Online Appendix for “Efficiency and Incidence of Taxation with Free Entry and Love-of-Variety Preferences”

A Specific Taxation and Ad Valorem and Results

Proof. Marginal Excess Burden Formula for specific tax \( \frac{dW}{dt} \).

Let the total welfare to be the sum of consumer surplus, profits and government tax revenues.

\[
W(p(t), t, J(t)) = u(Q_L(t), J(t)) - (p(t)(1 + \tau) + t)Q_L(t)
\]

\[
= \left[ CS + p(t)Q_L(t) - J(t)c\left(\frac{Q_L(t)}{J(t)}\right) - J(t)F + tQ_L(t) + p(t)\tau Q \right] R
\]

By totally differentiating \( W_L(t) = W(p(t), t, J(t)) \) with respect to \( t \) (and keeping \( \tau \) constant) we obtain

\[
\frac{dW_L}{dt} = \frac{\partial u}{\partial Q}(Q_0, J_0) - c'(q_0) \frac{dQ_L}{dt} + \frac{\partial u}{\partial J}(Q_0, J_0) - c(q_0) - F + q_0c'(q_0) \frac{dJ}{dt}
\]

\[
= (p_0(1 + \theta_\tau) + \theta_t) + c'(q_0) \frac{dQ_L}{dt} + (\Lambda_0 + \pi_0 - [p_0 - c'(q_0)] * q_0) \frac{dJ}{dt}
\]

where we used the first-order approximation from Chetty, Looney and Kroft (2009) \( \frac{\partial u}{\partial J}(Q_0, J_0) = p_0(1 + \theta_\tau) + \theta_t \), we used our definition of variety effect \( \Lambda_0 = \frac{\partial u}{\partial J}(Q_0, J_0) \) and profits \( \pi_0 = p_0q_0 - c(q_0) - F \). When \( t_0 = 0, p_0 = c'(q^*) \) and \( \Lambda_0 = -\pi_0 \), we get \( \frac{dW_L}{dt} = 0 \) which is the first-best outcome.

Proof. Lemma 1.

Let \( \pi = pq - c(q) = 0 \) be the free-entry condition of firms. When \( \tau \) is constant, then \( \frac{d\pi}{dt} = 0 \) implies that \( (p - mc) \frac{dq}{dt} = -q \frac{dp}{dt} \) and so \( \frac{p - mc}{p} = -\frac{q}{p/t} \frac{dp}{dt} \).

If \( t \) is now constant, then \( \frac{d\pi}{dt} = 0 \) implies \( (p - mc) \frac{dq}{dt} = -q \frac{dp}{dt} \) and so \( \frac{p - mc}{p} = -\frac{q/\tau}{p/t} \frac{dp}{dt} \).
Proof. **Proposition 1.**

Let \( \Delta = \left[ 2 - \frac{\nu_q}{\mathcal{J}} + \frac{\nu_q}{\epsilon_s J} + \frac{\nu_q}{\epsilon_{ms}} \right] - \frac{\epsilon_D \Delta}{(p(1+\tau)+t)q} \left( 1 + \frac{\nu_q}{\epsilon_s J} + \frac{1}{\epsilon_{ms}} \right) + \left( 1 - \frac{\nu_q}{\mathcal{J}} \right) \epsilon_D \frac{JQ}{p(1+\tau)+t} \frac{\partial^2 P}{\partial J \partial Q} \).\(^1\)

The firm stability conditions \( \frac{\partial^2 x}{\partial p^2} < 0 \) and \( \frac{\partial x}{\partial J} < 0 \), are respectively equivalent to \( 1 + \frac{\nu_s - \nu_q}{\epsilon_s} + \frac{\nu_q}{\epsilon_{ms}} > 0 \) and \( \Delta > 0 \), where \( \epsilon^*_D = \frac{p(1+\theta\tau)}{p(1+\tau)+t} \epsilon_D \). Here, \( \Delta \) and \( \epsilon^*_D \) are written in the general form that depends on both the specific tax rate \( t \) and the ad valorem tax rate \( \tau \).

By Lemma 1, we have \( \frac{dPS}{dt} = 0 \). Therefore substituting this into equation (1) we obtain:

\[
dW = \Lambda_0 \, \frac{dJ}{dt} - Q_0 \, \frac{dp}{dt} + (\theta_t t_0 + p_\theta \theta \tau_0) \, \frac{dQ_L}{dt}
\]

From the behavioral equation of consumers \( wtp(Q,J) \equiv P(Q,J) = p(1 + \theta \tau) + \theta t \), we have

\[
wtp(Q,J) \frac{dQ}{dt} + \frac{\partial P}{\partial J} \frac{dJ}{dt} = \frac{dp}{dt} \left( 1 + \theta \tau \right) + \theta t \tag{2}
\]

In addition, from the free-entry condition, \( (p-mc) \frac{dq}{dt} = -q \frac{dp}{dt} \), and firm’s first-order condition, \( p - mc = -mwtp(Q,J)Q \frac{\nu_q}{J(1+\theta \tau)} \), we have

\[
wtp(Q,J) \frac{\nu_q}{dt} = (1 + \theta \tau) \frac{dp}{dt} \tag{3}
\]

Combining this with the behavioral equation above, and letting \( mwtp(Q,J) = mwtp(Q) \) for simplicity, we have

\[
wtp(Q) \frac{\nu_q}{dt} = \frac{dQ}{dt} \frac{\partial P}{\partial J} - \theta_t = mwtp(Q) \left( J \frac{dQ}{dt} + q \frac{dJ}{dt} \right) + \frac{\partial P}{\partial J} \frac{dJ}{dt} - \theta_t \tag{4}
\]

where the second line follows from substituting \( \frac{dQ}{dt} = J \frac{dq}{dt} + q \frac{dJ}{dt} \). Therefore,

\[
\frac{dq}{dt} = \frac{\theta_t - \left( \frac{\partial P}{\partial J} + q * mwtp(Q) \right) \frac{dJ}{dt}}{mwtp(Q)(J - \nu_q)} \tag{5}
\]

\(^1\)This becomes \( \Delta = \left[ 2 - \frac{\nu_q}{\mathcal{J}} + \frac{\nu_q}{\epsilon_s J} + \frac{\nu_q}{\epsilon_{ms}} \right] - \frac{\Lambda q}{p(1+\tau)+t} \left( 1 + \frac{\nu_q}{\epsilon_s J} + \frac{1}{\epsilon_{ms}} \right) \) under parallel demands.
Using now $\frac{dq}{dt} = \frac{dq}{dt} + \frac{\partial q}{\partial J} \frac{dJ}{dt}$ (note that $\frac{\partial q}{\partial t} = \frac{dq}{dt}$), we can get

$$\frac{dJ}{dt} = \frac{\theta_t - (J - \nu q)mwtp(Q)\frac{dq}{dt}}{\frac{\partial P}{\partial J} + q * mwtp(Q) + (J - \nu q)mwtp(Q)\frac{dq}{dt}}$$  \hspace{1cm} (6)$$

From Kroft et al. (2020), we have

$$\frac{\partial q}{\partial t} = \frac{\partial q}{\partial t} \bigg|_J = \frac{1}{Jmwtp(Q)} \left( \rho_{SR} + \theta_t - 1 \right) = \frac{\omega_{SR}^{*} \theta_t}{Jmwtp(Q)}$$  \hspace{1cm} (7)$$

where $\rho_{SR}^{*} = 1 - (1 - \omega_{SR}) \theta_t$ and $\omega_{SR} = \frac{1}{1 + \epsilon_{D}^{*} \frac{\epsilon_{S}^{*} + \epsilon_{ms}^{*}}{\epsilon_{ms}^{*}}} \epsilon_{D}$ (short-run passthrough is taken from Kroft et al. (2020)).

