

Online Appendix
The impact of Presidential appointment of judges: Montesquieu or the Federalists?

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A. Variable Definitions and sources

State Wins = This is a case-level dummy variable for State victories. Law firm coded this variable as 1 for a State victory and 0 for a State loss based on reading the judgement orders retrieved from an online portal that records High Court cases in Pakistan (<https://www.pakistanlawsite.com/>) and High Court Registrar Offices. More information on this source and data construction can be found in Appendix B.3.

Case Delay = This variable is calculated as the difference between the case decision and filing years. Both pieces of this information of filing and decision years are clearly marked at the top of every judgement order.

Merit Decisions = A dummy variable for the case being decided based on “*evidence rather than technical or procedural grounds*” (Pound, 1963). This comes from the assessments by the Law firm based on their reading of the text of the judgment order.

Correct Decisions = A dummy variable that switches on if the cases is rated as correct. This comes from the assessments by the Law firm based on their reading of the text of the judgment order.

Process Followed = This is a discrete variable that rates from 1 to 5 the extent to which “all relevant jurisdictional, procedural, and evidential requirements were followed in reaching the judicial decision”. A higher rating implies higher jurisdictional, procedural, and evidential standards are followed while making the judicial decision. This rating also comes from assessments by the legal experts at the law firm based on their reading of the text of the judgment order.

Retirements in 2010 x Post 2010/Total Judges = This variable is the fraction of judges reaching their mandatory retirement age of 62 in 2010. This variable is interacted with a post-2010 reform dummy variable. Information to construct this variable is obtained from the judicial administrative records of the Registrar Offices of the High Courts.

Appointments in 2010 x Post 2010/Total Judges = This variable is the fraction of judges appointed by the judicial commission in 2010. This variable is interacted with a post-2010 dummy variable. Information on new appointments is obtained from the judicial administrative records of the Registrar Offices of the High Courts.

Cumulative Retirements Since 2010-2019 = This variable is the cumulative fraction of judges expected to reach their mandatory retirement age of 62 in each district bench from 2010 to 2019, as determined by the predicted trajectory of mandatory retirements in 2010. Information to

construct this variable is obtained from the judicial administrative records of the Registrar Offices of the High Courts of Pakistan.

Cumulative Appointments Since 2010-2019 = This variable is the cumulative fraction of judges appointed by the judicial commission from 2010 to 2019. Information to construct this variable is obtained from the judicial administrative records of the Registrar Offices of the High Courts of Pakistan.

Criminal Case = A dummy for criminal cases. This is indicated in the text of the judgement order.

Constitutional Case = A dummy for constitutional cases. This is indicated in the text of the judgement order.

Land Case = A subset of the constitutional cases. This is a dummy for the case involving a landownership or expropriation dispute with the State. These are “Eminent Domain” cases. The State here is the housing development agency authorized to resolve disputes with the public regarding land ownership on behalf of the government (the Defense Housing Authority, the Lahore Development Authority (LDA), the Karachi Development Authority (KDA), the Peshawar Development Authority (PDA), and the Capital Development Authority (CDA)).

Human-Rights Case = A subset of the constitutional cases. This is a dummy variable for the case involving a political-rights dispute with the State. These cases are marked as “writ petitions” in the text of the judgment order and are non-land cases against the government involving violation of a fundamental right.

Islamic Law Case = A subset of criminal cases that involve Islamic Law violations, i.e. all cases that were judged under the “Hudood Ordinance”. These cases involve consumption of alcohol, adultery, false accusation of fornication, fornication, homosexuality, and blasphemy.

Number of Lawyers = A count variable for the number of lawyers arguing the case. This is also indicated in the text of the judgment order.

Number of Judges = A count variable for the number of judges adjudicating upon the case. This is also indicated in the text of the judgment order.

Bench Chief Justice = A dummy variable for the Chief Justice adjudicating in the case. This is also indicated in the text of the judgment order.

Number of Pages of Judgment Orders = A count variable for the number of pages in the judgment order. This is also indicated in the text of the judgement order.

Age at appointment = The difference between date of birth and age at appointment. This data is obtained from Judicial Administrative Data Records at the High Court Registrar Offices.

Gender = A dummy for male judges. This is coded in two ways: 1) Manually, where the author checks every judge name, and 2) Automatically, where the author asked Stata to read the string starting with “Justice Miss” and “Justice Mrs.” as zero and the string starting with “Justice Mr.” as one. The two methods yielded an identical number of male and female justices.

