Tripping through Hoops: The Effect of Violating Compulsory Government Procedures Appendix

Natalia Emanuel & Helen Ho

September 8, 2023

A. Supplementary Tables

Table A.1: Sample texts in the two treatment arms for a traffic case.

	Informational Texts	Personalized Assistance Texts
2 weeks ahead	Hi NAME, Go to court on MMM DD at HH:MM PM or pay online to avoid license cancellation. Case# XXXXXXXXXX. [court website URL here]. Reply STOP to end texts Would you like information about rescheduling court dates, payment plans, or other topics? Please visit us online.	Hi NAME, Go to court on MMM DD at HH:MM PM or pay online to avoid license cancellation. Case# XXXXXXXXXX. [court website URL here]. Reply STOP to end texts Would you like information about rescheduling court dates, payment plans, or other topics? Just text back. We will reply during business hours with more info.
1 week ahead	Hi NAME, You have court on DOW MMM DD at HH:MM PM at ADDRESS. We have childcare, payment plans, and rescheduling options. Reply STOP to end texts. Your case # in STUDY SITE is XXXXXXXXXX	Hi NAME, You have court on DOW MMM DD at HH:MM PM at ADDRESS. We have childcare, payment plans, and rescheduling options. Reply STOP to end texts. Need help? Just text back! We will respond during business hours. Your case # in STUDY SITE is XXXXXXXXXX.
1 day ahead	You can resolve your case tomorrow at HH:MM PM at ADDRESS, Rm #. Show up or pay online to avoid a canceled license & fees. Your case # is XXXXXXXXXX	You can resolve your case tomorrow at HH:MM PM at ADDRESS, Rm #. Show up or pay online to avoid a cancelled license & fees. Questions? Just text back! We will respond during business hours. Your case # is XXXXXXXXXX.

Notes: SMS messages that were sent to the two treatment arms are displayed above. Each set of text messages was formatted with information specific to the defendant who received them. Only 3.27 percent of treated cases had an undeliverable message/number and 0.96 percent had a person reply saying it was the wrong number.

Table A.2: Descriptive Statistics and Covariate Balance Between Treatment Arms

ïż£		Adjusted Differences		
ïż£ ïż£	All	Control vs. Info.-Only	Control vs. Personal. Assist.	Info.-Only vs. Personal. Assist.
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
		Demographics and Income		
Female	0.366	0.005	0.003	-0.008
	[0.482]	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.008)
White	0.706	0.003	0.002	-0.003
	[0.455]	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)
Black	0.175	-0.008	-0.004	0.008
	[0.380]	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.006)
Hispanic	0.078	-0.000	-0.002	-0.002
	[0.269]	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Other Race	0.034	0.002	0.004	0.000
	[0.181]	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Age	35.048	0.418	0.168	-0.071
	[13.878]	(0.202)	(0.199)	(0.225)
Avg Inc. of Zip Code	66.287	0.369	0.440	-0.256
	[34.790]	(0.510)	(0.496)	(0.556)
		Case Characteristics		
Municipal	0.094	0.002	0.005	0.006
	[0.292]	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Traffic	0.684	0.000	0.000	0.000
	[0.465]	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Criminal	0.221	-0.002	-0.005	-0.006
	[0.415]	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Can Pay Ahead	0.254	0.002	0.007	0.007
	[0.435]	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.007)
FTA Bench Warrant	0.647	0.002	-0.014	-0.017
	[0.478]	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.007)
Num Charges on Case	2.278	0.036	-0.001	-0.032
	[1.261]	(0.019)	(0.017)	(0.019)
		Prior Court Contact		
Prior Case	0.498	0.010	0.003	0.001
	[0.500]	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.008)
Prior FTA	0.209	0.003	-0.009	-0.007
	[0.406]	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)
P-value		0.425	0.156	0.413
Observations	30870	22582	22897	16261

Notes: Column 1 presents summary statistics for the analysis sample. Dummies for court times were omitted from this table for brevity. Columns 2 through 4 display coefficients from balance tests that control for day and court building strata. We include the p-values from a joint test of significance for all of the covariates listed in the table and binaries for court times. Standard deviations are displayed in square brackets. Standard errors are displayed in parentheses and are robust to heteroskedasticity.