Finally, fix $t$, and differentiate the first-order condition $(p - mc)(1 + \theta_{\tau}) + mwtp(Q, J)Q_{J}^{\nu} = wtp(Q, J) - \theta_{t} t - mc(1 + \theta_{\tau}) + mwtp(Q, J)Q_{J}^{\nu} = 0$ with respect to $J$ to get:

$$\frac{\partial P}{\partial J} + mwtp(Q) \left( q + J \frac{\partial q}{\partial J} \right) - c''(q)(1 + \theta_{\tau}) \frac{\partial q}{\partial J} + \frac{\partial q}{\partial J} mwtp(Q)\nu q + q_{\nu} mwtp'(Q) \left( q + J \frac{\partial q}{\partial J} \right) + \frac{\partial^2 P}{\partial J \partial Q} q_{\nu} = 0$$

where we have assumed that $\frac{\partial \nu}{\partial J} = 0$. Further simplifying yields:

$$\frac{\partial q}{\partial J} = - \frac{\frac{\partial P}{\partial J} + \frac{\partial^2 P}{\partial J \partial Q} q_{\nu} + mwtp(Q)q + q_{\nu} mwtp'(Q)}{(J + \nu q)mwtp(Q) - c''(q)(1 + \theta_{\tau}) + Jq_{\nu} mwtp'(Q)}$$  \hspace{1cm} (8)$$

Rearranging equation (8), the denominator is equal to $J * mwtp(Q) \ast \left( 1 + \epsilon_{D}^{*} \frac{\epsilon_{S}^{*} + \epsilon_{ms}^{*}}{\epsilon_{ms}^{*}} \right)$, and so we get:

$$\frac{\partial q}{\partial J} = - \frac{\omega_{SR}}{J * mwtp(Q)} \left( \frac{\partial P}{\partial J} + \nu q \frac{\partial^2 P}{\partial J \partial Q} \right) - \frac{q}{J} \omega_{SR} \left( \frac{\nu q}{J} + \frac{\nu q}{\epsilon_{ms}^{*}} \right)$$  \hspace{1cm} (9)$$

Note:

$$\omega_{SR} * \frac{\nu q}{J} * q * mwtp(Q) * \Delta = \frac{\partial P}{\partial J} \left( 1 - \omega_{SR} \left( 1 - \frac{\nu q}{J} \right) \right) - \omega_{SR} \frac{\nu q}{J} \left( 1 - \frac{\nu q}{J} \right) \frac{\partial^2 P}{\partial J \partial Q} Q$$

$$+ q * mwtp(Q) \left( 1 - \omega_{SR} \left( 1 - \frac{\nu q}{J} \right) \left( 1 - \frac{\nu q}{J} + \frac{\nu q}{\epsilon_{ms}^{*}} \right) \right)$$
Substituting equation (9) and equation (7) into equation (6), we get:

\[
\frac{dJ}{dt} = \theta_t \left( \frac{1 - \omega_{SR} \left( 1 - \frac{\nu q}{J} \right)}{\omega_{SR} \nu q \Delta} \right)
\]

and substituting \( \frac{dJ}{dt} \) into equation (5), we obtain:

\[
\frac{dq}{dt} = \theta_t \left( \frac{1 - \frac{1}{\epsilon_{ms}}}{\Delta} \right)
\]

Finally, from equation (3) and the expression for \( \frac{dq}{dt} \) we have:

\[
\rho_t = 1 + mwtp(Q, J) \nu_q \frac{dq}{dt} = \frac{\Delta + \frac{\nu q}{J} \theta_t \left( 1 - \frac{1}{\epsilon_{ms}} \right)}{\Delta}
\]

\( \square \)

**Proof. Corollary 1.**

The proof is immediate by setting \( \theta_t = \theta_t = 1, \Lambda_0 = 0 \) and \( t_0 = \tau_0 = 0 \) into the conditions of Proposition 1.

\( \square \)

**Proof. Proposition 2**

Consider a change in the tax from \( \tau_0 \) to \( \tau_1 \). A first-order approximation to the marginal excess burden of taxation is:

\[
\frac{dW}{d\tau} = (p_0(1 + \theta_\tau_0) + \theta_t t_0 - c'(q_0)) \frac{dQ_L}{d\tau} + (\Lambda_0 + \pi_0 - [p_0 - c'(q_0)] * q_0) \frac{dJ}{d\tau}
\]  \hspace{1cm} (10)

Under Lemma 1, the marginal excess burden of taxation is given by:

\[
\frac{dW}{d\tau} = \Lambda_0 \frac{dJ}{d\tau} - Q_0 \frac{dp}{d\tau} + (\theta_t t_0 + p_0 \theta_\tau_0) \frac{dQ_L}{d\tau}
\]  \hspace{1cm} (11)
Willingness-to-pay with ad valorem taxes takes the form \( \text{wtp}(Q) = p(1 + \theta_T \tau) \), so \( \text{mwtp}(Q) \frac{\partial Q}{\partial \tau} + \frac{\partial P}{\partial \tau} \frac{dJ}{d\tau} = \frac{\partial P}{\partial J} \frac{dJ}{d\tau}(1 + \theta_T \tau) + p\theta_T \). We have the free entry-condition \( (p - mc) \frac{dQ}{d\tau} = -q \frac{dp}{d\tau} \), and the firm’s first-order condition \( p - mc = -\frac{\nu_q}{J(1 + \theta_T \tau)} \text{mwtp}(Q) \). Therefore, we have:

\[
\nu_q * \text{mwtp}(Q) \frac{dq}{d\tau} = (1 + \theta_T \tau) \frac{dp}{d\tau}
\]

which implies:

\[
\frac{dq}{d\tau} = \frac{p\theta_T - (\frac{\partial P}{\partial J} + q * \text{mwtp}(Q)) \frac{dJ}{d\tau}}{\text{mwtp}(Q) \left(1 - \frac{\nu_q}{J}\right)}
\]

Using now \( \frac{dq}{d\tau} = \frac{\partial q}{\partial \tau} + \frac{\partial q}{\partial J} \frac{dJ}{d\tau} \) (Here \( \frac{\partial q}{\partial \tau} = \frac{dq}{d\tau} \mid J \)). we get

\[
\frac{dJ}{d\tau} = \frac{p\theta_T + (\nu_q - J) \text{mwtp}(Q) \frac{dq}{d\tau}}{\frac{\partial P}{\partial J} + q * \text{mwtp}(Q) + (J - \nu_q) \frac{\partial q}{\partial J}}
\]

We also have

\[
\frac{\partial q}{\partial \tau} = \left. \frac{dq}{d\tau} \right|_J = \frac{1}{J \text{mwtp}(Q)} (\theta_T mc * \omega_{SR})
\]

where \( \rho^{\text{SR}} = 1 - \left(1 - \omega_{SR} mc \right) \theta_T \) and \( \omega_{SR} = \frac{1}{1 + \frac{\epsilon^{*} \text{D}}{\epsilon^{*} \text{S}} + \frac{\epsilon}{\epsilon_{ms}}} \). Moreover,

\[
\frac{\partial q}{\partial J} = -\frac{\omega_{SR}}{J * \text{mwtp}(Q)} \left( \frac{\partial P}{\partial J} + \frac{\partial^2 P}{\partial J \partial Q} \nu_q \right) - \frac{q \omega_{SR}}{J} \left(1 - \frac{\nu_q}{J} + \frac{\nu_q}{\epsilon_{ms}}\right)
\]

Therefore, substituting \( \frac{\partial q}{\partial \tau} \) and \( \frac{\partial q}{\partial J} \) into equation (14)we have

\[
\frac{dJ}{d\tau} = \theta_T \left( \frac{p - mc * \omega_{SR} \left(1 - \frac{\nu_q}{J}\right)}{\omega_{SR} *\frac{\nu_q}{J} * q * \text{mwtp}(Q) * \Delta} \right)
\]

\[
= \frac{p\theta_T \left( \frac{1 + \frac{\epsilon^{*} \text{D} - \nu_q}{\epsilon^{*} \text{S}} + \frac{\nu_q}{\epsilon_{ms}}}{\frac{\nu_q}{J} * q * \text{mwtp}(Q) * \Delta} - (1 - \frac{\nu_q}{\epsilon^{*} \text{D}}) \left(1 - \frac{\nu_q}{J}\right) \right)}{p \left(1 + \theta_T \right) + t \left( \frac{1 + \frac{\epsilon^{*} \text{D} - \nu_q}{\epsilon^{*} \text{D}} + \frac{\epsilon^{*} \text{D} - \nu_q}{\epsilon^{*} \text{S}} + \frac{1}{\epsilon_{ms}}}{\Delta} \right)}
\]

\( \text{OA-5} \)
Recall \( \Delta = \left[ 2 - \frac{\nu_q}{J} + \frac{\nu_q}{J_s \frac{p}{J}} + \frac{\nu_q}{\epsilon_m} \right] - \frac{\epsilon_D \frac{\partial P}{\partial J}}{\epsilon_s \frac{p}{J}} \left( 1 + \frac{\nu_q}{J_s \frac{p}{J}} + \frac{1}{\epsilon_m} \right) + \left( 1 - \frac{\nu_q}{J} \right) \epsilon_D \frac{JQ}{p(1+\tau) + t} \frac{\partial^2 P}{\partial J \partial Q}. \)

Substituting equation (16) into equation (13), then:

\[
\frac{dq}{d\tau} = -\theta \omega_{SR} \frac{\frac{\nu_q}{J} \left( p - mc \right) + q * mwtp(Q)}{\frac{\nu_q}{J} \Delta} \frac{\epsilon_D \frac{\partial P}{\partial J}}{\epsilon_s \frac{p}{J}} \left( p \left( 1 - \frac{\nu_q}{J} + \frac{\nu_q}{\epsilon_m} \right) - mc \right) \]