Promoted to SC = A dummy for the judge being elevated to the Supreme Court. This comes from the judicial administrative records of the Supreme Court Registrar Office.

Former Lawyer = A dummy for the judge having been a Lawyer before being appointed as a High-Court justice. The data comes from Bar Council records, and judicial administrative data.

Former Office Holder Bar Association = A dummy for the judge having been an office holder in the Lawyers’ Bar Association (before being appointed a High-Court justice). The data comes from a combination of biographical information contained in Bar Council records, and judicial administrative data.

Ran for Political Office = A dummy for the judge having run for State or national elections prior to appointment. The data comes from the Election Commission of Pakistan matched with judicial administrative data.

Former Judge = A dummy for the judge having formerly been a lower (civil or session) court judge. The data comes from Bar Council records, and judicial administrative data.

Total Judges in District Bench = A district-bench-year count variable of the number of judges on a district bench in a given year. This variable is constructed from information from registrar office records.

Number of Judges on Bench = This is the number of judges in a given judicial bench of a given district court. This is obtained from the judicial administrative records of the Registrar Offices of the High Courts and Annual Reports submitted to the Ministry of Law, Justice and Human Rights, Government of Pakistan.

B. Data Appendix: Additional information and data collection

Appendix B.1. The History and Structure of Courts in Pakistan

This subsection presents the background and structure of the Courts in Pakistan. The Indian High Courts Act of 1861 authorized the Crown to create High Courts in the Indian colony. These Courts served as precursors to the modern-day High Courts in both India and Pakistan. With the independence of India and Pakistan from British colonial rule in 1947, gradual changes were made in the legal institutions in both countries, but both retained their overarching institutional structure, such as Common Law jurisprudence. One change that is relevant here is the raising of the mandatory retirement age from 60 to 62. India raised the retirement age of High Court judges to 62 in 1963 and Pakistan made the same change in 1969 (both under constitutional amendments); mandatory retirement at age 62 for High Court judges in both countries remained ever since. It is also worth noting that this change occurred long before the selection reform of 2010.

Pakistan's judiciary is a three-tier hierarchical structure. The lowest Courts are the civil and session Courts, which hear civil and criminal cases respectively. These Courts' jurisdictions are dictated by the domicile of the litigating parties. Decisions by civil and session Courts can be challenged in the High Courts. If the government expropriates land or violates a fundamental right, the High Court is the first, and in most cases the only, remediation platform for individuals and firms. Cases are randomly assigned across judges subject to judge capacity and specialization constraint. Although there are only four provincial High Courts and one federal court High Court in Islamabad, the benches of each are spread out over the four provinces in the form of 16 district High Court divisional units (Alam, 2021). Within each district, there are four judicial benches consisting of about 7 judges each. These are property bench, writ or human rights bench, tax bench and criminal bench. Importantly, Pakistani laws and capacity constraints only allow for judicial vacancy to be filled at the judicial bench level. For instance, property judge bench can only be replaced by the judge of same expertise. Moreover, in the High Courts studied are particularly important because it is here cases can be filed against the government. This takes the form of a constitutional or criminal petition with the State as a party. Constitutional cases involving The State are filed against the federal government, provincial governments, local governments, or any organ of the state that yields executive authority (such as the office of the Prime Minister). Finally, there is the final appellate Court, the Supreme Court of Pakistan, located in the federal capital of

Islamabad. This typically hears appeals on “technical” grounds for the criminal and constitutional cases in the High Courts. The Supreme Court can have at most 16 judges, which greatly limits the number and scope of cases it can hear. Only a small fraction of cases therefore ends up being heard by the Supreme Court.

Appendix B.2. *The Political landscape at the time of the selection reform*

Since the 1990s, Pakistan has largely been dominated by two political parties: the Center-Right Pakistan Muslim League Nawaz (PML-N, henceforth) led by Nawaz Sharif, and the Center-Left Pakistan Peoples’ Party (PPP, henceforth) led by Benazir Bhutto. The 1990s was also a particularly volatile period in Pakistan’s history. First, no government was able to complete its five-year electoral term. Second, there were eight changes of Prime Minister and five changes of President over this period, rotating between the PML-N and the PPP. It was in this time of political uncertainty that the then army chief, General Pervez Musharraf, stepped in and seized power to ensure “stability”, in the “coup d’état of 1999.” General Musharraf consolidated his power and won a controversial referendum in 2002 that awarded him five years of Presidency; he managed to cobble together a coalition government consisting of ex-PPP and ex-PML-N lawmakers (Bose and Jalal, 2004).

