

Immigration and Support for Redistribution: Lessons from Europe Online Appendix

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A. Immigration in Western Europe: Brief Overview

Today, in most Western European countries, 1 in 10 legal residents are not citizens of the country they live in. The share of people born abroad ranges from a low of 12% in France to a high of 18 and 20% in Austria and Germany. According to a recent survey, in France, a third of the population has a connection to immigration through either one or both of their parents (Beauchemin, Lhommeau and Simon 2016).¹ This number is closer to 20% in Germany.² Based on the 2011 Census, in Great Britain, 1 in 5 residents do not identify with the category "white British."

Immigrant households have lower wages and higher poverty rates than native households. According to 2014 data, native workers in Germany, Austria or Italy earn on average 20% more than foreign born workers. A 2009 study (pre-Great Recession) found that, in France, Germany and Sweden, the overall household minority poverty rate was more than twice the majority poverty rate. On average, "poverty rate for children of minorities and immigrants (was) 20 percent, compared to 10 percent for comparable majority child populations" (Smeeding et al. 2009). Based on a Eurostat study (Marlier 2008), the poverty rate for immigrant households with children (heads or spouses born outside the EU country of destination) was 40.6 percent compared to 17.6 percent for households with both parents born within the country of residence.

Western European countries have not experienced a race to the bottom in confining benefits to majority-only citizens or cutting benefits for immigrants and minorities. As shown by Smeeding et al. (2009), the welfare state's impact on poverty rate reduction is the same for native and immigrant/minority households.

In other words, the key ingredients for Alesina and Glaeser's prophesized Americanization of the European Welfare state are present: a non-Christian, non-white minority, over-represented among low-income households and with full access to the welfare state.

Survey data shows that, in many countries, a majority of voters perceive immigrants as net-beneficiaries of redistribution. As shown in Table A1, in 2014, 50% of Austrian respondents believed that "people who come to live in Austria pay less in taxes than they receive in benefits." A third of respondents express no opinion. However, notice the cross-country differences: in Sweden and Germany, a third or less of respondents perceived immigrants as net-beneficiaries.

¹ The analysis in Beauchemin, Lhommeau and Simon (2016) stops at the second generation as third generation connections are often too difficult to trace using the existing data.

² Source: <https://www.migrationpolicy.org/sites/default/files/publications/TCM-Germanycasestudy.pdf>

Table A1: Perceptions of Immigrants' Fiscal Burden, ESS 2014 (2002 in parenthesis)

	Pay less taxes than receive in benefits/services (0/4)	Neutral Answer or DNK (5 or DNK)	Pay more taxes than receive in benefits/services (6/10)
Austria	0.50 (0.42)	0.32 (0.35)	0.18 (0.23)
Belgium	0.48 (0.51)	0.30 (0.32)	0.21 (0.17)
Denmark	0.43 (0.50)	0.31 (0.32)	0.26 (0.18)
Finland	0.43 (0.52)	0.30 (0.26)	0.26 (0.22)
France	0.42 (0.40)	0.37 (0.40)	0.20 (0.20)
Germany	0.33 (0.54)	0.41 (0.33)	0.26 (0.13)
Great Britain	0.40 (0.55)	0.29 (0.26)	0.31 (0.19)
Sweden	0.26 (0.38)	0.34 (0.35)	0.40 (0.27)
Portugal	0.37 (0.25)	0.39 (0.32)	0.24 (0.43)

Wording: "Most people who come to live here work and pay taxes. They also use health and welfare services. On balance, do you think people who come here take out more than they put in or put in more than they take out?" Answers were collected using a 0/10 scale. Displays shares. Values for 2002 are displayed in parenthesis. Choosing 5 on the 0 to 10 scale is considered the neutral answer. Note that people who answer DNK are coded as neutral (equal to 5).

Source: ESS round 1, ESS round 7, weighted. Select countries.

B. Attitudinal Trends in Great Britain


B.1. Support for Welfare Cuts

Figure B1 (left panel) plots changes in support for cuts to means-tested benefits. With the exception of a recent reversal in reaction to benefit cuts during the height of the Great recession, the general pattern in Great Britain is one of growing support for such cuts. This decline is correlated with a change in perception of the prevalence of free riding among the poor and the unemployed (right panel). See Cavaille (2023) for more details.

