CSWEP: People to Contact

General Policy Matters and Items for Newsletter
Robin Bartlett, Department of Economics
Denison University
Granville, OH 43023
barlett@denison.edu

Dues, Change of Address, Roster
Joan Haworth, Membership Secretary
Economic Research Services, Inc.
4901 Tower Court
Tallahassee, FL 32303
jhaworth@ersnet.com

CSWEP East
Barbara Fraumeni
Bureau of Economic Analysis
BE-3
1441 L Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20230
barbara.fraumeni@bea.doc.gov

CSWEP Mid-West
Jean Kimmel
W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research
300 South Westridge Avenue
Kalamazoo, MI 49007
kimmel@we.upjohninst.org

CSWEP South
Catherine Eckel, Department of Economics
Virginia Tech
Blacksburg, VA 24061-0316
eckel@vt.edu

CSWEP West
Helen Popper, Department of Economics
Santa Clara University
Santa Clara, CA 95053
hpopper@mailer.scu.edu

American Economic Association
CSWEP
c/o Robin Bartlett
Department of Economics
Denison University
Granville, OH 43023

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Negotiation Advice for Women: How Not to Lose Your Skirt

Linda Babcock - Carnegie Mellon University

1. Women are less comfortable negotiating because they often mistake the conflict over outcomes as a conflict over relationships.

2. Women are less comfortable negotiating because they often mistake the conflict over outcomes as a conflict over relationships.

3. Thirty few people have actually thought carefully about what they want and the strategies they are likely to want when they enter a negotiation, and too many people tend to view negotiations as inherently zero-sum rather than variable-sum.

4. Recognizing Opportunities for Negotiation

We normally think of negotiations as being very structured interactions like buying a house or a car. When we negotiate in such situations we know that we are supposed to make an offer on the house or the car rather than accepting the status quo of the asking or sticker price.

There are, however, numerous situations where we do accept the status quo and do not think to negotiate. This is a mistake and it is more likely to be made by men. As a director of our PhD program, a student remarked to me that two male students had gone through our May graduation ceremony even though they weren't defending their theses until late summer. She was disappointed because they had wanted to go through the ceremony but knew she wasn't defending until late summer. The problem was that she never asked them if they could go through the graduation (I would have said yes). Both male students had asked. Because she failed to recognize this as an opportunity for negotiation, it led to an inferior outcome for both of us (I would have been happy to see her go through graduation).

My main conclusion from these and other experiences is that women need to become more assertive in pursuing their objectives. To do this, women need to regard more situations as negotiations and consider all (or most) things as negotiable. Women must realize that opportunities and outcomes must be claimed for oneself rather than waiting for them to be offered.

2. Anxiety about Negotiating

I have found that there are big differences in the degree to which men and women are comfortable negotiating, even though it is understood that negotiation is necessary. For the past ten years, I have taught a negotiation class in our masters program in public policy and management. For their first assignment, the students describe why they have chosen to take this class (it is not required). There is an enormous difference between the typical descriptions by women and men - I'm quite confident that, judging them anonymously, I could separate out the women's assignments from the men's. The vast majority of female students report reactions such as "I'm uncomfortable handling negotiations so I need to force myself to do them to gain confidence." Female students also describe how they avoid situations that involve negotiation ("I had my brother negotiate the purchase of my car for me") or simply take what is offered them ("I'd rather accept a job offer as it is than face the anxiety of negotiating for more," or "Asking for more money could really spoil my relationship with my new boss."). They report that they are taking this course to become more assertive in this domain. Male students tend to report reasons such as, "I want to learn ways to win more negotiations."

Why the difference between men and women? While the exact mechanism remains unclear, I believe that this level of discomfort has to do with the fact that women tend to view the conflict inherent in negotiating as jeopardizing relationships that are valued. In most negotiating situations, substantive and relationship issues are largely independent and should be treated that way in negotiating environments. For example, I can have a good relationship with my Dean that rests on clear communication and mutual respect and is independent of the resolution of my salary, teaching load, and committee assignments. Men are more likely to operate under the assumption of this independence. Women are more likely to either avoid negotiation altogether or to trade off potential gains on substantive issues to insure against perceived rela-
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Tionship threats.

Women need to find ways to combat their anxiety over negotiation. Realizing that negotiation is an accepted and expected activity and can be conducted assertively while maintaining strong relationships should be a first step in doing this.

3. Thinking Carefully about Interests and Priorities

It may seem an obvious point, but it is difficult to reach your objectives in a negotiation if you are unsure about what you are trying to achieve. I'm not suggesting that people are completely uncertain about their preferences but that a great many of us give them much thought as they should. Lots of people ask me for negotiation advice about what often they should make and what strategies they should use. Instead of answering them I usually ask them what their objectives are for the negotiation -- what are their underlying interests and what are their priorities over which they are to be negotiated. I am always struck by how little thought is given to identifying these.

This is particularly important when you take sides in business contexts. Occasionally conduct training seminars for organizations to improve the negotiation skills of their employees. In one particular organization, I was teaching their national sales staff skills to improve the contracts they negotiated with clients. The contracts they negotiated involved multiple issues. I gave them 12 contracts I had generated by varying the outcomes on each of the issues and asked each of them to rank them from best to worst. There was virtually no agreement among the staff as to what were the best and worst contracts. They also found this exercise extremely difficult to do. Furthermore, very few people had ranked the contracts similarly to the rankings supplied by their managers. If the sales staff were unsure what to negotiate and if there is a wide range of opinions about what should be aspired to, it would be futile to devote a lot of energy to building skills in negotiation strategy.

My advice here is that it is extremely important to enter into a negotiation with a clear idea of your negotiation objectives and your preferences over the issues to be negotiated. For example, in a job negotiation, how important is relaying to teaching load and research support? Furthermore, do you neglect the other side's objectives and preferences. A successful negotiation requires agreement by both (or many) parties. Therefore, finding creative ways to reach a good outcome for yourself while still meeting the objectives of the other side is critical.

4. Viewing Negotiation as Zero-Sum Rather than Variable-Sum

While there is surely a distributive or competitive aspect to negotiations, it is a mistake to view all negotiations as zero-sum. In negotiations with multiple issues there are efficient and inefficient outcomes that could be reached. Especially when the status quo is inefficient, negotiation can improve the outcomes of all parties.

Viewing negotiations as strictly competitive and inhibits the ability to reach efficient outcomes. The key to reaching these efficient outcomes is the ability to understand how the underlying interests of both sides can be met and how differences in priorities over the issues can be traded off.

It is my experience that this is an area of strength for women. Men have historically had more experience in strictly competitive situations, such as sports, and tend to transfer this perspective to negotiations. Women bring a more cooperative and problem-solving approach and a willingness to understand the interests of the other side to the bargaining table. By doing so, women can obtain better outcomes than a strictly competitive approach would produce.

References


Linda Babcock is an associate professor of economics at the H. John Heinz III School of Public Policy and Management at Carnegie Mellon University. She is currently conducting research for a book on women and negotiation and would appreciate any feedback on this article, as well as recollections of personal negotiation experience. Her e-mail address is lb2@andrew.cmu.edu

Behavioral Economics

Colin Camerer - California Institute of Technology

"BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS" REPLACES STRONG RATIONALE WITH VARIABLE RATIONALE. The traditional economic modeling with assumptions that are consistent with evidence from psychology and neuroscience presents on mathematical structure and explanation of naturally-occurring (field) data. Understanding, for decades social scientists have criticized economic models for assuming too much rationality, and economists defend the models as useful approximations. In behavioral economics we believe more realistic assumptions regarding human behavior.

The only interesting question is how to incorporate the psychology into economics. Herbert Simon, who coined the term "bounded rationality" in the 1950s, thought that individuals in economics should resemble theories in cognitive psychology, which specify algorithms or detailed mechanisms by which the brain can be modeled. Economists never took up this suggestion with any vigor, perhaps because Simon's suggestion was in line with their general view that there are several different ways to characterize economic decisions and equilibria in unusually elegant mathematical forms. The elegant mathematics left no room for messier cognitive theories.