With elections due in January 2008 and Musharraf leading the polls, the sudden assassination of Benazir Bhutto on December 27th, 2007 drastically changed Pakistan’s political landscape. The PPP managed to obtain the majority (Perlez and Gall, 2008), with many analysts attributing this result to a “sympathy wave” sweeping across the country as a direct consequence of the assassination (Basu, 2008). General Musharraf’s political allies obtained less than 10% of the vote, and Musharraf resigned as President on 8th September 2008, once the impeachment proceedings were due to start. On 9th September 2008, the PPP Chairman, the widower of Benazir Bhutto, Asif Ali Zardari, was sworn in as the 11th President of Pakistan. It was against this backdrop that President Zardari gave a small parliamentary committee party the authority to frame an amendment to the constitution that would dramatically change judicial selection in Pakistan. The idea was that an independent judiciary might reduce the power of the military and provide a safeguard against future “unconstitutional” military takeovers (Zafar, 2012; Almeida, 2018).

Appendix B.3. Case Data Sources and Construction

Both the case characteristics and the outcome variables are based on judgment orders available online from the central repository of cases used by Lawyers in Pakistan to prepare their cases: (<https://www.pakistanlawsite.com/>) and High Court Registrar Offices. This website is the “Central Library” for lawyers preparing cases, and is also used by lawyers to prepare their cases. Access is password-protected, and permission to use the website and cases is obtained via a Law firm. This is combined with archives at the High Court’s Registrar Offices. In principle, these two data sources combine to provide the universe of High Court cases in Pakistan; we chose a sample period from 1986 to 2019 inclusive, given our budget and research question. We randomly sample 0.2% of all the available cases in every year from the universe of cases decided in that year from 1986 to 2019 inclusive. The random sample is *conditional* on State being one of the defendants. The number of cases decided in a given year gradually rises over time, most likely due to rising population, and this is reflected in a gradual increase in our sample. Figure C6 presents this information as a plot of sampled cases versus total available cases.

Two independent teams of four lawyers each supervised by a senior Lawyer recorded the key information in the judgment texts for the 8500 cases. We ensured via a formal contract that both teams worked independently. Random field visits also reassured us that the contract was being enforced. Table C1 presents the means of the outcome variables and case characteristics coded by the two teams, as well as the correlation coefficient between them. There is a strong correlation between the coding of the two teams. For instance, the average State Wins from Team 1 is 0.50 and the correlation coefficient for State Wins between the two teams is 0.85. Unsurprisingly given the high correlation coefficients, similar results are obtained using the cases coded by Team 2 (Table C20 reports for robustness of our main results using coding by Team 2). The two senior lawyers supervising the teams were experts in “constitutional law” with over 10 and 12 years of experience as attorneys practicing constitutional law, respectively. They were hence particularly suited to supervise coding of cases involving the State. The remaining 8 people who did the actual coding exercise were legal experts and had all passed “L.L.M” examination which is equivalent to 2 years master’s degree in law. This is the main requirement to practice law as an attorney in Pakistan. These coders were essentially junior attorneys starting practice as lawyers with the law firm. The teams were given no information on the research question, to ensure that the those

performing the coding exercise did not know whether a judge was appointed by peers or the President as this might risk biasing the results. Nevertheless, it is possible that since the law firm is based in Lahore, some legal experts might have had information about some judges in the Lahore district, including how they were appointed. We therefore show that the results are robust to excluding cases adjudicated in political capitals (including Lahore) in Table C12 of Appendix C.

While legal experts' coding the variables may be an improvement over having the cases coded by research assistants without much understanding of legal context, there is unavoidable subjectivity in the coding of whether the government obtained a victory or whether the decision was on case merits. In contrast, the level of subjectivity is likely to be low for the case delay outcome variable. This is because it is computed simply based on an accurate reading of the judgment text (where case delay = case decision year – case filing year). Both these pieces of information are explicitly mentioned in the judgment order which we use to construct the case delay variable. This observation is reflected in Table C1 where the correlation coefficient between Teams 1 and 2 of more subjective outcome variables (State Wins, Merit, Process Followed) is in the range of 0.85-0.90, while the correlation coefficient for case delay between the two teams is almost exactly one.

