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Project Citation: 

Fack, Gabrielle, Grenet, Julien, and He, Yinghua. Replication data for: Beyond Truth-Telling: Preference Estimation with Centralized School Choice and College Admissions. Nashville, TN: American Economic Association [publisher], 2019. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor], 2019-10-12. https://doi.org/10.3886/E113103V1

Project Description

Summary:  View help for Summary We propose novel approaches to estimating student preferences with data from matching mechanisms, especially the Gale-Shapley deferred acceptance. Even if the mechanism is strategy-proof, assuming that students truthfully rank schools in applications may be restrictive. We show that when students are ranked strictly by some ex ante known priority index (e.g., test scores), stability is a plausible and weaker assumption, implying that every student is matched with her favorite school/college among those she qualifies for ex post. The methods are illustrated in simulations and applied to school choice in Paris. We discuss when each approach is more appropriate in real-life settings.

Scope of Project

JEL Classification:  View help for JEL Classification
      D11 Consumer Economics: Theory
      D12 Consumer Economics: Empirical Analysis
      D82 Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
      I23 Higher Education; Research Institutions
Data Type(s):  View help for Data Type(s) program source code


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