Online Appendix
for
Public Information is an Incentive for Politicians: Experimental Evidence from Delhi Elections

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Tables and Figures

Table A1—Frequency tables of ward characteristics

	Ineligible		Eligible	
Panel A: Report card experiment[a]	Low slum	High slum	Low slum	High slum
Report card control	14	12	20	26
Report card treatment	27	27	59	55

	Not survey ward		Survey ward	
Panel B: SSI experiment[b]	Low slum	High slum	Low slum	High slum
SSI control	1	1	8	46
SSI treatment		2	9	40
Not in SSI experiment	100	30	2	1

Note: [a] The report card experiment sample comprised 240 of Delhi's 272 wards. Treatment was stratified by incumbent party and geographic zone. Councilor eligibility was subsequently randomly assigned by the government. Wards with above-median slum fraction by area are "high slum".
[b] The State of Sanitation Information (SSI) experiment sample comprised the high-slum subsample of the report card experiment's 240 wards. We surveyed slums in these wards. However, due chiefly to inaccurate preliminary measurements of slum area, as well as implementation errors, the wards in the SSI experiment are identical neither to the high-slum ward subsample nor to the actual surveyed ward subsample. Consequently, we use these variables as robustness checks for each other, but we do not analyze their intersections.

Table A2—Balance table of councilor performance and constituent preferences

	(1) Roads	(2) Sewage	(3) Parks	(4) Schools	(5) Garbage	(6) Other	(7) Total
Panel: Spending (all wards)							
Treatment	−0.004	−0.005	0.007	0.004	0.001	−0.003	0.000
	(0.022)	(0.016)	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.002)	(0.013)	——
Strata (zone–party) FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Control mean	0.552	0.178	0.060	0.024	0.008	0.178	1.000
Control s.d.	0.183	0.130	0.067	0.034	0.013	0.114	0.000
Observations	240	240	240	240	240	240	240
Panel: Spending (slum survey wards)							
Treatment	−0.017	0.018	−0.003	0.001	−0.001	0.002	0.000
	(0.037)	(0.028)	(0.015)	(0.005)	(0.003)	(0.019)	——
Strata (zone–party) FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Control mean	0.542	0.187	0.073	0.019	0.008	0.171	1.000
Control s.d.	0.194	0.142	0.070	0.023	0.012	0.094	0.000
Observations	106	106	106	106	106	106	106
Panel: Slum HH preference							
Treatment	0.005	−0.014	0.001	−0.006	0.026	−0.079	−0.067
	(0.011)	(0.040)	(0.003)	(0.016)	(0.045)	(0.073)	(0.099)
Strata (zone–party) FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Control mean	0.020	0.688	0.002	0.046	0.513	1.581	2.851
Control s.d.	0.043	0.180	0.007	0.063	0.195	0.389	0.411
Observations	106	106	106	106	106	106	106

Note: Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses.
Ward-level OLS regression. "Spending (all wards)" is the fraction of total MCD councilor spending (calculated over pre-treatment period) booked for each area. "Spending (slum survey wards)" is an equivalent measure restricted to wards in which we surveyed slum households. Spending is categorized by lexical heuristic. "Slum HH preference" is the ward-mean of households in slum areas who specify each area in response to the question, "In which of the following areas have you personally faced problems in the last year?" (The total is the mean number of areas named by households.) Household responses are weighted within wards to correct for differential coverage of surveys between slums.

TABLE A3—BALANCE TABLE OF INCUMBENT ELECTORAL OUTCOMES

	2007 Election					2012 Election
	(1) Log regis- tered voters	(2) Log turnout	(3) Seat reserved for minority	(4) Number of candidates	(5) Winner's vote share	(6) Eligible for reelection
Treatment × Ineligible (2012)	−0.051 (0.047)	−0.009 (0.057)	0.072 (0.128)	−0.214 (1.162)	−0.032 (0.041)	
Treatment	−0.004 (0.032)	−0.022 (0.038)	−0.060 (0.086)	0.113 (0.767)	0.056 (0.034)	0.040 (0.067)
Ineligible (2012)	0.002 (0.038)	−0.017 (0.044)	−0.438 (0.106)	0.405 (0.948)	0.013 (0.022)	
Control mean	10.500	9.643	0.472	9.472	0.395	0.639
Control s.d.	0.168	0.198	0.503	4.121	0.097	0.484
Observations	240	240	240	240	240	240

Note: Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses.
Ward-level cross section estimated with OLS. "Treatment" indicates observations of a ward in which a report card on the performance of the MCD councilor was published in a newspaper during the 2012 pre-election period (T1 or T2, ITT). "Ineligible (2012)" indicates observations of a ward in which the incumbent councilor became ineligible to run in the same ward in the 2012 elections due to a gender (commonly) or caste (rarely) quota; this is also the dependent variable in column (6). Columns (1)–(5) are dependent variables pertaining to the immediately previous elections in 2007. "Seat reserved for minority" indicates that the seat was reserved for a woman, scheduled caste person, or both, for the 2007–12 term.

TABLE A4—ELECTORAL VARIABLES OF WARDS BY SLUM DENSITY

Variable	(1) Low slum Mean/SE	(2) High slum Mean/SE	T-test P-value (1)-(2)
Incumbent eligible	.66 (.043)	.68 (.043)	.79
Incumbent's pro-poor spending index	-.22 (.11)	.0063 (.088)	.11
Incumbent's attendance index	-.038 (.092)	.073 (.085)	.37
Incumbent runs in any ward	.38 (.044)	.42 (.045)	.51
Incumbent runs in other ward	.033 (.016)	.05 (.02)	.52
Incumbent wins in same ward	.22 (.038)	.19 (.036)	.63
Incumbent's vote share in same ward	.13 (.019)	.13 (.017)	.76
Incumbent's party wins in same ward	.5 (.046)	.54 (.046)	.52
Incumbent's party's vote share in same ward	.37 (.016)	.37 (.012)	.94
Voter turnout	.54 (.006)	.54 (.0047)	.67
Voter registration	42129 (1036)	41168 (814)	.47
N	120	120	

Note: Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses.
Ward-level cross section. Wards are classified as "low slum" if they have below-median slum fraction by area, and "high slum" otherwise. "Pro-poor Spending Index" is the mean z-score of three log preference-weighted spending amounts (2007–11), analogous to the dependent variable in Table 1, columns 4–6, for the pre-publication period. "Attendance Index" is overall councilor attendance at MCD committees of which they are a member (2007–11). All other variables pertain to 2012 MCD elections. "Eligible" indicates observations of a ward in which the incumbent councilor was not rendered ineligible to run in the same ward in the 2012 elections due to a gender or caste quota. "Vote share in same ward" is set to zero if the incumbent does not rerun in that ward.

