Online Appendix

The Effects of Pre-Trial Detention on Conviction, Future Crime, and Employment: Evidence from Randomly Assigned Judges

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Online Appendix A:	Additional Results
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	No Prior	· Offense	Prior (Offense
	Detained	Released	Detained	Released
Panel A: Bail Type	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Release on Recognizance	0.019	0.393	0.015	0.264
Non-Monetary Bail	0.038	0.195	0.039	0.311
Monetary Bail	0.942	0.412	0.946	0.425
Bail Amount (in thousands)	54.369	10.884	36.628	18.364
Panel B: Subsequent Bail Outcomes				
Bail Modification Petition	0.450	0.066	0.400	0.088
Released in 14 Days	0.110	1.000	0.078	1.000
Released Before Trial	0.431	1.000	0.374	1.000
Panel C: Defendant Characteristics				
Male	0.870	0.777	0.887	0.814
White	0.384	0.432	0.381	0.399
Black	0.605	0.547	0.611	0.588
Age at Bail Decision	33.997	33.845	33.797	31.963
Prior Offense in Past Year	0.000	0.000	1.000	1.000
Baseline Earnings	4.845	7.823	3.943	4.818
Baseline Employed	0.331	0.440	0.301	0.357
Baseline Any Income	0.753	0.811	0.806	0.826
Panel D: Charge Characteristics				
Number of Offenses	3.915	2.556	3.352	2.262
Felony Offense	0.635	0.326	0.606	0.326
Misdemeanor Only	0.365	0.674	0.394	0.674
Any Drug Offense	0.271	0.400	0.305	0.501
Any DUI Offense	0.026	0.128	0.022	0.071
Any Violent Offense	0.325	0.210	0.231	0.115
Any Property Offense	0.321	0.180	0.384	0.205
Panel E: Outcomes				
Any Guilty Offense	0.547	0.461	0.633	0.585
Guilty Plea	0.415	0.194	0.489	0.257
Any Incarceration	0.274	0.134	0.345	0.192
Failure to Appear in Court	0.114	0.167	0.134	0.227
Rearrest in 0-2 Years	0.377	0.348	0.620	0.608
Earnings (thousands) in 1-2 Years	5.769	8.648	4.297	4.971
Employed in 1-2 Years	0.408	0.535	0.326	0.407
Any Income in 1-2 Years	0.455	0.539	0.463	0.453
Earnings (thousands) in 3-4 Years	6.405	9.026	4.971	5.713
Employed in 3-4 Years	0.401	0.502	0.338	0.401
Any Income in 3-4 Years	0.479	0.527	0.429	0.428
Observations	120,488	$187,\!352$	$66,\!450$	46,775

Appendix Table A1: Descriptive Statistics by Prior Offense

	Bla	ack	Wł	nite
	Detained	Released	Detained	Released
Panel A: Bail Type	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Release on Recognizance	0.021	0.353	0.031	0.349
Non-Monetary Bail	0.048	0.247	0.061	0.245
Monetary Bail	0.931	0.400	0.908	0.406
Bail Amount (in thousands)	60.069	12.231	44.185	21.133
Panel B: Subsequent Bail Outcomes				
Bail Modification Petition	0.466	0.064	0.467	0.065
Released in 14 Days	0.074	1.000	0.080	1.000
Released Before Trial	0.431	1.000	0.420	1.000
Panel C: Defendant Characteristics				
Male	0.880	0.802	0.876	0.771
White	0.000	0.000	0.974	0.956
Black	1.000	1.000	0.000	0.000
Age at Bail Decision	33.897	34.018	35.219	34.182
Prior Offense in Past Year	0.393	0.252	0.387	0.221
Baseline Earnings	3.875	5.773	5.094	7.213
Baseline Employed	0.301	0.381	0.324	0.401
Baseline Any Income	0.803	0.832	0.758	0.820
Panel D: Charge Characteristics				
Number of Offenses	3.639	2.381	2.828	2.289
Felony Offense	0.657	0.376	0.583	0.331
Misdemeanor Only	0.343	0.624	0.417	0.669
Any Drug Offense	0.295	0.443	0.282	0.390
Any DUI Offense	0.021	0.100	0.025	0.108
Any Violent Offense	0.295	0.185	0.205	0.202
Any Property Offense	0.345	0.196	0.369	0.196
Panel E: Outcomes				
Any Guilty Offense	0.612	0.530	0.655	0.526
Guilty Plea	0.487	0.262	0.537	0.243
Any Incarceration	0.352	0.193	0.323	0.167
Failure to Appear in Court	0.155	0.246	0.176	0.225
Rearrest in 0-2 Years	0.527	0.451	0.466	0.371
Earnings (thousands) in 1-2 Years	4.443	6.525	6.067	7.964
Employed in 1-2 Years	0.346	0.471	0.399	0.488
Any Income in 1-2 Years	0.463	0.497	0.467	0.508
Earnings (thousands) in 3-4 Years	4.963	6.948	6.768	8.585
Employed in 3-4 Years	0.344	0.443	0.393	0.462
Any Income in 3-4 Years	0.467	0.458	0.484	0.498
Observations	81,643	$67,\!634$	52,861	$53,\!911$

Appendix Table A2: Descriptive Statistics by Race

	Emp	loyed	Non-En	nployed
	Detained	Released	Detained	Released
Panel A: Bail Type	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Release on Recognizance	0.022	0.376	0.016	0.361
Non-Monetary Bail	0.039	0.193	0.040	0.241
Monetary Bail	0.939	0.431	0.944	0.398
Bail Amount (in thousands)	45.966	10.966	49.972	15.079
Panel B: Subsequent Bail Outcomes				
Bail Modification Petition	0.454	0.061	0.425	0.077
Released in 14 Days	0.114	1.000	0.091	1.000
Released Before Trial	0.441	1.000	0.409	1.000
Panel C: Defendant Characteristics				
Male	0.889	0.796	0.875	0.788
White	0.402	0.438	0.349	0.407
Black	0.589	0.544	0.641	0.574
Age at Bail Decision	31.939	31.827	34.851	34.901
Prior Offense in Past Year	0.334	0.169	0.398	0.240
Baseline Earnings	14.129	17.065	0.000	0.000
Baseline Employed	1.000	1.000	0.000	0.000
Baseline Any Income	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000
Panel D: Charge Characteristics				
Number of Offenses	3.819	2.558	3.643	2.426
Felony Offense	0.631	0.320	0.633	0.333
Misdemeanor Only	0.369	0.680	0.367	0.667
Any Drug Offense	0.278	0.382	0.296	0.465
Any DUI Offense	0.030	0.151	0.022	0.090
Any Violent Offense	0.308	0.217	0.281	0.164
Any Property Offense	0.334	0.177	0.344	0.188
Panel E: Outcomes				
Any Guilty Offense	0.575	0.460	0.586	0.518
Guilty Plea	0.439	0.201	0.445	0.215
Any Incarceration	0.288	0.140	0.317	0.155
Failure to Appear in Court	0.121	0.153	0.125	0.203
Rearrest in 0-2 Years	0.446	0.360	0.523	0.460
Earnings (thousands) in 1-2 Years	11.152	13.727	0.961	1.502
Employed in 1-2 Years	0.616	0.735	0.206	0.261
Any Income in 1-2 Years	0.596	0.676	0.358	0.352
Earnings (thousands) in 3-4 Years	11.551	13.706	1.498	2.158
Employed in 3-4 Years	0.575	0.670	0.225	0.264
Any Income in 3-4 Years	0.596	0.641	0.357	0.352
Observations	$59,\!861$	99,095	84,429	$91,\!558$

Appendix Table A3: Descriptive Statistics by Baseline Employmen	t
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		Median Code	Below I Zip (
	Detained	Released	Detained	Released
Panel A: Bail Type	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Release on Recognizance	0.020	0.415	0.014	0.361
Non-Monetary Bail	0.041	0.186	0.030	0.219
Monetary Bail	0.939	0.399	0.955	0.421
Bail Amount (in thousands)	44.894	20.632	48.054	9.920
Panel B: Subsequent Bail Outcomes				
Bail Modification Petition	0.456	0.065	0.433	0.071
Released in 14 Days	0.104	1.000	0.106	1.000
Released Before Trial	0.417	1.000	0.434	1.000
Panel C: Defendant Characteristics				
Male	0.877	0.793	0.875	0.782
White	0.530	0.655	0.335	0.359
Black	0.461	0.324	0.653	0.621
Age at Bail Decision	34.391	33.411	32.793	33.272
Prior Offense in Past Year	0.354	0.164	0.349	0.208
Baseline Earnings	4.962	9.660	4.358	6.575
Baseline Employed	0.349	0.492	0.323	0.409
Baseline Any Income	0.784	0.840	0.781	0.812
Panel D: Charge Characteristics				
Number of Offenses	3.434	2.508	4.055	2.546
Felony Offense	0.576	0.277	0.656	0.333
Misdemeanor Only	0.424	0.723	0.344	0.667
Any Drug Offense	0.255	0.361	0.295	0.439
Any DUI Offense	0.044	0.179	0.025	0.106
Any Violent Offense	0.252	0.187	0.323	0.191
Any Property Offense	0.364	0.190	0.328	0.182
Panel E: Outcomes				
Any Guilty Offense	0.596	0.480	0.561	0.491
Guilty Plea	0.459	0.193	0.418	0.206
Any Incarceration	0.284	0.145	0.308	0.144
Failure to Appear in Court	0.131	0.167	0.121	0.179
Rearrest in 0-2 Years	0.446	0.320	0.454	0.420
Earnings (thousands) in 1-2 Years	5.246	9.932	5.001	7.284
Employed in 1-2 Years	0.406	0.571	0.376	0.494
Any Income in 1-2 Years	0.463	0.565	0.440	0.505
Earnings (thousands) in 3-4 Years	6.086	10.538	5.638	7.750
Employed in 3-4 Years	0.405	0.540	0.378	0.470
Any Income in 3-4 Years	0.468	0.545	0.442	0.494
Observations	$28,\!429$	45,771	130,057	$171,\!199$