Table A.3: Descriptive Statistics by Phone Number Availability

	Full Sample (1)	Has Phone Number (2)	No Phone Number (3)
(A) Demographics and Income			
Female	0.368	0.366	0.369
	(0.482)	(0.482)	[0.004]
White	0.716	0.706	0.723
	(0.451)	(0.455)	[0.003]
Black	0.151	0.175	0.135
	(0.358)	(0.380)	[0.003]
Hispanic	0.080	0.078	0.081
	(0.271)	(0.269)	[0.002]
Other Race	0.046	0.034	0.054
	(0.209)	(0.181)	[0.001]
Age	35.410	35.048	35.652
	(13.315)	(13.878)	[0.099]
Avg Inc. of Zip Code	68.699	66.287	70.310
	(36.815)	(34.790)	[0.265]
(B) Case Characteristics			
Traffic	0.817	0.684	0.906
	(0.387)	(0.465)	[0.003]
Criminal	0.127	0.221	0.063
	(0.333)	(0.415)	[0.003]
Can Pay Ahead	0.456	0.254	0.590
	(0.498)	(0.435)	[0.003]
Num Charges on Case	2.088	2.278	1.961
	(1.054)	(1.261)	[0.008]
(C) Prior Court Contact			
Prior Case	0.470	0.498	0.452
	(0.499)	(0.500)	[0.004]
Prior FTA	0.173	0.209	0.149
	(0.378)	(0.406)	[0.003]
(D) Credit Data			
No credit data	0.329	0.364	0.305
	(0.470)	(0.481)	[0.003]
Fair or Higher VantageScore	0.551	0.491	0.587
	(0.497)	(0.500)	[0.005]
Observations	77114	30870	46244

Notes: We compare the subset of those with and without phone numbers in the court's database to assess the generalizability of our study sample. The sample is restricted to cases that are outstanding two weeks prior to the scheduled court date, and are not labeled as transient by the court. Standard deviations are shown in parentheses. P-values of the difference between the phone number and no phone number samples are shown in square brackets. The differences are estimated with a regression of the characteristic on having a phone number.

Table A.4: Automatic Conviction Sample Characteristics by Phone Number Availability

	Full Sample (1)	Has Phone Number (2)	No Phone Number (3)
(A) Demographics and Income			
Female	0.401	0.398	0.402
	(0.490)	(0.490)	[0.005]
White	0.744	0.736	0.746
	(0.437)	(0.441)	[0.005]
Black	0.129	0.145	0.123
	(0.335)	(0.352)	[0.004]
Hispanic	0.068	0.073	0.067
	(0.253)	(0.260)	[0.003]
Other Race	0.050	0.034	0.056
	(0.219)	(0.181)	[0.002]
Age	36.089	35.685	36.227
	(13.106)	(13.889)	[0.151]
Avg Inc. of Zip Code	72.398	70.983	72.882
	(38.412)	(36.887)	[0.415]
(B) Case Characteristics			
Traffic	0.996	0.991	0.997
	(0.065)	(0.095)	[0.001]
Criminal	0.000	0.000	0.000
	(0.005)	(0.010)	[0.000]
Can Pay Ahead	0.778	0.662	0.818
	(0.415)	(0.473)	[0.005]
Num Charges on Case	1.744	1.755	1.740
	(0.468)	(0.474)	[0.005]
(C) Prior Court Contact			
Prior Case	0.427	0.416	0.431
	(0.495)	(0.493)	[0.005]
Prior FTA	0.107	0.105	0.108
	(0.309)	(0.307)	[0.003]
(D) Credit Data			
No credit data	0.258	0.280	0.250
	(0.437)	(0.449)	[0.005]
Fair or Higher VantageScore	0.636	0.616	0.642
	(0.481)	(0.486)	[0.006]
Observations	42720	10889	31831

Notes: We compare the subset of those with and without phone numbers in the court's database to assess the generalizability of our study sample. The sample is restricted to cases where a failure to appear leads to an automatic conviction, are outstanding two weeks prior to the scheduled court date, and are not labeled as transient by the court. Standard deviations are shown in parentheses. P-values of the difference between the phone number and no phone number samples are shown in square brackets. The differences are estimated with a regression of the characteristic on having a phone number.