TABLE A5—IMPACT OF REPORT CARD ON COUNCILOR PERFORMANCE INDEX COMPONENTS BY SLUM DENSITY

	Pro-poor spending index (2010–12)	Spending index components			Directly elicited spending index (2010–12)	Spending index components		Attendance index (2010–12)	Attendance index components	
	(1)	(2) Biggest problem	(3) Problem for individual	(4) Problem for community	(5)	(6) Should spend more	(7) Should spend less	(8)	(9) Assembly	(10) Committees
Treatment × High slum	0.675	1.543	1.390	1.419	0.497	0.581	0.196	0.253	0.043	0.029
	(0.280)	(0.613)	(0.592)	(0.601)	(0.200)	(0.248)	(0.197)	(0.195)	(0.033)	(0.038)
Treatment	−0.349	−0.764	−0.737	−0.747	−0.270	−0.344	−0.109	−0.098	−0.023	−0.003
	(0.189)	(0.411)	(0.400)	(0.407)	(0.142)	(0.176)	(0.157)	(0.144)	(0.023)	(0.029)
High slum	−0.292	−0.670	−0.601	−0.610	−0.204	−0.316	−0.101	−0.093	−0.020	−0.001
	(0.244)	(0.534)	(0.516)	(0.524)	(0.172)	(0.219)	(0.172)	(0.162)	(0.028)	(0.032)
Pre-treat outcome control	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Strata (zone–party) FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Pre-treat control mean	−0.000	3.152	6.442	6.363	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.816	0.654
Pre-treat control s.d.	1.000	2.208	2.099	2.134	1.000	1.000	1.000	0.893	0.125	0.187
p-value: $T \times High + T = 0$	0.096	0.070	0.115	0.110	0.090	0.155	0.466	0.249	0.390	0.321
Observations	240	240	240	240	240	240	240	240	236	240

Note: Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses.

Ward-level OLS regression. The pro-poor spending index is the mean z-score of log spending on issues, with each issue weighted by the fraction of slum households in the city reporting that (1) it is the most problematic in the area, (2) it is a problem for them, and (3) it is a problem for the community. The directly elicited spending index is the z-score of the inverse hyperbolic sine of spending on issues, with each issue weighted by the fraction of slum households in the city reporting that their councilor should spend more on it minus the fraction reporting that they should spend less on it. The directly elicited spending index components are reported as the z-scores of the inverse hyperbolic sines of spending on issues, weighted with "should spend more" and "should spend less" (the latter with flipped sign). The attendance index is the mean z-score of councilor attendance at (1) the general assembly and (2) councilor committee meetings. "Treatment" indicates observations of a ward in which a report card on the performance of the MCD councilor was published in a newspaper during the 2012 pre-election period (T1 or T2, ITT). "High slum" indicates wards with above-median slum fraction by area. An unshown variable indicates twelve wards where slum area was estimated with an alternative method.

TABLE A6—IMPACT OF REPORT CARD ON INCUMBENT'S DISCRETIONARY FUND ALLOCATION BY SLUM DENSITY

	Log spending...					
	(1) ...total	(2) ...on sewage	(3) ...on garbage	(4) ...on schools	(5) ...on roads	(6) ...on parks
Treatment × High slum	−0.015	0.698	0.046	−0.481	−0.022	0.105
	(0.076)	(0.392)	(0.115)	(0.308)	(0.147)	(0.456)
Treatment	0.011	−0.359	−0.095	0.145	−0.042	0.380
	(0.061)	(0.271)	(0.080)	(0.212)	(0.109)	(0.333)
High slum	−0.033	−0.188	0.020	0.402	−0.010	−0.016
	(0.069)	(0.338)	(0.099)	(0.260)	(0.124)	(0.397)
Pre-treat spending control	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Strata (zone–party) FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Control mean	4.552	1.961	0.131	−0.003	3.876	0.592
Control s.d.	0.243	1.394	0.442	1.112	0.493	1.701
p-value: $T \times High + T = 0$	0.938	0.209	0.527	0.129	0.515	0.124
Observations	240	240	240	240	240	240

Note: Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses.
Ward-level OLS regression. "Treatment" indicates observations of a ward in which a report card on the performance of the MCD councilor was published in a newspaper during the 2012 pre-election period (T1 or T2, ITT). "High slum" indicates wards with above-median slum fraction by area. An unshown variable indicates twelve wards where slum area was estimated with an alternative method. Amount of spending is in lakh rupees. Spending is categorized by lexical heuristic.

TABLE A7—IMPACT OF REPORT CARD ON COUNCILOR PERFORMANCE BY SLUM DENSITY: DIRECTLY ELICITED SPENDING INDEX

	Directly elicited spending index (2010–12)	
	(1)	(2)
Treatment × High slum		0.497
		(0.200)
Treatment	−0.020	−0.270
	(0.096)	(0.142)
High slum		−0.204
		(0.172)
Pre-treat outcome control	Yes	Yes
Strata (zone–party) FE	Yes	Yes
Pre-treat control mean	0.000	0.000
Pre-treat control s.d.	1.000	1.000
p-value: $T \times High + T = 0$		0.090
Observations	240	240

Note: Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses.
Ward-level OLS regression. The directly elicited spending index is the z-score of the inverse hyperbolic sine of spending on issues, with each issue weighted by the fraction of slum households in the city reporting that their councilor should spend more on it minus the fraction reporting that they should spend less on it. "Treatment" indicates observations of a ward in which a report card on the performance of the MCD councilor was published in a newspaper during the 2012 pre-election period (T1 or T2, ITT). "High slum" indicates wards with above-median slum fraction by area. An unshown variable indicates twelve wards where slum area was estimated with an alternative method. Spending is categorized by lexical heuristic.

