be interviewed.

	Party admin	Party administrative data		survey data
	SLPP	APC	SLPP	APC
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Primary intervention	1.00	0.27	0.30	0.65
	(0.59)	(0.62)	(0.56)	(0.51)
Control mean	2.68	4.12	4.04	3.96
Observations (races)	45	37	46	46

Table A12: Null Effects of the Primary Intervention on Aspirant Entry

Notes: i) this table estimates treatment effects on the total number of aspirants considered per party-race; ii) ordinary least squares regression with robust standard errors; iii) specifications include fixed effects for each party's respective randomization strata; and iv) columns 1 and 2 use administrative data from each party's Secretary General, columns 3 and 4 use the number of aspirants surveyed by the research team.

	Treatment effect	Standard error	Naïve <i>p</i> - value	FDR <i>q</i> -value			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)			
Panel A: Primary Effects on Indices of Aspirant Traits							
Personal qualifications index	-0.00	(0.04)	0.92	0.99			
Wealth index	0.00	(0.07)	0.96	0.99			
Economic development index	0.08	(0.08)	0.31	0.73			
Public service motivation index	-0.07	(0.06)	0.26	0.73			
Party loyalty index	-0.02	(0.04)	0.58	0.99			
Cognitive ability index	-0.08	(0.04)	0.05	0.73			
Local networks index	0.06	(0.04)	0.12	0.73			
Campaign expenditure index	0.01	(0.06)	0.83	0.99			
Conscientiousness indicator	0.09	(0.06)	0.14	0.73			
Panel B: Primary Effects on Aspirant Ti	raits Identified	by Regular	rization Met	hods			
Number of development projects	0.09	(0.11)	0.40	0.99			
Incumbent MP	-0.02	(0.02)	0.23	0.99			
Years of public office experience	-0.21	(0.41)	0.62	0.99			
Party versus own campaign expenditure	-0.02	(0.07)	0.75	0.99			
Number of relatives in party leadership	-0.06	(0.11)	0.61	0.99			
Number of meetings with party officials	-5.07	(2.65)	0.06	0.73			
PSM welfare of strangers question	-0.06	(0.18)	0.72	0.99			
Observations	390						

Table A13: Balance Check on Characteristics of the Aspirant Pool

Notes: i) this balance table suggests that the effects of the primary intervention were not driven by aspirant entry since the average characteristics of all aspirants in the pool do not vary systematically by treatment assignment; ii) the table reports treatment effect estimates on the characteristics of all aspirants in the pool for 9 indices of traits in Panel A and for the 7 individual traits selected via regularized regression in Panel B; iii) each row reports results from a separate OLS regression with robust standard errors that includes fixed effects for 23 party-region randomization strata; iv) in Panel A, all indices are equally weighted sums of underlying traits expressed in standard deviation units (following Kling, Liebman and Katz 2007); v) in Panel B, all traits are in natural units; vi) party versus own expenditure indicates an affirmative response to the question "Are you willing to spend more money on your party's campaign versus your own?;" and vii) column 4 presents false discovery rate (FDR)-sharpened q-values that adjust for multiple inference over all estimates by panel, following Benjamini, Krieger and Yekutieli (2006) and Anderson (2008).

	All aspirants	Selected candidates	All aspirants	All aspirants in stronghold
	(1)	(2)	(3)	races (4)
Primary intervention	-35.0	934.7	-352.6	-819.3
	(254.3)	(475.7)	(308.4)	(403.2)
Selected candidate			-758.8	-1146.3
			(316.9)	(423.8)
Selected X Primary intervention			1267.2	2256.4
			(542.2)	(775.9)
Observations	385	92	385	237

Table A14: Effects of the Primary Intervention on Aspirant Contributions to Parties

Notes: i) this table estimates how contributions (demarcated in US\$) from aspirants to parties are affected by the experimental treatment; ii) ordinary least square regression with robust standard errors clustered by party-race; iii) specifications include fixed effects for 23 party-region strata used in the random assignments; and iv) contributions are winsorized at the 95th percentile.