Finally,

\[
\rho_{\tau} = \frac{1}{p} \frac{1 + \tau}{1 + \theta \tau} \nu_q mwtp(Q) \frac{dq}{d\tau} + 1
\]

\[
= -\frac{\nu_q \theta (1 + \tau)}{J} \frac{\frac{\nu_q}{J} \left( p - mc \right) + q * mwtp(Q)}{\frac{\nu_q}{J} \Delta} \frac{\epsilon_D \frac{\partial P}{\partial J}}{\epsilon_s \frac{p}{J}} \left( p \left( 1 - \frac{\nu_q}{J} + \frac{\nu_q}{\epsilon_m} \right) - mc \right) + 1
\]

\[
= -\frac{\nu_q}{J} \Delta - \frac{\nu_q \theta (1 + \tau)}{J} \frac{\frac{\nu_q}{J} \left( p - mc \right) + \frac{\nu_q}{\epsilon_m}}{\frac{\nu_q}{J} \Delta} \frac{\epsilon_D \frac{\partial P}{\partial J}}{\epsilon_s \frac{p}{J}} \left( p \left( 1 - \frac{\nu_q}{J} + \frac{\nu_q}{\epsilon_m} \right) - mc \right)
\]

Using \( \frac{p-mc}{p} = \frac{\nu_q}{J} \epsilon_D \), we obtain:

\[
\rho_{\tau} = \frac{\Delta + \nu_q \frac{\theta (1 + \tau)}{J} \left[ 1 - \frac{1}{\epsilon_D} - \frac{1}{\epsilon_m} + \frac{\epsilon_D}{(1+\tau)p+t} \left( \frac{\epsilon_D}{\epsilon_s} \right) \right]}{\Delta}
\]
Derivation of $\Delta$

Let $\Delta = \left[ 2 - \frac{\nu_q}{J} + \frac{\nu_q}{\epsilon_s J} + \frac{\nu_q}{\epsilon_m J} \right] - \left( 1 + \frac{\nu_q}{\epsilon_s J} + \frac{1}{\epsilon_m J} \right) \epsilon_D \frac{J}{p(1 + \tau) + t} \frac{\partial P}{\partial J} + \left( 1 - \frac{\nu_q}{J} \right) \epsilon_D \frac{JQ}{p(1 + \tau) + t} \frac{\partial^2 P}{\partial J \partial Q}$, we show that $\Delta = -\frac{J \epsilon^* D}{p q} \frac{\partial \pi}{\partial J}$.

**Proof.** The effect of taxes on entry is derived by using the implicit function theorem on the long-run entry condition $\pi(q(J, t, \tau_0), J, t, \tau_0) = 0$, and the first-order condition of the firm $\frac{\partial \pi}{\partial q} = 0$, so that $\frac{dJ}{d\tau} = -\frac{\frac{\partial \pi}{\partial \tau}}{\frac{\partial \pi}{\partial J}}$. Therefore

$$\frac{\partial \pi}{\partial J} = -\frac{\frac{\partial \pi}{\partial q}}{\frac{\partial \pi}{\partial \tau}} = \frac{\frac{\partial \pi}{\partial q}}{1 + \frac{\theta \tau}{\tau} \frac{\partial \pi}{\partial \tau}} = \frac{\frac{\partial \pi}{\partial q}}{1 + \frac{\theta \tau}{\tau} (\frac{\partial P}{\partial J} + q * mwtp(Q) + mwtp(Q) * J * \left( 1 - \frac{\nu_q}{J} \right) \frac{\partial q}{\partial J})} = \frac{\frac{\partial \pi}{\partial q}}{1 + \frac{\theta \tau}{\tau} mwtp(Q)Q \frac{1}{J} (\Delta)} = \frac{\frac{\partial \pi}{\partial q}}{1 + \frac{\theta \tau}{\tau} \frac{p(1 + \tau) + t \ mwtp(Q)Q \frac{1}{p(1 + \tau) + t \ J} (\Delta)}} = \frac{-1}{\epsilon_D J} \frac{pq}{\Delta}$$

**Corollary.** A1. Consider the case of full-optimization ($\theta = \theta = 1$), homogeneous products ($\Lambda_0 = 0$) and no pre-existing taxes ($\tau_0 = t_0 = 0$). The marginal excess burden and pass-
through formulas are given respectively by:

\[
\frac{dW}{d\tau} = -Q_0 \frac{dp}{d\tau} \tag{17}
\]

\[
\rho_\tau = \frac{2 + \frac{\epsilon_D - \epsilon_{q0}}{\epsilon_S} \frac{\epsilon_{q0}}{\epsilon_{q0}}}{2 - \frac{\nu_q}{J_0} + \frac{\epsilon_D - \epsilon_{q0}}{\epsilon_S} \frac{\epsilon_{q0}}{\epsilon_{q0}}} \tag{18}
\]

\[
\frac{1}{p_0} \frac{dJ}{d\tau} = -\frac{J_\epsilon_D}{p_0} \left[ 1 + \frac{\epsilon_D - \epsilon_{q0}}{\epsilon_S} \frac{\epsilon_{q0}}{\epsilon_{q0}} + \frac{1}{\epsilon_{ms}} + \frac{1 - \nu_q}{\epsilon_D} \right] \tag{19}
\]

**Proof. Corollary A1.**

The proof is immediate by setting \(\theta_\tau = \theta_t = 1\), \(\Lambda_0 = 0\) and \(\tau_0 = t_0 = 0\) into the conditions of Proposition 2. \qedhere

**Lemma. A1.** For fixed \(\tau\). The effect of competition on prices and output is given respectively by:

\[
\frac{\partial p}{\partial J} = \left[ \frac{\partial P}{\partial J} - \frac{p + t}{J_\epsilon_D} \left( 1 + \frac{J_\partial q}{q_\partial J} \right) \right] \tag{20}
\]

\[
\frac{J_\partial q}{q_\partial J} = -\omega_{SR} \left[ 1 - \frac{\nu_q}{J_\epsilon_D} \left( 1 - \frac{1}{\epsilon_{ms}} \right) - \frac{J_\epsilon_D}{(1 + \tau)p + t_\partial q_\partial J} \right] \tag{21}
\]

Thus, in the case of constant marginal cost \((\epsilon_S = \infty)\), \(\frac{\partial p}{\partial J} < 0\) if and only if \(\frac{1}{\epsilon_{ms}} \frac{\Lambda_\epsilon_D}{(p + t)q} < 1\) and there is business stealing \(\left( \frac{\partial q}{\partial J} < 0 \right)\) whenever \(\frac{\Lambda_\epsilon_D}{(p + t)q} + \frac{\nu_q}{J_\epsilon_D} \left( 1 - \frac{1}{\epsilon_{ms}} \right) < 1\).

For fixed \(t\). The effect of competition on prices and output is given respectively by:

\[
\frac{\partial p}{\partial J} = \frac{1}{1 + \theta_\tau} \left[ \frac{\partial P}{\partial J} - \frac{p(1 + \tau)}{J_\epsilon_D} \left( 1 + \frac{J_\partial q}{q_\partial J} \right) \right] \tag{22}
\]

\[
\frac{J_\partial q}{q_\partial J} = -\omega_{SR} \left[ 1 - \frac{\nu_q}{J_\epsilon_D} \left( 1 - \frac{1}{\epsilon_{ms}} \right) - \frac{J_\epsilon_D}{(1 + \tau)p + t_\partial q_\partial J} \right] \tag{23}
\]

Thus, in the case of constant marginal cost \((\epsilon_S = \infty)\), \(\frac{\partial p}{\partial J} < 0\) if and only if \(\frac{1}{\epsilon_{ms}} \frac{\epsilon_D}{p(1 + \tau)} \frac{\partial P}{\partial J} < 1\) and there is business stealing \(\left( \frac{\partial q}{\partial J} < 0 \right)\) whenever \(\frac{\epsilon_D}{(1 + \tau)p} \frac{\partial P}{\partial J} + \frac{\nu_q}{J_\epsilon_D} \left( 1 - \frac{1}{\epsilon_{ms}} \right) < 1\). Furthermore, assuming parallel demands \(\frac{\partial P}{\partial J} = \frac{\Lambda}{Q}\).
Proof. **Lemma A1. Unit Taxes:**

From the behavioral equation $wtp(Q) = P(Q, J) = p + \theta t$, we can express price as a function of $J$ and $t$. Then we have

$$p(J, t) = P(Q(J, t), J) - \theta t$$

Therefore,

$$\frac{\partial p}{\partial J} = \frac{\partial P}{\partial J} + mwtp(Q, J) \frac{\partial Q}{\partial J}$$

$$= \frac{\partial P}{\partial J} + q * mwtp(Q, J) + mwtp(Q, J) * J * \frac{\partial q}{\partial J}$$

$$= \left[ \frac{\partial P}{\partial J} - \frac{p + t}{J\epsilon_D} \left(1 + \frac{J \partial q}{q \partial J}\right) \right]$$