TABLE A8—IMPACT OF REPORT CARD ON COUNCILOR PERFORMANCE BY SLUM DENSITY, WITHOUT WARDS CLASSIFIED AS HIGH/LOW SLUM BY ALTERNATIVE METHOD

	Log total spending (2010–12)		Pro-poor spending index (2010–12)		Slum-RWA difference spending index (2010–12)		Attendance index (2010–12)	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Treatment × High slum		−0.059 (0.074)		0.656 (0.291)		0.440 (0.153)		0.285 (0.197)
Treatment	0.026 (0.038)	0.055 (0.056)	0.007 (0.138)	−0.325 (0.198)	−0.059 (0.077)	−0.286 (0.112)	−0.028 (0.102)	−0.173 (0.146)
High slum		0.007 (0.065)		−0.275 (0.252)		−0.227 (0.133)		−0.124 (0.164)
Pre-treat outcome control	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Strata (zone–party) FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Pre-treat control mean	5.721	5.721	0.019	0.019	−0.017	−0.017	−0.004	−0.004
Pre-treat control s.d.	0.109	0.109	0.923	0.923	0.987	0.987	0.912	0.912
p-value: $T \times High + T = 0$		0.947		0.105		0.134		0.409
Observations	227	227	227	227	227	227	227	227

Note: Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses.
Ward-level OLS regression. The pro-poor spending index is the mean z-score of log spending on issues, with each issue weighted by the fraction of slum households in the city reporting that (1) it is the most problematic in the area, (2) it is a problem for them, and (3) it is a problem for the community. The slum-RWA difference spending index is the z-score of the inverse hyperbolic sine of spending on issues, with each issue weighted by the fraction of slum households in the city reporting that it is a problem for them minus the fraction of RWAs in the city reporting that it is their highest priority issue. The attendance index is the mean z-score of councilor attendance at (1) the general assembly and (2) councilor committee meetings. "Treatment" indicates observations of a ward in which a report card on the performance of the MCD councilor was published in a newspaper during the 2012 pre-election period (T1 or T2, ITT). "High slum" indicates wards with above-median slum fraction by area. Spending is categorized by lexical heuristic.

Table A9—Impact of report card on councilor performance by ward survey status

	Log total spending (2010–12)		Pro-poor spending index (2010–12)		Slum-RWA difference spending index (2010–12)		Attendance index (2010–12)	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Treatment × Survey ward		−0.006 (0.080)		0.529 (0.281)		0.350 (0.159)		0.025 (0.211)
Treatment	0.005 (0.040)	0.006 (0.063)	−0.010 (0.133)	−0.234 (0.194)	−0.046 (0.076)	−0.192 (0.113)	0.030 (0.100)	0.025 (0.144)
Survey ward		−0.008 (0.068)		−0.084 (0.240)		−0.048 (0.135)		0.039 (0.170)
Pre-treat outcome control	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Strata (zone–party) FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Post-treat control mean	4.552	4.552	−1.854	−1.854	0.306	0.306	−0.394	−0.394
Post-treat control s.d.	0.243	0.243	1.053	1.053	0.603	0.603	1.162	1.162
p-value: $T \times Svy + T = 0$		0.999		0.130		0.135		0.734
Observations	240	240	240	240	240	240	240	240

Note: Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses.
Ward-level OLS regression. The pro-poor spending index is the mean z-score of log spending on issues, with each issue weighted by the fraction of slum households in the city reporting that (1) it is the most problematic in the area, (2) it is a problem for them, and (3) it is a problem for the community. The slum-RWA difference spending index is the z-score of the inverse hyperbolic sine of spending on issues, with each issue weighted by the fraction of slum households in the city reporting that it is a problem for them minus the fraction of RWAs in the city reporting that it is their highest priority issue. The attendance index is the mean z-score of councilor attendance at (1) the general assembly and (2) councilor committee meetings. "Treatment" indicates observations of a ward in which a report card on the performance of the MCD councilor was published in a newspaper during the 2012 pre-election period (T1 or T2, ITT). Spending is categorized by lexical heuristic.

Table A10—Impact of report card treatment arm on councilor performance by slum density

	Log total spending (2010–12)		Pro-poor spending index (2010–2012)		Slum-RWA difference spending index (2010–2012)		Attendance index (2010–12)	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
T1: 2012 report (ITT) × High slum		−0.055 (0.100)		0.560 (0.366)		0.389 (0.290)		−0.029 (0.234)
T2: 2010/12 reports (ITT) × High slum		0.016 (0.084)		0.745 (0.290)		0.670 (0.236)		0.404 (0.220)
T1: 2012 report (ITT)	0.072 (0.054)	0.095 (0.076)	0.018 (0.162)	−0.244 (0.227)	−0.027 (0.131)	−0.212 (0.187)	0.037 (0.115)	0.044 (0.157)
T2: 2010/12 reports (ITT)	−0.031 (0.042)	−0.040 (0.067)	−0.024 (0.143)	−0.414 (0.198)	−0.061 (0.116)	−0.413 (0.167)	0.026 (0.112)	−0.187 (0.171)
High slum		−0.034 (0.069)		−0.296 (0.245)		−0.258 (0.196)		−0.100 (0.164)
Pre-treat outcome control	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Strata (zone–party) FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
p-value: $T1 \times High + T1 = T2 \times High + T2$		0.333		0.945		0.675		0.170
p-value: $T1 = T2$	0.042	0.072	0.772	0.361	0.772	0.184	0.923	0.174
Observations	240	240	240	240	240	240	240	240

Note: Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses.
Ward-level OLS regression. The pro-poor spending index is the mean z-score of log spending on issues, with each issue weighted by the fraction of slum households in the city reporting that (1) it is the most problematic in the area, (2) it is a problem for them, and (3) it is a problem for the community. The slum-RWA difference spending index is the z-score of the inverse hyperbolic sine of spending on issues, with each issue weighted by the fraction of slum households in the city reporting that it is a problem for them minus the fraction of RWAs in the city reporting that it is their highest priority issue. The attendance index is the mean z-score of councilor attendance at (1) the general assembly and (2) councilor committee meetings. "High slum" indicates wards with above-median slum fraction by area. An unshown variable indicates twelve wards where slum area was estimated with an alternative method. Spending is categorized by lexical heuristic.