Appendix C. Additional Tables and Figures




Figure C1. Jurisdictions covered by District High Courts of Pakistan

Note: peshhc stands for Peshawar High Court, abthc for Abbottabad High Court, khyhc for Khyber High Court, islhc for Islamabad High Court and so forth.




Figure C2. State Wins over Time by District (16-panel graph)

Note: The figure plots average State Wins over time for every district (or division). abohc is average State Wins over time across all benches in Abbottabad, islhc is average State Wins over time for all benches in Islamabad and so on. Vertical line represents the 2010 reform year.







Figure C3. Cumulative Mandatory Retirements and Judicial Commission Appointments

Note: The figure plots key explanatory variables used in specification (2), which vary at district-bench-year level. Each of the four panels shows a specialized bench adjudicating cases involving tax, property, human rights, and crime, respectively. The dark line represents the fraction of judges reaching their mandatory retirement age of 62 in each district bench from 2010 onwards. The predicted trajectory of retirements from 2010-2019 as determined by age structure of judges in 2010. The light line represents the fraction of judges appointed by the judicial commission (peer judges) in each district bench from 2010-2019.




Figure C4. Impact of Mandatory Retirements in 2010 on State Wins by Type of Cases

Note: This figure presents the coefficients along with their 95% confidence intervals when we estimate specification (3) on sample of all constitutional cases (Table 7, Panel A), and its constituent land and political rights cases (Table 7, Panel B).




Figure C5. Confidence Interval by Wild Bootstrap Clustering

Note: The figure displays confidence interval for our coefficient of interest for the first specification (1) using wild bootstrap clustering, as per Cameron et al. (2008), that imposes a small cluster correction. Roodman et al. (2019)'s *bootest* in Stata 15.1 is used to construct this confidence interval.




Figure C6. Total vs. Sampled Cases

Note: These are 8500 randomly sampled cases for all years from 1986 to 2019 from the universe of district High Courts in Pakistan (0.2% of total cases decided in the period are sampled).

Table C1—Outcome Variables and Case Characteristics

Variables	Team 1	Team 2	Difference	Correlation (ρ)
State Wins	0.48	0.56	-0.08	0.85
Merit	0.63	0.67	-0.05	0.91
Case Delay	3.35	3.33	0.02	0.99
Process Followed	3.31	3.22	0.09	0.88
Correct Decisions	0.47	0.44	0.02	0.95
Constitutional	0.72	0.70	0.02	0.95
<i>Land Cases</i>	0.41	0.38	0.03	0.94
<i>HR Cases</i>	0.31	0.33	-0.02	0.96
Criminal Cases	0.28	0.29	-0.01	0.98
No. of Lawyers	4.12	4.09	0.03	0.96
No. of Judges	1.81	1.84	-0.03	0.95
CJ in Bench	0.07	0.08	-0.02	0.87
Pg. of Judgment	8.88	8.70	0.18	0.95

Note: This table compares the outcome variables and case characteristics for the two teams of coders for the same 8446 cases used in the analysis. Team 1 data are used in the regressions (except Table C20 that reports that essentially identical results are found if we use data coded by Team 2). The table shows the two means, the difference, and the correlation coefficient between the two codings.

Table C2—Impact of Selection Reform on State Wins

Panel A: Ordinary Least Squares and 2 nd -Stage Least Squares Results				
	OLS		2SLS, 2 nd Stage	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	<i>State Wins</i>			
Appointments in 2010 X Post 2010	-0.289*** [0.0539]	-0.248*** [0.0546]	-0.363*** [0.0860]	-0.310*** [0.0817]
District-by-Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Bench and Case Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes
Observations	8,446	8,446	8,446	8,446
R-squared	0.135	0.142	0.135	0.142
Mean of dependent variable	0.482	0.482	0.482	0.482
Panel B: First-Stage Results				
		(3)	(4)	
		Appointments in 2010 X Post 2010		
Retirements in 2010 X Post 2010		0.645*** [0.136]	0.647*** [0.135]	
District-by-Year FE		Yes	Yes	
Case and Bench Controls		No	Yes	
Observations		8,446	8,446	
R-squared		0.855	0.856	
F-Statistic (Montiel et al., 2013)		22.572	22.835	