Table A.5: Warrant Sample Characteristics by Phone Number Availability

	Full Sample (1)	Has Phone Number (2)	No Phone Number (3)
(A) Demographics and Income			
Female	0.327	0.348	0.297
	(0.469)	(0.476)	[0.005]
White	0.683	0.690	0.673
	(0.465)	(0.462)	[0.005]
Black	0.178	0.191	0.162
	(0.383)	(0.393)	[0.004]
Hispanic	0.095	0.081	0.113
	(0.293)	(0.273)	[0.003]
Other Race	0.040	0.034	0.049
	(0.197)	(0.181)	[0.002]
Age	34.567	34.701	34.380
	(13.523)	(13.860)	[0.146]
Avg Inc. of Zip Code	64.105	63.728	64.628
	(34.177)	(33.315)	[0.377]
(B) Case Characteristics			
Traffic	0.595	0.517	0.704
	(0.491)	(0.500)	[0.005]
Criminal	0.284	0.342	0.203
	(0.451)	(0.474)	[0.005]
Can Pay Ahead	0.055	0.032	0.087
	(0.228)	(0.175)	[0.003]
Num Charges on Case	2.515	2.563	2.449
	(1.374)	(1.450)	[0.015]
(C) Prior Court Contact			
Prior Case	0.525	0.542	0.501
	(0.499)	(0.498)	[0.005]
Prior FTA	0.255	0.265	0.240
	(0.436)	(0.441)	[0.005]
(D) Credit Data			
No credit data	0.417	0.409	0.427
	(0.493)	(0.492)	[0.005]
Fair or Higher VantageScore	0.416	0.409	0.427
	(0.493)	(0.492)	[0.007]
Observations	34394	19981	14413

Notes: We compare the subset of those with and without phone numbers in the court's database to assess the generalizability of our study sample. The sample is restricted to cases where a failure to appear leads to a warrant, that are outstanding two weeks prior to the scheduled court date, and are not labeled as transient by the court. Standard deviations are shown in parentheses. P-values of the difference between the phone number and no phone number samples are shown in square brackets. The differences are estimated with a regression of the characteristic on having a phone number.

Table A.6: The Impact of Any Text Message Treatment on Case Outcomes Using Reweighted Sample

	Failure to Appear (1)	Appear in Person (2)	Pay in Advance (3)	Reschedule (4)	Payment Plan (5)	Dismissed or Not Guilty (6)
(A) Automatic Conviction Sample						
Treatment	-0.082	0.016	0.039	0.022	0.007	0.006
	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.009)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Control Mean	0.207	0.139	0.567	0.027	0.014	0.019
Observations	10836	10836	10836	10836	10836	10836
(B) Failure to Appear Warrant Sample						
Treatment	-0.063	0.038	0.002	0.033	0.007	0.006
	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Control Mean	0.216	0.624	0.022	0.043	0.095	0.095
Observations	19932	19932	19932	19932	19932	19932

Notes: This table shows the impact of the interventions on court date resolutions for our two analysis samples: those in which an FTA results in an automatic conviction and those in which an FTA results in a warrant. The sample is reweighted to match the gender, race/ethnicity, case type, court history, and credit data characteristics of the population of non-transient defendants with and without phone numbers in the court system. Estimates come from Equation 1, controlling for the covariates in Table 1, time of day of the hearing, and randomization strata. Standard errors are displayed in parentheses and are robust to heteroskedasticity. Standard errors are displayed in parentheses and are robust to heteroskedasticity.

Table A.7: Demographics and Prior Court Contact of Two-Way Text Treatment Arm by Conversation Take-Up