TABLE A11—IMPACT OF REPORT CARD ON COUNCILOR PERFORMANCE BY SLUM DENSITY AND COUNCILOR ELIGIBILITY

	Log total spending (2010–12)	Pro-poor spending index (2010–12)	Slum-RWA difference spending index (2010–12)	Attendance index (2010–12)
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Treatment × High slum	−0.041	0.783	0.493	−0.047
	(0.109)	(0.356)	(0.190)	(0.233)
Treatment	−0.013	−0.407	−0.240	0.159
	(0.092)	(0.254)	(0.144)	(0.174)
Ineligible × Treatment × High slum	0.090	−0.362	−0.377	0.815
	(0.179)	(0.591)	(0.344)	(0.490)
Ineligible × Treatment	0.072	0.195	0.025	−0.697
	(0.134)	(0.396)	(0.253)	(0.366)
Remaining Interactions	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Pre-treat outcome control	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Strata (zone–party) FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Pre-treat control mean	5.709	0.000	0.000	0.000
Pre-treat control s.d.	0.157	1.000	1.000	0.893
Observations	240	240	240	240

Note: Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses.
Ward-level OLS regression. The pro-poor spending index is the mean z-score of log spending on issues, with each issue weighted by the fraction of slum households in the city reporting that (1) it is the most problematic in the area, (2) it is a problem for them, and (3) it is a problem for the community. The slum-RWA difference spending index is the z-score of the inverse hyperbolic sine of spending on issues, with each issue weighted by the fraction of slum households in the city reporting that it is a problem for them minus the fraction of RWAs in the city reporting that it is their highest priority issue. The attendance index is the mean z-score of councilor attendance at (1) the general assembly and (2) councilor committee meetings. "Treatment" indicates observations of a ward in which a report card on the performance of the MCD councilor was published in a newspaper during the 2012 pre-election period (T1 or T2, ITT). "High slum" indicates wards with above-median slum fraction by area. An unshown variable indicates twelve wards where slum area was estimated with an alternative method. Spending is categorized by lexical heuristic.

TABLE A12—IMPACT OF PRIVATE INFORMATION ON PUBLIC SERVICES: SPILLOVERS AND INDEX COMPONENTS

	Drains outcomes			Toilet availability index	Toilet availability index components			Garbage collection index	Garbage collection index components	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
	Total drains	Drains with proper disposing (%)	Drains clogged (%)		Log total toilets	Log open toilets	Log adult toilet users (#)		Formal piles regularly collected (%)	Informal piles recently collected (%)
SSI treatment	−0.032 (0.069)	−0.087 (0.052)	−0.048 (0.133)							
Post × SSI treatment				−0.048 (0.031)	−0.010 (0.026)	−0.043 (0.024)	−0.091 (0.067)	−0.055 (0.042)	−0.004 (0.089)	−0.038 (0.044)
Post				0.052 (0.023)	0.041 (0.020)	0.044 (0.020)	0.071 (0.050)	0.332 (0.028)	−0.054 (0.065)	0.416 (0.026)
Ward FE	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Control mean	0.271	0.136	0.500							
Baseline control mean				0.935	0.723	0.517	1.566	0.256	0.304	0.253
Slums in sample	311	66	66	312	312	312	312	309	110	307
Observations	620	132	132	932	932	932	932	894	328	867

Note: Standard errors clustered by ward in parentheses.
Slum-level OLS regression. "SSI treatment" indicates observations in a slum of which the MCD councilor received State of Sanitation Information (ITT). "Post" indicates observations that took place in the second or third round of audits. "Total drains" is the number of drains in the slum. "Drains with proper disposing (%)" is the fraction of drains from which extracted garbage was taken to a formal garbage pile or to a landfill, rather than left by the drain or burned. "Drains clogged (%)" is the fraction of drains which are so clogged with trash at any point that the water is not visible. "Toilet availability index" is the mean z-score of log total toilets, log open toilets, and log adult toilet users, with first percentile values imputed for zeroes. "Log total toilets" is the log of the number of toilets in the slum. "Log open toilets" is the log of the number of open (i.e. not locked shut) toilets in the slum. "Log adult toilet users" is the log of the mean number of adults who used each toilet in a randomly chosen 15 minute interval between 3–5 PM. "Garbage collection index" is the mean of the fraction of formal piles in the slum regularly collected, relative to the number of formal piles at the baseline, and the fraction of informal garbage piles in the slum collected in the past week. The sample is restricted to slums with one or more garbage piles. "Formal piles regularly collected" is the fraction of formal piles in the slum regularly collected, relative to the number of formal piles at the baseline. "Informal piles recently collected" is the fraction of informal piles in the slum recently collected, relative to the number of informal piles at the baseline.