From the proof of Proposition 1, we also have that:

$$\frac{\partial q}{\partial J} = -\frac{\Lambda}{Q} + mwtp(Q)q + q^2 \nu_q mwtp'(Q)$$

$$\frac{\partial q}{\partial J} = -\omega_{SR} \frac{\lambda}{JQ * mwtp(Q)} - \frac{q}{J} \omega_{SR} \left(1 - \frac{\nu_q}{J} + \frac{\nu_q}{J} \epsilon_{ms}\right)$$

Therefore,

$$\frac{\partial p}{\partial J} = \left[ \frac{\Lambda}{Q} - \frac{p + t}{J\epsilon_D} \left(1 + \frac{J \partial q}{q \partial J}\right) \right]$$

$$J \frac{\partial q}{q \partial J} = -\omega_{SR} \left[1 - \frac{\nu_q}{J} \left(1 - \frac{1}{\epsilon_{ms}}\right) - \frac{\Lambda\epsilon_D}{(p + t)q}\right]$$

**Ad valorem:**

The proof is analogous to Lemma 2. The only modification is that the behavioral equation for ad valorem taxation $p(J, t) = \frac{P(Q(J, t), J)}{1 + \theta t}$ implies a rescaling is needed for $\frac{\partial p}{\partial J}$. \qed
Comparison between Ad Valorem and Specific Taxation

We begin by considering the reduced-form effects of taxes in order to compare ad valorem to specific taxation. Throughout we will make use of the definitions

\[ \epsilon_D = -p(1+\tau) + t \]
\[ \epsilon_* = \frac{p(1+\theta_\tau)}{p(1+\tau) + t} \epsilon_D, \] and \( \Delta = \left[ 2 - \frac{\nu}{J} + \frac{\epsilon_D - \nu}{\epsilon_D} \frac{\epsilon_D}{\epsilon_D} \right] - \left( 1 + \frac{\epsilon_D - \nu}{\epsilon_D} + \frac{1}{\epsilon_D} \right) \epsilon_D \frac{J}{p(1+\tau) + t} \frac{\partial P}{\partial J} + \left( 1 - \frac{\nu}{J} \right) \epsilon_D \frac{J}{p(1+\tau) + t} \frac{\partial^2 P}{\partial J \partial Q} > 0 \) for the stability condition:

\[
\rho_t = \frac{\Delta + \frac{\nu}{J} \left( 1 - \frac{1}{\epsilon_D} \right)}{\Delta} \\
\rho_\tau = \frac{\Delta + \frac{\nu}{J} \left( 1 + \frac{1}{\epsilon_D} \right) \left( 1 - \frac{1}{\epsilon_D} \right) - \left( 1 + \frac{1}{\epsilon_D} + \frac{1}{\epsilon_D} \right) \epsilon_D \frac{J}{p(1+\tau) + t} \frac{\partial P}{\partial J} + \left( 1 - \frac{\nu}{J} \right) \epsilon_D \frac{J}{p(1+\tau) + t} \frac{\partial^2 P}{\partial J \partial Q} > 0 \}
\]

\[
\frac{dq}{dt} = -\frac{\theta_t q \epsilon_D}{p(1+\tau) + t} \left( 1 - \frac{1}{\epsilon_D} \right) \\
\frac{dq}{d\tau} = -\frac{\theta_t \epsilon_D}{p(1+\tau) + t} \left( 1 + \frac{1}{\epsilon_D} - \frac{1}{\epsilon_D} \right) \\
\frac{dJ}{dt} = -\frac{\theta_t J \epsilon_D}{p(1+\tau) + t} \left( 1 + \frac{1}{\epsilon_D} - \frac{1}{\epsilon_D} \right) \\
\frac{dJ}{d\tau} = -\frac{\theta_t \epsilon_D}{p(1+\tau) + t} \left( 1 + \frac{1}{\epsilon_D} - \frac{1}{\epsilon_D} \right) + \frac{1}{\epsilon_D} \left( 1 + \frac{1}{\epsilon_D} - \frac{1}{\epsilon_D} \right) \epsilon_D \frac{J}{p(1+\tau) + t} \frac{\partial P}{\partial J} + \left( 1 - \frac{\nu}{J} \right) \epsilon_D \frac{J}{p(1+\tau) + t} \frac{\partial^2 P}{\partial J \partial Q} > 0 \\
\frac{dQ}{dt} = -\frac{\theta_t q \epsilon_D}{p(1+\tau) + t} \left( 1 + \frac{1}{\epsilon_D} - \frac{1}{\epsilon_D} \right) \\
\frac{dQ}{d\tau} = -\frac{\theta_t \epsilon_D}{p(1+\tau) + t} \left( 1 + \frac{1}{\epsilon_D} - \frac{1}{\epsilon_D} \right) + \frac{1}{\epsilon_D} \left( 1 + \frac{1}{\epsilon_D} - \frac{1}{\epsilon_D} \right) \epsilon_D \frac{J}{p(1+\tau) + t} \frac{\partial P}{\partial J} + \left( 1 - \frac{\nu}{J} \right) \epsilon_D \frac{J}{p(1+\tau) + t} \frac{\partial^2 P}{\partial J \partial Q} > 0 \\
\frac{dW}{dt} = \Lambda \frac{dJ}{dt} + \theta_t \frac{dQ}{dt} - Q \frac{dp}{dt} \\
\frac{dW}{d\tau} = \Lambda \frac{dJ}{d\tau} + \theta_t \tau \frac{dQ}{d\tau} - Q \frac{dp}{d\tau} \\
\frac{dR}{dt} = Q + \frac{dQ}{dt} \\
\frac{dR}{d\tau} = pQ + \tau \frac{dQ}{d\tau} + \tau Q \frac{dp}{d\tau} \]
Proof. **Proposition 3.** Rewrite $\rho_\tau$ as:

$$\rho_\tau = \frac{2 + \frac{\epsilon_\rho - \nu_q}{\epsilon S \frac{\nu_q}{J}} - \frac{\theta_\tau (1+\tau)}{(1+\theta_\tau \tau)} \left( \frac{\nu_q}{J} - \frac{\nu_q}{\epsilon m_s} \right)}{\Delta}$$

$$= \frac{\frac{J \epsilon_D}{\epsilon S \frac{\nu_q}{J}} \frac{\partial P}{\partial J} \left( 1 + \frac{\epsilon_\rho - \nu_q}{\epsilon S \frac{\nu_q}{J}} + \frac{1}{\epsilon m_s} \right) + \frac{\theta_\tau (1+\tau)}{(1+\theta_\tau \tau) \epsilon S \frac{\nu_q}{J}} \left[ \frac{J \epsilon_D}{\epsilon S \frac{\nu_q}{J}} \frac{\partial P}{\partial J} - 1 \right]}{\Delta}$$

Then, observe that for $\theta_t = \frac{\theta_\tau (1+\tau)}{(1+\theta_\tau \tau)}$ (for example if $\theta_t = \theta_\tau$ and $\tau = 0$) then

$$\rho_\tau - \rho_t = \frac{\theta_\rho (1+\tau)}{(1+\theta_\rho \tau) \epsilon S \frac{\nu_q}{J}} \left[ \frac{J \epsilon_D}{\epsilon S \frac{\nu_q}{J}} \frac{\partial P}{\partial J} - 1 \right]$$

so

$$\rho_\tau > \rho_t \iff \frac{J \epsilon_D}{\epsilon S \frac{\nu_q}{J}} \frac{\partial P}{\partial J} > 1 \iff \Lambda \frac{Q}{Q} + \nu \ast mwtp(Q) > 0$$

We now consider the marginal cost of public funds (MCPF) starting from zero initial taxes.

$$R = \tau pQ + tQ$$

$$MCPF_t = -\frac{\Lambda dJ}{dt} + \theta_\tau \rho_t \frac{dQ}{dt} - \frac{Q}{Q} \frac{dp}{dt}$$

$$= -\frac{\Lambda dJ}{dt} + \frac{dp}{dt}$$

$$= -\frac{\Lambda dJ}{Q dt} + \rho_t - 1$$

$$MCPF_\tau = -\frac{\Lambda dJ}{d\tau} + \theta_\tau \tau p \frac{dQ}{d\tau} - \frac{Q}{pQ} \frac{dp}{d\tau}$$

$$= -\frac{\Lambda dJ}{p Q d\tau} + \rho_\tau - 1$$
Furthermore,

\[
\frac{dJ}{dt} = \frac{\theta_t}{\frac{\partial P}{\partial J} + q \times mwtp(Q)} + \frac{1 - \frac{1}{\frac{\partial P}{\partial J} + q \times mwtp(Q)}}{dp}
\]

\[
\frac{dJ}{d\tau} = \frac{p\theta_r}{\frac{\partial P}{\partial J} + q \times mwtp(Q)} + (1 + \theta_r \tau) \frac{1 - \frac{1}{\frac{\partial P}{\partial J} + q \times mwtp(Q)}}{dp}
\]

and when taxes are zero, we get:

\[
\frac{dJ}{dt} = \frac{\theta_t}{\frac{\partial P}{\partial J} + q \times mwtp(Q)} + \frac{1 - \frac{1}{\frac{\partial P}{\partial J} + q \times mwtp(Q)}}{dp} (\rho_t - 1)
\]

\[
\frac{dJ}{d\tau} = \frac{p\theta_r}{\frac{\partial P}{\partial J} + q \times mwtp(Q)} + \frac{1 - \frac{1}{\frac{\partial P}{\partial J} + q \times mwtp(Q)}}{dp} p(\rho_r - 1)
\]

and so

\[
MCPF_t = -\frac{\Lambda}{Q} \frac{\theta_t}{\frac{\partial P}{\partial J} + q \times mwtp(Q)} + (\rho_t - 1) \left( 1 - \frac{\Lambda}{Q} \frac{1 - \frac{1}{\frac{\partial P}{\partial J} + q \times mwtp(Q)}}{\frac{\partial P}{\partial J} + q \times mwtp(Q)} \right)
\]

\[
MCPF_r = -\frac{\Lambda}{Q} \frac{\theta_r}{\frac{\partial P}{\partial J} + q \times mwtp(Q)} + (\rho_r - 1) \left( 1 - \frac{\Lambda}{Q} \frac{1 - \frac{1}{\frac{\partial P}{\partial J} + q \times mwtp(Q)}}{\frac{\partial P}{\partial J} + q \times mwtp(Q)} \right)
\]