To measure free riding beliefs, we combine the following survey items into an index using weights recovered from a factor analysis (eigenvalue = 2.4). The index is then standardized.

- The welfare state encourages people to stop helping each other
- If welfare benefits weren't so generous, people would learn to stand on their own two feet.
- Around here, most unemployed people could find a job if they really wanted one
- Many people who get social security don't really deserve any help.
- Most people on the dole are fiddling in one way or another
- Unemployment benefits are too high and disincentive work

Figure B1: Attitudes Towards Means-Tested Benefits in Great Britain



Binned scatterplot where each bin is a survey/year. *Left panel:* “The government should spend more money on welfare benefits for the poor, even if it leads to higher taxes”, respondents who disagree with this claim are coded as 1. *Right panel:* free riding index, see text for wording. Variable is standardized, higher (lower) value imply the belief that free riding is more (less) prevalent. Source: BSAS 1983-2017, weighted.

Next, we show that concerns over the prevalence of free riding, which are correlated with support for welfare cuts, are themselves correlated with anti-immigrant sentiment. Due to the absence, in the BSAS, of items that ask about immigration, we turn to the British Election Study (BES), specifically the online panel.³ The BES panel includes the following items:

- **Anti-immigrant sentiment (Group preferences):**

Immigration good (1) or bad (7) for economy?

Immigration enriches (1) or undermines (7) cultural life

Immigrants are a burden on the welfare state [Strongly disagree (1) – Strongly agree (5)]

- **Attitudes toward welfare benefits:**

The amount of money families on welfare receive is much too low (1) - much too high (5)


- **Free riding beliefs:**

Too many people these days like to rely on government handouts [Strongly disagree (1) – Strongly agree (5)]

As shown in Figure B2, people with more negative views on immigration and immigrants are more likely to find welfare benefits too generous (left panel). As the right panel shows, people with negative views about immigrants are also more likely to believe that too many people prefer to live on handouts: once the latter is included as a control, the relationship between anti-immigrant sentiment and support for welfare cuts weakens. These empirical patterns suggest, in line with Alesina and Glaeser’s conjecture, a tight connection between anti-immigrant sentiment on the one hand, and free riding beliefs and support for cuts to means-tested benefits on the other.

³ For more information, see <https://www.britishelectionstudy.com/bes-resources/about-the-bes-internet-panel-study>

Figure B2: Anti-Immigrant Sentiment, Welfare Attitudes and Free Riding Beliefs



Binned scatterplot. X-axis variable: individual scores obtained by combining anti-immigrant sentiment items using weights recovered from a factor analysis (eigenvalue = 2.25). Scores are standardized using sample mean and SD. Y-axis variable: equals 1 if respondents finds welfare benefits too generous, 0 otherwise. A quadratic fit based on the underlying data is overlaid on the binned scatter plot. The right panel uses the residuals obtained after regressing Y on answers to the free riding item (answers are dummied out).


Source: British Election Study Internet Panel, wave 2. Fieldhouse et al. (2014)

B.2. Support for Welfare Cuts By Income Level

Figure B3 plots support for cuts to welfare benefits (left panel) and free riding beliefs (right panel) by income group. Both variables were computed using the same measurement strategy as the one described in Section B1. Notice how low-income individuals, despite a conservative shift in free riding beliefs (right panel), do not increase their support for welfare cuts. In contrast, this conservative shift is fully reflected in the welfare attitudes of high-income individuals.

Income measure To measure income, we rely on a categorical income measure available in the BSAS. Respondents were asked to provide an assessment of household income from all sources by choosing an income bracket (bracket differences were around 1000 pounds on average). New top income brackets were regularly added each year. First, we transform the income intervals into their common-currency mid-points.⁴ Second, for the top category, we use the method recommended by Hout (2004), which imputes an income value as a function of the number of respondents in the top category and the number of respondents in the interval that precedes it. This information, combined with a few assumptions regarding the skew of the income distribution, seeks to compensate for under-estimating income levels among those with the highest income in the sample.⁵ Finally, we divide this income measure by the square root of the number of people living in this household.