TABLE A13—IMPACT OF REPORT CARD PUBLICATION ON INCUMBENT RECONTESTING, BY TREATMENT ARM

	Eligible incumbent runs in same ward		Incumbent runs in other ward					Incumbent runs in other ward controlled by party	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6) *from* high-slum ward	(7) *from* low-slum ward	(8) *to* high-slum ward	(9) *to* low-slum ward
T1: 2012 report (ITT)	0.016 (0.115) [0.895]	0.010 (0.123) [0.936]	0.035 (0.032) [0.391]	−0.017 (0.019) [0.563]	−0.021 (0.021) [0.425]	0.040 (0.036) [0.590]	−0.014 (0.044) [0.589]	0.043 (0.035) [0.475]	−0.010 (0.027) [0.580]
T2: 2010/12 reports (ITT)	0.093 (0.093) [0.316]	0.096 (0.095) [0.322]	0.041 (0.025) [0.190]	−0.009 (0.021) [0.735]	−0.011 (0.023) [0.605]	0.061 (0.052) [0.224]	−0.028 (0.042) [0.205]	0.068 (0.046) [0.132]	−0.034 (0.031) [0.044]
T1: 2012 report (ITT) × Ineligible				0.144 (0.086) [0.156]	0.150 (0.097) [0.155]	0.175 (0.165) [0.352]	0.007 (0.077) [0.968]	0.076 (0.118) [0.683]	0.028 (0.063) [0.770]
T2: 2010/12 reports (ITT) × Ineligible				0.166 (0.070) [0.053]	0.162 (0.074) [0.070]	0.007 (0.103) [0.968]	0.263 (0.108) [0.067]	0.128 (0.117) [0.400]	0.107 (0.091) [0.209]
T1: 2012 report (ITT) × … …Pro-poor Spending Index		−0.069 (0.117) [0.539]			−0.040 (0.036) [0.308]	−0.127 (0.088) [0.220]	−0.001 (0.037) [0.956]	−0.010 (0.034) [0.854]	0.011 (0.025) [0.517]
T2: 2010/12 reports (ITT) × … …Pro-poor Spending Index		−0.011 (0.112) [0.911]			−0.053 (0.035) [0.047]	−0.161 (0.092) [0.017]	0.006 (0.035) [0.774]	−0.045 (0.047) [0.378]	0.003 (0.027) [0.847]
T1: 2012 report (ITT) × … …Attendance Index		−0.018 (0.125) [0.890]			−0.027 (0.020) [0.178]	−0.112 (0.062) [0.117]	−0.011 (0.037) [0.676]	−0.045 (0.041) [0.376]	−0.028 (0.025) [0.139]
T2: 2010/12 reports (ITT) × … …Attendance Index		−0.039 (0.100) [0.713]			−0.009 (0.021) [0.564]	−0.087 (0.060) [0.082]	0.008 (0.039) [0.684]	−0.045 (0.040) [0.247]	−0.022 (0.023) [0.095]
T1: 2012 report (ITT) × Ineligible × … …Pro-poor Spending Index					0.144 (0.072) [0.176]	0.288 (0.173) [0.183]	0.109 (0.109) [0.525]	0.163 (0.128) [0.437]	0.134 (0.093) [0.346]
T2: 2010/12 reports (ITT) × Ineligible × … …Pro-poor Spending Index					0.110 (0.078) [0.201]	0.449 (0.193) [0.010]	−0.009 (0.081) [0.947]	0.221 (0.191) [0.265]	0.017 (0.046) [0.911]
T1: 2012 report (ITT) × Ineligible × … …Attendance Index					0.090 (0.173) [0.508]	0.147 (0.271) [0.596]	0.153 (0.183) [0.457]	0.340 (0.218) [0.114]	0.175 (0.136) [0.081]
T2: 2010/12 reports (ITT) × Ineligible × … …Attendance Index					−0.031 (0.063) [0.759]	0.164 (0.087) [0.366]	−0.260 (0.128) [0.147]	0.070 (0.073) [0.673]	−0.006 (0.046) [0.955]
Additional Interactions	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Strata (zone–party) FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Ineligible control mean			0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Eligible control mean	0.457	0.457	0.0217	0.0217	0.0217	0.0385	0	0.0385	0
p-value: $T1 + T1 \times I + T1 \times I \times PPSI = 0$					0.0452	0.111	0.360	0.213	0.207
p-value: $T1 + T1 \times I + T1 \times I \times AI = 0$					0.195	0.326	0.413	0.133	0.200
p-value: $T2 + T2 \times I + T2 \times I \times PPSI = 0$					0.0296	0.0475	0.0873	0.0928	0.312
p-value: $T2 + T2 \times I + T2 \times I \times AI = 0$					0.181	0.116	0.806	0.0739	0.456
Observations	160	160	240	240	240	119	121	120	120

Note: Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses.
Councilor-level cross section estimated with OLS and with randomization inference (10,000 repetitions). Robust standard errors in parentheses. Randomization inference *p*-values in brackets. Randomization strata are fixed. "Attendance Index" is the mean *z*-score of two attendance measures (2007–11), analogous to the dependent variable in Table 1, columns 7–8, for the pre-treatment period. "Pro-poor Spending Index" is the mean *z*-score of three log preference-weighted spending amounts (2007–11), analogous to the dependent variable in Table 1, columns 3–4, for the pre-publication period. "Additional interactions" are "Ineligible", "Pro-Poor Spending Index", "Ineligible × Pro-Poor Spending Index", "Attendance Index", and "Ineligible × Attendance Index". $T1 + T1 \times I + T1 \times I \times PPSI = 0$ is the net T1 treatment effect for an ineligible incumbent with a Pro-Poor Spending Index one standard deviation above average and an average Attendance Index. $T1 + T1 \times I + T1 \times I \times AI = 0$ is the symmetrical effect for attendance.