Appendix Table A4: Descriptive Statistics by Baseline Income in Zip Code

	Leniency in t-2	Leniency in t-1	$\begin{array}{c} \text{Leniency} \\ \text{in t} \end{array}$	$\substack{ \text{Leniency} \\ \text{in } t+1 }$	$\substack{ \text{Leniency} \\ \text{in } t+2 }$
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
(1) Leniency in $t-2$	1.000				
(2) Leniency in t-1	0.6505	1.000			
(3) Leniency in t	0.3706	0.5129	1.0000		
(4) Leniency in $t+1$	0.5086	0.5655	0.4952	1.0000	
(5) Leniency in $t+2$	0.3650	0.4212	0.3543	0.6383	1.0000

Appendix Table A5: Pair-Wise Correlation of Judge Leniency Over Time

Note: This table reports pairwise correlations between judge leniency measures over time. The correlations are estimated on the sample as described in the notes to Table 1. Judge leniency is estimated using data from other cases assigned to a bail judge the same year following the procedure described in Section III.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Leniency in t	0.641***	0.607***	0.585^{***}	0.582^{***}	0.615^{***}	0.541^{***}
	(0.062)	(0.048)	(0.043)	(0.039)	(0.048)	(0.035)
Leniency in t-2		0.169^{***}				0.076^{***}
		(0.034)				(0.029)
Leniency in t-1			0.234^{***}			0.151^{***}
			(0.041)			(0.031)
Leniency in t+1				0.241^{***}		0.157^{***}
				(0.055)		(0.033)
Leniency in t+2					0.129^{***}	0.051^{**}
					(0.043)	(0.025)
Court x Time FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Baseline Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	$421,\!065$	$421,\!065$	$421,\!065$	$421,\!065$	$421,\!065$	$421,\!065$

Appendix Table A6: Additional First Stage Results

Note: This table reports OLS estimates of pre-trial release on residualized judge leniency measures calculated in each year. The regressions are estimated on the sample as described in the notes to Table 1. Judge leniency is estimated using data from other cases assigned to a bail judge the same year following the procedure described in Section III. *** = significant at 1 percent level, ** = significant at 5 percent level, * = significant at 10 percent level.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Residualized ROR Rate	0.017			
	(0.067)			
Residualized Non-Monetary Rate		0.147^{***}		
		(0.057)		
Residualized Monetary Rate		, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,	-0.477^{***}	
			(0.048)	
Residualized Monetary Amount			× ,	-0.002^{***}
				(0.001)
Observations	$421,\!065$	421,065	421,065	421,065

Appendix Table A7: Predictors of Pre-Trial Release

Note: This table reports OLS estimates of pre-trial release on residualized judge leniency measures separately calculated for each bail type. The regressions are estimated on the sample as described in the notes to Table 1. Judge leniency is estimated using data from other cases assigned to a bail judge the same year following the procedure described in Section III. *** = significant at 1 percent level, ** = significant at 5 percent level, * = significant at 10 percent level.

	Detained		
	Mean	OLS R	lesults
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Any Guilty Offense	0.578	-0.079^{***}	-0.090***
	(0.494)	(0.029)	(0.027)
Guilty Plea	0.441	-0.060^{*}	-0.070^{**}
	(0.497)	(0.034)	(0.031)
Any Incarceration	0.300	0.004	-0.008
	(0.458)	(0.019)	(0.020)
Failure to Appear in Court	0.121	0.146^{***}	0.143^{***}
	(0.326)	(0.039)	(0.039)
Rearrest in 0-2 Years	0.462	0.014	0.009
	(0.499)	(0.035)	(0.035)
Rearrest Prior to Disposition	0.155	0.111^{***}	0.107^{***}
	(0.362)	(0.024)	(0.025)
Rearrest After Disposition	0.343	-0.066^{*}	-0.069^{*}
	(0.475)	(0.037)	(0.036)
Employed in 1-2 Years	0.378	0.040	0.022
	(0.485)	(0.028)	(0.024)
Any Income in 1-2 Years	0.458	0.083^{**}	0.068^{**}
	(0.498)	(0.037)	(0.033)
Employed in 3-4 Years	0.378	0.062^{*}	0.057
	(0.485)	(0.035)	(0.037)
Any Income in 3-4 Years	0.461	0.078^{**}	0.065^{*}
	(0.498)	(0.035)	(0.035)
Court x Time FE	_	Yes	Yes
Baseline Controls	_	No	Yes
Observations	186,938	421,065	421,065

Appendix Table A8: Reduced Form Effect of Judge Leniency

Note: This table reports reduced form OLS estimates of case outcomes on our residualized judge leniency measure described in Section III. The regressions are estimated on the sample as described in the notes to Table 1. The dependent variable is listed in each row. All specifications control for court-by-time fixed effects. Robust standard errors two-way clustered at the individual and judge level are reported in parentheses in columns 2-4. *** = significant at 1 percent level, ** = significant at 5 percent level, * = significant at 10 percent level.

	Crime S	Severity		Crime	Type	
	Misd.	Felony	Drug	DUI	Property	Violent
Panel A: Initial Release	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Released in 3 Days	0.834***	0.441***	0.687***	1.257^{**}	0.848***	0.091
	(0.105)	(0.072)	(0.118)	(0.501)	(0.165)	(0.079)
	[0.692]	[0.395]	[0.645]	[0.854]	[0.401]	[0.489]
Panel B: Subsequent Bail Out	tcomes					
Bail Modification Petition	-0.500^{***}	-0.283^{*}	-0.446^{***}	-0.662^{***}	-0.970^{***}	-0.002
	(0.059)	(0.149)	(0.072)	(0.244)	(0.077)	(0.068)
	[0.136]	[0.301]	[0.179]	[0.135]	[0.269]	[0.227]
Released in 14 Days	0.818***	0.437^{***}	0.653^{***}	1.145***	0.833***	0.180***
	(0.088)	(0.061)	(0.101)	(0.429)	(0.141)	(0.069)
	[0.725]	[0.452]	[0.679]	[0.877]	[0.438]	[0.552]
Released Before Trial	0.692^{***}	0.292***	0.522^{***}	0.352***	0.615^{***}	0.125**
	(0.054)	(0.057)	(0.065)	(0.102)	(0.086)	(0.058)
	[0.792]	[0.675]	[0.816]	[0.967]	[0.625]	[0.742]
Court x Time FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Baseline Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	$227,\!837$	193,228	$115,\!473$	20,796	78,931	72,950

Appendix Table A9: First Stage Results by Case Characteristics

Note: This table reports first stage results for selected case types. The regressions are estimated on the sample as described in the notes to Table 1. Judge leniency is estimated using all cases assigned to a bail judge in the same year following the procedure described in Section III. All specifications control for court-by-time fixed effects. Robust standard errors two-way clustered at the individual and judge level are reported in parentheses and the mean of the dependent variable is reported in brackets in all specifications. *** = significant at 1 percent level, ** = significant at 5 percent level, * = significant at 10 percent level.

	No Prior	Prior	Black	White	$\operatorname{Employed}$	Non-Emp.	High SES	Low SES
Panel A: Initial Release	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(9)	(2)	(8)
Released in 3 Days	0.596^{***}	0.755^{***}	0.627^{***}	0.543^{***}	0.594^{***}	0.676^{***}	0.718^{***}	0.645^{***}
	(0.042)	(0.152)	(0.056)	(0.076)	(0.052)	(0.082)	(0.064)	(0.076)
	[0.609]	[0.413]	[0.457]	[0.500]	[0.623]	[0.520]	[0.617]	[0.568]
Panel B: Subsequent Bail Outcomes	tcomes							
Bail Modification Petition	-0.369^{***}	-0.532^{***}	-0.380^{***}	-0.546^{***}	-0.425^{***}	-0.396^{***}	-0.543^{***}	-0.372^{***}
	(0.076)	(0.091)	(0.068)	(0.053)	(0.047)	(0.062)	(0.075)	(0.056)
	[0.196]	[0.246]	[0.254]	[0.221]	[0.186]	[0.221]	[0.183]	[0.213]
Released in 14 Days	0.583^{***}	0.755^{***}	0.648^{***}	0.559^{***}	0.559^{***}	0.665^{***}	0.687^{***}	0.627^{***}
	(0.034)	(0.135)	(0.054)	(0.071)	(0.049)	(0.079)	(0.061)	(0.065)
	[0.652]	[0.459]	[0.498]	[0.540]	[0.666]	[0.564]	[0.657]	[0.614]
Released Before Trial	0.453^{***}	0.602^{***}	0.497^{***}	0.438^{***}	0.433^{***}	0.527^{***}	0.543^{***}	0.473^{***}
	(0.035)	(0.070)	(0.037)	(0.043)	(0.035)	(0.052)	(0.045)	(0.040)
	[0.777]	[0.632]	[0.692]	[0.709]	[0.790]	[0.716]	[0.777]	[0.755]
Court x Time FE	\mathbf{Yes}	$\mathbf{Y}_{\mathbf{es}}$	\mathbf{Yes}	\mathbf{Yes}	Yes	\mathbf{Yes}	\mathbf{Yes}	\mathbf{Yes}
Baseline Controls	\mathbf{Yes}	${ m Yes}$	\mathbf{Yes}	${ m Yes}$	$\mathbf{Y}_{\mathbf{es}}$	\mathbf{Yes}	\mathbf{Yes}	$\mathbf{Y}_{\mathbf{es}}$
Observations	$307,\!840$	113, 225	153,014	103,035	158,956	175,987	74,200	301,256

Characteristics
Defendant
e Results by]
First Stage
Table A10:
Appendix 7

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Note: This table reports first stage results for selected defendant types. The regressions are estimated on the sample as described in the notes to Table 1. Judge lemiency is estimated using all cases assigned to a bail judge in the same year following the procedure described in Section III. All specifications control for court-by-time fixed effects. Robust standard errors two-way clustered at the individual and judge level are reported in parentheses and the mean of the dependent variable is reported in brackets in all specifications. *** = significant at 1 percent level, ** = significant at 5 percent level, * = significant at 10 percent level.