Figure B3: Support for Welfare Cuts By Income Level



Binned scatterplot where each bin is a survey/year. Red/continuous line: low-income respondents (≤ 20 th percentile). Purple/dashed line: high-income respondents (≥ 80 th percentile). *Left panel:* variable equals 1 if respondent supports welfare cuts, 0 otherwise (see fn. Figure B1). *Right panel:* free riding index, see fn. Figure B1. Source: BSAS 1983-2010, weighted.

⁴ For example, [2000-3000] becomes 2500.

⁵ See replication file for more information: <https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/6WTDRH>.


B.3. Support for Redistribution

Figure B4 plots the share of respondents who, in a given year agree with the following two claims:

- It should be the government's responsibility to reduce income differences between the rich and the poor
- It should be the government's responsibility to provide a decent standard of living for the unemployed

While agreement with the first claim remained stable at around 70 %, agreement with the second claim declined by 40 percentage points. In other words, growing opposition to transfers for the unemployed does not imply growing opposition to the principle of income redistribution.

Figure B4: Government's Responsibility to Redistribute Income and Help the Unemployed




Share of respondents who chose "Definitely should/Should be the government's responsibility." Item wordings: "...to provide decent living standards for the unemployed" and "...to reduce income differences between rich and poor." Source: ISSP Role of Government module I-V, weighted.

C. Attitudinal Trends in France

C.1. Attitudes Toward Welfare

The Credoc, through the Conditions de vie et aspirations longitudinal survey has collected information on French respondents' attitudes toward government support for the poor starting in 1990. Figure C1 plots the share of respondents who say that the government's financial effort for helping the worse off is either too little, about right or too generous. Up until the Great Recession, the overall pattern is one of stability with roughly 60% of respondents answering that the government is doing too little. There is a peak at 73% during the 1993-1994 recession. The pattern post-2009 is strikingly different: despite an increase in unemployment and paltry growth rates, the share of individuals who believe that the government is doing too little decreases steadily to 45%.

Figure C1: Government Intervention and the Poor in France (1991-2015)



Plots share of respondents who in a given survey/year say that the government's support for the poor is either too little, about right or too generous. Lowess curves are overlayed.
Source: Conditions de vie et aspiration, longitudinal data


C.2. Support for Making Benefits Conditional on Past Contributions

The DREES barometer is a data collection effort focused on social policy preferences that started in the early 2000s. It includes repeated measures of people's support for unconditional access to non means-tested benefits. Specifically, one set of items asks respondents whether they believe that access to social benefits should be limited to those who have paid into the system (versus unconditional access to all).⁶ Respondents are asked their opinion about conditional versus universal access with regards to healthcare, pensions, unemployment insurance and child benefits. The answers

⁶ "In your opinion, [benefit type] should 1) only be accessible to those who pay payroll taxes, 2) only be accessible to those who cannot make ends meet or 3) be accessible to all irrespective of social background and job type. Very few people choose option 2."

across the four items are highly correlated (Cronbach's alpha is equal to 0.80). The maximum (minimum) score identifies individuals who support (oppose) excluding non-contributors for all four programs. To facilitate interpretation, the final index score is also standardized. As show in Figure C2 support for making benefit access conditional on past contributions has increased over time.

Figure C2: Changes in Support for Conditional Access



Plots change in the conditional access index. Respondents are asked their opinion about conditional versus universal access with regards to healthcare, pensions, unemployment insurance and child benefits. Answers are combined into an index. The maximum (minimum) score identifies individuals who support (oppose) excluding non-contributors for all four programs. To facilitate interpretation, the final index score is also standardized. A quadratic fit using the underlying data is also overlaid on the binned data. Source: DREES, barometre d'opinion