Indeed, the "literary" tradition in economics before about 1980 — due to Smith, Keynes, Marshall, Fisher and others — is full of psychological insights, which came to be neglected as the core ideas were mathematized by later economists. In fact, Smith, for example, is famous in economics only for The Wealth of Nation, in which he suggests that people get their dinner "not from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or the baker," but "from their regard for their own interest." However, Smith wrote an earlier book, The Theory of Moral Sentiments, all about the ways in which people care about others (see V-L Smith, 1988). Why is the latter book virtually unknown, and the first so famous? Perhaps because the race to prove Pareto-optimality of competitive equilibria was so greatly simplified by assumptions that do not depend on their own allocations. Having proved that, perhaps it is time to ask how economic analysis is changed by incorporating the insights in Smith’s book on moral sentiments.

To the 1970s, cognitive psychologists began studying judgment and economic decision making. These studies took a different approach: asking which one Simon suggested. They took expected utility maximization and Bayes- sian probability judgments as basic mental heuristics as well as general principles that might be justified by more basic psychophysical principles which characterize a wide range of human behavior. For example, nonlinear weights result if people are unable to discriminate among probabilities equally well, throughout the range from impossible to certain, which is highly implausible. In addition, another phenomenon, which Kahneman and Tversky proposed as an alternative to expected utility theory, the central principle in prospect theory is that people adapt to hedonic sensations, and therefore, utilities are measured by differentiation in how the reference point, rather than by overall wealth. Many studies suggest behavior toward losses and gains is different in two ways: Losses are disliked about twice as much as equal-sized gains ("loss-aversion"), and people often work risk in the domain of losses when they can "break even" (i.e., reach the reference point), while they avoid risk in the domain of gains (the "reflection effect"). In addition, in expected utility theory, attitudes toward risk are expressed by curvature of the utility function. In prospect theory (and many other alternative theories), risk attitudes are also influenced by nonlinear weighting of probabilities — for example, a person could buy a lottery ticket, even if her utility function for money outcomes is constant, or she loses the small chance of winning. Indeed, the hypothe-

sis that small probabilities are given too much weight (which is backed by many experiments) is why people with concave utility for gains would love high-likelihood lotteries with a tiny effective return, why people who gamble over losses would nonetheless buy insurance against small changes or disaster is.

It is crucial to note that prospect theory is not an ad hoc customization of standard theory but rather an attempt to fit a few experimental data. Nonlinear weighting of probabilities, differential sensitivity to gains and losses, and diminishing utility of gains and losses are all justified by more basic psychophysical principles which characterize a wide range of human behavior. For example, nonlinear utilities result if people are unable to discriminate among probabilities equally well, throughout the range from impossible to certain, which is highly implausible. In addition, another phenomenon, which Kahneman and Tversky proposed as an alternative to expected utility theory, the central principle in prospect theory is that people adapt to hedonic sensations, and therefore, utilities are measured by differentiation in how the reference point, rather than by overall wealth. Many studies suggest behavior toward losses and gains is different in two ways: Losses are disliked about twice as much as equal-sized gains ("loss-aversion"), and people often work risk in the domain of losses when they can "break even" (i.e., reach the reference point), while they avoid risk in the domain of gains (the "reflection effect"). In addition, in expected utility theory, attitudes toward risk are expressed by curvature of the utility function. In prospect theory (and many other alternative theories), risk attitudes are also influenced by nonlinear weighting of probabilities — for example, a person could buy a lottery ticket, even if her utility function for money outcomes is constant, or she loses the small chance of winning. Indeed, the hypoth-

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References and suggested reading


Colin Camerer is the Bea A. and Lela G. Asline Professor of Business Economics, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences, California Institute of Technology. He is currently working on a book on behavioral economics. He can be reached at: camerer@his.caltech.edu

CSWEP 6 Newsletter

CSWEP 7 Newsletter
III. Reciprocity

Other experimental evidence suggests that individuals reciprocate the treatment they receive at the hands of others. In a two-player trust game, the role of the sender is one of trust induction, and that of the receiver is one of trust confirmation. In a two-player trust game, the sender is given a monetary reward, and the receiver is given an opportunity to return some or all of this reward. The receiver is allowed to choose a portion of the money to give back to the sender, and this amount is added to a pool of money. The amount returned is then divided equally between the two players. The experiment is designed to test whether individuals will return the money they have been given, or whether they will keep it for themselves. The results of the experiment show that individuals are more likely to return money than they were given, indicating that they are more likely to reciprocate the treatment they receive.

IV. Conclusion

The interaction of theory and data forms the basis of many empirical studies, including physics, chemistry, and even some social sciences. Economics has suffered somewhat because of the lack of data available for theory testing, particularly in areas like game theory and individual decision-making where the context of actual decisions bear on the outcomes that are assumed in the theory. The rise of economics in experiments has alleviated this problem by providing a controlled setting in which to test theoretical predictions. The underlying assumptions of the theory can be implemented in the laboratory, providing a clean test of both baseline and comparative statics predictions.

Results from a number of experiments (very sketched by review here) demonstrate that the results of baseline economics theories have been hypothesized. This behavior involves preferences for altruism, fairness, and reciprocity, as well as self-interest. The natural response to build theories consistent with our observations — has begun in earnest. These theories accommodate observed behavior by incorporating other-regarding preferences into individual’s decision-making process. The next step in theoretical development is a generalization that identifies the important parameters that allow us to predict and explain behavior across different games and settings. New experiments will be designed to test the implications of new theories, and the dialectic will continue.

Experiments like these and their resulting empirical work provide an opportunity to challenge the field of economics by testing the assumptions of individual preferences at its very foundation. And they also give us something to say or to cocktail parties.

References


Rachael Croson is an assistant professor of OPM, Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania. Her published research includes many papers on both linear and threshold public goods games, ultimatum and trust games, and explorations of the impact of other-regarding behavior. She can be reached at croson@wharton.upenn.edu.

Using Experiments in the Classroom

A reward aspect of using experimental techniques is that they allow us to move beyond the classroom versions of these experiments which are very effective at teaching tools. The use of experiments is quite simple: ask students to take part in an experiment, present the results, and then ask questions about the experiment and give some suggestions on how to run them.

A classroom game can be almost any interactive exercise that gets students involved in the economic point of view. We have used a variety of formal and informal exercises, with or without a specific setting and a specific set of tools. In our case, we have used some simple games to get students interested in the results of what they would do if it "didn't work." I gave some tips about how to handle whatever happened, but found her concerns illuminating. Inherent in it was a basic doubt about the supply and demand model that we teach, and a sense that small differences can make a big difference. This idea is a good one to use in the classroom. It is one that I have used in several classes and found to be very effective.

Although I am an outspoken advocate for the use of classroom games, one should also think about how to use them most effectively. Classroom exercises are certainly no substitute for preparing a lecture, and they don't do a good job of teaching everything. One thing I believe is that you can effectively use a random sample of students at the end of class (a small percentage of their earnings) to cover their costs. I have found that students are not taking the same classes. When I conducted a course exercise early in the semester, my students typically ask after just a few weeks what is going on with the classroom. Classroom games have been used more widely in microeconomics classes rather than in macroeconomics classes primarily because there have been more games that teach micro-level related topics. This is changing. I use at least one or two classroom games in every course I teach, including Principles of Economics classes (either micro or macro), intermediate economics, public economics, international trade, game theory (at any level) and MBA economics. I have even worked with grade school teachers that are beginning to teach economic concepts to their students as a result of state-mandated standards of learning in economics. The focus of this spectrum, conducting an auction exercise with Ph.D. students can remind one of the complexity of mathematical expressions that they are learning.

If you are thinking about using your first classroom exercise, try one that someone else has successfully conducted in a similar class. An auction market is an excellent place to start. Students enjoy participating in the exercise and the public goods experiment (see Holt and Laury, 1997) is another easy-to-run auction game. There is a particular problem with the public goods market. The result of a game is that the instructor is trying to tailor to any outcome that might occur. Before class read through the instructions carefully—do whatever advance preparation is necessary. Typically this involves photocopying instructions, deciding on the specific parameters for your class size, and organizing materials. The first time you conduct a classroom exercise, it will probably take as much preparation time as getting ready for a lecture. However, there are certain exercises that are more suitable for that preparation time is reduced considerably when you use the game again. Many of these games offer an opportunity to randomly choose a student (or group of students) to ask the question for which they would want to be called. This is not a small number of people. For example, there are fewer than 100 students in the game. Classroom games have been used more widely in microeconomics classes rather than in macroeconomics classes primarily because there have been more games that teach micro-level related topics. This is changing. I use at least one or two classroom games in every course I teach, including Principles of Economics classes (either micro or macro), intermediate economics, public economics, international trade, game theory (at any level) and MBA economics. I have even worked with grade school teachers that are beginning to teach economic concepts to their students as a result of state-mandated standards of learning in economics. The focus of this spectrum, conducting an auction exercise with Ph.D. students can remind one of the complexity of mathematical expressions that they are learning.