Robust standard errors appear in brackets (clustered at district-bench level). The dependent variable is State Wins, a dummy variable for the case being ruled in favor of the State. Appointments in 2010 is fraction of mandatory retirements in a given district bench in reform year 2010. Post 2010 is a dummy for post-reform period. In the IV regressions, we instrument Appointments in 2010 X Post 2010 with Retirements in 2010 X Post 2010. The first-stage results corresponding to Columns (3) and (4) appear in Panel B. The F-Statistics on the first stage results are well above the rule of thumb of 10. The controls include all case and district bench characteristics shown in Table 1. The case controls also include case-type fixed effects. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table C3—Impact of Mandatory Retirements on Decision Quality

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	<i>Case Delay</i>	<i>Merit</i>	<i>Correct Decisions</i>	<i>Process Followed</i>
Retirements in 2009 X Post 2010	0.0806 [0.152]	-0.0266 [0.0539]	-0.0185 [0.0538]	-0.0142 [0.163]
District-by-Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Case and Bench Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	8,446	8,446	8,446	8,446
R-squared	0.216	0.138	0.096	0.080
Mean of dependent variable	3.354	0.627	0.468	3.314

Robust standard errors appear in brackets (clustered at district-bench level). In Column (1), the dependent variable is case delay i.e. the difference between filing and decision year. In Column (2) it is a dummy variable for the case being ruled on merits of the case. In Column (3), the dependent variable is a dummy variable for the case being judged as correct by legal experts. In Column (4), the dependent variable is a rating from 1-5 on process followed. Retirements in 2009 is the fraction of mandatory retirements in a given district bench in 2009. Post 2010 is a dummy for post-reform period. The controls include all case and district bench characteristics shown in Table 1. The case controls also include case-type fixed effects. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table C4—Impact of Selection Reform on State Wins (Controlling for Pre-2010 Retirements)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	<i>State Wins</i>					
Retirements in 2010 X Post 2010	-0.200*** [0.0416]	-0.204*** [0.0455]	-0.201*** [0.0465]	-0.204*** [0.0424]	-0.203*** [0.0460]	-0.210*** [0.0484]
Retirements in 2009 X Post 2009	0.0218 [0.0596]			-0.0168 [0.0607]	0.0221 [0.0608]	-0.0172 [0.0608]
Retirements in 2008 X Post 2008		-0.0119 [0.0907]	-0.152 [0.259]		-0.0202 [0.0938]	-0.229 [0.270]
Retirements in 2007 X Post 2007				0.118 [0.0832]		0.132 [0.0886]
Retirements in 2008 X Post 2010			0.158 [0.293]			0.183 [0.293]
District-by-Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Case and Bench Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Pre-Treatment Retirement (2009)	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Transition to Democracy (2008)	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Pre-Treatment Retirement (2007)	No	No	No	Yes	No	Yes
Observations	8,446	8,446	8,446	8,446	8,446	8,446
R-squared	0.142	0.142	0.142	0.143	0.142	0.143
Mean of dependent variable	0.482	0.482	0.482	0.482	0.482	0.482

Robust standard errors appear in brackets (clustered at district-bench level). The dependent variable is State Wins, a dummy variable for the case being ruled in favor of the State. Retirements in 2010 is fraction of mandatory retirements in a given district bench in reform year 2010. Retirements in 2007, 2008, 2009 are the fraction of mandatory retirements in a given district bench in 2007, 2008, 2009, respectively. Column (3) examines the robustness of our results to retirements in the transition to democracy year in 2008. It controls for fraction of mandatory retirements in 2008 (democratic transition year) interacted with post 2008 and 2010 dummies, respectively. Column (6) controls for pre-treatment retirements in 2007, 2008, and 2009 and corresponding interactions. The controls include all case and district bench characteristics shown in Table 1. The case controls also include case-type fixed effects. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table C5—Impact of Post- and Pre-Reform Cumulative Retirements on State Wins

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Cumulative Retirements Since 2010-2019	-0.224*** [0.0429]			
Cumulative Retirements from 2000 - 2009		0.0772 [0.0670]		
Cumulative Retirements from 1990 - 1999			-0.000705 [0.0420]	
Cumulative Retirements from 1986-1989				0.125 [0.158]
District-by-Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Case and Bench Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	8,446	5,174	2,677	686
R-squared	0.137	0.108	0.127	0.125
Mean of dependent variable	0.482	0.534	0.521	0.511