D. Immigrants' Access to Social Benefits

The survey item used for Table 1 in the manuscript (*When should immigrants access...*) was also asked in 2008, alongside a question on immigrants' perceived fiscal burden. The wording of the latter item was similar to the one used in Table A1, specifically: "On balance, do you think people who come to live in [country] receive more than they contribute or contribute more than they receive?" As Table D1 shows, people who think immigrants receive more than they contribute (i.e., provide an answer between 0 and 4) are also more likely to want to make access to benefits conditional on citizenship or to reserve access to native born citizens only. Yet even within this group of respondents, less than half supports excluding immigrants from accessing the welfare state. Most people support a short delay of one year in the work force before allowing immigrants' to access the welfare state. Furthermore, support for excluding immigrants does not vary dramatically based on beliefs about immigrants' reliance on social benefits. In other words, only a minority both perceives immigrants as net beneficiaries and supports excluding them from accessing the welfare state. Instead, most people support a weak version of reciprocity, something that cannot be accounted for under the parochial altruism assumption.

Table D1: When Should Immigrants Access Benefits? ESS 2008

	Great Britain			France			Germany		
	Get More	Neutral	Give More	Get More	Neutral	Give More	Get More	Neutral	Give More
Immediately on arrival	2	10	11	3	18	18	5	12	17
After living in (cntry) for a year	4	8	7	5	13	19	9	16	13
Only after they have worked and paid taxes for at least a year	47	50	51	47	45	43	43	43	38
Once they have become a (British/UK) citizen	34	30	27	36	22	18	33	27	28
They should never get the same rights	13	2	4	10	2	2	10	2	4
TOTAL	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

Displays percentages, each column adds to 100%. Wording for row item "Thinking of people coming to live in (country) from other countries, when do you think they should obtain the same rights to social benefits and services as citizens already living here? Please choose the option on this card that comes closest to your view." Wording for column item: "On balance, do you think people who come to live in [country] receive more than they contribute or contribute more than they receive?" DNKs are coded as missing for the row item and coded as 5 for the column item. Column item: if 0/4 then coded as "Get More." If 5 or DNK coded as "Neutral." If 6/10 then coded as "Give More." Source: ESS round 4, weighted. Select countries.

E. Fairness Perceptions: Who is Better Treated?

Table E1 reports the share of respondents who perceive that their government treats immigrants better (or worse) than it treats the respondent.

Table E1: Are Immigrants Treated Better or Worse? ESS 2014

	Better	Same (or DNK)	Worse
Austria	0.36	0.31	0.33
Belgium	0.35	0.40	0.24
Denmark	0.19	0.41	0.41
Finland	0.16	0.42	0.42
France	0.34	0.37	0.28
Germany	0.25	0.28	0.47
Great Britain	0.45	0.38	0.17
Sweden	0.12	0.37	0.51
Portugal	0.38	0.50	0.12

Displays shares, each column adds to 1 (with some rounding error). Wording: "Compared to yourself government treats new immigrants better or worse?" "Better" ("Worse") includes respondents who pick either "much better (worse)" or "a little better (worse)." Note that people who answer DNK are coded as "same."

Source: ESS round 7, weighted. Select countries.

F. Immigration, Liberal-Authoritarian Values and Free Riding Perceptions


In Figure B2, we documented a strong correlation between welfare attitudes and free riding beliefs on the one hand, and anti-immigrant sentiment on the other. Here, we show how a third set of items is also highly correlated with the latter attitudes and beliefs. We will follow common practices and call these items "Liberal-Authoritarian Values" (LAV) items.

The first step of the analysis builds on the same British dataset as the one used in Figure B2. In the BES panel, wave 2, LAV items are worded as follows:

- Young people today don't respect traditional [British/country] values
- For some crimes, death penalty most appropriate sentence
- Schools should teach children to obey authority
- Lawbreakers should be given stiffer sentences

LAV items are described by Kitschelt and Rehm (2014) as capturing "disagreement over how to best organize the polity:" on one side are people who support a more "libertarian [form of governance] with broader participation of members and more subjects left to personal autonomy" and on the other are people who support a more "authoritarian [form of governance] with less participation and a broader realm of subjects covered by binding codes of conduct." Items commonly used to measure these LAVs include law and order items asking about the need for stiffer sentences or support for the death penalty or child rearing items asking about the value of teaching kids discipline and obedience (Hetherington and Weiler 2009). The emphasis on autonomy to describe the liberal end of the continuum echoes Inglehart's definition of post-materialist values. As a result, LAVs have often been associated with differences towards policies that can be interpreted as giving