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out the way theories predict. When this happens, explain to students what you expected (and why) and then get their input into why things didn't turn out this way. Often students will figure out reasons why things turned out as they did, or how results might have been different. Keep a positive attitude about this, and remember that you do not have to be theory's defender.

The interesting thing in using classroom experiments is evident in the number of publications on the topic. Several reports contain regular or periodic features on the use of classroom experiments. These include the "Classroom Games" columns in the Journal of Economic Perspectives, the Southern Economic Journal, and the Journal of Economics Education. Many writing of classroom games can be found in these, as well as in back issues of Economic Inquiry. There is an electronic newsletter produced by Greg Delmense and John Nelson available on the web at [http://monet.marist.edu/~delmense/expernum.html](http://monet.marist.edu/~delmense/expernum.html).

Each issue includes submissions from several instructors about games they have successfully used. There is a new principles textbook, Experiments and Economic Principles, by Ted Bergstrom and John Miller, that is designed around the use of classroom experiments. In addition, several principles textbooks suggest the use of classroom games in supplements. For example, Delmense and Nelson have written a supplement to Taylor's Economics and Ottman and Coitler have written a supplement to Coitler's Economics. I have a section of my web page (http://freenet.bradm.sc.edu/laury) devoted to classroom games. It contains abstracts of some papers as well as instructions that can be downloaded. If you have a game that you use when teaching, contact me and I will add a link on my page so that you can share your idea with others.

Although there is little quantitative evidence on whether or not classroom games raise test scores or in what ways they enhance learning, I have no doubt that they are an effective teaching tool. Students are usually much more enthusiastic about studying economics after they have participated in one or two classroom games. In addition, I am more interested in what I am teaching and have gained new perspectives on the course material after observing how students behave in these exercises. The good news is that, with the resources that are currently available, classroom games are no longer only the domain of experimental economists. They can be effectively used by anyone with an interest.

References

Susan Laury is assistant professor of economics and research economist at the University of South Carolina. She has published extensively in experimental economics and in the use of experiments in the classroom. She can be reached at: slaury@darla.bradm.sc.edu

Writing Reviews for the Economics Program at the National Science Foundation that will Make Your Program Officer Love You

Catherine Eckel - Virginia Polytechic Institute and State University (formerly NSF)

1. Background information
When proposals come into the Economics Program at NSF, they are sorted by field, then distributed to one of three program officers. Proposals are reviewed in two ways: by members of the Economics Advisory Panel (there are 14) and by external reviewers. Each proposal is assigned to the two panelists whose research interests are closest to the proposal. The Panel meets about three months after the proposal deadline to discuss and rank all of the proposals. In addition, each proposal is sent to about 6 external reviewers for written reviews. (Proposals that are interdisciplinary or complex may be sent to more). Program officers do their best to assign proposals to reviewers with expertise in the subject of the proposal. Often, an external reviewer will be someone who has been suggested by the Principal Investigator (PI).

After the panel meeting, the program officers meet and make decisions about the proposals. They consider both panel rankings and external reviews in making their decision.

Timing is critical for these proposals — please consider putting them ahead of other papers in your queue of refereeing. Your review is most useful if it reaches the program officer before the panel meeting, which usually occurs about 6 weeks or so after you receive the request. That way the panel can consider your opinion as well as their own. If it arrives shortly after the panel meeting, it still can affect the decision. If your review arrives late, it will be invaluable for the decision on the proposal (though it will still be sent to the PI).

2. What's in a good review?

Overall Length: The review should add up to about 1-2 pages unless you are feeling expansive or have a long foot, in which case feel free to write more. The three-line review is not very helpful to anyone, though it is easy to understand the temptation to be terse. Really extensive comments are useful to the PI, but probably will not affect the decision, unless the issue you raise is complex. Keep in mind that for most PI the research is just getting underway and your suggestions can do a great deal to shape the direction of the research. I recommend three paragraphs or sections:

First paragraph: What is the proposal about? What is its methodology? What literature or field of research does it fit into?

Second paragraph: Tell the program officer about the PI. Has he/she published well? Has she been productive under prior National Science Foundation support? Is this a "promising young investigator?" An "interdisciplinary collaborative team?" Anything else we should know?

Third paragraph: Evaluate the proposed project. Be constructive. Is the topic important? Is it well-motivated? What contribution will it make? Is there a clear research plan? If the proposal is not good, please try to spell out what would be necessary to make it good.

3. Things to remember

First, remember that your review will go to the PI. Avoid the temptation to be nasty, even if the proposal is really bad, and the message you want to send is "Don't even darken the door of NSF again. PI's who receive nasty reviews sometimes come back to haunt your friendly and overworked program officer. (This is a government agency, after all.)

Your program officer has to write up an evaluation of this proposal based on the Panel discussion and external reviews. He/she may not know much about the field in which the PI is writing, and the discussion during the Panel meeting may be too brief for her to get a handle on it. Give her a hand by providing as much detail as you can about what is right/wrong with the proposal.

Try to avoid seeing the proposals in black and white (Excellent and Poor). Intermediate gray evaluations are very helpful to your program officer in making decisions at the margin. Nearly all of the proposals that have consistent Excellent evaluations are funded. Many proposals with consistent reviews in the Very Good range are funded as well. On occasion proposals with mixed reviews will be funded, particularly those that are somewhat risky but seem promising for advancing the discipline. The information you provide is critical in choosing among the many Very Good and Good proposals.

Remember that this is not a journal. The funding rate on proposals is about 25 percent — not the 5-10 percent of most top journals. While the proposal may not be perfect, try to determine whether the project, as you understand it, is worth funding. While a recommendation to "revise and
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result" is probably the most common outcome of a journal submission, this is relatively rare for proposals. The reason for this is that a revision will go back to a different person—one that excludes all

but 1/4 new members. It is likely to go to at least three new external reviewers as well. It is not like dealing with a stable editor and set of referees.

There is a tendency for reviewers to fall prey to two biases. Try not to under-evaluate the proposals in the areas that you know best (also known as eating your children). The temptation is great to nail the shortcomings of a proposal that a reviewer knows most about. The shortcomings of these proposals are, after all, easiest to see. By contrast, proposals in other fields can look very appealing—intriguing, nice puzzles, cute ideas, with shortcomings that are less apparent. But it is worth considering that your field is competing with all the other fields for funding. Reviewers in some fields are much harsher on average than reviewers in other fields. While program officers may make a great effort to take this into account, their flexibility is limited by really negative reviews. On the other hand, try also not to over-evaluate your field relative to others. Here’s the other bias. Reviewers sometimes succumb to the temptation to act as advocates for their own fields at the expense of everything that is not theirs (also known as touting your children). This skews the evaluation scores and makes accurate comparisons difficult. Balance is necessary.

The distribution of reviews is typically center-weighted, with a mean somewhere between Good and Very Good. Most panels will have distributions that look like this, too. For external reviewers, it is useful to keep this distribution in mind. One or two ratings of "Good" are generally sufficient to ensure a proposal will not be funded. It is unusual for proposals with any ratings of "Poor" or "Very Poor" to be funded.

So as this cycle’s proposals reach you, keep in mind how important these reviews are in determining the allocation of funding my the programs the Economic Programs. Your review can have a significant impact on the decisions that are made.

The National Science Foundation bears no responsibility for these recommendations.

Catherine Ecko is professor of economics at Virginia Tech. She spent 1996-1998 as a program director at the National Science Foundation. She can be reached at: edecko@vt.edu

1998 CSWEP Annual Report
Robin L. Bartlett, Chair

The American Economics Association (AEA) has charged the Committee on the Status of Women in the Economics Profession (CSWEP) with monitoring the position of women in the profession and with undertaking activities to improve that position. This report presents information on the position of women graduate students and faculty in academic economics departments and reports on the committee’s activities during 1998.

WOMEN ECONOMISTS IN AND FROM PH.D.-GRANTING DEPARTMENTS

For the past six years, CSWEP has worked on making and developing contacts in all (118) of the Ph.D.-granting economics departments in the US. One of the tools of CSWEP representatives in these institutions is to report on the status of women in their departments. In order to facilitate that report a one-page questionnaire is sent every September to each representative to fill out and return by the end of November. Using its representatives, CSWEP has been able to acquire more complete and accurate data than is available currently through the AEA Universal Academic Questionnaire (UAQ) which is mailed each fall to all department chairs [1]. The five most recent surveys for which results are complete and tabulated allow for a five-year trend analysis of the status of women graduate students, job applicants, and faculty members in Ph.D.-granting economics departments in the US.

