

TRUMPING NORMS: LAB EVIDENCE ON AGGRESSIVE COMMUNICATION BEFORE AND
AFTER THE 2016 US PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION
BY JENNIE HUANG AND CORINNE LOW
ONLINE APPENDIX

ADDITIONAL RESULTS

Table A1 shows that individuals were more likely to play their preferred choice, \$15 for themselves, following the election, both with and without chat communication. Profit is not significantly reduced in the no chat condition, but is reduced by more than a dollar in the chat condition. Results with individual-level clustering are similar, with slightly smaller standard errors.

TABLE A1—PLAYING PREFERRED AND PROFIT WITH NO CHAT AND WITH CHAT

	Dependent variable:			
	No Chat		With Chat	
	Play Preferred	Profit	Play Preferred	Profit
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Post-Election	0.053*	0.052	0.055***	-1.077***
	(0.030)	(0.545)	(0.016)	(0.308)
Constant	0.669***	4.461***	0.557***	8.772***
	(0.018)	(0.274)	(0.010)	(0.205)
Observations	1544	1544	1544	1544
R-Squared	0.00318	0.0000179	0.00297	0.00802

Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the session level. Significance: *** 1 percent; ** 5 percent; * 10 percent.

Table A2 shows that individuals were more likely to use aggressive communication such as “Hard Commitment” and being a “Tough talker.” They are also more likely to be rated as aggressive. Additionally, individuals were less likely to offer the higher payoff to their partner, and less likely to reach an agreement. The result for being a “Friendly Negotiator” is directionally consistent, but not significant.

TABLE A2—AGGRESSIVE AND COOPERATIVE COMMUNICATION

	Dependent variable:					
	Hard	Tough	Aggressive	Offer	Friendly	Reach
	Commitment	Talker	Score	\$15	Negotiator	Agreement
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Post-Election	0.123***	0.092***	0.075**	-0.053*	-0.048	-0.097**
	(0.040)	(0.032)	(0.028)	(0.027)	(0.030)	(0.043)
Constant	0.149***	0.118***	0.242***	0.279***	0.547***	0.844***
	(0.023)	(0.017)	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.022)	(0.035)
Observations	1544	1544	1544	1544	1544	1544
R-Squared	0.0315	0.0265	0.0266	0.00509	0.00578	0.0179

Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the session level. Significance: *** 1 percent; ** 5 percent; * 10 percent.

Source: Experimental data from 36 sessions run at the Wharton Behavioral Lab in October and November 2016.

Figure A1 shows visually the changes in cooperative communication for men playing against female partners versus male partners when gender is revealed. For cooperative communication, the changes are less striking than for aggressive communication, both because the size of the post-election change is smaller, and because there also appears to be a change when playing against male partners, unlike in aggressive communication. However, for all three cooperative behaviors, we see a decrease when playing against women post-election.




FIGURE A1. COOPERATIVE COMMUNICATION (MEN ONLY)

Note: Vertical lines represent the 95 percent confidence interval.

Table A3 Panel A shows that the difference in aggressive and cooperative behavior of men playing male partners is small and not significant for almost all behaviors. On the other hand, Table A3 Panel B shows that men playing female partners are being significantly more aggressive and less cooperative after the election compared to before. For example, we see that men were 17.2 percentage points more likely to use a Hard Commitment strategy against women in the post-election, this is equivalent to a 140 percent increase in using this strategy post-election.

We now turn to reporting additional results that control for sample selection. We run regressions that control for demographics characteristics of age, being non-white, being liberal, being a US citizen, being a native English speaker, employment status, as well as gender, the partner’s gender, whether gender was revealed, and other session controls. In addition to this, we perform regressions that match on these characteristics in addition to controlling for them. In each table, the odd columns contains estimates from regressions with controls, while the even columns contain estimates from matching with controls.

Table A4 repeats the analysis in Table A1 with controls for sample selection and sample matching. The increase in playing preferred in both conditions and the decrease in profit in the chat condition remains significant.

Table A5 provides regression results for other communication behaviors besides “Hard Commitment”, comparing rates of being a “Tough Talker,” overall aggressiveness score, rates of offering \$15 and rates of reaching an agreement before and after the Trump election. Our results remain significant with both methods of controlling for sample selection.