Assuming \( \theta_t = \theta_r \) and \( \tau = t = 0 \), and \( \frac{\partial P}{\partial J} = \frac{\Lambda}{Q} \), note that \( 1 - \frac{\Lambda}{Q} \frac{1 - \frac{1}{\frac{\partial P}{\partial J} + q \times mwtp(Q)}}{\frac{\partial P}{\partial J} + q \times mwtp(Q)} = \left( \frac{q \times mwtp(Q) + \frac{\Lambda}{Q}}{\frac{\partial P}{\partial J} + q \times mwtp(Q)} \right) \).

Therefore:

\[
\text{sign}(MCPF_t - MCPF_r) = \text{sign} \left( (\rho_r - \rho_t) \frac{q \times mwtp(Q) + \frac{\Lambda}{Q}}{\frac{\partial P}{\partial J} + q \times mwtp(Q)} \right)
\]

\[
= \text{sign} \left( q \times mwtp(Q) + \frac{\Lambda}{Q \frac{\partial P}{\partial J}} \right)
\]
Finally, observe:

\[
\text{sign} \left( \frac{1}{p} \frac{dJ}{dt} - \frac{dJ}{dt} \right) = \text{sign} \left( (p_r - p_t) \times \frac{1}{q} \frac{\partial p}{\partial J} + q \times mwtp(Q) \right)
\]

< 0

\[\square\]

C Microfoundations for Demand

In this section, we provide the microfoundation for parallel demands. First, we introduce a class of continuous choice models that are nested by our utility function.

Preferences. Let the representative consumer’s utility function given by

\[u_J(q_1, \ldots, q_J, m) = h_J(q_1, \ldots, q_J) + m\]

for any \(h_J : \{1, \ldots, J\} \rightarrow \mathbb{R}\) which is symmetric in all its arguments, continuously differentiable, strictly quasi-concave and \(h(0, \ldots, 0) = 0\) and where the linear good \(m\) is interpreted as money.

Demand. The consumer’s problem is

\[
\max u_J(q_1, \ldots, q_J, m) = h_J(q_1, \ldots, q_J) + m
\]

subject to \(m + \sum_{j=1}^{J} p_j q_j = y\).

When the consumer is facing symmetric prices \(p_j = p\) for all \(j\), we can transform the problem as follows. Define \(H_J(Q) = h_J \left( \frac{Q}{J}, \ldots, \frac{Q}{J} \right)\) where we interpret \(Q\) as aggregate demand.
The new problem then is given by

\[ u^*(p, J, y) = \max_Q H_J(Q) + y - pQ. \]

From the first-order condition, we obtain the family of inverse demands \( P(Q, J) = H'_J(Q) \).

Furthermore, it is easy to see that given the optimal aggregate quantity \( Q(p, J) \) for price \( p \), the strict quasi-concavity of \( h_J \) implies the consumer chooses symmetric quantities \( q_j = \frac{Q}{J} \) for all \( j \) in the original problem.

Furthermore, none of the assumptions on utility are too restrictive. We show that for any family of downward sloping aggregate demands there exists a utility function \( u_J : \mathbb{R}^{J+1} \to \mathbb{R} \) satisfying the conditions above that rationalize the aggregate demands. Let \( P(Q, J) \) be continuously differentiable and strictly decreasing in \( Q \). Let \( H \) be any antiderivative \( \int P(Q, J)dQ \), which exists because \( P(Q, J) \) is differentiable. Then, for some \( \rho \in (0, 1) \), the following is a strictly quasi-concave direct utility function that rationalizes \( P(Q, J) \) for integer \( J \) when all prices \( p_j \) in the market are equal:

\[ u(q_1, \ldots, q_J, m) = H\left( \left( \frac{1}{\rho} J^{\rho-1} \sum_{j=1}^{J} q_j^\rho \right)^{\frac{1}{\rho}} \right) + m. \]

Furthermore, we can make sense of \( J \) as a continuous variable if we permit a continuum of varieties \( q : [0, J] \to \mathbb{R} \) and let

\[ u_J(q, m) = H\left( \left( \int_0^J J^{\rho-1} q^\rho(j) dj \right)^{\frac{1}{\rho}} \right) + m. \]

We provide two examples in the following to further illustrate the idea of parallel demands and its applications.

**Example 1.** Bulow and Pfleiderer (1981) obtain the following three categories of inverse demands as the unique curves with the property of constant pass-through:
1. $P(Q,J) = \alpha_J - \beta_J Q^\delta$, for $\delta > 0$,
2. $P(Q,J) = \alpha_J - \beta_J \log(Q)$,
3. $P(Q,J) = \alpha_J + \beta_J Q^{1/\eta}$, for $\eta < 0$, which is the constant elasticity inverse demand shifted by the intercept $\alpha_J$.

An important case is when $\beta_J = \beta$ for all $J$, then the inverse aggregate demands are linearly separable in $J$ and $Q$ and they shift in parallel as $J$ moves. The fact that these are the only class of curves for which marginal costs are passed-on in a constant fraction makes them a tractable benchmark and therefore they have been popular in applied work. Fabinger and Weyl (2016) generalize Bulow and Pfeiferer (1983) and characterize a broader class of “tractable equilibrium forms” of the form $P(Q,J) = \alpha_J + \beta Q^t + \gamma Q^u$ which allow for greater modeling flexibility. Again, as long as $\beta$ and $\gamma$ are independent of $J$, then we say that the inverse demands shift in parallel.

**Example 2.** This example shows that our revealed-preference approach allows for rational preferences that display *hate-of-variety* ($a'(J) < 0$). Imagine there is a marginal cost of consumption $cJ$ for each unit of some good that is consumed; that is, for each unit consumed, the agent faces a constant cost of evaluating each of $J$ varieties before he chooses. Preferences are given by

$$U = H \left( \sum_{j=1}^{J} q_j \right) - cJ \sum_{j=1}^{J} q_j + m$$

where $H$ is concave. The inverse demands are then $P(Q,J) = h(Q) - cJ$ with $h = H'$ decreasing, therefore aggregate demand shifts inward as the variety increases (the intercept being $h(0) - cJ$). We can interpret this as the agent displaying a strong degree of thinking aversion or attention costs. More generally, if the inverse demands are given by $P(Q,J) = a(J) - h(Q)$ then the sign of $a'(J)$ is unrestricted.

\footnote{For example, for the first class one possible family of utility functions, among many, that rationalize the inverse aggregate demands is given by}

$$u_J(q_1, \ldots, q_J, m) = \alpha_J \left( J^{\rho-1} \sum_{i=1}^{J} q_i^\rho \right)^{\frac{1}{\rho}} - \beta_J \left( \sum_{i=1}^{J} q_i \right)^{\frac{\delta+1}{\delta+1}} + m.$$
D Formulas in Calibration

Taking logs and rescaling by \( \frac{W}{pQ} \) equation (11) we obtain the following expression which we use in Section 5 of the paper:

\[
\frac{d\log(W)}{d\log(1+\tau)} \frac{W}{pQ} = \tilde{\Lambda}_0 \frac{d\log(J)}{d\log(1+\tau)} - \frac{d\log(p)}{d\log(1+\tau)} + \theta_0 \tau_0 \frac{d\log(Q_L)}{d\log(1+\tau)}
\]

(21)

where \( \tilde{\Lambda}_0 \equiv \frac{\Lambda_0}{pQ} \).