Information from the CSWEP questionnaire on the status of women graduate students in economics. Table 1 provides information on the percent of students who are female at various stages of their graduate careers. In 1993, 30.5 percent of all first year students were women. In 1997, that percentage increased slightly to 31.3 percent. In 1993, 27.2 percent of all ABDs were women. In 1997, that percentage had decreased slightly to 26.8 percent. In 1993, the percent of students earning a Ph.D. who were women was 24.2, and in 1997, that figure was up slightly to 25.0 percent. Overall, the attrition rate is small for female graduate students. Table 2 has the same set of percentages for the top 20 Economics departments in the country. [4]. There are a few discernable patterns in this table. First, all of the percentages of students who are women at various points in their graduate studies are lower than those found in Table 1. Second, although a smaller percentage of students who are women enter these programs, a higher proportion of women on average graduate. Table 3 presents the same percentages for the top 10 Economics departments in the US [9]. The one obvious trend is that over the last three years the percent of students who are women graduating with a degree in economics has fallen off noticeably. In addition, all of the percentages are smaller than those found in Table 2 suggesting that the percentages of students who are women in the graduate programs of the top 10 departments are smaller than those at the remaining 10 schools in the top 20. In turn, the percentages of students who are women at various stages of graduate education in economics at the top 20 departments are less than those found at all the otherwise-ranked departments in the US.

Information from the CSWEP questionnaire on the status of women job applicants in economics. The fate of women in the job market is reflected in the averages found in the second section of Table 1, Table 2, and Table 3. As presented in Table 1, 35 percent of the jobs in Ph.D.-granting departments went to newly-minted female Ph.D.s in 1993. In sharp contrast, that percentage fell to 20.2 percent in 1997. Female Ph.D.s received more than their fair share of new job offers in 1993, but they received less than their fair share in 1997. While women were receiving disproportionately fewer jobs at non PhD-granting departments in 1993, they were receiving disproportionately more in 1997.

In terms of public sector and private sector jobs, female Ph.D.s in economics found a larger proportion of the new jobs in both of sectors than did their male counterparts. In contrast, a disproportionately smaller percentage of novice female economists took non-Ph.D. jobs. Similarly, a disproportionately smaller percentage of female Ph.D.s did not find a job.

Women graduating from the top 20 departments, as indicated by the percentages found in Tables 2 and 3, did not meet with more success. While the overall trends are the same as those found for the aggregate, they are exaggerated. For example, in 1993 recent female graduates from the top 10 departments received 27.8 percent of the new jobs in Ph.D.-granting departments and only 9.3 percent in 1997, as compared to the overall figures of 35.0 and 20.2 percent, respectively. Moreover, the percentage of women from the top 10 departments who found jobs in non-Ph.D.-granting institutions increased from 30.8 percent in 1993 to 42.9 percent in 1997. The second tier departments act more like the remaining otherwise ranked schools than do the top 10 departments. Nonetheless, there seems to be an overall trend, more pronounced at the top 10 departments, for women who are receiving Ph.D.s to disproportionately find jobs in non Ph.D.-granting institutions.

In terms of the public sector versus the private sector, the overall percentages indicate that women are receiving a disproportionate share of both public and private jobs. However, women graduating from the top 20 departments are receiving a disproportionate number of the public sector jobs indicating that a disproportionate number of women graduating from the remaining tiers are finding jobs in the private sector. In contrast, a disproportionate number of jobs are going to men in each tier and in the aggregate. Finally, while a smaller percentage of women are left with no job in the aggregate, a larger percentage of women are left with no jobs at the top 20 departments.

Information from the CSWEP questionnaire on an women faculty in economics. Overall as demonstrated in Table 1, the proportion of faculty who are women in non tenure track full-time jobs without tenure at Ph.D.-granting departments increased significantly over the past five years from 30.4 percent in 1993 to 50.5 percent in 1996 and back down to 30.0 percent in 1997. The
percent of assistant professors without tenure who are women is approximately equal to that of those earning a Ph.D.: 24-26 percent. However, a disproportionate number of assistant professors who are women are not promoted to the associate professor rank. The percentage of associate professor rank who are women is only 13 percent. Similarly, the percentage of full professors who are women is 24 percent with the exception of the past five years, remaining around 30 percent. The percentage of faculty who are women holding appointments at the 118 Ph.D. granting departments is 13 percent.

Table 2 exhibits the same trends as those illustrated in Table 1, but they are once again more pronounced. There are larger percentages of full professors for the non-tenor track full-time positions. The percentages of the associate, assistant, and full professors that are women are all less than those of otherwise ranked institutions.

The availability of women to the economics profession to serve in academic institutions and in the public and private sectors depends on the pipeline of women being trained in economics departments around the country and on their chances of being successful and receiving tenure and getting a promotion. The data that CSWEWP has collected indicates that women have hit a glass ceiling in the academy. This information suggests that while the pipeline of graduate students is flowing at about a 27 percent rate, the flow of women into the academic positions at top Ph.D. granting institutions is diminishing and that the flow into small state and private liberal arts colleges and universities is increasing. While a greater percentage of young female economists are going into public and private careers outside of academia, there is no reason to suspect that they are being any more successful.

The COMMITTEE'S ACTIVITIES

CSWEWP Co-going Activities. CSWEWP is involved in a wide range of activities to help promote women in the profession and to increase the probabilities that they will be successful. As part of its ongoing efforts to increase the participation of women on the AEA's Co-going Committees, six sessions for the January 1999 AAEA meeting in New Orleans, Louisiana, were organized. Catherine Eckel and Masayuki Cooper organized three sessions on gender-related issues and Henry Farber and Joyce Jacobsen organized three sessions on non-gender-related issues in labor economics. In addition, CSWEWP organized a roundtable discussion on "Furthuring Women's Careers in Economics: It Takes a Village" to highlight its efforts to further the careers of women economists over the last year. CSWEWP will also hold a business meeting to report to its associates and other sister AEA members about its activities and to hear from those present suggestions for future activities. To encourage networking and to support junior women meeting senior women, a hospitality suite will be provided every evening and afternoon at the meeting and staffed by members of the Committee.

New CSWEWP Initiatives. Last year's meetings was particularly meaningful for CSWEWP. We celebrated the 25th anniversary of its founding in the Chicago program, and created two new national conferences: the first national conference on the economics of crime, and the second national conference on the economics of women in the workforce, both of which were held during the annual meeting in San Diego. The first conference was a resounding success and was celebrated in grand style. The originally appointed members of CSWEWP were invited to come and talk about the event that led up to the creation of CSWEWP. Walter Adams, Carolyn Shaw Bell, Francine Blau, Colette Morey, Barbara Reagan, and Roberta Romer were all present. These sessions were so popular that they requested a meeting to discuss how to establish another conference for 1999. This meeting was held on the last day of the conference and was attended by John Kenneth Galbraith who was president of the AEA and an ex officio member of the original committee was not present either. In addition, every past and present member of CSWEWP was invited to attend the birthday party. Over 75 past and present board members attended.

The second initiative was a mentor-mentoring program, "COCODE: Creating Career Opportunities For Female Economists" that was funded by the National Science Foundation (NSF). The purpose of the initiative is to increase the chances of women economists in the profession. This program has two main objectives: one to help attract eight senior women economists and 40 junior women economists from the top universities to cooperatively work on each of the projects as teams. In addition, there are sessions on publishing, grant-writing, networking, and balancing life choices.

Andrea Ziegert (University of Minnesota) and KimMarie McGoldrick (University of Richmond) helped with the logistics of the workshops. Beth Allen (University of Minnesota), Rebecca Blank (University of Chicago), Elizabeth Hoffmann (University of Illinois at Chicago), Beth Ingram (University of Iowa), Kala Kudra (Pennsylvania State University), Marijoe McElroy (Duke University), Valerie Ramsey (University of California - San Diego), and Michelle White (University of Michigan) served as senior mentors. Kathryn Anderson (Vanderbilt University), Hal Edson (Federal Reserve), Barbara Frankena (Northwestern University), Joui Henschel (University of Wyoming), Joyce Jacobsen (Wesleyan University), Daphne Kenyon (Simon College), Aedem Lohrmann (University of California - Los Angeles), and Susan Pave (Western Michigan University) served as facilitators. A COCODE reunion is scheduled for the 1999 meetings.