Robust standard errors appear in brackets (clustered at district-bench level). The dependent variable is State Wins, a dummy variable for the case being ruled in favor of the State. Cumulative Mandatory Retirements Since 2010 is fraction of mandatory retirements in a given district bench from 2010-2019 as predicted by age structure in 2010. In Column 2, cumulative retirements are fraction of mandatory retirements in a given district bench from 2000-2009, as predicted by age structure in 2000 and so forth. The controls include all case and district bench characteristics shown in Table 1. The case controls also include case-type fixed effects. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table C6—Test for Pre-Trends - Impact of Selection Reform on State Wins Over Time

	(1)	(2)	(3)
	<i>State Wins</i>		
Retirements in 2010 X Year 1986 to 1991	-0.159 [0.149]	-0.0921 [0.130]	-0.0747 [0.126]
Retirements in 2010 X Year 1992 to 1998	-0.181 [0.116]	-0.0955 [0.100]	-0.0621 [0.0953]
Retirements in 2010 X Year 1999 to 2003	-0.0853 [0.0694]	0.0130 [0.0853]	0.00988 [0.0923]
Retirements in 2010 X Year 2004 to 2009	-0.0283 [0.0958]	0.0442 [0.0937]	0.0511 [0.0953]
Retirements in 2010 X Year 2010 to 2014	-0.287*** [0.0747]	-0.263*** [0.0764]	-0.252*** [0.0745]
Retirements in 2010 X Year 2015 to 2019	-0.203*** [-0.159]	-0.161** [-0.0921]	-0.167** [-0.0747]
District-by-Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
Case Controls	No	Yes	Yes
Bench Controls	No	No	Yes
Observations	8,446	8,446	8,446
R-squared	0.136	0.140	0.142
Mean of dependent variable	0.482	0.482	0.482

Robust standard errors appear in brackets (clustered at district-bench level). The dependent variable is State Wins, a dummy variable for the case being ruled in favor of the State. Retirements in 2010 is fraction of mandatory retirements in a given district bench in reform year 2010. This is interacted with time-period dummies as indicated in equation (3). The controls include all case and district bench characteristics shown in Table 1. The case controls also include case-type fixed effects. Estimates from column (3) with controls are presented in graphical form in Figure 3. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table C7—Judicial Commission Appointees and Judge Characteristics at Case Level

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
	Gender	Muslim	Former Lawyer	Punjabi Ethnicity	Sindhi Ethnicity	Balochi Ethnicity	Pashtun Ethnicity	Former Office Holder Bar Assoc.	Ran for Political Office
Post-Reform Judge	-0.0521* (0.0285)	-0.00232 (0.0105)	0.0106 (0.0301)	0.0127 (0.0115)	-0.00270 (0.00610)	0.00399 (0.0067)	-0.0004 (0.0097)	-0.358*** (0.0505)	-0.140*** (0.0381)
Age Control	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Case Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Bench Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	8,446	8,446	8,446	8,446	8,446	8,446	8,446	8,446	8,446
R-squared	0.016	0.002	0.008	0.007	0.004	0.005	0.007	0.097	0.023
Mean of dependent variable	0.961	0.991	0.892	0.200	0.051	0.059	0.141	0.573	0.188

Robust standard errors appear in brackets (clustered at the judge level). Post Reform Judge is a dummy for a case decided by a judge appointed by the judicial commission. The case and bench controls are identical to those in the baseline regression. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table C8—Impact of Selection Reform on State Wins (by type of Case) – Cumulative Retirements

Panel A: Constitutional vs Criminal Cases				
	Constitutional Cases		Criminal Cases	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	<i>State Wins</i>			
Cumulative Retirements Since 2010	-0.347*** [0.0648]	-0.333*** [0.0627]	0.307 [0.572]	0.316 [0.719]
District-by-Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Case and Bench Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes
Observations	6,094	6,094	2,368	2,368
R-squared	0.158	0.160	0.277	0.280
Mean of dependent variable	0.456	0.456	0.548	0.548
Panel B: Constitutional and Criminal Cases Disaggregated				
	Constitutional Cases		Criminal Cases	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Human-Rights Cases	Land Cases	Non-Islamic Case	Islamic Case
	<i>State Wins</i>			
Cumulative Retirements Since 2010	-0.378*** [0.0858]	-0.339*** [0.117]	0.243 [1.018]	-0.0793 [0.826]
District-by-Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Case and Bench Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	3,428	2,650	2,143	225
R-squared	0.221	0.217	0.285	0.763
Mean of dependent variable	0.462	0.449	0.552	0.520