We now show the derivation equation (18) in the paper. Note that the Lerner condition

\[
\frac{p-mc}{p(1+\tau)} = \frac{\nu_q}{(1+\theta_\tau)\epsilon_D}
\]

and the long-run free entry condition \( \frac{d\log(p)}{d\tau} = -\frac{p-mc}{p} \) we can identify

\[
\frac{\nu_q}{J} = -\epsilon_D \frac{1 + \theta_\tau \tau}{1 + \tau} \frac{d\log(p)}{d\tau}
\]

(22)

We have from Proposition 2, and assuming constant \( mc \), that

\[
\frac{dJ}{d\tau} = -\theta_\tau J \epsilon_D \left[ \frac{1 + \frac{1}{\epsilon_m + \frac{1 - \nu_q}{\epsilon_D}}}{\Delta} \right]
\]

and

\[
\rho_\tau = \frac{\Delta - \theta_\tau (1+\tau) \left( \frac{\nu_q}{\epsilon_D} - \frac{\nu_q}{J} + \frac{\nu_q}{\epsilon_m} \right) + \frac{\Lambda_\epsilon_D}{pq(1+\tau)q} \left( \theta_\tau (1+\tau) \frac{\nu_q}{(1+\theta_\tau)\epsilon_D} \right)}{\Delta}
\]

where \( \Delta \equiv 1 + \left[ 1 + \frac{\nu_q - \frac{\nu_q}{\epsilon_D}}{2 \epsilon_s} \right] \left[ 1 - \frac{\Lambda_\epsilon_D}{pq(1+\tau)q} \right] - \frac{1}{\epsilon_m + \frac{1 - \nu_q}{\epsilon_D}} - \frac{\Lambda_\epsilon_D}{pq(1+\tau)q} \frac{\nu_q}{J} \left[ 1 - \frac{1}{\epsilon_m} \right] \). Then

\[
\Delta = -\frac{\theta_\tau J \epsilon_D}{(1+\tau)} \left[ \frac{1 + \frac{1}{\epsilon_m + \frac{1 - \nu_q}{\epsilon_D}}}{\frac{dJ}{d\tau}} \right] = -\frac{\theta_\tau (1+\tau) \left( \frac{\nu_q}{\epsilon_D} - \frac{\nu_q}{J} + \frac{\nu_q}{\epsilon_m} \right) + \frac{\Lambda_\epsilon_D}{pq(1+\tau)q} \left( \theta_\tau (1+\tau) \frac{\nu_q}{(1+\theta_\tau)\epsilon_D} \right)}{\rho_\tau - 1}
\]

And so, using \( \rho_\tau - 1 = (1+\tau) \frac{d\log(p)}{d\tau} \), then

\[
\frac{\Lambda_\epsilon_D}{pq} \left( \frac{1}{1+\theta_\tau \tau} \frac{\nu_q}{\epsilon_D} \right) = -J \epsilon_D \frac{d\log(p)}{d\tau} \left[ \frac{1 + \frac{1}{\epsilon_m + \frac{1 - \nu_q}{\epsilon_D}}}{\frac{dJ}{d\tau}} \right] + \frac{1 + \tau}{(1+\theta_\tau)\epsilon_D} \left( \frac{\nu_q}{\epsilon_D} - \frac{\nu_q}{J} + \frac{\nu_q}{\epsilon_m} \right)
\]
which implies
\[
\Lambda \frac{\epsilon^*_D}{pq} (1 + \theta_\tau) \frac{d\log(p)}{d\tau} \left(1 + \frac{1}{\epsilon_{ms}} + \frac{1 - \nu_q}{\epsilon^*_D}\right) + (1 + \tau) \frac{\epsilon^*_D}{\epsilon_D} \left(\frac{1}{\epsilon^*_D} - 1 + \frac{1}{\epsilon_{ms}}\right)
\]

Now, from \(\frac{\epsilon^*_D}{\epsilon_D} = \frac{1 + \theta_\tau}{1 + \tau}\) and equation (22) we get
\[
\Lambda \frac{\epsilon^*_D}{p(1 + \tau)q} = -\frac{1 + \theta_\tau}{1 + \tau} \left(1 + \frac{\theta_\tau}{1 + \tau}\right) \frac{d\log(q)}{d\tau} \left(1 + \frac{1}{\epsilon_{ms}} + \frac{1 - \nu_q}{\epsilon^*_D}\right) + (1 + \theta_\tau) \left(\frac{1}{\epsilon^*_D} - 1 + \frac{1}{\epsilon_{ms}}\right)
\]
\[
= \left(1 + \frac{\theta_\tau}{1 + \tau}\right) \frac{d\log(q)}{d\tau} \left(1 + \frac{1}{\epsilon_{ms}} + \frac{1 - \nu_q}{\epsilon^*_D}\right) + (1 + \theta_\tau) \left(\frac{1}{\epsilon^*_D} - 1 + \frac{1}{\epsilon_{ms}}\right)
\]
\[
= \left(1 + \frac{\theta_\tau}{1 + \tau}\right) \left[\frac{d\log(q)}{d\tau} \left(1 + \frac{1}{\epsilon_{ms}} + \frac{1 - \nu_q}{\epsilon^*_D}\right) + \frac{1}{\epsilon^*_D} - 1\right]
\]
\[
= \left(1 + \frac{\theta_\tau}{1 + \tau}\right) \left[\frac{1}{\epsilon_{ms}} \left(\log(q) + 1\right) + \frac{d\log(q)}{d\tau} \left(1 + \frac{1 - \nu_q}{\epsilon^*_D}\right) + \frac{\nu_q}{\epsilon^*_D} - 1\right]
\]
\[
= \left(1 + \frac{\theta_\tau}{1 + \tau}\right) \left[\frac{1}{\epsilon_{ms}} \left(\log(Q) + 1\right) + \frac{d\log(Q)}{d\tau} \frac{d\log(J)}{d\tau} \left(1 + \frac{1 - \nu_q}{\epsilon^*_D}\right) + \frac{\nu_q}{\epsilon^*_D} - 2\right]
\]

E Data Appendix

E.1 Data Description

The RMS data records weekly prices and quantities by product at the barcode level, designated as Universal Product Codes (UPCs), for 35,000 stores in the United States (excluding Hawaii and Alaska). Products are organized in a hierarchical structure: there are over 2.5 million different UPCs, which are categorized into approximately 1,200 product-modules (e.g., fresh eggs, milk, aluminum foil, batteries, frozen desserts). In these data, we aggregate weekly revenue and quantities sold to the yearly level separately for each UPC. The average yearly
price for product (UPC) \( j \) in store \( r \) is calculated by dividing the total yearly revenue (from the sales of that product) by the number of units sold.

To obtain a module-level price index (aggregating average yearly prices across all of the products in a module), we follow Handbury and Weinstein (2015) and regress log average yearly price on UPC fixed effects and store fixed effects, separately for each module and each year. The estimated store fixed effects serve as the pre-tax price. To measure quantity demanded, we re-calculate yearly revenue replacing the price of each product \( j \) in store \( r \) by the average national price (across all stores in our sample), and then aggregate across products within a module-by-store-by-year cell. This effectively constitutes a price-weighted quantity demanded index based on prices that are common across stores, an approach that is similar to the real consumption index developed by Kaplan, Mitman and Violante (2020). We measure product variety as the simple count of distinct UPCs with positive sales within a module-by-store-by-year cell, and we show robustness to alternative variety measure that weights each variety by its national market share.\(^3\)

Our sales tax exemptions data is collected from a variety of sources, which includes state laws, state regulations, and online brochures. All sources are listed in Kroft et al. (2020), Online Appendix Table OA.2. In general, tax exemptions are set by U.S. states and are roughly module-specific. We therefore assign a tax exemption status to each state-module-year cell in our data. We then assign the appropriate tax rate given the inputed exemption status. In most cases, products are either taxed at the regular rate or fully exempt. In some states, some products are rather subject to a reduced rate. Our measures do take these features into account. We examine potential measurement error due to mis-assignment of exemption status in Section E.4 below.

\(^3\)Note that when a product does not show up in the RMS data, we don’t know if the product is not in the data because it wasn’t purchased or because it wasn’t available, so we aggregate to the year level to minimize the chance we are undercounting variety and avoiding a “mechanical” correlation between declining quantity demanded and low product variety.
E.2 Heterogeneous Effects

To investigate whether the reduced-form effects of taxes vary across types of products, we grouped modules into categories using Nielsen’s product category codes, and Appendix Figure OA.5 presents the estimates of the effects of taxes on prices, quantity, and variety in each of the five broad categories (health and beauty care, dry grocery, other food, cleaning products, other nonfood). We also present estimates of the price elasticity of demand in each of these categories for comparison, using the methodology in Kroft et al. (2020).

E.3 Robustness

First, we report the yearly OLS and 2SLS estimates for each of the main outcomes reported in Table 2 (i.e., pre-tax prices, quantity, and variety) for each year in Appendix Figures OA.1 and OA.2. These figures show that the county border pair estimates are very stable across years and clustered around the across-year simple unweighted average. We gain precision by pooling the OLS and 2SLS estimates across years, and these figures show that our model-based estimates are not sensitive to the specific choice of years in the sample.