	Detained					-
	Mean		JLS Results		ZSLS Results	tesults
Panel A: Case Outcomes	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(9)
Number of Guilty Offenses	0.936	-0.241^{***}	-0.089^{***}	-0.084^{***}	-0.131	-0.158^{**}
	(1.755)	(0.014)	(0.010)	(0.007)	(0.080)	(0.072)
Guilty Plea to Time Served	0.215	-0.143^{***}	-0.063^{***}	-0.058^{***}	-0.106	-0.112
	(0.411)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.005)	(0.086)	(0.082)
Offense Charged Down	0.464	0.021	0.061^{***}	0.049^{***}	0.088^{*}	0.101^{**}
	(0.499)	(0.014)	(0.006)	(0.008)	(0.053)	(0.051)
Days to Case Decision	196.475	16.103^{***}	35.196^{***}	36.581^{***}	45.607^{***}	40.920^{**}
	(247.361)	(6.230)	(3.957)	(4.341)	(16.055)	(16.600)
Panel B: Crime Outcomes						
Number of Counts in 0-2 Years	2.595	-0.475^{***}	-0.080^{*}	0.210^{***}	0.417	0.352
	(4.619)	(0.078)	(0.046)	(0.043)	(0.351)	(0.320)
Number of Counts Prior to Disposition	0.773	0.111^{**}	0.269^{***}	0.494^{***}	1.114^{***}	1.085^{***}
	(2.799)	(0.044)	(0.043)	(0.047)	(0.257)	(0.254)
Number of Counts After Disposition	1.822	-0.586^{***}	-0.349^{***}	-0.284^{***}	-0.697^{**}	-0.733^{***}
	(3.825)	(0.046)	(0.018)	(0.026)	(0.287)	(0.260)
Court x Time FE	I	\mathbf{Yes}	\mathbf{Yes}	$\mathbf{Y}_{\mathbf{es}}$	\mathbf{Yes}	Yes
Baseline Controls	I	N_{O}	\mathbf{Yes}	${ m Yes}$	N_{O}	$\mathbf{Y}_{\mathbf{es}}$
Complier Weights	I	N_{O}	No	${ m Yes}$	No	N_{O}
Observations	186,938	421,065	421,065	421,065	421,065	421,065

Appendix Table A11: Additional Case and Crime Results

sample as described in the notes to Table 1. The dependent variable is listed in each row. Two-stage least squares models instrument for pre-trial detention using a judge leniency measure that is estimated using data from other cases assigned to a bail judge in the same year following the procedure described in Section III. All specifications control for court-by-time fixed effects. Robust standard errors two-way clustered at the individual and judge level are reported in parentheses in columns 2-6. *** = significant at 1 percent level, ** = significant at 5 percent level, * = significant at 10 percent level. Note: '

	Detained					
	Mean		OLS Results		2SLS 1	2SLS Results
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(9)
Days Detained Prior to Disposition	36.989	-32.629^{***}	-32.986^{***}	-29.068^{***}	-13.262^{**}	-14.092^{***}
	(84.796)	(1.803)	(1.951)	(1.640)	(5.580)	(5.341)
Days Detained After Disposition	316.680	-277.366^{***}	-141.642^{***}	-124.989^{***}	5.025	0.028
	(735.902)	(14.577)	(5.156)	(4.792)	(44.721)	(47.270)
Days Detained Ever	353.669	-309.995^{***}	-174.629^{***}	-154.057^{***}	-8.238	-14.064
	(754.274)	(15.046)	(5.963)	(6.054)	(47.453)	(49.697)
Court x Time FE	1	Y_{es}	Yes	Yes	Yes	\mathbf{Yes}
Baseline Controls	Ι	No	${ m Yes}$	${ m Yes}$	No	\mathbf{Yes}
Complier Weights	Ι	No	No	\mathbf{Yes}	N_{O}	N_{O}
Observations	172,956	385, 255	385, 255	385, 255	385, 255	385, 255

Appendix Table A12: Pre-Trial Release and Number of Days Detained

Note: This table reports additional OLS and two-stage least squares results of the impact of pre-trial release. The regressions are estimated on the sample as described in the notes to Table 1. The dependent variable is listed in each row. Two-stage least squares models instrument for pre-trial detention using a judge leniency measure that is estimated using data from other cases assigned to a bail judge in the same year following the procedure described in Section III. All specifications control for court-by-time fixed effects. Robust standard errors two-way clustered at the individual and judge level are reported in parentheses in columns 2-6. *** = significant at 1 percent level, ** = significant at 5 percent level, * = significant at 10 percent level.

					5	
	Mean		OLS Results		2SLS I	2SLS Results
Panel A: Years 1-2	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(9)
Married	0.178	-0.003	-0.003^{**}	-0.002	-0.045	-0.060
	(0.383)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.063)	(0.048)
Any Move	0.769	-0.152^{***}	-0.131^{***}	-0.129^{***}	-0.150^{**}	-0.133^{*}
	(0.422)	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.004)	(0.066)	(0.070)
Move To Higher Income Area	0.492	-0.117^{***}	-0.105^{***}	-0.104^{***}	-0.134^{*}	-0.128^{*}
	(0.500)	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.005)	(0.070)	(0.072)
Move To Lower Income Area	0.308	-0.039^{***}	-0.030^{***}	-0.028^{***}	-0.025	-0.014
	(0.462)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.066)	(0.065)
Panel B: Years 3-4						
Married	0.163	-0.002	-0.005^{**}	-0.001	0.030	0.011
	(0.369)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.065)	(0.045)
Any Move	0.802	-0.123^{***}	-0.111^{***}	-0.111^{***}	-0.037	-0.021
	(0.399)	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.004)	(0.049)	(0.052)
Move To Higher Income Area	0.516	-0.098^{***}	-0.091^{***}	-0.093^{***}	-0.041	-0.030
	(0.500)	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.004)	(0.065)	(0.069)
Move To Lower Income Area	0.321	-0.030^{***}	-0.024^{***}	-0.024^{***}	-0.001	0.004
	(0.467)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.004)	(0.071)	(0.073)
Court x Time FE	1	Yes	$\mathbf{Y}_{\mathbf{es}}$	Yes	\mathbf{Yes}	Yes
Baseline Controls	I	N_{O}	$\mathbf{Y}_{\mathbf{es}}$	\mathbf{Yes}	N_{O}	$\mathbf{Y}_{\mathbf{es}}$
Complier Weights	Ι	N_{O}	N_{O}	$\mathbf{Y}_{\mathbf{es}}$	N_{O}	No
Observations	144,290	334,943	334,943	334,943	334,943	334,943

Appendix Table A13: Additional IRS Results

the sample as described in the notes to Table 1. The dependent variable is listed in each row. Two-stage least squares models instrument for pre-trial detention using a judge leniency measure that is estimated using data from other cases assigned to a bail judge in the same year following the procedure described in Section III. All specifications control for court-by-time fixed effects. Robust standard errors two-way clustered at the individual and judge level are reported in parentheses in columns 2-6. *** = significant at 1 percent level, ** = significant at 5 percent level, * = significant at 10 percent level. Note: This ta

	Crime S	Severity		Crime	e Type	
	Misd.	Felony	Drug	DUI	Property	Violent
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Any Guilty Offense	-0.183^{***}	-0.066	-0.099	0.076	-0.109^{*}	-0.818
	(0.066)	(0.090)	(0.066)	(0.107)	(0.059)	(0.950)
	[0.508]	[0.549]	[0.677]	[0.527]	[0.559]	[0.289]
Guilty Plea	-0.168^{**}	-0.001	-0.077	-0.020	-0.087	-0.365
	(0.083)	(0.084)	(0.072)	(0.058)	(0.058)	(0.496)
	[0.214]	[0.425]	[0.355]	[0.263]	[0.420]	[0.198]
Any Incarceration	0.019	-0.074	-0.099^{*}	0.099	0.045	-0.474
	(0.017)	(0.083)	(0.058)	(0.124)	(0.051)	(0.607)
	[0.112]	[0.334]	[0.259]	[0.429]	[0.228]	[0.147]
Failure to Appear in Court	0.123**	0.212***	0.202	0.102	0.140***	0.147
	(0.058)	(0.033)	(0.143)	(0.068)	(0.041)	(0.141)
	[0.201]	[0.101]	[0.237]	[0.182]	[0.186]	[0.082]
Rearrest in 0-2 Years	-0.043	0.100	0.002	0.106	-0.085	0.191
	(0.055)	(0.105)	(0.077)	(0.153)	(0.107)	(0.432)
	[0.427]	[0.428]	[0.482]	[0.277]	[0.518]	[0.334]
Rearrest Prior to Disposition	0.156***	0.243***	0.147^{*}	0.093	0.199***	0.459
	(0.028)	(0.083)	(0.076)	(0.119)	(0.072)	(0.463)
	[0.167]	[0.225]	[0.223]	[0.179]	[0.205]	[0.139]
Rearrest After Disposition	-0.145^{***}	-0.094	-0.120	0.051	-0.182^{*}	-0.076
	(0.054)	(0.088)	(0.077)	(0.109)	(0.099)	(0.353)
	[0.317]	[0.252]	[0.325]	[0.139]	[0.372]	[0.231]
Employed in 1-2 Years	0.036	0.034	0.163^{*}	-0.061^{**}	-0.025	0.514
	(0.042)	(0.079)	(0.091)	(0.025)	(0.076)	(0.448)
	[0.481]	[0.418]	[0.425]	[0.601]	[0.396]	[0.491]
Any Income in 1-2 Years	0.117^{*}	0.104	0.145^{*}	-0.031	0.063	0.679^{*}
	(0.068)	(0.092)	(0.088)	(0.038)	(0.095)	(0.410)
	[0.509]	[0.476]	[0.455]	[0.591]	[0.481]	[0.524]
Employed in 3-4 Years	0.088	0.105	0.133	-0.061	-0.149	0.877^{*}
	(0.058)	(0.106)	(0.106)	(0.185)	(0.118)	(0.527)
	[0.458]	[0.414]	[0.408]	[0.568]	[0.385]	[0.469]
Any Income in 3-4 Years	0.067	0.159	0.027	-0.198^{**}	0.086	0.638
	(0.054)	(0.126)	(0.090)	(0.099)	(0.120)	(0.485)
	[0.493]	[0.482]	[0.458]	[0.556]	[0.473]	[0.499]
Court x Time FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Baseline Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	$227,\!837$	$193,\!228$	$115,\!473$	20,796	$72,\!950$	$34,\!482$