Robust standard errors appear in brackets (clustered at district-bench level). The dependent variable is State Wins, a dummy variable for the case being ruled in favor of the State. Cumulative Mandatory Retirements Since 2010 is fraction of mandatory retirements in a given district bench from 2010-2019 as predicted by age structure in 2010. Panel A show that our results disaggregated into constitutional and criminal cases. The constitutional and criminal cases do not add to the 8446-case sample because 16 criminal cases were also marked as constitutional. Panel B shows further disaggregation of constitutional cases into human rights and land cases. The criminal cases are disaggregated into those judged under Islamic limits law and those judged under common law. The controls include all case and district bench characteristics shown in Table 1. The case controls also include case-type fixed effects. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table C9—Savings in Land Expropriations Avoided Due to Selection Reform

Panel A: Land Expropriations Results			
	(1)	(2)	(3)
	Average Value	Minimum Value (<i>Most Conservative</i>)	Maximum Value (<i>Least Conservative</i>)
Total Land Expropriated (% of GDP)	0.828	0.333	1.693
Counterfactual: No Selection Reform (% of GDP)	0.930	0.399	1.693
Land Expropriations Avoided Due to Selection Reform (% of GDP)	0.102	0.067 (2015)	0.282 (2010)

Panel B: Land Expropriation Details					
Year	Pakistan GDP (USD)	Total Land Expropriated (USD)	Total Land Expropriated (% GDP)	Counterfactual: No Selection Reform (% GDP)	Non-expropriated land under Selection Reform (% GDP)
2007	152385716312	2196000000	1.441079947	1.441079947	0
2008	170077814106	2880000000	1.693342553	1.693342553	0
2009	168152775283	1700000000	1.010985395	1.011985395	0
2010 (max)	177165635077	2494000000	1.407722214	1.689897545	0.282175332
2011	213587413184	851000000	0.398431718	0.480711789	0.080128007
2012	224383620830	2320000000	1.033943561	1.241868048	0.207924486
2013	231218567179	1400000000	0.605487707	0.727007199	0.121519492
2014	244360888751	1150000000	0.470615411	0.565620954	0.094005544
2015 (min)	270556131701	900000000	0.332648162	0.399208387	0.067260225
2016	278654637738	1679000000	0.602537971	0.723455717	0.121917746
2017	304567253219	1680000000	0.551602309	0.662412918	0.110526871
2018	314567541558	1690000000	0.537245512	0.645843597	0.107598084
2019	278221906023	1904000000	0.684345826	0.821952374	0.137606548

Note: Panel A shows the results of the back-of-the-envelope calculations based on Mian and Khwaja (2005)'s computation of economy-wide costs of political connections using minimum and maximum bounds in Pakistan. The minimum value of avoided land expropriations is realized in 2015 (0.067% of GDP), the maximum in 2010 (0.284% of GDP), while the average value of land expropriations avoided is about 0.140% of GDP every year. That is, the computations indicate that the selection reform prevented land expropriations to the tune of 0.07 to 0.3 percent of GDP (average: 0.135 percent of GDP) from its implementation onward. The procedure for this calculation is as follows: given that in 20% of our 8500 randomly sampled cases, the government was successful in expropriating land, and that we randomly sampled 0.2% of the total population of cases, total state victories in land expropriation cases are calculated at 850,000. Basing computations on an average value of USD 51,280 for the 57 expropriated properties whose market values are listed in judgment texts, and assuming all judges are replaced by peer-appointed judges, state victories should fall by about 20 percentage points. We thus estimate that value of avoided land expropriations to be about 0.07 to 0.3 percent of GDP from 2010-2019. Panel B presents yearly figures showing the minimum and maximum value of total land expropriations, counterfactual land expropriations, and expropriations avoided.