Table A14—Impact of report card publication on incumbent recontesting using strictly pre-treatment performance

	Eligible incumbent runs in same ward		Incumbent runs in other ward					Incumbent runs in other ward controlled by party	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6) *from* high-slum ward	(7) *from* low-slum ward	(8) *to* high-slum ward	(9) *to* low-slum ward
Treatment	0.069	0.074	0.039	−0.012	−0.014	0.041	−0.014	0.058	−0.019
	(0.089)	(0.089)	(0.022)	(0.019)	(0.020)	(0.039)	(0.036)	(0.038)	(0.027)
	[0.374]	[0.415]	[0.186]	[0.637]	[0.492]	[0.468]	[0.474]	[0.228]	[0.210]
Treatment × Ineligible				0.156	0.170	0.092	0.224	0.131	0.088
				(0.056)	(0.060)	(0.106)	(0.092)	(0.103)	(0.065)
				[0.048]	[0.038]	[0.564]	[0.081]	[0.369]	[0.248]
Treatment × … …Pro-poor Spending Index		−0.085			−0.032	−0.101	−0.008	−0.002	−0.002
		(0.105)			(0.026)	(0.066)	(0.027)	(0.029)	(0.020)
		[0.330]			[0.170]	[0.058]	[0.664]	[0.959]	[0.881]
Treatment × … …Attendance Index		−0.008			−0.019	−0.088	0.016	−0.059	−0.012
		(0.096)			(0.022)	(0.064)	(0.030)	(0.044)	(0.015)
		[0.937]			[0.291]	[0.137]	[0.402]	[0.176]	[0.308]
Treatment × Ineligible × … …Pro-poor Spending Index					0.125	0.237	0.079	0.137	0.084
					(0.051)	(0.111)	(0.075)	(0.089)	(0.067)
					[0.058]	[0.065]	[0.487]	[0.323]	[0.374]
Treatment × Ineligible × … …Attendance Index					−0.001	0.138	−0.196	0.124	0.056
					(0.076)	(0.108)	(0.145)	(0.090)	(0.079)
					[0.991]	[0.382]	[0.248]	[0.435]	[0.620]
Additional Interactions	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Strata (zone–party) FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Ineligible control mean			0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Eligible control mean	0.457	0.457	0.0217	0.0217	0.0217	0.0385	0	0	0
p-value: $T + T \times I + T \times I \times PPSI = 0$					0.00343	0.0607	0.0268	0.0668	0.158
p-value: $T + T \times I + T \times I \times AI = 0$					0.105	0.136	0.902	0.0663	0.227
Observations	160	160	240	240	240	119	121	120	120

Note: Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses. Councilor-level cross section estimated with OLS and with randomization inference (10,000 repetitions). Robust standard errors in parentheses. Randomization inference p-values in brackets. Randomization strata are fixed. "Attendance Index" is the mean z-score of two attendance measures (2007–10), analogous to the dependent variable in Table 1, columns 7–8, for the pre-treatment period. "Pro-poor Spending Index" is the mean z-score of three log preference-weighted spending amounts (2007–10), analogous to the dependent variable in Table 1, columns 3–4, for the pre-treatment period. "Additional interactions" are "Ineligible", "Pro-Poor Spending Index", "Ineligible × Pro-Poor Spending Index", "Attendance Index", and "Ineligible × Attendance Index". $T + T \times I + T \times I \times PPSI = 0$ is the net treatment effect for an ineligible incumbent with a Pro-Poor Spending Index one standard deviation above average and an average Attendance Index. $T + T \times I + T \times I \times AI = 0$ is the symmetrical effect for attendance.

TABLE A15—IMPACT OF REPORT CARD PUBLICATION ON INCUMBENT VOTE SHARE, BY TREATMENT ARM

	Incumbent's party's vote share in same ward			Incumbent's vote share (0 if didn't run)		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
T1: 2012 report (ITT)	0.009 (0.025) [0.715]	0.013 (0.031) [0.677]	0.007 (0.035) [0.834]	0.042 (0.034) [0.222]	0.042 (0.048) [0.349]	0.040 (0.052) [0.392]
T2: 2010/12 reports (ITT)	−0.008 (0.020) [0.689]	−0.007 (0.023) [0.803]	−0.010 (0.024) [0.718]	0.050 (0.029) [0.099]	0.028 (0.037) [0.465]	0.028 (0.038) [0.496]
T1: 2012 report (ITT) × Ineligible		−0.010 (0.057) [0.855]	0.002 (0.059) [0.967]		0.008 (0.059) [0.890]	0.014 (0.062) [0.832]
T2: 2010/12 reports (ITT) × Ineligible		0.003 (0.043) [0.952]	0.012 (0.042) [0.811]		0.032 (0.055) [0.538]	0.042 (0.058) [0.445]
T1: 2012 report (ITT) × … …Pro-poor Spending Index			−0.011 (0.028) [0.701]			−0.033 (0.046) [0.472]
T2: 2010/12 reports (ITT) × … …Pro-poor Spending Index			−0.020 (0.026) [0.393]			−0.037 (0.040) [0.344]
T1: 2012 report (ITT) × … …Attendance Index			0.018 (0.032) [0.646]			−0.013 (0.046) [0.801]
T2: 2010/12 reports (ITT) × … …Attendance Index			0.026 (0.024) [0.421]			0.014 (0.036) [0.751]
T1: 2012 report (ITT) × Ineligible × … …Pro-poor Spending Index			0.085 (0.048) [0.155]			0.098 (0.052) [0.118]
T2: 2010/12 reports (ITT) × Ineligible × … …Pro-poor Spending Index			0.106 (0.038) [0.021]			0.081 (0.057) [0.117]
T1: 2012 report (ITT) × Ineligible × … …Attendance Index			0.035 (0.069) [0.625]			0.106 (0.061) [0.124]
T2: 2010/12 reports (ITT) × Ineligible × … …Attendance Index			0.022 (0.052) [0.713]			0.079 (0.050) [0.194]
Additional Interactions	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Strata (zone–party) FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Ineligible control mean	0.408	0.408	0.408	0	0	0
Eligible control mean	0.347	0.347	0.347	0.171	0.171	0.171
p-value: $T1 + T1 \times I + T1 \times I \times PPSI = 0$			0.204			0.0149
p-value: $T1 + T1 \times I + T1 \times I \times AI = 0$			0.590			0.0136
p-value: $T2 + T2 \times I + T2 \times I \times PPSI = 0$			0.0358			0.0350
p-value: $T2 + T2 \times I + T2 \times I \times AI = 0$			0.678			0.0294
Observations	240	240	240	240	240	240