Appendix Table A14: Results by Crime Characteristics

Note: This table reports two-stage least squares results of the impact of pre-trial release for selected case types. The regressions are estimated on the judge sample as described in the notes to Table 1. The dependent variable is listed in each row. Two-stage least squares models instrument for pre-trial detention using a judge leniency measure that is estimated using data from other cases assigned to a bail judge in the same year following the procedure described in Section III. All specifications control for court-by-time fixed effects and baseline controls. Robust standard errors two-way clustered at the individual and judge level are reported in parentheses and the mean of the dependent variable is reported in brackets in all specifications. *** = significant at 1 percent level, ** = significant at 5 percent level, * = significant at 10 percent level.

	Black	White	Not Emp.	Employed	High SES	Low SES
-	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Any Guilty Offense	-0.092	-0.242^{***}	-0.081	-0.170^{**}	-0.206^{***}	-0.123^{***}
	(0.059)	(0.090)	(0.067)	(0.067)	(0.075)	(0.043)
	[0.574]	[0.592]	[0.550]	[0.504]	[0.525]	[0.521]
Guilty Plea	-0.120^{*}	-0.180^{**}	-0.093	-0.093	-0.231^{***}	-0.048
	(0.068)	(0.092)	(0.071)	(0.065)	(0.075)	(0.052)
	[0.383]	[0.392]	[0.325]	[0.290]	[0.295]	[0.297]
Any Incarceration	-0.040	-0.011	-0.002	-0.053	-0.064	-0.005
	(0.051)	(0.066)	(0.047)	(0.051)	(0.058)	(0.032)
	[0.280]	[0.244]	[0.233]	[0.196]	[0.198]	[0.215]
Failure to Appear in Court	0.214^{***}	0.165	0.141^{***}	0.123^{***}	0.175^{***}	0.143^{***}
	(0.049)	(0.105)	(0.053)	(0.040)	(0.035)	(0.049)
	[0.201]	[0.209]	[0.170]	[0.143]	[0.156]	[0.156]
Rearrest in 0-2 Years	-0.162^{*}	0.134	0.038	-0.053	-0.050	0.076
	(0.097)	(0.146)	(0.094)	(0.069)	(0.121)	(0.080)
	[0.491]	[0.428]	[0.491]	[0.393]	[0.371]	[0.435]
Rearrest Prior to Disposition	0.050	0.257^{**}	0.153^{**}	0.210^{***}	0.158^{**}	0.178^{***}
	(0.078)	(0.114)	(0.069)	(0.055)	(0.080)	(0.055)
	[0.194]	[0.162]	[0.212]	[0.188]	[0.168]	[0.206]
Rearrest After Disposition	-0.150^{*}	-0.049	-0.073	-0.218^{***}	-0.152	-0.069
	(0.088)	(0.107)	(0.088)	(0.064)	(0.102)	(0.075)
	[0.349]	[0.307]	[0.341]	[0.255]	[0.245]	[0.289]
Employed in 1-2 Years	0.072	0.034	0.032	0.033	-0.049	0.074
	(0.077)	(0.098)	(0.063)	(0.053)	(0.094)	(0.061)
	[0.404]	[0.444]	[0.235]	[0.690]	[0.510]	[0.444]
Any Income in 1-2 Years	0.125^{*}	0.256	0.082	0.149^{**}	0.042	0.119
	(0.075)	(0.161)	(0.088)	(0.061)	(0.086)	(0.084)
	[0.478]	[0.488]	[0.355]	[0.646]	[0.527]	[0.478]
Employed in 3-4 Years	0.013	0.008	0.090	0.101	0.110	0.129^{**}
	(0.101)	(0.147)	(0.072)	(0.082)	(0.133)	(0.054)
	[0.389]	[0.425]	[0.246]	[0.635]	[0.490]	[0.432]
Any Income in 3-4 Years	-0.018	0.364^{*}	0.082	0.158^{*}	0.081	0.124^{*}
	(0.109)	(0.204)	(0.073)	(0.083)	(0.137)	(0.075)
	[0.462]	[0.492]	[0.354]	[0.624]	[0.517]	[0.473]
Court x Time FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Baseline Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	$153,\!014$	$103,\!035$	$175,\!987$	158,956	74,200	301,256

Appendix Table A15: Results by Other Defendant Characteristics

Note: This table reports two-stage least squares results of the impact of pre-trial release for selected defendant types. The regressions are estimated on the judge sample as described in the notes to Table 1. The dependent variable is listed in each row. Two-stage least squares models instrument for pre-trial detention using a judge leniency measure that is estimated using data from other cases assigned to a bail judge in the same year following the procedure described in Section III. All specifications control for court-by-time fixed effects and baseline controls. Robust standard errors two-way clustered at the individual and judge level are reported in parentheses and the mean of the dependent variable is reported in brackets in all specifications. *** = significant at 1 percent level, ** = significant at 5 percent level, * = significant at 10 percent level.

		J	udge Leniency	7
	Sample	No	Non-Mon.	Monetary
	Mean	Conditions	Conditions	Conditions
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Released with No Conditions	0.204	0.930^{***}	-0.046^{***}	-0.009
	(0.403)	(0.012)	(0.008)	(0.014)
Released with Non-Monetary Conditions	0.121	-0.122^{***}	0.881^{***}	-0.058^{***}
	(0.327)	(0.025)	(0.032)	(0.015)
Released with Monetary Conditions	0.230	-0.181^{***}	-0.183^{***}	0.413^{***}
	(0.421)	(0.028)	(0.021)	(0.042)
Court x Time FE	—	Yes	Yes	Yes
Baseline Controls	_	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	$421,\!065$	$421,\!065$	421,065	$421,\!065$

Appendix Table A16: First Stage Results by Release Type

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Note: This table reports additional first stage results for two types of pre-trial release: release ROR with no conditions and release with conditions. The regressions are estimated on the sample as described in the notes to Table 1. The dependent variable is listed in each row. Estimates in columns 2-4 are from the same OLS specification. Judge leniency is estimated using data from other cases assigned to a bail judge in the same year following the procedure described in Section III. All specifications control for court-by-time fixed effects and baseline controls. Robust standard errors two-way clustered at the individual and judge level are reported in parentheses in all specifications. *** = significant at 1 percent level, ** = significant at 5 percent level, * = significant at 10 percent level.

	Detained	No	Non-Mon.	Monetary	No	Non-Mon.	Monetary
	Mean	Conditions	Conditions	Conditions	Conditions	Conditions	Conditions
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(9)	(2)
Any Guilty Offense	0.578	-0.075^{***}	-0.011	-0.070^{***}	-0.183^{***}	-0.166^{***}	-0.274^{**}
	(0.494)	(0.013)	(0.012)	(0.008)	(0.051)	(0.050)	(0.111)
Guilty Plea	0.441	-0.145^{***}	-0.101^{***}	-0.079^{***}	-0.168^{***}	-0.156^{***}	-0.346^{***}
	(0.497)	(0.015)	(0.009)	(0.010)	(0.057)	(0.057)	(0.125)
Any Incarceration	0.300	-0.110^{***}	-0.091^{***}	-0.107^{***}	-0.000	-0.017	-0.028
	(0.458)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.040)	(0.038)	(0.082)
Failure to Appear in Court	0.121	0.083^{***}	0.096^{***}	-0.046^{***}	0.209^{***}	0.181^{***}	0.221^{**}
	(0.326)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.012)	(0.063)	(0.060)	(0.112)
Rearrest in 0-2 Years	0.462	-0.046^{***}	0.030^{***}	-0.021^{***}	0.009	-0.011	-0.105
	(0.499)	(0.00)	(0.010)	(0.006)	(0.077)	(0.074)	(0.151)
Rearrest Prior to Disposition	0.155	0.053^{***}	0.100^{***}	0.057^{***}	0.205^{***}	0.197^{***}	0.229^{**}
	(0.362)	(0.00)	(0.012)	(0.007)	(0.048)	(0.048)	(0.102)
Rearrest After Disposition	0.343	-0.078^{***}	-0.016^{***}	-0.052^{***}	-0.135^{**}	-0.148^{**}	-0.243^{*}
	(0.475)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.068)	(0.067)	(0.137)
Employed in 1-2 Years	0.378	0.052^{***}	0.041^{***}	0.053^{***}	0.024	0.020	-0.036
	(0.485)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.061)	(0.058)	(0.129)
Any Income in 1-2 Years	0.458	0.033^{***}	0.016^{***}	0.045^{***}	0.183^{**}	0.179^{**}	0.417^{***}
	(0.498)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.076)	(0.076)	(0.157)
Employed in 3-4 Years	0.378	0.040^{***}	0.018^{***}	0.033^{***}	0.047	0.065	-0.025
	(0.485)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.084)	(0.080)	(0.178)
Any Income in 3-4 Years	0.461	0.030^{***}	0.016^{***}	0.035^{***}	0.114	0.151^{*}	0.280
	(0.498)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.094)	(0.091)	(0.220)
Court x Time FE	I	\mathbf{Yes}	$\mathbf{Y}_{\mathbf{es}}$	\mathbf{Yes}	Yes	$\mathbf{Y}_{\mathbf{es}}$	$\mathbf{Y}_{\mathbf{es}}$
Baseline Controls	Ι	\mathbf{Yes}	$\mathbf{Y}_{\mathbf{es}}$	\mathbf{Yes}	\mathbf{Yes}	\mathbf{Yes}	${ m Yes}$
Observations	186,938	421,065	421,065	421,065	421,065	421,065	421,065

Estimates in columns 2-4 are from the same OLS specification, and estimates in columns 5-7 are from the same two-stage least squares specification. All specifications control for court-by-time fixed effects and baseline controls. Robust standard errors two-way clustered at the individual and judge level are reported in parentheses. *** = significant at 1 percent level, ** = significant at 5 percent level, * = significant at 10 percent level.