Table A6 repeats this analysis for male subjects with female partners (when gender is revealed). In this case, everything except for “Tough Talker” remains significant when controlling for sample selection through either methodology.

TABLE A3—AGGRESSIVE AND COOPERATIVE COMMUNICATION (MEN ONLY)

Panel A: Male with Male Partners						
	Hard Commitment	Tough Talker	Aggressive Score	Offer \$15	Friendly Negotiator	Reach Agreement
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Post-Election	0.003 (0.091)	0.009 (0.079)	0.007 (0.082)	-0.057 (0.065)	-0.002 (0.077)	-0.113 (0.129)
Constant	0.269*** (0.057)	0.224*** (0.058)	0.333*** (0.049)	0.261*** (0.040)	0.456*** (0.045)	0.733*** (0.098)
Observations	174	174	174	174	174	174
R-Squared	0.0000189	0.000184	0.000145	0.00632	0.00000963	0.0169
Panel B: Male with Female Partners						
	Hard Commitment	Tough Talker	Aggressive Score	Offer \$15	Friendly Negotiator	Reach Agreement
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Post-Election	0.172*** (0.050)	0.115** (0.045)	0.107*** (0.035)	-0.095** (0.040)	-0.072* (0.035)	-0.156*** (0.048)
Constant	0.121*** (0.033)	0.098*** (0.026)	0.217*** (0.027)	0.343*** (0.030)	0.590*** (0.029)	0.910*** (0.030)
Observations	242	242	242	242	242	242
R-Squared	0.0599	0.0421	0.0485	0.0143	0.0126	0.0592

Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the session level. Significance: *** 1 percent; ** 5 percent; * 10 percent.

Table A7 demonstrates that the increase in “Hard Commitment” post-election is also robust to simply restricting the sample to only white or only liberal, to eliminate possible changes from sample variation in these characteristics post election.

Table A8 demonstrates that our results on the increase in aggressive and decrease in cooperative communication appear to be slightly stronger for lab participants who identify as conservative, although this effect is not significant.

TABLE A4—PLAYING PREFERRED AND PROFIT WITH CHAT AND WITH NO CHAT

	Dependent variable:							
	No Chat				With Chat			
	Play Preferred		Profit		Play Preferred		Profit	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Post-Election	0.058*	0.073**	-0.061	-0.071	0.053**	0.082***	-1.257***	-1.121***
	(0.030)	(0.031)	(0.449)	(0.492)	(0.021)	(0.028)	(0.333)	(0.324)
Constant	0.826***	0.308	6.481***	8.279***	0.835***	0.782**	11.222***	12.226***
	(0.147)	(0.271)	(2.051)	(2.872)	(0.150)	(0.348)	(1.058)	(2.303)
PS Match		YES		YES		YES		YES
Observations	1388	962	1388	962	1388	964	1388	964
R-Squared	0.0428	0.0508	0.0298	0.0451	0.0157	0.0193	0.0232	0.0264

Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the session level. Regressions in the full sample control for age, non-white, liberal, citizen status, employment, gender, partner gender, gender reveal, and session controls such as day of the week, time, and game period. Significance: *** 1 percent; ** 5 percent; * 10 percent.

TABLE A5—OTHER AGGRESSIVE AND COOPERATIVE COMMUNICATION

	Dependent variable:							
	Tough Talker		Aggressive Score		Offer \$15		Reach Agreement	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Post-Election	0.096***	0.102***	0.079***	0.096***	-0.053*	-0.067**	-0.113**	-0.067**
	(0.029)	(0.034)	(0.027)	(0.030)	(0.028)	(0.031)	(0.043)	(0.031)
Constant	0.065	0.235	0.214***	0.391**	0.265**	0.697***	0.983***	0.697***
	(0.098)	(0.193)	(0.069)	(0.159)	(0.124)	(0.216)	(0.102)	(0.216)
PS Match		YES		YES		YES		YES
Observations	1388	964	1388	964	1388	964	1388	964
R-Squared	0.0622	0.0686	0.0632	0.0767	0.0291	0.0295	0.0630	0.0295

Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the session level. Regressions in the full sample control for age, non-white, liberal, citizen status, employment, gender, partner gender, gender reveal, and session controls such as day of the week, time, and game period. Significance: *** 1 percent; ** 5 percent; * 10 percent.