	Did not Initiate Conversation (1)	Initiated Conversation (2)	Adjusted Difference (3)
	Demographics and Income		
Female	0.364	0.371	0.004
	[0.481]	[0.483]	(0.011)
White	0.716	0.701	-0.016
	[0.451]	[0.458]	(0.011)
Black	0.162	0.191	0.029
	[0.368]	[0.393]	(0.009)
Hispanic	0.078	0.071	-0.006
	[0.268]	[0.258]	(0.006)
Other Race	0.037	0.033	-0.004
	[0.189]	[0.180]	(0.004)
Age	34.294	36.478	2.191
	[13.442]	[14.790]	(0.334)
Avg Inc. of Zip Code	66.444	66.391	-0.267
	[34.763]	[34.044]	(0.804)
	Prior Court Contact		
Prior Case	0.490	0.508	0.014
	(0.500)	(0.500)	[0.012]
Prior FTA	0.192	0.217	0.020
	(0.394)	(0.412)	[0.009]
	Case Characteristics		
Municipal	0.100	0.099	-0.002
	(0.299)	(0.299)	[0.006]
Traffic	0.686	0.678	0.000
	(0.464)	(0.467)	[0.000]
Criminal	0.214	0.223	0.002
	(0.410)	(0.416)	[0.006]
Can Pay Ahead	0.288	0.222	-0.061
	(0.453)	(0.416)	[0.010]
FTA Bench Warrant	0.622	0.652	0.021
	(0.485)	(0.476)	[0.010]
Num Charges on Case	2.250	2.277	0.009
	(1.073)	(1.156)	[0.025]
Observations	5055	3233	

Notes: Did not Initiate Conversation indicates a non-response or a response indicating a wrong number or opt-out. Column 3 displays coefficients from regressions of each characteristic on whether the respondent initiated a conversation. The regressions also control for day and court building strata. Standard deviations displayed in square brackets. Robust standard errors displayed in parentheses.



Figure A.1: **Effects of Information and Personalized Assistance on Case Outcomes**

Notes: We plot the effects of an informational nudge and information-plus-personalized assistance relative to the control group. Panel A shows the effects of the two treatments on FTA rates and Panel B shows how the case is resolved. The analysis controls for the variables shown in Table **??** as well as court time and court date and court building strata. Whiskers show 95% confidence intervals. The sample includes 30,759 cases.



Figure A.2: **Heterogeneous Treatment Effects**

Notes: This figure shows heterogenous treatment effects by demographic trait and prior history of failing to appear. Panel A shows the cases for which an FTA results in an automatic conviction; Panel B the cases in which an FTA results in a warrant. Baseline FTA rates among the control group are shown in parentheses. Whiskers show the 95-percent confidence intervals that are robust to heterogeneity.

Table A.8: The Impact of Any Text Message Treatment on Bond Return Court Dates

	Warrant (1)	Jail Booking by 1 Yr (2)	Bond Return Court Date by 1 Yr (3)	Bond Ret. w. Jail in Prior 28 Days by 1 Yr (4)	Bond Ret. w.out Jail in Prior 28 Days by 1 Yr (5)
(A) Failure to Appear Warrant Sample					
Treatment	-0.047	0.007	-0.021	-0.008	-0.017
	(0.006)	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.006)
Control Mean	0.289	0.142	0.171	0.073	0.118
Observations	19929	7424	7424	7424	7424
(B) Automatic Conviction Sample					
Treatment	0.001	0.000	0.002	0.001	0.002
	(0.000)	(0.005)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Control Mean	-0.000	0.020	0.001	0.001	-0.000
Observations	10883	3620	3620	3620	3620

Notes: In Columns 3-5, the bond return court date has been scheduled within 1 year after the randomization date. The outcome in Column 4 is a bond return court date that is preceded by a jail booking in the prior 28 days. The outcome in Column 5 is a bond return court date that is not preceded by a jail booking in the prior 28 days. The number of observations differ slightly from those in the main analysis due to minor coding updates. The sample used in the main analysis was deidentified for matching to credit bureau records and could not be re-merged to new outcomes on bond return court dates that were preceded by jail bookings.

Table A.9: Descriptive Statistics by Credit Score Category for the Automatic Conviction Sample