Figure F1: Immigration, Welfare, LAVs



Binned scatterplot. X-axis variable: individual scores obtained by combining anti-immigrant sentiment items using weights recovered from a factor analysis. Scores are standardized using sample mean and SD. Y-axis variable: equals 1 if respondents agree that too many people prefer to rely on handouts, 0 otherwise. A quadratic fit based on the underlying data is overlaid on the binned scatter plot. *Left panel*: no controls. *Right panel*: uses residuals obtained after regressing the outcome on individual LAV scores, which are obtained by combining LAV items using weights recovered from a factor analysis.

Source: British Election Study, Panel wave 2, 2014.

all individuals the same right to live according to their “true self” (e.g. multiculturalism) and to make individual decisions that go against collective norms and traditions (i.e. divorce, abortion, gay rights).

As shown in Figure F1, people with more negative views on immigration and immigrants are more likely to believe that free riding is high prevalence as captured by their agreement with the claim that too many people “these days” are on benefits. Notice how, in Figure F1, the correlation decreases once LAV items are controlled for. In the main manuscript, we hypothesize that differences in moral matrices underpin these correlations.

For evidence beyond Great Britain, we turn to the European Social Survey (2008), which includes the items listed in Table F1. Figure F2 presents binned scatter plots examining average free riding beliefs according to one’s score on the LAV index (20 bins in total), with and without controlling for anti-immigrant sentiment. We reproduce the same analysis using anti-immigrant sentiment, controlling for LAVs. In Great Britain, the two attitudinal variables explain roughly a similar share of the variance in free riding beliefs. In Germany, free riding beliefs are correlated with LAVs only: any correlation between anti-immigrant sentiment and free riding beliefs disappears once the LAVs index is included. In most Western democracies, the pattern is similar to the one in Germany, with some notable exceptions including France and Denmark, which are closer to the British case (not shown).


Table F1: Item Wording

<i>Free Riding Beliefs</i>	<i>Anti-Immigrant Sentiment</i>
Most unemployed people do not really try to find a job	Immigration bad or good for country's economy
Many manage to obtain benefits/services not entitled to	Country's cultural life undermined or enriched by immigrants
Employees often pretend they are sick to stay at home	Immigrants make country worse or better place to live
Social benefits/services make people lazy	Allow many/few immigrants of different race/ethnic group from majority
Social benefits/services make people less willing to look after themselves/family	Allow many/few immigrants from poorer countries outside Europe
Social benefits/services make people less willing to care for one another	Allow many/few immigrants of same race/ethnic group as majority

Liberal-Authoritarian Values Items

Schools should teach children to obey authority
 People who break the law should receive much harsher sentences
 Terrorist suspect in prison until police satisfied

Figure F2: Free Riding Beliefs, Anti-immigrant Sentiment and Authoritarian-Libertarian Values (G.B. and Germany)



Binned scatterplot. X-axis variable: individuals LAV scores (left and center panel), and anti-immigrant scores (right panel). Y-axis variable: individual free riding beliefs score. All scores obtained by combining items listed in the text using weights from a factor analysis. Individual score variables are standardized using country-specific mean and SD. The left panel shows the raw correlation. The center panel uses the residuals obtained after regressing Y on anti-immigrant sentiment scores. The right panel uses the residuals obtained after regressing Y on LAV scores. For an idea of the substantive relationship: in Great Britain, one SD increase in the LAV score is roughly equal to half a SD increase on the free riding score (no controls).

Source: ESS round 4, weighted

If people differ, whether at birth or as a result of class socialization, in terms of which ideal-typical moral matrix they rely on the most when faced with a social dilemma, then we can expect them to reason differently about moral hazard, whether tied to immigrants' access to the welfare state (and welfare shopping), social benefit generosity (and recipients' work effort) or lenient approaches to criminal justice (and the crime rate). In contrast, an emphasis on parochial altruism cannot explain why LAVs underpin the correlation between anti-immigrant sentiment and attitudes toward welfare and welfare recipients.

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