Finally, two national awards for women economists will be given at the 1999 AAEA meeting for the first time. Barbara Frankena organized the National Bank Women's Economic Achievement Award. This award will be given to a woman economist who has shown remarkable achievement in the economics profession, through her example, through her achievements, through increasing our understanding of how women can advance through the economics profession, or through her mentoring of other women. Catherine Eckel headed up another committee that founded the Elaine Bennett Research Award. This award was given in memory of Elaine Bennett and was generously funded by her husband William Zame (University of California - Los Angeles). The prize is intended to recognize and honor outstanding research by a young woman in any area of economics. The recipient will receive a $50 prize at the AAEA meeting.

CSWEWP's Regional Activities. To assist women in the profession who cannot make it to national meetings, CSWEWP organizes sessions at the AEA meetings in the Eastern, Southern, Midwest, and Western Economic Association meetings. As at the national meetings, sessions are on gender-related research and on a non-gender-related field to showcase the work of younger women economists. CSWEWP is increasing its efforts to broaden the base of its organization by encouraging a closer liaison between the regional governing boards and the formation of regional CSWEWP committees to attend to the work of the region associations. In addition, CSWEWP will conduct regional adaptations of the COCODE workshops at these meetings this year.

In addition, Andrea Ziegert and Sarah Pozo organized a COCODE workshop for the Midwest Economic Association meeting in Chicago, Illinois, and Marianne Ferber (University of Minnesota), Roberta Williams (Northwestern University), and Jim Kimmel (W. E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research) served as senior women for the junior women at this workshop. Andrea Ziegert, KimMarie McGoldrick, and Catherine Eckel organized a COCODE workshop at the Southern Economic Association meeting in Baltimore in November. Beth Allen (University of Minnesota), Barbara Bergman (University of Maryland and American University), Catherine Eckel (Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University), Nancy Lee (Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University), Jennifer Reitman (University of Delaware), and Einaugria Toia (National Science Foundation and University of Wisconsin) served as senior women for the junior women at this workshop. Similar workshops are planned for the Easterns and Western Economic Association meetings next year. By the end of the 1999 NSF/AFAA-CSWEWP COCODE workshops will have increased the chances of over 100 junior women economists earning tenure within the next six years.

SEVERAL WORDS OF THANKS

The Committee would like to thank several people who have made major contributions to its effort. First, CSWEWP would like to thank all the former chairs and board members who made extra efforts to attend the 25th Anniversary celebration and make it such an historic and special event to so many people. The efforts and commitments of these people laid the foundation for CSWEWP to embark upon its next 25 years of promoting the interest of women in the economics profession. Second, CSWEWP would like to thank all of the senior women who helped with the COCODE workshops and the junior women who participated in them. Everyone gave of their talents and expertise in the first concerted effort to catapult women into the upper echelons of the academy.

As always Joan Harweth, the membership chair and her staff have served CSWEWP well by maintaining the roster, sending out annual membership reminders, and creating customized listings for potential employers.

Four of these members will be at the end of 1998 Daphne Kenyon has who has served tirelessly writing the mission statement, policies for CSWEWP seniors, and organizing the upcoming Eastern Economic Association COCODE workshop with Barbara Frankena; Joyce Jacobsen has also served the Committee well. She kept the newsletter on target with helpful reminders of due dates of proposed articles. She also helped write the CSWEWP senior policy statement with Daphne Kenyon. Both Daphne and Barbara hosted a CSWEWP meeting in Boston and served as facilitators at the national COCODE workshop. Olivia Mitchell hosted one of our meetings at Wharton and served as a general advisor to the chair. Her insights were always appreciated. Hal Edson (Federal Reserve) served not only as a committee member important but also as our UK representative. She helped solidify the connections between the two countries allowing CSWEWP to officially recognize economic collaboration for the committee to meet at the Fed for one of its meetings. Hal also served as a facilitator at the national COCODE workshop. Finally, Sarah Pozo took on the task of organizing the first regional COCODE workshop. She also took on the lead on maternity issues and providing the board with information on what is done around the country. All of these committee members also organized sessions for the national meetings and edited in issues of the newsletter. All of them deserve our deepest thanks for a job well done.

Finally, CSWEWP thanks Sally Schindler for keeping the Committee and all of its paper and cyber work on track. Denise University, Mary Potterfield (Department of Economics), the Department of Economics (University of Richmond), and the Harris Chan, have all contributed to the work of CSWEWP with office space, phone, telephones, and postage. Mary Winer and her staff at the AEA offices also deserve a word of thanks for all of their help with budgets and general information. Mary Winer has worked a tremendous help arranging for meeting rooms at national meetings and with the logistics of the national COCODE workshop. All of these people have been wonderful to work with and the Committee could not have been as successful and productive as it was without their dedication.

Notes

1. CSWEWP's sample contains only US economics departments, while that of the AEA UAJ includes a few non-US economics departments. The most recent versions of the AEA UAJ's is much shorter and has received a much greater response rate.

2. The top 20 departments are Brown University, University of California - Berkeley, University of California - Los Angeles, University of California - Santa Barbara, University of Chicago, Columbia University, Cornell University, Harward University, University of Maryland, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, University of Michigan, University of Minnesota, New York University, Northwestern University, University of Pennsylvania, Princeton University, University of Rochester, Stanford University, University of Virginia - Madison, and Yale University.

3. The top 10 economics departments are University of California - Los Angeles, University of Chicago, Columbia University, Harward University, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, University of Minnesota, University of Pennsylvania, Princeton University, Stanford University, University of Virginia - Madison, and Yale University.

CSWEWP 14 Newsletter
CSWEWP 15 Newsletter
### Table 1. Percent Female by Pipeline Categories for all Departments—CSWEP Annual Departmental Questionnaire: 1993-97

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### Table 2. Percent Female by Pipeline Categories for the Top 20 Departments—CSWEP Annual Departmental Questionnaire: 1993-97

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### The Carolyn Shaw Bell Award

**Description:** This award is given annually to an individual who has furthered the status of women in the economics profession, through example, achievements, increasing our understanding of how women can advance in the economics profession, or mentoring of others.

**Eligibility:** Any individual who has been trained in economics is eligible for the award, whether they are practicing economists or not. For example, an individual is eligible to receive the award if they were an undergraduate economics major.

**Peters** The first award was presented at the January 1999 CSWEP reception at the ASSA/SAFEA Convention. A "master" plaque that lists all award winners, in addition to the further status of women citation will be in the form of a "Carolyn Shaw Bell Award" plaque, which includes Carolyn's name. "We need every day to be worthy of some woman's achievements, to treat a woman's book or painting or scholarly article, to bring about a preservation or prize and to show admiration for the efforts and influence of women, in their professional and technical and social and human endeavors of all kinds." (CSWEP Newsletter, Fall 1997, p. 4). The award requires that the "master" plaque be displayed prominently in a public place in the winner's local area so that others can see the achievements of the winner.

**Procedure:**
- Candidate is nominated by one person, with two additional supporting letters.
- The nominations should contain the candidate's CV as well as the nominating letter.
- Nominations will be judged by the CSWEP Carolyn Shaw Bell Award Committee.
- The award will be announced in Fall preceding the annual ASSA/SAFEA meetings.
- Nominating letters, including the supporting letters and the candidate's CV, are due by July 1 of each year and should be sent to the Chair of the Carolyn Shaw Bell Award Committee.

*For 1999, the chair is:*
- Dea Barber Frantzen
  100 Lunglow Street
  Newton, MA 02458
  (617) 737-2232; FAX (617) 373-3640

**Other committee members:**
- Sara Johnson, Chief Regional Economist
- Standard & Poor's DRI
- Vice Chair and Business Representative
- Alicia Mannell, Professor, Boston College
- CSWEP Newsletter
- CSWEP Newsletter
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1999 CSWEP Award Winners

Dr. Judith Chevalier, First Recipient Of The Elaine Bennett Research Award

Dr. William Zame, Dr. Judith Chevalier and Dr. Robin Barlett prepare to cut the celebratory cake at the CSWEP reception.

Dr. Alice M. Rivlin, First Recipient of the Carolyn Shaw Bell Award

T was announced January 3rd at the CSWEP reception at the Allied Social Science Association Convention in New York City that Dr. Alice M. Rivlin, Vice-Chair of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, is the first recipient of the Carolyn Shaw Bell Award.