Note: Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses.
Ward- and concilor-level cross sections estimated with OLS and randomization inference (10,000 repetitions). Robust standard errors in parentheses. Randomization inference p-values in brackets. Randomization strata are fixed. "Attendance Index" is the mean z-score of two attendance measures (2007–11), analogous to the dependent variable in Table 1, columns 7–8, for the pre-publication period. "Pro-poor Spending Index" is the mean z-score of three log preference-weighted spending amounts (2007–11), analogous to the dependent variable in Table 1, columns 3–4, for the pre-publication period. "Additional interactions" are "Ineligible", "Pro-Poor Spending Index", "Ineligible × Pro-Poor Spending Index", "Attendance Index" and "Ineligible × Attendance Index". $T1 + T1 \times I + T1 \times I \times PPSI = 0$ is the net T1 treatment effect for an ineligible incumbent with a Pro-Poor Spending Index one standard deviation above average and an average Attendance Index. $T1 + T1 \times I + T1 \times I \times AI = 0$ is the symmetrical effect for attendance.

TABLE A16—IMPACT OF REPORT CARD PUBLICATION ON INCUMBENT VOTE SHARE USING STRICTLY PRE-TREATMENT PERFORMANCE

	Incumbent's party's vote share in same ward			Incumbent's vote share (0 if didn't run)		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Treatment	−0.002 (0.018) [0.905]	−0.001 (0.022) [0.983]	−0.006 (0.022) [0.810]	0.047 (0.027) [0.094]	0.032 (0.035) [0.373]	0.031 (0.035) [0.405]
Treatment × Ineligible		−0.000 (0.041) [0.995]	0.017 (0.041) [0.706]		0.024 (0.047) [0.612]	0.035 (0.047) [0.485]
Treatment × . . . . . . Pro-poor Spending Index			−0.032 (0.021) [0.142]			−0.054 (0.038) [0.130]
Treatment × . . . . . . Attendance Index			0.029 (0.021) [0.341]			0.017 (0.035) [0.692]
Treatment × Ineligible × . . . . . . Pro-poor Spending Index			0.094 (0.038) [0.031]			0.116 (0.047) [0.012]
Treatment × Ineligible × . . . . . . Attendance Index			0.034 (0.051) [0.562]			0.073 (0.045) [0.206]
Additional Interactions	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Strata (zone–party) FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Ineligible control mean	0.408	0.408	0.408	0	0	0
Eligible control mean	0.347	0.347	0.347	0.171	0.171	0.171
p-value: $T + T \times I + T \times I \times PPSI = 0$			0.0439			0.00196
p-value: $T + T \times I + T \times I \times AI = 0$			0.437			0.0110
Observations	240	240	240	240	240	240

Note: Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses.
Ward- and councilor-level cross sections estimated with OLS and randomization inference (10,000 repetitions). Robust standard errors in parentheses. Randomization inference p-values in brackets. Randomization strata are fixed. "Attendance Index" is the mean z-score of two attendance measures (2007–10), analogous to the dependent variable in Table 1, columns 7–8, for the pre-treatment period. "Pro-poor Spending Index" is the mean z-score of three log preference-weighted spending amounts (2007–10), analogous to the dependent variable in Table 1, columns 3–4, for the pre-treatment period. "Additional interactions" are "Ineligible", "Pro-Poor Spending Index", "Ineligible × Pro-Poor Spending Index", "Attendance Index" and "Ineligible × Attendance Index". $T + T \times I + T \times I \times PPSI = 0$ is the net treatment effect for an ineligible incumbent with a Pro-Poor Spending Index one standard deviation above average and an average Attendance Index. $T + T \times I + T \times I \times AI = 0$ is the symmetrical effect for attendance.

TABLE A17—IMPACT OF REPORT CARD ON ELECTORAL PARTICIPATION

	Voter turnout			Voter registration		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Treatment	−0.008	−0.008	−0.009	−744.579	−702.669	−492.899
	(0.007)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(1420.318)	(1941.576)	(2008.216)
Treatment × Ineligible		−0.001	−0.001		−460.830	−530.574
		(0.015)	(0.015)		(2519.533)	(2669.845)
Treatment × ...			−0.007			1924.416
...Pro-poor Spending Index			(0.014)			(2626.850)
Treatment × ...			0.011			−571.926
...Attendance Index			(0.011)			(3202.175)
Treatment × Ineligible × ...			−0.006			−1650.412
...Pro-poor Spending Index			(0.018)			(3362.528)
Treatment × Ineligible × ...			−0.015			547.208
...Attendance Index			(0.019)			(4034.852)
Nontreatment Interactions	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Strata (zone–party) FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Ineligible control mean	0.534	0.534	0.534	40226.3	40226.3	40226.3
Eligible control mean	0.554	0.554	0.554	43269.2	43269.2	43269.2
Observations	240	240	240	240	240	240

Note: Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses.
Ward-level cross section estimated with OLS. "Attendance Index" is the mean z-score of two attendance measures (2007–11), analogous to the dependent variable in Table 1, columns 7–8, for the pre-treatment period. "Pro-poor Spending Index" is the mean z-score of three log preference-weighted spending amounts (2007–11), analogous to the dependent variable in Table 1, columns 3–4, for the pre-publication period.

FIGURE A1. MAP OF DELHI WARDS BY TREATMENT ARM

Data Appendix

B1.   *Slum Identification*

Many of Delhi's poor are concentrated in slums. Identifying slum incidence in wards served two purposes for us. Firstly, it helped us select high-slum wards for the baseline survey. Secondly, it helped us create a measure to identify wards with higher than average density of urban poor.

We found official Delhi slum lists to be incomplete, with many only including "notified"—officially designated—slums. Given this, our field team implemented a two-stage process to identify slums across all Delhi wards in our sample.