Second, we show that our results do not rely on specific county border pairs by dropping each state (one at a time) and re-running our reduced-form analysis dropping all of the county border pairs that have a county in the dropped state. Appendix Figure OA.3 shows that our main results are very stable as we drop each state one by one.4

4These results are consistent with the binscatter plots of regression residuals presented in Appendix Figure OA.6, which show that our estimated effects of taxes on prices, quantity, and variety do not appear to be driven by outliers. We also show robustness to dropping alcohol and tobacco products in Appendix Table OA.3, since these products have excise taxes in some states and counties. This would not cause bias in the reduced-form analysis if the variation in excise taxes is uncorrelated with the variation in ad valorem sales taxes that is our focus in this paper.
E.4 Measurement Error in Tax Rates

There are two potential sources of measurement error in how we code tax rates. First, we only consider state-level exemptions. That is, we do not incorporate county-level exemptions or county-specific sales surtaxes. Our understanding is that these cases are uncommon. Second, in practice taxability may vary within modules in some cases. For example, in the state of New York, fruit drinks are tax exempt as long as they contain at least 70% real fruit juice, but are subject to the sales tax otherwise. Therefore, some products in Nielsen’s module “Fruit Juice- Apple”, may or may not be taxed in New York. We coded these products as tax exempt since we cannot readily identify the specific products that do not meet that threshold. In cases where it is impossible to tell whether the majority of products in a given module are subject to the tax or not, we chose to code the statutory tax rate as missing. This results in excluding less than 3 percent of the observations in our sample.

To insure that our results are not contaminated by measurement error, we re-estimate our key reduced-form elasticities excluding modules for which we suspect there might be some within-module variation in exemption status in some states. These modules are listed below:

- CANDY-NON-CHOCOLATE
- CANDY-CHOCOLATE
- FRUIT JUICE - APPLE
- FRUIT DRINKS & JUICES-CRANBERRY
- FRUIT DRINKS-OTHER CONTAINER
- FRUIT JUICE-REMAINING
- FRUIT JUICE - ORANGE - OTHER CONTAINER
- VEGETABLE JUICE AND DRINK REMAINING
- BAKERY - BREAD - FRESH
- BAKERY-BUNS-FRESH
- BAKERY-ROLLS-FRESH
- BAKERY-MUFFINS-FRESH
- BAKERY-CAKES-FRESH
- BAKERY-BREAKFAST CAKES/SWEET ROLLS-FRESH
- BAKERY-DOUGHNUTS-FRESH
- BAKERY-BAGELS-FRESH
- WATER-BOTTLED
- FRUIT-DRIED AND SNACKS
- PRECUT FRESH SALAD MIX
- FRUIT-REFRIGERATED
- COMBINATION LUNCHES
- REMAINING-READY MADE SALADS
- ENTREES-REFRIGERATED
Results for models that exclude the modules listed above are presented in Appendix Table OA.6. All estimates are very similar to those reported in Table 2.

References


Online Appendix Table OA.1:
Effect of Food and Nonfood Sales Taxes [Placebo Test]

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<td>Own tax rate differential</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.125)</td>
<td>(0.115)</td>
<td>(0.100)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other tax rate differential</td>
<td>0.015</td>
<td>0.054</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.106)</td>
<td>(0.093)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Specification:**
Food dummy y y y y
Cell (border pair by year) fixed effects y
N (observations) 8430 8430 8430 8430

**Notes:** This table reports regressions of prices, quantity, and product variety on average tax rates for food and nonfood products. For each border pair-by-year cell, there are two observations: one for food products and one for nonfood products. All variables are measured as within-cell differences between the two contiguous counties. Own tax rate is the average food tax rate differential for food observations and the average nonfood tax rate differential for nonfood observations. Other tax rate is the average food tax rate differential for nonfood observations and the average nonfood tax rate differential for food observations. Standard errors are clustered at the border pair-by-year cell-level. Each regression includes a dummy variable for food products. Observations are weighted to reflect the number of underlying module-by-store-by-year observations in each cell.
Online Appendix Table OA.2
Variance Decomposition of Tax Rates

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Variance of log(1+τ)</td>
<td>0.0010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Standard deviation of log(1+τ)</td>
<td>0.0312</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Standard deviation within:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Store × Year cells</td>
<td>0.0269</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Module × Border Pair × Year cells</td>
<td>0.0108</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fraction of variance within:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Store × Year cells</td>
<td>74.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Module × Border Pair × Year cells</td>
<td>11.9%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: This table reports variance decompositions of the tax rate variable in the RMS data.
Online Appendix Table OA.3:
Effect of Sales Taxes on Prices, Quantity, and Product Variety

[Robustness to Dropping Alcohol and Tobacco Product Modules]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dependent Variable:</th>
<th>Prices (1)</th>
<th>Quantity (2)</th>
<th>Variety (3)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>\log(1 + r_{mcn})</td>
<td>0.008 (-0.011)</td>
<td>-0.678 (-0.137)</td>
<td>-0.261 (-0.060)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>\log(1 + r_{mcn})</td>
<td>0.011 (-0.011)</td>
<td>-0.736 (-0.135)</td>
<td>-0.267 (-0.060)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Panel A: County Border Pair OLS Estimates

Panel B: 2SLS Estimates Using State-Level Tax Rate as Instrument

Specification:
Store fixed effects | y | y | y
Module × County Border Pair fixed effects | y | y | y

Notes: Sales tax rates are measured annually based on the rates that were effective on September 1. Sales, prices, and variety are measured yearly. The Retail Scanner data is restricted to modules above the 80th percentile of the national distribution of sales. All reported coefficients are simple averages of nine estimated coefficients -- one for each year from 2006 to 2014. The sample is restricted to border counties and observations are weighted by the inverse of number of pairs a store belongs to. Standard errors are clustered two-way at the state-module level and at the border pair by module level. In panel B, the tax rate is instrumented with the state-level, leave-county-out, average tax rate.
**Online Appendix Table OA.4: Additional Sensitivity Analysis of Calibration Results**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Panel A: Calibrated parameters</th>
<th>Baseline calibration</th>
<th>Alternative demand elasticity and tax salience parameters</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Average tax rate, $\tau_0$</td>
<td>0.034</td>
<td>0.034 0.034 0.034 0.034 0.034</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tax salience parameter, $\theta_t$</td>
<td>0.556</td>
<td>0.500 0.612 0.556 0.556 0.556</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Demand elasticity, $\epsilon_D$</td>
<td>1.170</td>
<td>1.170 1.170 1.287 1.053 1.053</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Panel B: Reduced-form estimates</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pass-through of taxes into pre-tax prices, $d \log(p)/d \log(1+\tau)$</td>
<td>0.039 0.039 0.039 0.039 0.039</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quantity response, $d \log(Q)/d \log(1+\tau)$</td>
<td>-0.731 -0.731 -0.731 -0.731 -0.731</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Variety response, $d \log(J)/d \log(1+\tau)$</td>
<td>-0.243 -0.243 -0.243 -0.243 -0.243</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Panel C: Model parameters estimated by matching reduced-form estimates</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Markup, $(p - c'(q))/p$</td>
<td>0.080 0.080 0.080 0.080 0.080</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Implied conduct parameter, $\nu_q/J$</td>
<td>0.092 0.092 0.101 0.083</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inverse elasticity of marginal surplus, $\epsilon_{ms}$</td>
<td>-0.903 -0.970 -0.846 -0.903 -0.903</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Variety effect parameter, $\tilde{\Lambda}_0$</td>
<td>0.125 0.366 -0.108 -0.113 0.425</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Panel D: Calibrated welfare formulas</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Full marginal excess burden (MEB) formula, $d\tilde{W}/dt$</td>
<td>-0.083 -0.140 -0.028 -0.025 -0.156</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alternative MEB formula benchmarks:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Harberger/CLK benchmark, $\theta_t\tau_0* d \log(Q)/d \log(1+\tau)$</td>
<td>-0.014 -0.012 -0.015 -0.014 -0.014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Besley(1989)-style benchmark; i.e., full MEB formula with $\tilde{\Lambda}_0 = 0$</td>
<td>-0.053 -0.051 -0.054 -0.053 -0.053</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% difference between full formula and Besley(1989)-style benchmark</td>
<td>57.5% 172.9% -48.3% -51.8% 195.3%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Notes:** This table reports structural parameter estimates by finding parameters that allow the model to match the reduced-form estimates. The table reports sensitivity to different assumptions on the demand elasticity and the tax salience parameter.
Online Appendix Table OA.5: Counterfactual Scenarios Comparing Ad Valorem and Unit Tax Taxes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variety effect parameter, ( \hat{\Lambda}_0 )</th>
<th>Baseline variety effect estimate, ( \hat{\Lambda}_0 = 0.125 )</th>
<th>No variety effect counterfactual, ( \hat{\Lambda}_0 = 0.000 )</th>
<th>Large variety effect counterfactual, ( \hat{\Lambda}_0 = 1.000 )</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ad valorem tax (( dt ))</td>
<td>Specific tax (( dt ))</td>
<td>Ad valorem tax (( dt ))</td>
<td>Specific tax (( dt ))</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>(2)</td>
<td>(3)</td>
<td>(4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Panel A: Pass-through of taxes into pre-tax prices</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( d\log(p)/d\log(1+\tau) ) or ( d\log(p)/dt )</td>
<td>0.039</td>
<td>0.059</td>
<td>0.036</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Difference b/w ad valorem and specific tax</td>
<td>-0.020</td>
<td>-0.024</td>
<td>0.004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Panel B: Marginal cost of public funds (( MC\Pi F ))</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( MC\Pi F_t ), or ( MC\Pi F_t )</td>
<td>0.082</td>
<td>0.067</td>
<td>0.048</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Difference between ad valorem and specific tax</td>
<td>0.015</td>
<td>-0.024</td>
<td>0.273</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Panel C: The effects of taxes on variety and profits</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( d\log(J)/d\log(1+\tau) ) or ( d\log(J)/dt )</td>
<td>-0.243</td>
<td>0.037</td>
<td>-0.245</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( \partial \log(\pi)/\partial \log(1+\tau) ) or ( \partial \log(\pi)/\partial t )</td>
<td>-0.041</td>
<td>0.006</td>
<td>-0.041</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Panel D: Competitive effects of entry</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( \partial \log(p)/\partial \log(J) )</td>
<td>-0.106</td>
<td>-0.105</td>
<td>-0.092</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( \partial \log(q)/\partial \log(J) )</td>
<td>-0.751</td>
<td>-0.740</td>
<td>-0.911</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stability condition (must be &gt;0)</td>
<td>1.822</td>
<td>1.822</td>
<td>1.806</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: This table reports counterfactual estimates of reduced-form effects of specific taxes under different assumptions on the variety effect based on using the model parameter estimates of Table 4. The difference between the ad valorem and specific tax \( MC\Pi F \) estimates (\( MC\Pi F_t \), - \( MC\Pi F_t \)) switches sign as the variety effect increases (comparing columns (1) and (2) to (3) and (4)). The difference between ad valorem and specific tax pass-through rate is less sensitive to the variety effect and only switches sign when the variety effect is large (columns (5) and (6)).
Online Appendix Table OA.6: Robustness to Measurement Error, Effect of Sales Taxes on Prices, Quantity, and Product Variety