Appendix Table A17: Results by Release Type

	Length	of Stay
	(1)	(2)
Judge Leniency for Bail Met	-4.810	-7.827^{**}
	(9.858)	(3.595)
Judge Leniency for Days Detained		-0.061
		(0.058)
Exclude 0 Length of Stay	Yes	No
Court x Time FE	Yes	Yes
Baseline Controls	Yes	Yes
Dep. Variable Mean	61.132	17.827
Observations	122,792	421,065

Appendix Table A18: First Stage Results for Number of Days Detained Before Trial

Note: This table reports additional first stage results for the length of stay in detention. The sample for column 1 is all defendants who are detained for one or more days before trial. The sample for column 2 is all defendants regardless of length of stay. Judge leniency is estimated using data from other cases assigned to a bail judge in the same year following the procedure described in Section III. All specifications control for court-by-time fixed effects and baseline controls. Robust standard errors two-way clustered at the individual and judge level are reported in parentheses in all specifications. *** = significant at 1 percent level, ** = significant at 5 percent level, * = significant at 10 percent level.

		1	udge Lenien	ıcy	
	Crime	Crime	Release	Release	Non-Money
	Severity	Type	14 Days	Ever	Bail
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Any Guilty Offense	-0.115^{**}	-0.163^{***}	-0.154^{***}	-0.258^{***}	-0.074^{***}
	(0.045)	(0.049)	(0.043)	(0.055)	(0.024)
Guilty Plea	-0.117^{**}	-0.137^{*}	-0.131^{**}	-0.266^{***}	-0.042
	(0.052)	(0.073)	(0.053)	(0.067)	(0.030)
Any Incarceration	0.040	-0.022	-0.011	-0.027	-0.006
	(0.035)	(0.040)	(0.032)	(0.041)	(0.016)
Failure to Appear in Court	0.116^{***}	0.146^{**}	0.173^{***}	0.241^{***}	0.082^{***}
	(0.032)	(0.059)	(0.056)	(0.068)	(0.019)
Rearrest in 0-2 Years	0.040	0.043	-0.001	0.023	0.039
	(0.062)	(0.057)	(0.069)	(0.084)	(0.039)
Rearrest Prior to Disposition	0.169^{***}	0.184^{***}	0.195^{***}	0.287^{***}	0.118^{***}
	(0.040)	(0.038)	(0.046)	(0.056)	(0.026)
Rearrest After Disposition	-0.073	-0.075	-0.144^{**}	-0.202^{***}	-0.062^{*}
	(0.054)	(0.080)	(0.059)	(0.074)	(0.034)
Employed in 1-2 Years	0.033	0.019	0.041	-0.045	0.023
	(0.030)	(0.038)	(0.050)	(0.065)	(0.019)
Any Income in 1-2 Years	0.081^{*}	0.056	0.120^{*}	0.110	0.003
	(0.043)	(0.043)	(0.068)	(0.073)	(0.025)
Employed in 3-4 Years	0.012	0.054	0.093	0.079	0.075^{**}
	(0.049)	(0.039)	(0.068)	(0.087)	(0.030)
Any Income in 3-4 Years	0.060	0.028	0.123^{*}	0.147^{*}	0.044
	(0.044)	(0.043)	(0.064)	(0.084)	(0.031)
Court x Time FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Baseline Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	$421,\!065$	$421,\!065$	$421,\!065$	$421,\!065$	421,065

Appendix Table A19: Robustness of Two-Stage Least Squares Results

Note: This table reports robustness checks of our two-stage least squares results. The regressions are estimated on the sample as described in the notes to Table 1. The dependent variable is listed in each row. Column 1 allows judge leniency to vary across felonies and misdemeanors. Column 2 allows judge leniency to vary across the 5 mutually exclusive crime types. Column 3 uses an indicator for released within 14 days of the bail hearing to calculate judge leniency. Column 4 uses an indicator for ever being released before trial to calculate judge leniency. Column 5 uses an indicator for the assignment of non-monetary bail. All specifications control for court-by-time fixed effects and baseline controls. Robust standard errors two-way clustered at the individual and judge level are reported in parentheses. *** = significant at 1 percent level, ** = significant at 5 percent level, * = significant at 10 percent level.

		Ju	dge Leniency			
	Non	Pooled	Bootstrap	Split	Scheduled	Judge
	Residualized	Years	Cluster	Sample	Judge	\mathbf{FE}
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Any Guilty Offense	-0.136^{***}	-0.185^{***}	-0.140^{***}	-0.182^{**}	-0.129^{***}	-0.190***
	(0.041)	(0.070)	(0.054)	(0.084)	(0.048)	(0.051)
Guilty Plea	-0.104^{**}	-0.120	-0.108	-0.151	-0.118^{**}	-0.162^{**}
	(0.051)	(0.080)	(0.067)	(0.094)	(0.052)	(0.066)
Any Incarceration	-0.015	-0.004	-0.012	0.011	-0.015	-0.043^{**}
	(0.030)	(0.037)	(0.038)	(0.052)	(0.031)	(0.022)
Failure to Appear in Court	0.148^{***}	0.104^{***}	0.156^{***}	0.135^{***}	0.120^{***}	0.098^{***}
	(0.044)	(0.020)	(0.048)	(0.040)	(0.045)	(0.014)
Rearrest in 0-2 Years	0.023	0.130	0.015	0.221^{*}	0.016	0.003
	(0.063)	(0.110)	(0.074)	(0.126)	(0.073)	(0.047)
Rearrest Prior to Disposition	0.176^{***}	0.175^{***}	0.189^{***}	0.198^{***}	0.190^{***}	0.116^{***}
	(0.043)	(0.054)	(0.049)	(0.065)	(0.043)	(0.033)
Rearrest After Disposition	-0.099^{*}	0.008	-0.121^{**}	0.097	-0.108^{*}	-0.076
	(0.055)	(0.105)	(0.062)	(0.133)	(0.065)	(0.050)
Employed in 1-2 Years	0.030	-0.024	0.036	-0.044	0.048	0.027
	(0.041)	(0.051)	(0.061)	(0.071)	(0.046)	(0.035)
Any Income in 1-2 Years	0.115^{*}	0.049	0.113	0.026	0.146^{**}	0.060
	(0.066)	(0.058)	(0.093)	(0.060)	(0.065)	(0.041)
Employed in 3-4 Years	0.099^{*}	0.059	0.094	0.023	0.080	0.077^{*}
	(0.057)	(0.072)	(0.078)	(0.104)	(0.065)	(0.045)
Any Income in 3-4 Years	0.121^{**}	0.083	0.107	0.115	0.121^{*}	0.041
	(0.056)	(0.060)	(0.081)	(0.089)	(0.070)	(0.047)
Court x Time FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Baseline Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	$421,\!065$	$421,\!065$	$421,\!065$	$315,\!808$	421,065	421,065

Appendix Table A20: Additional Robustness of Two-Stage Least Squares Results

Note: This table reports robustness checks of our two-stage least squares results. The regressions are estimated on the sample as described in the notes to Table 1. The dependent variable is listed in each row. Column 1 calculates judge leniency using a simple leave-out measure that does not condition on court-by-time fixed effects. Column 2 calculates judge leniency pooling cases across all years. Column 3 presents bootstrap-clustered standard errors from 500 simulations. This procedure involves sampling at the judge level, with replacement, and then generating the judge leniency measure and outcome variables within this sampled data. Column 4 calculates judge leniency using a 25 percent random subset of the data and estimates the treatment effects in the opposing subset of data. Column 5 uses the scheduled bail judge to calculate judge leniency. Column 6 uses an exhaustive set of judge fixed effects as instruments (first stage F-statistic = 3245.5). All specifications control for court-by-time fixed effects and baseline controls. Robust standard errors two-way clustered at the individual and judge level are reported in parentheses. *** = significant at 1 percent level, ** = significant at 5 percent level, * = significant at 10 percent level.