The Carolyn Shaw Bell Award was created as part of the last year's 25th Anniversary celebration of the founding of CSWEP. Carolyn Shaw Bell, the Katherine Conn Chair Professor Emerita of Wellesley College, was the first Chair of CSWEP. The Bell award is given annually to an individual who has furthered the status of women in the economics profession, through example, achievements, increasing our understanding of how women can advance in the profession, and/or "real world" contributions. Dr. Rivlin has had a distinguished career as an economist. She has held several positions at The Brookings Institution, where she first worked subsequent to receiving a Ph.D. in Economics from Radcliffe College in 1958. Her government career includes Assistant Secretary and Deputy Assistant Secretary positions at the U.S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare, founding Director of the Congressional Budget Office in 1975, and Deputy Director and Director of the Office of Management and Budget. She taught at the John F. Kennedy School of Government of Harvard University and George Mason University. In 1986, she was the first female President of the American Economic Association. In addition to being Vice-Chair of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System since 1996, she currently serves as Chair of the Washington, D.C. Control Board. Her notable accomplishments make her a worthy recipient of the first Carolyn Shaw Bell Award.

Carolyn wrote in the CSWEP 25th Anniversary Newsletter in Fall of 1997, "We need to do more to help some women's achievements, to tout a woman's book or painting or scholarly article, to brag about a promotion or prize and to show admiration for the efforts and influence of women, in their professional and technical and social and human endeavors of all kinds."

In the spirit of her words, the award requires that the "master" plaque be displayed prominently in a public place in the winner's local area so that others can see the achievements of the winner.

GENDER-RELATED TOPICS

"Gender and Bargaining"
Chairs Robert A. Pollak (Washington University in St. Louis)

As the title suggests, "Risk Aversion and Gender: Some Cross-Cultural Evidence" by Lisa R. Anderson (William and Mary), Yaya V. Rodgers (William and Mary), and Roger R. Rodriguez (Unidad de Apoyo Tecnico), uses experimental data to investigate gender differences in risk aversion. The authors are from the US and Honduras. To estimate risk aversion, the authors compared the propensity of proposed divisions in two types of games: dictator games, in which the proposer faces no risk that the initial proposal will be rejected, and ultimatum games, in which the respondent may reject offers perceived to be "unfair," in which case the proposer gets nothing. The authors find that cultural differences between US and Honduran results explain the greatest variation in the data. They also found that the US results, but not the Honduran results, were sensitive to which of the two games the subjects played first. They found no systematic gender differences in responses in either country.

"Gender and Culture: International Experimental Evidence from Trust Games" by Rachel Croson (University of Wisconsin) and Nancy Bochum (University of Wisconsin) finds that women reciprocate more than men. In the trust game, the proposer contributes a sum of money and the respondent receives a fraction of this amount, plus the original contribution. The proposer can choose to "steal" the entire amount, preventing the respondent from winning any money and the respondent returns a fraction of the sum. Crosen and Bochum found that more than 95 percent of the proposers sent something to the responder, and 85 percent of the responders returned at least as much as had been sent. They found no significant difference between genders in the amounts sent by the proposers, but women respondents returned significantly more than male responders.

"In Introducing Power in Household Modeling: A Dynamic Noncooperative Bargaining Approach" Susan E. Fleck (Bureau of Labor Statistics) asks why, in some developing countries, married women seldom work outside the home, despite the risks of marital dissolution. Thus, the analysis begins with the assumption that marriage contracts are not binding. Fleck distinguishes between "power" (the ability to influence the allocation decisions of another) and bargaining. Fleck argues that, in a dynamic noncooperative game, the player with the more-power advantage has noncooperative power over the other player's allocation decisions. She also argues that husbands use such a first-mover advantage to impose complete specialization in household production on their wives. Using Honduran data on married women's labor force participation, Fleck finds that husbands' disagreement of wives' working has a significant effect on wives' labor force participation.

"In Nonparametric Testable Restrictions of Household utility maximizing models to a model of household labor supply. The model is thus in the spirit of the nonparametric approach of Afriat, Deaton, and Leyton. The question of whether the observed behavior is consistent with that of a "rational" utility maximizing one-person house- hold. Snyder tests whether observed behavior is consistent with a two-person household in which the alloca- tion of consumption and leisure is Pareto efficient. The test of Pareto efficiency is, in turn, the spirit of Chari and Chernov's "collective model." The paper develops tests analogous to Sarno's and tests whether a household is Pareto efficient, uses data from the NLS to test for Pareto efficiency, and finds that the household's satisfaction in the sample behave efficiently.

The discussed were Lisa Vesterlund (Iowa State), Sara Scott (University of Miami), Carol Scates (Virginia Commonwealth University), and Robert A. Pollak (Washington University in St. Louis).

"Gender Differences in Valuation, Time Preference, and Risk Attitudes: Experimental Evidence" Chair Catherine Eckel, Virginia Tech

The paper was by Kelley Brown (Georgia State University) and Laura Lee (Georgia State University). The paper was "Why 'So You'll Do That And Do What You Say: Evidence on Gender Differences in Voluntary Contributions to Public Goods." Brown and Osborne conducted a study that compared the behavior of women and men in their valuation of an environmental asset in both hypothetical and real-world settings, using both adult and student populations. They examine the level of giving in both cases, and also discuss whether men and women actually send contributions when they promise to do so. They find that both contributions and real contributions are larger for women. Both women and men give more when the situation is less hypothetical, and gender differences are much larger for men. Men and women are equally likely to give, conditional on giving. Women are less likely to participate in the experiment. Gender differences are found between adult and student populations. The discount was Rebecca (Miami University). She suggested several interesting modifications of the study and noted that results may be due to the specific nature of the study and the good examined.

"In Discount Rates: Evidence from the Experimental Laboratory" by Melonie Williams (US Environmental Protection Agency) was the second paper. Williams reported the results of several studies that examine individual and differences in discount rates among US students and Danish adults. As in the Brown and Osborne study, gender differences in discount rates among US students and Danish adults. As in the Brown and Osborne study, gender differences in discount rates among US students and Danish adults.

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“Women in Academe”

Chair: Robin Bartlett, Denison University

The session on Women in Academe focused on the issues of promotion and contained several papers on the topic. "Differences by Gender in Academic Careers in the Humanities" by Donna Gimmet (Washington University in St. Louis) and Kathy Hayes (Southern Methodist University) uses a data set from the Survey of Doctorate Recipients. The authors explored gender differences in wages and promotion probabilities for faculty in the humanities. They found that while differences in wages by gender can be largely explained by academic rank, differences in promotion to tenure by gender are more strongly controlling for productivity, demographic characteristics and discipline.

"Is There a Glass-Ceiling in Economics?" by John M. McDowell (Arizona State University), Larry D. Singell, and James P. Ziliak (University of Oregon) used panel data for the American Economic Association members to again explore gender differences in promotion. They found that promotion opportunities for women differ by rank at distinguished institutions. Male female assistant professors are more likely to be promoted to the rank of associate professor than similar male colleagues. Those who do seem to be glass-ceiling where men and women do not have similar labor market opportunities and circumstances with controls for productivity.

"Faculty Gender Discrimination Revisited" by Emily P. Hoffman (Western Michigan University) examined the determinants of faculty compensation and found that women faculty earned less than male faculty, even after controlling for teaching quality, research experience, and work effort. The model distinguishes between real differences (consistent of risk preference and expectations) and expected differences (conditioned by context). Sex differences can emerge at several points in the decision-making process. The authors concluded that both risk attitudes and risk perception differ for women and men, and these differences may be a less frame as compared with a gain frame.

"Career Dynamics"

Chair: Joy L. Jacobson, Wesleyan University

The first paper was Anne Preston’s (Russell Sage Foundation and SUNY-Stony Brook) “Sex, Jobs, and Commitment Following a Late Career Job Loss”, was by. She surveyed 155 women in a detailed study of the reasons for job loss. The survey found that women who experienced job loss were more likely to have experienced a reduction in prestige or earnings. The study also found that women who had experienced job loss were more likely to report a decrease in job satisfaction.