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dependent Variable:</th>
<th>Prices</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
<th>Variety</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>(2)</td>
<td>(3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>log(1 + r_{mcn})</td>
<td>0.028</td>
<td>-0.607</td>
<td>-0.198</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.017)</td>
<td>(0.170)</td>
<td>(0.080)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Panel A: County Border Pair OLS Estimates

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>log(1 + r_{mcn})</th>
<th>0.028</th>
<th>-0.607</th>
<th>-0.198</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.017)</td>
<td>(0.170)</td>
<td>(0.080)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Panel B: 2SLS Estimates Using State-Level Tax Rate as Instrument

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>log(1 + r_{mcn})</th>
<th>0.030</th>
<th>-0.671</th>
<th>-0.207</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.017)</td>
<td>(0.169)</td>
<td>(0.080)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Specification:

| Store fixed effects | y | y | y |
| Module × County Border Pair fixed effects | y | y | y |

Notes: The sample is derived from the Nielsen Retail Scanner data covering the years 2006-2014. The sample excludes modules with potential variation in tax rate exemptions across products within the module. Sales tax rates are measured annually based on the rates that were effective on September 1. Sales, prices, and variety are measured yearly. All reported coefficients are simple averages of nine estimated coefficients -- one for each year from 2006 to 2014. The sample is restricted to border counties and observations are weighted by the inverse of number of pairs a store belongs to. Standard errors are clustered two-way at the state-module level and at the border pair by module level. In panel B, the tax rate is instrumented with the state-level, leave-county-out, average tax rate.
### Online Appendix Table OA.7: Sensitivity of calibration results to alternative values of variety response, demand elasticity, and tax salience parameters

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Panel A: Calibrated parameters</th>
<th>Baseline calibration</th>
<th>Hold model parameters fixed</th>
<th>Re-estimate model parameters</th>
<th>Alternative demand elasticity and tax salience parameters</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Average tax rate, $\tau_0$</td>
<td>0.034</td>
<td>0.034</td>
<td>0.034</td>
<td>0.034</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tax salience parameter, $\theta_t$</td>
<td>0.556</td>
<td>0.556</td>
<td>0.556</td>
<td>0.500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Demand elasticity, $\epsilon_D$</td>
<td>1.170</td>
<td>1.170</td>
<td>1.170</td>
<td>1.287</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Panel B: Reduced-form estimates</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pass-through of taxes into pre-tax prices, $d \log(p)/d \log(1+\tau)$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quantity response, $d \log(Q)/d \log(1+\tau)$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Variety response, $d \log(J)/d \log(1+\tau)$</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Panel C: Model parameters estimated by matching reduced-form estimates</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Markup, $(p - c'(q))/p$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Implied conduct parameter, $v_q/J$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inverse elasticity of marginal surplus, $\epsilon_{ms}$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Variety effect parameter, $\Lambda_0$</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Panel D: Calibrated welfare formulas</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Full marginal excess burden (MEB) formula, $dW/d\tau$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alternative MEB formula benchmarks:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Harberger/CLK benchmark, $\theta_0 \cdot \tau_0 \cdot d \log(Q)/d \log(1+\tau)$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Besley(1989)-style benchmark; i.e., full MEB formula with $\Lambda_0 = 0$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% difference between full formula and Besley(1989)-style benchmark</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Notes:** This table reports structural parameter estimates by finding parameters that allow the model to match the reduced-form estimates. The table reports sensitivity to different assumptions on the demand elasticity and the tax salience parameter. Columns (2) and (3) use the alternative variety response to taxes, while columns (4) through (7) vary both the demand elasticity and tax salience parameters but hold the product of the tax salience parameter and demand elasticity constant in order to ensure that $d \log(Q)/d \log(1+\tau)$ is constant.
Notes: This figure shows yearly estimates of the effects of sales taxes on price (panel A), quantity (panel B) and product variety (C). All models are based on equation (17) and estimated by OLS. The black vertical bars indicate 95% confidence intervals. The dashed red horizontal line indicates the average coefficient estimate across all 9 years, and the red area denotes the 95% confidence interval around that average.
Figure OA.2: Year-by-Year 2SLS Regression Coefficients

Panel A: log Prices

Panel B: log Quantity

Panel C: log Product Variety

Notes: This figure shows yearly estimates of the effects of sales taxes on price (panel A), quantity (panel B) and product variety (C). All models are based on equation (17) and estimated by 2SLS. The instrument is the average state-level, leave-county-out average tax rate for each module-year cell. The black vertical bars indicate 95% confidence intervals. The dashed red horizontal line indicates the average coefficient estimate across all 9 years, and the red area denotes the 95% confidence interval around that average.
Figure OA.3: Leave-State-Out Regression Coefficients

Panel A: log Prices

Panel B: log Quantity

Panel C: log Product Variety

Notes: This figure shows yearly leave-state-out estimates of the effects of sales taxes on price (panel A), quantity (panel B) and product variety (C). All models are based on equation (17) and estimated by OLS. For each regression, all stores located in a given state or in a county adjacent to that state are dropped. The blue vertical bars indicate 95% confidence intervals. The dashed red horizontal line indicates the average coefficient estimate across all 9 years, and the red area denotes the 95% confidence interval around that average.
Figure OA.4: Correlations between County Demographics and Tax Rates

Notes: This figure shows correlation coefficients between county-level demographics (from the American Community Survey) and county-level average sales tax rates in 2008. Blue dots depict correlations with the average tax rate on food products. Red squares depict correlations with the average tax rate on non-food products. Green diamonds depict correlations with the county-specific difference between tax rates on non-food and food products. All correlations are estimated by OLS using a specification that includes border-pair fixed effects. The horizontal dashed bars indicate 95% confidence intervals. Standard errors are clustered at the state level.
Notes: This figure shows estimates of the effects of sales taxes on price (panel A), quantity (panel B) and product variety (C) for different categories of products. Models for panels A, B and C are based on an augmented version of equation (17), in which tax rates are interacted with indicators for 5 different categories of goods. Panel D shows corresponding estimates of the demand elasticity, estimated using the methods described in Kroft et al. (2021). The blue dashed bars indicate 95% confidence intervals. The red vertical line indicates the average coefficient estimate across all 9 years, and the red area denotes the 95% confidence interval around that average.
Notes: This figure shows binscatter plots of regression residuals from models estimating the effects of sales taxes on price (panel A), quantity (panel B) and product variety (C). The number of bins is set to 20. All residuals are based on equation (17) and estimated by OLS. The red lines show the linear fit, the slope of which corresponds to our main estimates reported in Table 2.