	Pre-Trial	Judge
	Release	Leniency
	$\frac{\text{Release}}{(1)}$	
Male	(1) -0.11781^{***}	(2) 0.00010
Male	(0.00716)	(0.00016)
Black	(0.00710) -0.03941^{***}	(0.00010) 0.00007
DIACK	(0.00362)	(0.00007)
Age at Bail Decision	-0.01287^{***}	-0.000017
Age at Dan Decision	(0.00236)	(0.00006)
Prior Offense in Past Year	-0.15492^{***}	0.00019
Thor Oliclise in Last Tear	(0.00739)	(0.00013)
Number of Offenses	-0.02409^{***}	-0.000012)
Number of Offenses	(0.00120)	(0.00002)
Felony Offense	-0.25575^{***}	0.00002)
relong Onense	(0.01821)	(0.00010)
Any Drug Offense	0.12528^{***}	0.00017
This Drug Onense	(0.00909)	(0.00020)
Any DUI Offense	0.10966***	0.00024
This Der onense	(0.01679)	(0.00025)
Any Violent Offense	-0.01740	0.00013
They violent offende	(0.01838)	(0.00017)
Any Property Offense	0.01097	-0.00013
ing rieperey energy	(0.01688)	(0.00017)
Matched to IRS Data	0.00868***	-0.00004
	(0.00194)	(0.00013)
Baseline Earnings	0.00113***	-0.00001^{*}
0	(0.00009)	(0.00000)
Baseline UI	0.00279***	-0.00001
	(0.00048)	(0.00002)
Baseline EITC	0.01233***	0.00002
	(0.00087)	(0.00008)
Baseline Filed Return	0.05136***	-0.00022
	(0.00387)	(0.00017)
Baseline Employed	0.02523***	0.00020
	(0.00272)	(0.00014)
Baseline Any EITC	-0.01856^{***}	0.00001
	(0.00418)	(0.00022)
Baseline Any Income	0.00000	0.00000
-	(0.00000)	(0.00000)
Baseline Any UI	0.02431***	0.00030
	(0.00363)	(0.00029)
Joint F-Test	[0.00000]	[0.71874]
Observations	421,065	421,065

Appendix Table A21: Test of Randomization with Non-Residualized Judge IV

Note: This table reports reduced form results testing the random assignment of cases to bail judges. Judge leniency is estimated using data from other cases assigned to a bail judge in the same year. Column 1 reports estimates from an OLS regression of pre-trial release on the variables listed and court-by-time fixed effects. Column 2 reports estimates from an OLS regression of judge leniency on the variables listed and court-by-time fixed effects. Robust standard errors two-way clustered at the individual and judge level are reported in parentheses. The p-value reported at the bottom of columns 1-2 is for a F-test of the joint significance of the variables listed in the rows with the standard errors two-way clustered at the individual and judge by year level. *** = significant at 1 percent level, ** = significant at 5 percent level, * = significant at 10 percent level. See the data appendix for additional details on the sample and variable construction.

		Judge L	eniency	
	First	IRS	Phl	Miami
	Case	Sample	Only	Only
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Any Guilty Offense	-0.192^{***}	-0.124^{**}	-0.116^{***}	-0.165^{**}
	(0.054)	(0.048)	(0.026)	(0.079)
Guilty Plea	-0.134^{**}	-0.098^{*}	-0.033	-0.198^{**}
	(0.062)	(0.055)	(0.041)	(0.080)
Any Incarceration	0.037	-0.025	-0.006	-0.009
	(0.034)	(0.036)	(0.029)	(0.056)
Failure to Appear in Court	0.056	0.132^{***}	0.156^{***}	0.156^{***}
	(0.080)	(0.046)	(0.046)	(0.046)
Rearrest in 0-2 Years	-0.020	-0.010	0.013	-0.002
	(0.080)	(0.060)	(0.075)	(0.104)
Rearrest Prior to Disposition	0.188^{***}	0.180^{***}	0.204^{***}	0.192^{***}
	(0.046)	(0.049)	(0.056)	(0.065)
Rearrest After Disposition	-0.171^{***}	-0.144^{***}	-0.180^{***}	-0.094
	(0.058)	(0.054)	(0.041)	(0.090)
Employed in 1-2 Years	0.084	0.036	-0.001	0.087
	(0.053)	(0.042)	(0.020)	(0.100)
Any Income in 1-2 Years	0.120^{*}	0.113^{*}	-0.028	0.357^{***}
	(0.064)	(0.064)	(0.029)	(0.130)
Employed in 3-4 Years	0.173^{***}	0.094	0.167^{***}	-0.032
	(0.066)	(0.057)	(0.040)	(0.113)
Any Income in 3-4 Years	0.214^{***}	0.107^{*}	0.072	0.175
	(0.076)	(0.056)	(0.048)	(0.135)
Court x Time FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Baseline Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	209,393	$334,\!943$	327,707	93,358

Appendix Table A22: Robustness of Two-Stage Least Squares Results to Sample Restrictions

Note: This table reports robustness checks of our two-stage least squares results across different samples. The dependent variable is listed in each row. Column 1 restricts the sample to each defendant's first observed case. Column 2 restricts the sample to cases matched to the IRS data. Column 3 restricts the sample to Philadelphia. Column 4 restricts the sample to Miami-Dade. All specifications control for court-by-time fixed effects and baseline controls. Robust standard errors two-way clustered at the individual and judge level are reported in parentheses. *** = significant at 1 percent level, ** = significant at 5 percent level, * = significant at 10 percent level.

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	Detained					
	Mean	Ŭ	DLS Results		2SLS I	2SLS Results
Panel A: Years 1-2	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(2)	(9)
Rearrested and Employed	0.120	0.010^{***}	0.003^{*}	0.011^{***}	-0.006	-0.018
	(0.325)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.027)	(0.028)
Rearrested and Not Employed	0.232	-0.054^{***}	-0.018^{***}	-0.004	0.003	0.008
	(0.422)	(0.007)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.031)	(0.030)
Not Rearrested and Employed	0.156	0.084^{***}	0.035^{***}	0.019^{***}	0.045	0.037
	(0.363)	(0.006)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.032)	(0.028)
Not Rearrested and Not Employed	0.210	-0.040^{***}	-0.020^{***}	-0.027^{***}	-0.042	-0.027
	(0.407)	(0.006)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.037)	(0.037)
Panel B: Years 3-4						
Rearrested and Employed	0.102	0.007^{***}	0.002	0.009^{***}	0.026	0.016
	(0.303)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.029)	(0.029)
Rearrested and Not Employed	0.210	-0.042^{***}	-0.010^{***}	0.001	-0.038	-0.035
	(0.408)	(0.005)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.035)	(0.035)
Not Rearrested and Employed	0.143	0.060^{***}	0.018^{***}	0.006***	0.027	0.020
	(0.350)	(0.004)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.025)	(0.025)
Not Rearrested and Not Employed	0.193	-0.025^{***}	-0.010^{***}	-0.017^{***}	-0.015	-0.001
	(0.395)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.033)	(0.035)
Court x Time FE	I	Yes	\mathbf{Yes}	$\mathbf{Y}_{\mathbf{es}}$	Yes	Yes
Baseline Controls	I	No	\mathbf{Yes}	$\mathbf{Y}_{\mathbf{es}}$	N_{O}	\mathbf{Yes}
Complier Weights	I	No	N_{O}	${ m Yes}$	No	N_{O}
Observations	144,290	334,943	334,943	334,943	334,943	334,943


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employment. The regressions are estimated on the sample as described in the notes to Table 1. The dependent variable is listed in each row. Two-stage least squares models instrument for pre-trial detention using a judge leniency measure that is estimated using data from other cases assigned to a bail judge in the same year following the procedure described in Section III. All specifications control for court-by-time fixed effects and baseline controls. Robust standard errors two-way clustered at the individual and judge level are reported in parenthese. *** = significant at 1 percent level, ** = significant at 5 percent level, * = significant at 10 percent level. rrest and Note: T

	Denaimen					
	Mean	•	OLS Results		2SLS I	2SLS Results
Panel A: Years 1-2	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(9)
Guilty and Employed	0.190	0.027^{***}	-0.003	-0.003	-0.060^{*}	-0.079^{**}
	(0.392)	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.003)	(0.035)	(0.035)
Guilty and Not Employed	0.338	-0.097^{***}	-0.048^{***}	-0.040^{***}	-0.050	-0.043
	(0.473)	(0.007)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.039)	(0.036)
Not Guilty and Employed	0.149	0.093^{***}	0.049^{***}	0.040^{***}	0.104^{**}	0.099^{***}
	(0.356)	(0.007)	(0.005)	(0.003)	(0.042)	(0.038)
Not Guilty and Not Employed	0.220	-0.023^{***}	0.003	0.004	0.006	0.023
	(0.414)	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.030)	(0.029)
Panel B: Years 3-4						
Guilty and Employed	0.140	0.009^{**}	-0.008^{**}	-0.010^{***}	-0.007	-0.019
	(0.347)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.031)	(0.030)
Guilty and Not Employed	0.240	-0.054^{***}	-0.022^{***}	-0.020^{***}	-0.013	-0.009
	(0.427)	(0.005)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.035)	(0.033)
Not Guilty and Employed	0.105	0.059^{***}	0.028^{***}	0.026^{***}	0.059^{*}	0.054^{*}
	(0.307)	(0.005)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.031)	(0.030)
Not Guilty and Not Employed	0.163	-0.013^{**}	0.002	0.004	-0.040	-0.027
	(0.369)	(0.005)	(0.003)	(0.005)	(0.028)	(0.028)
Court x Time FE	ļ	\mathbf{Yes}	\mathbf{Yes}	$\mathbf{Y}_{\mathbf{es}}$	$\mathbf{Y}_{\mathbf{es}}$	Y_{es}
Baseline Controls	I	N_{O}	\mathbf{Yes}	\mathbf{Yes}	N_{O}	Y_{es}
Complier Weights	I	N_{O}	N_{O}	\mathbf{Yes}	N_{O}	N_{O}
Observations	$144,\!290$	334,943	334,943	334,943	334,943	334,943

Appendix Table A24: Effects on Joint Probabilities of Conviction and Employment

employment. The regressions are estimated on the sample as described in the notes to Table 1. The dependent variable is listed in each row. Two-stage least squares models instrument for pre-trial detention using a judge leniency measure that is estimated using data from other cases assigned to a bail judge in the same year following the procedure described in Section III. All specifications control for court-by-time fixed effects and baseline controls. viction and Robust standard errors two-way clustered at the individual and judge level are reported in parentheses. *** = significant at 1 percent level, ** = significant is parenthese. *** = significant at 1 percent level, ** = significant at 10 percent level. Note: Thi