"Public Policy and the Institutions in the Labor Market" Chair: Francine D. Blau, Cornell University

The first paper in the session, "What is Happening to Families Revisited: A Replication of Earlier Research on the Early Stage of the Development of Welfare Reform" by Taehee Chipy (Ohio State University and Brown University) and Ann Drayzen-Witte (Wellesley College and Florida International University), Maryg Queralt (Florida State University), and Harriet Griner (Wellesley Childcare Research Partnership) study the early period of welfare reform. The authors focus on the metropolitan area in the U.S. To estimate the effects of the reforms on earnings and job opportunities, whether or not the employment expansion of public health insurance to cover children of working parents has had the intended effect of increasing labor force participation of mothers to exit welfare more quickly, however this effect appears to be concentrated among recipients (as proxied by recipients who begin the sample on welfare). Their results suggest that young children are less likely to exit welfare and begin work than women with older children, indicating that expansions in health insurance for such women may not be enough to ease their welfare-to-work transitions.

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**From the Chair**

**CSWEP Chair, Robin L. Bartlett - Denison University**

CSWEP SPONSORED THREE NEW EVENTS THIS YEAR AT THE AEA ANNUAL MEETING.

First, Dr. Judith Chevalier was awarded a crystal paper-weight as the first recipient of the Elaine Bennett Research Prize. The founder of the prize, William Zame and friends of Elaine Bennett, were on hand for the awarding of the prize. Afterward, Judith Chevalier gave the first Elaine Bennett lecture to inform the large crowd that was present of her recent work on the behavior of mutual fund managers. Cake was served and shared at the CSWEP reception to honor her achievements. Second, the first Carolyn Shaw Bell Award was given to Dr. Alice Rivlin for her life-long achievements and for representing women in every aspect of the profession. Carolyn Shaw Bell wanted us to boost of the achievements of successful women and the size and placement of the plaque of the prize. The award ensured that our recognition of Dr. Rivlin’s achievements will not go unnoticed.

Third, participants of the January, Midwest, and Southern COCOPE workshops had their first reunion. While the weather and illness cut down the class numbers, thirty senior women, facilitators, and participants made it to the pre-conference reunion. Successes and dis-appointments were shared over mid-afternoon coffee and tea.

The Joint Hersch, Tracy Dickert-Collins, and Shella Miller once again put together a successful Women on the Run event. The dozen or so runners browsed the cold and Central Park. Sally and some of us who were less courageous greeted them upon their return. Everyone was accounted for and posed for a photo. Next year’s run will be bigger than ever along the Charles. Start getting in shape for the CSWEP millenium run!

There will be two more COCOPE workshops at the Eastern in March and the Western in July. Information is elsewhere.

\[End of excerpt\]

**Regional Meetings**

**SOUTHERN ECONOMIC ASSOCIATION MEETINGS**

CSWEP sponsored two sessions at the Southern Economic Association Meetings, November 8-10, 1998 in Baltimore, MD.

Women's Health and the Labor Market Organized by Leslie Seaton, Virginia Commonwealth University

"The Effects of Clinical Depression on Wages and Returns to Schooling" 
Presenters: Cristina Parsons, Fairfield University Discussion: Kathryn Anderson, Vanderbilt University

"Recent Trends in Employer-Sponsored Health Insurance Coverage: Are Bad Jobs Getting Worse?" 

"The Relationship Between Employment, Private Health Insurance, and Medicaid Evidence from the SIPP" 
Presenters: Lara Shore-Sheppard, University of Pittsburgh Discussion: Brooks Pierce, Bureau of Labor Statistics

Insurance, Adverse Selection, and Medical Expended in the 1990s" 
Presenters: Melissa Thomson, Miami University Discussion: Pamela Peile, University of Pittsburgh

**The CSWEP ‘Brag Box’**

"We need every day to herald some woman’s achievements ... go ahead and boast!" 
Carolyn Shaw Bell

**The CSWEP Roundtable**

Furthering Women’s Careers in Economics: It Takes a Grant

Chair: Robin Bartlett, Denison University

Several of the January 1998 COCOPE senior women, facilitators, and participants engaged in the give-and-take of a roundtable. The discussions included Andrea Ziegert (Denison University), Beth Allen (University of Missouri), Frances Blunk (Council of Economic Advisors), Joyce Jacobsen (Wesleyan University), Dan Newlon (National Science Foundation), Sewin Cai (Princeton University), Usha Nair (Georgia Institute of Technologoy), Anne Pfeil (University of California-Berkeley), and Laura Ramonzi (University of Mississippi).

The conversation focused on whether there is a pipeline for women, faculty, NSF, and the participants had taken away from a two-day workshop where a number of senior economists teamed up in groups of five with one of eight senior economists to comment on each other’s work and “learn the tricks of the trade.” The senior women discussed what they had learned from the experience. They gleaned information that they were not aware of before the workshop. Many of the facilitators discussed how to improve future COCOPE workshops given the limited pool of senior women. Adding male mentors may be an avenue to pursue. Dan Newlon voiced the same concern. In general, the participants felt the team concept had worked better than they had anticipated. They felt that the comments and support from other team members had improved their productivity over the course of the year. There was some discussion of what role the senior women and team members play in keeping a team together and working productively. For example, it is necessary for there to be a team. The day-by-day challenges, numbers, thirty senior women, facilitators, and participants made it to the pre-conference reunion. Successes and dis-appointments were shared over mid-afternoon coffee and tea.

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Regional Meetings continued from page 23
peripheral workers thus widening the benefits differential between core and peripheral jobs.
Lora Shole-Shoppard used SIPP data to examine the relationship between employment, private health insurance, and Medicaid. These panel data allow her to examine the factors precipitating eligibility for Medicaid and to examine the degree to which those eligible choose to participate and/or are covered by private insurance. While many who are eligible do not participate, those that do typically enroll soon after they become eligible, and few had private coverage just before they enrolled or crow out does not appear to be a severe problem as some have feared.
Finally, Melissa Thomason of Miami University added an historical perspective. She used data from the 1950s to examine the decision to insure and the impact of insurance on medical expenditures. Initial results indicate that insured households spent substantially more on medical expenditures but that the decision to insure was so effectively constrained by supply concerns with adverse selection, that those more likely to be insured were simultaneously less likely to incur large medical bills.

Gender Differences: Theory and Laboratory Experiments Organizer and chair: Catherine Eckel, Virginia Tech, Southern Representative for CSWEP

"The Effects of Risk Aversion on Job Matching: Can Differences in Risk Aversion Explain the Wage Gap?" Presenter: Lise Vesterlund, Iowa State University Discussant: Nick Feltoch, University of Houston

"Risk Mitigation Experiments: Should Women Protect and Men Invest" Presenter: Jamie Brown Kruse, Texas Tech University Discussant: Philip Grossman, University of Texas, Arlington

"Strategic Similarity and Emergent Conventions" Presenter: John VanHuyck, Texas A&M University (coauthored with Raymond Battalio, Texas A&M University)
Discussant: Catherine Eckel, Virginia Tech.
Lise Vesterlund provides a theoretical analysis of the impact of risk aversion on job matching and wages. She presents a simple matching model with two identical types of workers, where one type exhibits greater risk aversion. In equilibrium, the type with greater risk aversion ends up with worse (lower-productivity) job matches, and lower average wages. This occurs despite the fact that both groups have equal productivity for a given match. It is due in part to the fact that risk-averse workers stop searching sooner, accepting on average lower-productivity matches, and in part to the fact that risk-averse makes workers weaker negotiators for a given match. There is extensive evidence from psychology experiments and more recent experiments in economics that women exhibit greater risk aversion that men in many decision environments. The implication of her work is that differences in risk aversion alone could be largely responsible for the wage gap between women and men.
Jamie Brown Kruse investigates the value of insurance against low-probability losses in a series of laboratory experiments. She compares survey responses to hypothetical questions about losses with the behavior of subjects in a risk-mitigation experiment where subjects are paid their earnings. While no significant differences were found in the process by which women and men make decisions, women exhibited greater risk aversion in both hypothetical and salient decision situations.
John van Huyck presented preliminary results from a series of experiments designed to explore the social-justice preferences of subjects. In these experiments, subjects make a series of decisions in coordination games presented as matrix games. The effects of learning and of social justice preferences on the emergence of conventions are examined. The games vary in several dimensions, one of which attempts to tease out subjects' preference for "utilitarian" or "Rawlsian" outcomes. While many interesting patterns of play are observed in the data, they find no significant sex differences in the results.

Midwest Economic Association Meetings
CSWEP will co-sponsor two sessions at the Midwest Economic Association Annual Meetings to be held in Nashville, Tenn., on March 28-29, 1999.