	Full Sample (1)	Fair or Higher VantageScore (2)	Poor or Lower VantageScore (3)	Unmatched to Credit Data (4)
(A) Demographics and Income				
Female	0.398	0.431	0.453	0.291
	(0.490)	(0.495)	(0.498)	(0.454)
White	0.736	0.794	0.693	0.688
	(0.441)	(0.405)	(0.461)	(0.464)
Black	0.145	0.099	0.197	0.166
	(0.352)	(0.299)	(0.398)	(0.372)
Hispanic	0.073	0.059	0.074	0.093
	(0.260)	(0.236)	(0.262)	(0.290)
Other Race	0.034	0.037	0.022	0.041
	(0.181)	(0.189)	(0.145)	(0.198)
Age	35.685	37.821	34.614	33.361
	(13.889)	(14.428)	(11.822)	(14.403)
Avg Inc. of Zip Code ($1000s)	70.983	75.526	66.298	68.409
	(36.887)	(38.455)	(34.724)	(35.585)
Estimated Income ($1000s)	–	81.312	41.367	–
	–	(64.965)	(22.463)	–
(B) Case Characteristics				
Municipal	0.009	0.004	0.011	0.015
	(0.095)	(0.066)	(0.103)	(0.122)
Traffic	0.991	0.996	0.989	0.985
	(0.095)	(0.066)	(0.103)	(0.123)
Criminal	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
	(0.010)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.018)
Can Pay Ahead	0.662	0.640	0.685	0.675
	(0.473)	(0.480)	(0.465)	(0.469)
Num Charges on Case	1.755	1.803	1.674	1.759
	(0.474)	(0.436)	(0.506)	(0.487)
(C) Prior Court Contact				
Prior Case	0.416	0.403	0.492	0.363
	(0.493)	(0.490)	(0.500)	(0.481)
Prior FTA	0.105	0.062	0.176	0.103
	(0.307)	(0.241)	(0.381)	(0.305)

Notes: This table displays descriptive statistics for cases where a failure to appear leads to an automatic conviction. Column 1 includes the full sample, Column 2 is restricted to the sample that matched to a pre-randomization credit dataset and has a fair or higher credit score. Column 3 is restricted to the sample that matched to a pre-randomization credit dataset and has a poor or lower credit score. Column 4 is restricted to the sample that did not match to a pre-randomization credit dataset. The estimated income variable is the credit bureau's estimate of the individual's income. This variable is unavailable for the sample that did not match to a pre-randomization credit dataset.

Table A.10: The Impact of Failure to Appear on Subsequent Court Contact within 1 Year for the Warrant Consequence Sample

	Warrant on Case (1)	Jail Booking by 1 Yr (2)	Bonded Out by 1 Yr (3)	New Case by 1 Yr (4)
Failure to Appear	0.655	-0.081	0.365	0.024
	(0.127)	(0.128)	(0.120)	(0.070)
Complier Mean	.321	.331	.17	.027
Observations	7448	7448	7448	7448

Notes: This table shows the effect of a failure to appear on future court contact using assignment to the interventions as an instrument for failure to appear. The sample is restricted to cases where a failure to appear leads to a bench warrant and that have a full 12 months of follow-up data available to us. The coefficient is the reduced form effect of the treatments on criminal justice outcomes scaled by the effect of the treatments on FTA. The complier means row displays means for those who were assigned to treatment and for whom treatment prevents a failure to appear. Regressions control for covariates in Table **??**, time of day of the hearing, and randomization strata. Standard errors are displayed in parentheses and are robust to heteroskedasticity.

Table A.11: The Impact of Failure to Appear on Fine and Fee Outcomes for the Automatic Conviction Consequence Sample

	Fines and Fees Paid (1)	Fines and Fees Charged (2)
(A) All Cases		
Failure to Appear	79.193	72.042
	(13.327)	(13.367)
Complier Mean	133.875	164.171
Observations	10889	10889
(B) High Credit Score		
Failure to Appear	84.547	96.013
	(18.147)	(18.480)
Complier Mean	146.983	155.536
Observations	4829	4829
(C) Low Credit Score		
Failure to Appear	52.274	44.563
	(23.845)	(24.556)
Complier Mean	134.395	180.825
Observations	3006	3006
(D) Unmatched to Credit Data		
Failure to Appear	73.127	77.497
	(25.411)	(25.510)
Complier Mean	113.222	154.225
Observations	3054	3054

Notes: This table shows the effect of a failure to appear on fines and fees charged and paid on the case using assignment to the interventions as an instrument for failure to appear. The sample is restricted to cases where a failure to appear leads to an automatic conviction and sentence. The high credit score sample is defined as those with VantageScores categorized by the credit agency as "Fair" or higher. The low credit score sample is defined as those with VantageScores categorized as "Poor" or lower. The coefficient is the reduced form effect of the treatments on criminal justice outcomes scaled by the effect of the treatments on FTA. The complier means row displays means for those who were assigned to treatment and for whom treatment prevents a failure to appear. Regressions control for covariates in Table **??**, time of day of the hearing, and randomization strata. Standard errors are displayed in parentheses and are robust to heteroskedasticity.