Appendix Figure A1: Criminal Case Process

Appendix Figure A2: Bail Guidelines in Philadelphia


> HIGH 10	10	\$3,000- \$12,000	37	\$3,700- \$12,000	38	\$6,700- \$22,500	39	\$9,000- \$75,000	40
0	y	\$2,200- \$6,700	33	\$3,700- \$8,200	34	\$4,500- \$9,700	35	\$4,500- \$12,000	36
0	Ø	\$1,500- \$4,500	29	\$3,000- \$6,700	30	\$3,700- \$7,500	31	\$4,500- \$7,500	32
<i>г</i>	/	ROR	25	ROSC 1	26	ROSC 2	27	\$3,700- \$6,700	28
essد د	٥	ROR	21	ROSC 1	22	ROSC 2	23	ROSC 2	24
Charge Seriousness	0	ROR	17	ROR	18	ROSC 2	19	ROSC 2	20
Cha	4	ROR	13	ROR	14	ROSC 1	15	ROSC 2	16
с С	c	ROR	9	ROR	10	ROSC 1	11	ROSC 1	12
	7	ROR	5	ROR	9	ROSC 1	7	ROSC 1	8
LUW <	1	ROR	1	ROR	2	ROR	3	ROSC 1	4
-	L	-	1	c	1	"	r	V	ŀ

Note: This figure illustrates the bail guidelines in Philadelphia. The guidelines classify defendants into 40 possible categories and suggest four basic types of release options. Charge seriousness ranges from one to 10, with 10 the most serious. Risk level ranges from one to four, with four the highest risk, and is based on the risk of a defendant failing to appear in court and committing new offenses. ROR is release on recognizance. ROSC is release on special conditions.




Appendix Figure A3: Distribution of Alternative Judge Leniency Measures

Note: These figures report the distribution of various judge leniency measures that are estimated using data from cases assigned to a bail judge in other dates following the procedure described in Section III.




Appendix Figure A4: Judge Leniency by Defendant and Case Characteristics

Note: These figures show the correlation between our residualized measure of judge leniency for different groups of defendants. DUI cases are only available in Philadelphia. We take the average leniency for each group over all available years of data. The solid line shows the best linear fit estimated using OLS relating each judge leniency measure.



Note: This figure reports two-stage least squares estimates and corresponding 95 percent confidence intervals for the impact of pre-trial release on the probability of having earnings above each income threshold. Two-stage least squares models instrument for pre-trial detention using a judge leniency measure that is estimated using data from other cases assigned to a bail judge in the same year following the procedure described in Section III. All specifications control for court-by-time fixed effects and baseline controls.

Appendix Figure A6: Probability of Incarceration by Days Since Bail



Note: This figure reports two-stage least squares estimates and corresponding 95 percent confidence intervals for the impact of pre-trial release on the probability of either pre- or post-disposition incarceration at different points in time after the bail hearing. Two-stage least squares models instrument for pre-trial detention using a judge leniency measure that is estimated using data from other cases assigned to a bail judge in the same year following the procedure described in Section III. All specifications control for court-by-time fixed effects and baseline controls.

Online Appendix B: Data Appendix

A. Match to the IRS Data

We match the court data to administrative tax data from the IRS using first and last name, date of birth, gender, zip code, and state of residence. Defendants were first matched to Social Security records on the basis of their date of birth, gender, and the first four letters of their last name. Duplicate matches were iteratively pruned based on (1) whether the defendant ever filed a tax return or received an information return reporting residence in the state of residence, (2) whether the first three letters of the defendant's first name matched a first name reported on a tax return or other informational return, and (3) whether the defendant's zip code matched a zip code reported with a tax return or informational return. Remaining duplicates were dropped from the sample. Because the filing of tax and information returns may be related to pre-trial release, we restrict the matching process to tax information submitted before the year of the defendant's arrest.

We are only able to match individuals who file a tax return or for whom someone else (e.g., an employer) file an information return relating to them (e.g., a W-2 relating to their employment) in any year prior to the year in which the individual first appears in the administrative court data. Thus, an individual who never files a tax return and for whom an information return is never filed will generally be excluded from our sample. The one exception to this general rule is that if a court record has only one potential match in the social security data based on date of birth, gender, and the first four letters of the individual's last name, the individual is treated as matched, even though no information from an information return or tax return is used.

Unfortunately, we cannot distinguish between records in the court data that do not match to the tax data for any of the following three reasons: (1) the individual in the court data has never filed a tax return or been formally employed; (2) the record in the court data contains a mistake; and (3) the tax return or information return contains a mistake. For example an individual's first name may have been spelled differently in the tax return than in the court record. In this case, we would not match the court record to the tax data, and we would be unable to tell whether the cause of the non-match was a spelling mistake or a history of never filing a return.

In total, our match rate in Philadelphia is 81 percent and our match rate in Miami-Dade is 73 percent. Our match rates are higher than match rates in most prior studies linking criminal court records to administrative UI records using name, date of birth, and social security number, which typically range around 60 to 70 percent (Travis, Western, and Redburn 2014). Importantly, the probability of being matched to the IRS data is not significantly related to judge leniency (see Table ??). For outcomes contained in the IRS data, we limit our estimation sample to these matched cases.

B. Data Dictionary

Judge Leniency: We calculate judge leniency as the leave-one-out mean residualized pre-trial release decisions of the assigned judge within a bail year. We use the residual pre-trial release decision after removing court-by-time fixed effects. In our main results, we define pre-trial release based on whether a defendant was released within the first three days after the bail hearing.

Release on Recognizance: An indicator for whether the defendant was released on recognizance (ROR), where the defendant secures release on the promise to return to court for his next scheduled hearing. ROR is used for offenders who show minimal risk of flight, no history of failure to appear for court proceedings, and pose no apparent threat of harm to the public.

Non-Monetary Bail: An indicator for whether the defendant was released on non-monetary bail, also known as conditional release. Non-monetary conditions include monitoring, supervision, halfway houses, and treatments of various sorts, among other options.

Monetary Bail: An indicator for whether the defendant was assigned monetary bail. Under monetary bail, a defendant is generally required to post a bail payment to secure release, typically 10 percent of the bail amount, which can be posted directly by the defendant or by sureties such as bail bondsman.

Bail Amount: Assigned monetary bail amount in thousands, set equal to missing for defendants who receive non-monetary bail or ROR.

Race: Information on defendant race is missing for the Philadelphia data prior to 2010.

Prior Offense in Past Year: An indicator for whether the defendant had been charged for a prior offense in the past year of the bail hearing within the same county, set to missing for defendants who we cannot observe for a full year prior to their bail hearing.

Number of Offenses: Total number of charged offenses.

Felony Offense: An indicator for whether the defendant is charged with a felony offense.

Misdemeanor Offense: An indicator for whether the defendant is charged with only misdemeanor offenses.

Any Guilty Offense: An indicator for whether the defendant is found guilty of any charged offense. A defendant is guilty of an offense if found guilty at trial, or if he pleads guilty or nolo contendere (no contest).

Guilty Plea: An indicator for whether the defendant pleads guilty or nolo contendere to any charged offense.

Offense Charged Down: An offense is charged down if the defendant is found not guilty, or if the highest conviction offense is less severe than the highest charged offense.

Any Incarceration: An indicator for whether the defendant receives a term of imprisonment following conviction, equal to zero if a defendant is found not guilty.

Max Days Incarcerated: Maximum days incarcerated calculated by taking the maximum prison sentence across all convicted offenses, equal to zero if a defendant is found not guilty.

Bail Modification Petition: An indicator for whether the defendant petitions for a bail modification.

Days to Case Decision: Number of days from the bail hearing to case disposition, set to missing for cases still pending.

Failure to Appear in Court: An indicator for whether the defendant fails to appear in court, as proxied by the issuance of a bench warrant.

Absconded: An indicator for whether the defendant absconded from the jurisdiction, defined as a case that is still pending but inactive, and for which the defendant failed to appear.

Rearrest: An indicator for whether the defendant was rearrested and charged in the same county at a given point in time.

New Conviction: An indicator for whether the defendant was convicted for another offense in the same county at a given point in time.

Wage Earnings: The individual's wages as reported by the employer to the IRS on Form W-2. This information is available whether or not the individual files a tax return, and is aggregated across jobs if the individual works more than one job during the year. All dollar amounts are in terms of year 2013 dollars and reported in thousands. We top- and bottom-code earnings in each year at the 99th and 1st percentiles, respectively, to reduce the influence of outliers.

Employed: An indicator for whether W-2 wages are greater than zero in a given year.

Adjusted Gross Income (AGI): Total household income from all sources (wage, interest, selfemployment, UI, etc.) as reported on the individual's tax return. This measure is only available if the individual files a tax return. For individuals who did not file a tax return, we impute adjusted gross income to equal W-2 wages + UI income. All dollar amounts are in terms of year 2013 dollars and reported in thousands. We top- and bottom-code earnings in each year at the 99th and 1st percentiles, respectively, to reduce the influence of outliers.

Any Income: An indicator for whether AGI is greater than zero in a given year.

Filed Return: An indicator for whether the individual filed a tax return in the given year.

UI Benefits: Amount of UI benefits the individual receives during the tax year, as reported to the IRS from the state UI agency. This measure is available whether the individual files a tax return or not. All dollar amounts are in terms of year 2013 dollars and reported in thousands. We top- and bottom-code earnings in each year at the 99th and 1st percentiles, respectively, to reduce the influence of outliers.

EITC Benefits: Amount of EITC claimed by the individual (and spouse if filing jointly) on his or her tax return. This measure is only available for individuals who file a tax return. All dollar amounts are in terms of year 2013 dollars and reported in thousands. We top- and bottom-code earnings in each year at the 99th and 1st percentiles, respectively, to reduce the influence of outliers.