In each ward, we identified potential slum areas using satellite imagery and government listings. In satellite imagery, we looked for small houses, disordered arrangement, and unpainted roofs. We intended to survey households in 100 wards with multiple slums, which we selected at random, stratified by treatment status and geographic zone. If we couldn't identify at least three slums in a selected ward, we selected a replacement at random from that stratum.

Second, we visited and recorded living conditions for identified slum areas in the survey sample. Here, we followed a methodology based on the UN-HABITAT and Indian census definition of slums.[1] We constructed a list of nine common criteria closely correlated to the census definition of slums: high density of housing, poor quality housing structure and material, lack of internal household infrastructure, poor road infrastructure, poor access to water and water infrastructure, uncovered and unimproved drains, low coverage of private toilet facilities, prevalent trash piles, and frequent cohabitation with animals. Areas exhibiting at least five of these nine characteristics were marked as more slumlike and others as less slumlike.

106 wards formed our final household survey sample frame. We surveyed between one and six slums in each ward, but in 85% of wards we surveyed three or fewer slums. We surveyed between 5 and 126 households per ward, but in 80% of wards we surveyed between 33 and 51 households. To the extent that population density is similar across different slums, this approximates a Probability Proportional to Size (PPS) sampling procedure.

In a related, but separate, exercise we classified a ward as a high-slum density ward if it had above median slum fraction by area. To construct this indicator, we estimated slum area for each ward using satellite imagery, with neighborhood slum categorization based on ground-truthed imagery classification developed during our ward selection for baseline survey. We classify a ward with above median slum

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[1]The 2011 Indian census defines a slum as a "compact housing cluster or settlement of at least 20 households with a collection of poorly built tenements which are, mostly temporary in nature with inadequate sanitary, drinking water facilities and unhygienic conditions will be termed as slums."; UN-HABITAT defines a slum household as "a group of individuals living under the same roof that lacks any one of meet the following conditions: insecure residential status, inadequate access to safe water, inadequate access to sanitation and other infrastructure, poor structural quality of housing and overcrowding." The main difference between the two is UN-HABITAT's inclusion of insecure residential status.

fraction by area as "high slum." In twelve wards, slum area was not recorded at the time of the experiment, and for these twelve wards, *post hoc* values for the indicator were assigned during the analysis phase referencing satellite photography, contemporaneous news coverage, and contemporaneous studies of Delhi slums. An indicator for these twelve wards is present in every regression where "high slum" appears.

B2.   *2012 Newspaper Report Card Publication Sequence Randomization*

All 2010 report cards were published as intended, but subject to space constraints in each newspaper and time constraints, we were unable to publish all 2012 report cards before the 2012 election. We did not publish any report cards after election day. Of 168 report cards for ITT councilors, 124 were published. Six wards were dropped because the councilor was suspended for corruption or died; seven were dropped because they were never sampled (in two of these cases another ward was sampled instead); one was dropped because there were no slums in the ward; and the last thirty were dropped because they could not be published by election day. Out of the 58 T1 wards, 45 were treated, and of the 110 T2 wards, 79 were treated.

First, report cards were categorized according to zone (of which there were ten), to whether the councilor was eligible for reelection, and to whether the ward had above- or below-median slum fraction by area. Then, within these forty categories, each of which had about four report cards, we randomly assigned report cards to pairs. We then assigned a stratum to each pair according to treatment status (T1/T1, T1/T2, or T2/T2) and political party affiliation (no BJP councilor, or at least one BJP councilor). We randomly assigned publication sequence to each pair of report cards for eligible councilors, distributing the above six strata evenly across the publication sequence. Then we repeated the process for half (i.e. as many as possible) of the report cards for ineligible councilors, and these were placed after the eligible councilors in the publication sequence. Report cards for ineligible councilors were published after the deadline for parties to assign candidate tickets. Two pairs of report cards were published in each daily issue of the newspaper.

B3.   *State of Sanitation Information Randomization*

Our audits covered the sample of 108 high-slum-density wards that entered our baseline survey. These wards, in turn, were situated in 55 state assembly constituencies (ACs). All ACs were randomized into treatment and control, followed by a balanced randomization of the wards within an AC. In the event that a ward was split across two ACs, it was put in the AC with an unbalanced number of wards. We then separately randomized report card distribution across the two levels of government: 51 wards were randomly assigned to have the MCD councilor receive a ward report card and, out of the 55 ACs, 27 were randomly assigned to

receive a AC report cards.[2] In each ward we audited, on average, three slums giving us a sample of 310 slums across 108 wards.

B4. *Deviations from Trial Registration*

Our experiment began in 2010, prior to the establishment of the AEA RCT registry. In 2020, we retrospectively registered our experiment as AEARCTR-0004975, based on implementation and analysis plans developed in 2010. Here, we highlight three notable changes between the registered design and the implementation.

First, in 2010, Delhi had 272 municipal wards. The experimental design in the registry specifies a sample of 257 wards, because we excluded 5 wards where our partner NGO was well known and 10 wards where recent by-elections made midterm reports infeasible. However, before implementation, 17 additional wards in two MCD zones – one rural area and one commercial district – were excluded because they had few slums.

Second, the registry plan specifies a 53-ward control group, 1/5 of the sample (with minor adjustments for stratification). For greater power in pooled treatment regressions, this proportion was subsequently increased to 15/48 (with minor adjustments for stratification), or 72 wards.

Third, the registry describes an additional treatment arm. Treatment arm "2" (midterm and pre-election report cards) was crosscut with a voter mobilization campaign, creating treatment arm "3". Budget constraints, and changes in councilor powers that we anticipated would make councilors relatively more responsive to middle-class interests, led us to replace this with a small-scale Residential Welfare Association (RWA) mobilization campaign. This campaign was not directly relevant to the interests of the poor, and may be underpowered, so we do not report it. In our analysis treatment arms "2" and "3" were pooled into a single treatment arm "2".

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[2]Because wards and ACs are not perfectly aligned, this made for a total of 118 Ward–AC combinations: 30 control, 30 where only the MLA received a report card, 32 where only the MCD councilor received a report card, and 26 were both the MLA and MCD councilor received report cards.