TABLE A6—OTHER AGGRESSIVE AND COOPERATIVE COMMUNICATION (MEN WITH FEMALE PARTNERS WHEN GENDER IS REVEALED ONLY)

	Dependent variable:							
	Tough Talker		Aggressive Score		Offer \$15		Reach Agreement	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Post-Election	0.120*	0.104	0.120**	0.100*	-0.085**	-0.065*	-0.176***	-0.159***
	(0.067)	(0.078)	(0.045)	(0.053)	(0.035)	(0.037)	(0.054)	(0.049)
Constant	-0.130	-0.687**	0.088	-0.459	0.478***	1.633**	1.108***	2.221***
	(0.160)	(0.315)	(0.128)	(0.340)	(0.159)	(0.698)	(0.125)	(0.516)
PS Match		YES		YES		YES		YES
Observations	221	155	221	155	221	155	221	155
R-Squared	0.111	0.112	0.132	0.128	0.108	0.110	0.150	0.197

Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the session level. Regressions in men with female partners (when gender is revealed) subsample control for age, non-white, liberal, citizen status, employment, and session controls such as day of the week, time, and game period. all except gender, partner gender, and gender reveal. Significance: *** 1 percent; ** 5 percent; * 10 percent.

TABLE A7—USING A HARD COMMITMENT STRATEGY (WHITE/LIBERAL ONLY)

	Full Sample				Men with Female Partners			
	White Only		Liberal Only		White Only		Liberal Only	
	Hard Commitment	Hard Commitment	Hard Commitment	Hard Commitment	Hard Commitment	Hard Commitment	Hard Commitment	Hard Commitment
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Post-Election	0.161*** (0.058)	0.168*** (0.050)	0.113** (0.042)	0.117*** (0.042)	0.293*** (0.090)	0.295*** (0.081)	0.194** (0.084)	0.187* (0.103)
Constant	0.156*** (0.035)	0.513* (0.288)	0.138*** (0.022)	0.145 (0.116)	0.066 (0.038)	0.326 (0.387)	0.101*** (0.029)	0.027 (0.219)
Controls		YES		YES		YES		YES
Observations	568	568	1292	1160	89	89	194	178
R-Squared	0.0475	0.135	0.0284	0.0598	0.165	0.464	0.0806	0.128

Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the session level. Controls for regressions in the full sample include age, non-white, liberal, citizen status, employment, gender, partner gender, gender reveal, and session controls such as day of the week, time, and game period. Controls for regressions in men with female partners (when gender is revealed) subsample include for all controls except gender, partner gender, and gender reveal. Significance: *** 1 percent; ** 5 percent; * 10 percent.

TABLE A8—AGGRESSIVE AND COOPERATIVE COMMUNICATION, INTERACTION WITH “CONSERVATIVE”

	Dependent variable:					
	Hard	Tough	Aggressive	Offer	Friendly	Reach
	Commitment	Talker	Score	\$15	Negotiator	Agreement
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Post-Election	0.113** (0.042)	0.078** (0.031)	0.066** (0.027)	-0.042 (0.030)	-0.039 (0.031)	-0.079* (0.042)
Conservative × Post	0.014 (0.103)	0.047 (0.082)	0.029 (0.062)	-0.047 (0.066)	-0.017 (0.075)	-0.076 (0.055)
Conservative	0.085 (0.064)	0.047 (0.048)	0.033 (0.039)	-0.008 (0.059)	-0.070 (0.045)	-0.017 (0.041)
Constant	0.138*** (0.022)	0.112*** (0.017)	0.238*** (0.018)	0.280*** (0.019)	0.556*** (0.022)	0.846*** (0.034)
Observations	1544	1544	1544	1544	1544	1544
R-Squared	0.0413	0.0362	0.0331	0.00666	0.0144	0.0227

Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the session level. Significance: *** 1 percent; ** 5 percent; * 10 percent.

EXPERIMENTAL PROTOCOL

Protocol available in Huang, Jennie, and Corinne Low. 2017. "Men Don't Ask (Women): Benevolent Sexism in a Negotiation Experiment." Working Paper.