Marriage: An indicator for whether an individual reports being married in a given year. We code this variable as missing if there is no tax return in a given year.

Mobility: An indicator for whether the zip code in the arrest data differs from the zip code on a tax return in a given year. Higher- and lower-income zip codes are defined using the IRS data. We code all mobility variables as missing if there is no tax return in a given year.

Matched to IRS data: Indicator for whether the 421,065 cases in our court data are matched to IRS data. We match the court data to administrative tax data from the IRS using first and last name, date of birth, gender, and state of residence. We were able to successfully match approximately 77 percent of individuals in the court data. Our match rate in Philadelphia is 81 percent and our match rate in Miami-Dade is 73 percent.

Missing Race: An indicator for whether defendant race is missing.

Online Appendix C: Interpreting our LATE

This section includes additional details on how we calculate the number and characteristics of defendants who are always takers, never takers, and compliers in our sample.

Overview: Following Dahl et al. (2014), we define compliers as defendants whose pre-trial release decision would have been different had their case been assigned to the most lenient instead of the most strict judge:

$$\pi_c = Pr(Released_i = 1 | Z_i = \overline{z}) - Pr(Released_i = 1 | Z_i = \underline{z}) = Pr(Released_i(\overline{z}) > Released_i(\underline{z}))$$

where \overline{z} represents the maximum value of our judge instrument (the most lenient judge) and \underline{z} represents the minimum value of our instrument (the most strict judge).

Always takers are defendants who would always be released before trial regardless of the bail judge assigned to their case. Because of the monotonicity and independence assumptions, the fraction of always takers is given by the probability of being released pre-trial for the most strict judge:

$$\pi_a = Pr(Released_i = 1 | Z_i = \underline{z}) = Pr(Released_i(\overline{z}) = Released_i(\underline{z}) = 1)$$

Finally, never takers are defendants who would never be released before trial, with the fraction of never takers given by the probability of being detained pre-trial by the most lenient judge:

$$\pi_n = Pr(Released_i = 0 | Z_i = \overline{z}) = Pr(Released_i(\overline{z}) = Released_i(\underline{z}) = 0)$$

Number of Compliers: We calculate the shares of defendants in each category by looking at the pretrial release rates for defendants assigned to the "most lenient" and "most strict" judges. Following Dahl et al. (2014), we begin by defining the "most strict" judge as the bottom 1 percentile of judge leniency and the "most lenient" judge as the top 1 percentile of judge leniency.

In the first three columns of Table C.1, we estimate a local linear regression of pre-trial release on our residualized measure of judge leniency controlling for our exhaustive court-by-time fixed effects. Under this more flexible analog to our first stage equation, we find that 13 percent of our sample are compliers, 36 percent are never takers, and 51 percent are always takers.

In the last three columns of Table C.1, we estimate our linear specification of the first stage, given by Equation (4). Under this specification, we can recover π_c as $\hat{\alpha}_1(\overline{z}-\underline{z})$, π_a as $\hat{\alpha}_0 + \hat{\alpha}_1\underline{z}$, and π_n as $1 - \hat{\alpha}_0 - \hat{\alpha}_1\overline{z}$ where $\hat{\alpha}_0$ and $\hat{\alpha}_1$ are the estimated first stage coefficients. Under this linear specification, we find that 11 percent of our sample are compliers, 39 percent are never takers, and 50 percent are always takers. We also explore the sensitivity of the estimated share of compliers, always takers, and never takers to the exact choice of cutoff for the most lenient and most strict judge. Our results are robust to the particular model specification and cutoff.

Model Specification:	Local	Linear M	odel	Line	ear Mode	el
Leniency Cutoff:	1%	1.5%	2%	1%	1.5%	2%
Compliers	0.13	0.13	0.13	0.11	0.10	0.09
Never Takers	0.36	0.36	0.36	0.39	0.39	0.40
Always Takers	0.51	0.51	0.51	0.50	0.51	0.51

Table C.1: Sample Share by Compliance Type

Characteristics of Compliers: We also characterize our population of compliers by observable characteristics, which can be recovered by calculating the fraction of compliers in different subsamples (Abadie 2003, Dahl et al. 2014). We find that compliers are significantly more likely to be charged with misdemeanor offenses and less likely to be charged with violent offenses compared to the sample average. Compliers are also somewhat more likely to have a prior offense from the past year.

	P[X = x]	P[X = x complier]	$\frac{P[X=x \text{complier}]}{P[X=x]}$
White	0.402	0.375	0.931
	(0.001)	(0.017)	(0.042)
Non-White	0.598	0.624	1.047
	(0.001)	(0.017)	(0.028)
Drug	0.274	0.301	1.099
	(0.001)	(0.015)	(0.054)
Non-Drug	0.726	0.699	0.963
	(0.001)	(0.015)	(0.020)
Violent	0.173	0.010	0.058
	(0.001)	(0.012)	(0.068)
Non-Violent	0.827	0.990	1.197
	(0.001)	(0.012)	(0.014)
Felony	0.459	0.318	0.692
	(0.001)	(0.016)	(0.036)
Misdemeanor	0.541	0.682	1.261
	(0.001)	(0.016)	(0.030)
Prior Last Year	0.269	0.310	1.154
	(0.001)	(0.013)	(0.049)
No Prior	0.731	0.690	0.943
	(0.001)	(0.013)	(0.018)
Employed	0.475	0.457	0.963
	(0.001)	(0.017)	(0.036)
Non-Employed	0.525	0.543	1.033
	(0.001)	(0.017)	(0.033)

Table C.2: Characteristics of Marginal Defendants

Note: This table presents the sample distribution, complier distribution, and relative likelihood for different subgroups. Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses are obtained using 500 replications.

Online Appendix D: Cost-Benefit Analysis

Table D.1 below presents our relevant two-stage least squares estimates and lower and upper bounds on each cost.

A. Social Benefits of Release

Direct Costs of Jail: We estimate the cost savings from jail using marginal costs of incarceration. According to Department of Corrections, the marginal daily cost of keeping someone in jail in Philadephia is \$15 (compared to an average daily cost of \$95.) According to the Miami-Dade corrections system, the average daily cost of housing an inmate in jail is \$155 (see, for example, http://www.miamiherald.com/news/local/community/miami-dade/article1985206.html). We are unable to find any estimates of the marginal daily cost in Miami-Dade, so we use the ratio between marginal and average costs in Philadelphia and assume a marginal daily cost of \$25. Combining these estimates across cities, we assume an average marginal jail cost of \$20 per day. Taking our two-stage least squares estimates on the number of days incarcerated, we find that the marginal released defendant spends 14.2 days less in jail, saving taxpayers \$204 in direct administrative costs.

Costs of Future Crime: We estimate the net impact of crime, which combines short-run incapacitation effects and medium-term criminogenic effects. To capture the fact that the social costs of crime differ across crime type, we separately estimate our net crime results by major crime type. Over the first two years after the bail hearing, the marginal released defendant is rearrested for 0.009 fewer murders, 0.004 more rapes, 0.062 more robberies, 0.066 more assaults, 0.076 more burglaries, 0.053 more thefts, 0.272 fewer drug crimes, and 0.037 more DUIs. Using the social costs by crime type compiled by Mueller-Smith (2015), we estimate a benefit to pre-trial release ranging from \$26,123 to \$70,104.

Costs of Decreased Earnings and Social Assistance: Taking our two-stage least squares estimates, the marginal released defendant earns roughly \$948 per year and has \$293 more in UI income and \$209 in EITC income, for a total average annual income gain of \$1,450, 10.1 percent of mean earnings in the sample. Following Chetty et al. (2014), we assume that the percentage gain in earnings remains constant over the working lifecycle and discount annual earnings at a 3 percent discount rate back to age 34, the mean age in the sample. Under these assumptions, the marginal released defendant gains \$29,001 over a lifetime relative to the marginal detained defendant.

B. Social Costs of Release

Failure to Appear: There are very few estimates of the costs of re-apprehending a defendant who misses a required court appearance, but we follow Abrams and Rohlfs (2011) in assuming that the cost is roughly five percent of the bail amount, or approximately \$625 in our sample, and that the cost of additional bail hearings is roughly \$560 (Bierie 2007) to equal \$1,185. Combined with our two-stage least squares estimates which find that the marginal released defendant is 15.6 percentage

points more likely to fail to appear, the expected cost of failing to appear is \$185 for the marginal released defendant.

C. Cost-Benefit Calculation

We combine our estimates of the social costs and benefits of pre-trial release with the monetary costs associated with each. Based on these assumptions, the lower-bound net benefit of release for the marginal individual is 204 + 26,123 + 29,001 - 185 = 55,143. The upper-bound net benefit is 204 + 70,104 + 29,001 - 185 = 99,124.

	2SLS Estimate	Lower Bound	Upper Bound
Panel A: Days in Jail	(1)	(2)	(3)
Days Detained Before Trial	-10.234	\$20	\$20
,	(5.398)	+ -•	, _ ·
Panel B: Future Crime (Count	ts)		
Murder	-0.009	4,301,817	\$11,559,713
	(0.008)		
Rape	0.004	\$187,680	\$343,859
	(0.007)		
Robbery	0.062	\$73,196	\$333,701
	(0.026)		
Assault	0.066	\$41,046	\$109,903
	(0.052)		
Burglary	0.076	\$50,291	\$50,291
	(0.061)		
Theft	0.053	\$9,598	\$9,974
	(0.120)		
Drug Crime	-0.272	\$2,544	\$2,544
	(0.173)		
DUI	0.037	\$25,842	\$25,842
	(0.026)		
Panel C: Earnings and Social	Assistance (T	housands)	
Earnings	0.948		
	(1.128)		
UI	0.293		
	(0.193)		
EITC	0.209		
	(0.127)		
Panel D: Failure to Appear			
Failure to Appear	0.156	\$1,185	\$1,185
	(0.046)		