Figure A.3: **Percent of Fines and Fees Paid by Age of Case**

Notes: This figure plots binned means of the percent of fines and fees paid by the number of weeks between the scheduled court hearing date and August 6, 2019. The sample only includes control cases that failed to appear within the automatic conviction sample.

B. RESULTS WITHOUT COVARIATE CONTROLS

This appendix reproduces the main analyses controlling only for randomization strata and without dropping observations that are missing covariate information.

Table B.1: The Impact of Any Text Message Treatment on Case Outcomes

	Failure to Appear (1)	Appear in Person (2)	Pay in Advance (3)	Reschedule (4)	Payment Plan (5)	Dismissed or Not Guilty (6)
(A) Automatic Conviction Sample						
Treatment	-0.128	0.026	0.075	0.021	0.008	-0.001
	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.010)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Control Mean	0.209	0.168	0.528	0.029	0.015	0.021
Observations	11061	11061	11061	11061	11061	11061
(B) Failure to Appear Warrant Sample						
Treatment	-0.063	0.034	0.000	0.036	0.007	0.005
	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.005)	(0.005)
Control Mean	0.213	0.637	0.018	0.041	0.097	0.098
Observations	20311	20311	20311	20311	20311	20311

Notes: This table shows the impact of the interventions on case outcomes for our two analysis samples: those in which an FTA results in an automatic conviction and those in which an FTA results in a warrant. The regressions control for randomization strata. Standard errors are displayed in parentheses and are robust to heteroskedasticity.

Table B.2: The Impact of Failure to Appear on Fine and Fee Outcomes for the Automatic Conviction Consequence Sample

	Fines and Fees Paid (1)	Fines and Fees Charged (2)
(A) All Cases		
Failure to Appear	30.981	48.623
	(9.820)	(9.686)
Complier Mean	133.781	163.675
Observations	11061	11061
(B) Fair or Higher Vantage Score		
Failure to Appear	30.745	47.368
	(14.041)	(13.957)
Complier Mean	147.717	156.821
Observations	4899	4899
(C) Poor or Lower Vantage Score		
Failure to Appear	17.923	41.788
	(17.340)	(17.450)
Complier Mean	134.077	179.409
Observations	3048	3048
(D) Unmatched to Credit Data		
Failure to Appear	36.315	59.326
	(19.162)	(18.461)
Complier Mean	112.701	152.565
Observations	3114	3114

Notes: This table shows the effect of a failure to appear on fines and fees charged and paid on the case using assignment to the interventions as an instrument for failure to appear. The sample is restricted to cases where a failure to appear leads to an automatic conviction and sentence. The coefficient is the reduced form effect of the treatments on criminal justice outcomes scaled by the effect of the treatments on FTA. The complier means row displays means for those who were assigned to treatment and for whom treatment prevents a failure to appear. Regressions control for randomization strata. Standard errors are displayed in parentheses and are robust to heteroskedasticity.

Table B.3: The Impact of Failure to Appear on Subsequent Court Contact for the Warrant Consequence Sample

	Warrant on Case (1)	Jail Booking by 1 Yr (2)	Bonded Out by 1 Yr (3)	New Case by 1 Yr (4)
Failure to Appear	0.645	-0.191	0.344	0.024
	(0.142)	(0.160)	(0.135)	(0.077)
Complier Mean	.353	.351	.171	.028
Observations	7561	7561	7561	7561

Notes: This table shows the effect of a failure to appear on future court contact using assignment to the interventions as an instrument for failure to appear. The sample is restricted to cases where a failure to appear leads to a bench warrant and that have a full 12 months of follow-up data available to us. The coefficient is the reduced form effect of the treatments on criminal justice outcomes scaled by the effect of the treatments on FTA. The complier means row displays means for those who were assigned to treatment and for whom treatment prevents a failure to appear. Regressions control for randomization strata. Standard errors are displayed in parentheses and are robust to heteroskedasticity.