Non-Gender Related Sessions:
- "Nontraditional Work Arrangements: Causes, Consequences and Policies to Mitigate Unfavorable Outcomes." Friday, March 29, from 1:30 to 3:30 p.m.
- "Wage Inequality: Moral Mobility Among Female Heads of Households: Racial Inequality Reconsidered." by Sozanne Zandveld

Discussed:
- Carolyn Anderson (Vanderbilt University)
- Siobhan Reilly (Vanderbilt University)

The CSWEP Business meeting will be held on Friday, March 26, 1999, from 8:30 to 9:30 p.m.

The CSWEP reception will be held on Saturday, March 27, from 5:30 to 7 p.m.

Western Economic Association Meetings
CSWEP will sponsor four sessions at the Western Economic Association Meetings to be held Tuesday, July 6 through Sunday, July 10, 1999 at the Sheraton San Diego Hotel and Marina, San Diego, Calif.

"Causes Cited by Managers for Creating Non-Traditional Jobs and Their Relation to Organizational Characteristics" by Susan Houseman (University of Pennsylvania, Department of Employment Research)

"Responses to Temporary and Short Term Work" by François Carre and Pamela Joshi (Rutgers University)

"Employment and Gender Economics" by Helen Popper (Stanford University, and chair on the Research Committee on Employment and Economic Policy)

"Labor and Gender Economics" by Helen Popper (Stanford University, and chair on the Research Committee on Employment and Economic Policy)

"A regional CCOPE Workshop will be held on July 9-10. More information regarding these meetings, visit the CSWEP website at:

http://www.reeconomics.org/annual.htm

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Gender Related Sessions:
- "Restructuring the US Health Workforce: How Have Women Fared?" by Anna Maria LoPresti (St. Louis University)

- "Male-Female Wage Differentials in the Urban Labor Market of El Salvador: A Decomposition Analysis" by Ana Regina Vides de Andrade (Vanderbilt University)

- "The Effects of Child Care Costs on the Labor Force Participation and Welfare Recipient of Single Mothers" by Joan Knebel (W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research) and Rachel Connolly (Bowdoin College)

- "Income Mobility Among Female Heads of Households: Racial Inequality Reconsidered" by Sozanne Zandveld

Discussed:
- Kathryn Anderson (Vanderbilt University)
- Siobhan Reilly (Vanderbilt University)

The CSWEP Business meeting will be held on Friday, March 26, 1999, from 8:30 to 9:30 p.m.

The CSWEP reception will be held on Saturday, March 27, from 5:30 to 7 p.m.

Eastern Economic Association Meetings
CSWEP will sponsor two sessions at the Eastern Economic Association Meetings on March 11 at the Boston Park Plaza Hotel in Boston, Mass.

Gender Effects on Human Capital and Wages Date: Friday, March 12, 1999
Chair: Barbara Fraumeni, Bureau of Economic Analysis

Papers:
- "The Effects of Co-residence on Women's Reservation Wages and Labor Supply," Zooyanne Anne and Jane Koldolinsky (University of Vermont)
- "College Enrollment Rates, Investment in Education and Lifetime Market Income by Gender," Barbara Fraumeni (Bureau of Economic Analysis)

Infrastructures: Transportation and Housing Date: Friday, March 12, 1999
Chair: Barbara Fraumeni, Bureau of Economic Analysis

Papers:
- "An Investigation into the Determinants in the Decline of Home Ownership Rates Among Young Families in the United States," Anwati Babugana (Fleet Bank)
- "Measurement of Productive Highway Capital Stock," Barbara Fraumeni (Bureau of Economic Analysis)
- "The Economic Impact of the Jones Act," Dene Hurley (Lehman College).

CSWEP Reception
Date: Friday, March 12, from 4 to 5 p.m.
Tentative location: Fox and Hounds Room, Boston Park Plaza Hotel.

This reception is to welcome all those who are friends of CSWEP, current members, and potential future members. Please bring a friend or arrange to meet a friend at the reception. In addition, it will be an opportunity for participants in the Eastern Creating Career Opportunities for Female Economists (CCOPE), which begins the next morning, to meet each other. There will be complimentary hors d'oeuvres and drinks (non-alcoholic).

For information about registering for the Eastern Economic Association Meetings, see the Eastern Economic Association web page at www.iana.edu/ academic/arcs_congress or contact Mary Lesser at: nisseri@iana.edu
News and Notes

Helen Goldblatt died of a heart attack in mid-December. Helen had been the secretary and editorial assistant to CSWEP at Northwestern University during the time when Rebecca Blank served as chair.

The deadline for submission of papers for the Econometric Society's joint meeting with the American Economic Association in Boston, January 7-9, 2000 is April 1, 1999. Three copies of an abstract not more than 200 words in length should be sent to Professor Wolfgang Pesendorfer, Department of Economics, Princeton University, Princeton, N.J. 08544.

We have a few t-shirts left from the 1999 run in New York. They are available in size L or XL. If you would be interested in having one, please contact Sally Schedler at schedler@denison.edu or (740) 587-5772. They are available for a $15.00 donation to CSWEP.

Participants in the 1999 "Women on the Run Fun Run." Organizers for the month were Jodi Hersch, Sheila Murray and Stacy Dickens-Cantin.

* CCOFFEE at the 1999 Western Economics Association Meetings *

CREATING CAREER OPPORTUNITIES FOR FEMALE ECONOMISTS

An NSF/CSWEP WORKSHOP will be held during the WEA July 1999 Meetings in San Diego, California. The purpose of this workshop is to bring together senior and junior women economists to form teams to improve grant writing, research organization, and other professional skills. The workshop will include working and informational sessions. The working sessions, participants will have time to work on a grant or research project with the help and guidance of a senior woman economist and the other team members. There will also be sessions devoted to networking, life-balancing, and tenure issues. Senior economists participating include:

JOYCE JACOBSEN
Associate Professor
Department of Economics
Wesleyan University

ARLEEN LEIBOWITZ
Chair
Department of Public Policy
University of California, Los Angeles

VALERIE RAMEY
Associate Professor
Department of Economics
University of California, San Diego

The workshop will run from noon Friday, July 9 to 5:00 p.m. Saturday, July 10. The fee to cover expenses will be $100. If you are untutored and interested in this workshop or you know of an untutored female professor who could benefit from this mentoring workshop, please download an application from the CSWEP upcoming events website:

http://www.cswep.org/events.html

Please e-mail or mail your completed application to be received by March 1 to sqoyres@sou.edu, or to Professor Helen Poppet, c/o Sharon Squirees, Department of Economics, Santa Clara University Santa Clara, CA 95053.

Participants will be responsible for their own lodging, and transportation costs. WEA registration, lodging, and other conference information is available at:

http://www.weainternational.org/annual.htm

How to Become an Associate

CSWEP

THE COMMITTEE ON THE STATUS OF WOMEN IN THE ECONOMICS PROFESSION

CSWEP depends on all of its dues-paying associates to continue its activities. In addition to publishing the Newsletter, we maintain a Roster of women economists that is used by associates, employers, organizations establishing advisory groups, and the like. We also organize sessions at the meetings of the AEA and the regional economics associations and publish an annual report on the status of women in the profession.

If you have not paid your dues for the current member year (July 1, 1998 - June 30, 1999), we urge you to do so. Questionnaires and dues reminders were mailed in September to associates.

If you have paid, please pass this newsletter page on to a student, friend, or colleague and tell them about our work. Thank you!

NOTICE: STUDENTS DO NOT HAVE TO PAY ASSOCIATE DUES!!! JUST SEND IN THIS APPLICATION WITH A NOTE FROM A FACULTY MEMBER VERIFYING YOUR STUDENT STATUS

To become a dues-paying associate of CSWEP and receive our Newsletter and Roster, send this application, with a check for $20 payable to:

CSWEP
c/o Dr. Joan Haworth
4901 Tower Court
Tallahassee, FL 32303

Name ____________________________
Mailing Address ____________________________
City ____________________________ State ____________ Zip ____________

Check here if currently an AEA member ________

Check one: Renewal of CSWEP associate ________ New CSWEP associate ________ Student ________

If you checked student, please indicate what institution you attend ________

Check here if you wish a copy of the Special Reprint Issue ________

The Special Reprint Issue of the newsletter contains reprints of ten articles designed to help women economists advance in the profession. The cost for non-paying members is $8.00.