Table C10—The Impact of Selection Reform on State Wins (by Chief Justice)

	<i>State Wins</i>						
	CJ Khosa (1)	CJ Nisar (2)	CJ Jamali (3)	CJ Khawaja (4)	CJ Mulk (5)	CJ Jillani (6)	CJ Chaudry (7)
Retirements in 2010 X Post 2010	-0.115* (0.0605)	-0.137* (0.0693)	-0.135* (0.0689)	-0.130** (0.0605)	-0.136* (0.0702)	-0.0903 (0.0699)	-0.0793 (0.0795)
District-by-Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	7,019	7,284	7,236	7,083	6,944	6,865	6,781
R-squared	0.134	0.142	0.141	0.128	0.122	0.124	0.124
Mean Dep. Var.	0.517	0.507	0.506	0.514	0.518	0.524	0.525
Tenure of CJ	2019-2019	2016-2019	2015-2016	2015-2015	2014-2015	2013-2014	2007-2013

Robust standard errors appear in brackets (clustered at district-bench level). The dependent variable is State Wins, a dummy variable for the case being ruled in favor of the State. Retirements in 2010 is fraction of mandatory retirements in a given district bench in reform year 2010. Post 2010 is a dummy for post-reform period. Retirements in 2010 X Post 2010 is interacted with periods when different Chief Justices headed the Judicial Commission. The controls include all case and district bench characteristics shown in Table 1. The case controls also include case-type fixed effects. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table C11—Impact of Selection Reform on Case and Bench Characteristics – Cumulative Retirements

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
	Constitutional Case	No. Pages	CJ on Case	No. Lawyers on Case	No. Judges on Case	No. Judges on Bench	No. Criminal cases on Bench	No. Land cases on Bench	No. Human Rights Cases on Bench
Cumulative Retirements Since 2010	-0.000643 (0.00430)	0.347 (0.504)	-0.0185 (0.0177)	0.113 (0.158)	-0.0152 (0.0561)	0.770* (0.444)	2.164* (1.177)	0.488 (0.683)	0.750 (0.668)
District-by-Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	8,446	8,446	8,446	8,446	8,446	8,446	8,446	8,446	8,446
R-squared	0.991	0.292	0.110	0.068	0.138	0.910	0.763	0.663	0.662
Mean of dependent variable	0.722	8.877	0.065	4.123	1.809	8.025	2.77	3.476	2.586

Robust standard errors appear in brackets (clustered at the district-bench level). Cumulative Mandatory Retirements Since 2010 is fraction of mandatory retirements in a given district bench from 2010-2019 as predicted by age structure in 2010. The controls include case and bench characteristics outlined in Table 1 (except the dependent variable used in the respective column). The case controls include case-type fixed effects. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table C12—The Impact of Selection Reform on Case Filings

	(1)	(2)	(3)
	Total Filed	Constitutional Filed	Criminal Filed
Retirements in 2010 X Post 2010	-7,659 [6,253]	-5,666 [4,453]	-2,023 [1,805]
District and Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
District and Case Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	491	491	491
R-squared	0.955	0.955	0.950
Mean of dependent variable	9935.959	7153.159	2784.768

Robust standard errors appear in brackets. The dependent variable is total cases filed in the first column, total constitutional cases filed in the second column, and total criminal cases filed in the third column. The filing variable is only available at district-year level so we *cannot* add district-by-year fixed effects (we instead add district and year FEs separately). Retirements in 2010 is fraction of mandatory retirements in a given district bench in reform year 2010. The controls include all case and district characteristics available. The case controls also include case-type fixed effects. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table C13—Impact of Selection Reform on State Wins (excluding cases from Political Capitals)

	<i>Excluding Lahore</i>	<i>Excluding Karachi</i>	<i>Excluding Quetta</i>	<i>Excluding Peshawar</i>	<i>Excluding Islamabad</i>
	<i>State Wins</i>				
Retirements in 2010 X Post 2010	-0.207*** [0.0401]	-0.198*** [0.0397]	-0.218*** [0.0383]	-0.235*** [0.0359]	-0.199*** [0.0499]
District-by-Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Bench and Case Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	7,363	6,945	7,913	8,295	8,388
R-squared	0.154	0.172	0.152	0.148	0.144
Mean of dependent variable	0.479	0.483	0.474	0.481	0.482

Robust standard errors appear in brackets (clustered at district-bench level). The dependent variable is State Wins, a dummy variable for the case being ruled in favor of the State. Retirements in 2010 is fraction of mandatory retirements in a given district bench in reform year 2010. Post 2010 is a dummy for post-reform period. The controls include all case and district bench characteristics shown in Table 1. The case controls also include case-type fixed effects. Every column excludes cases one-by-one for the mentioned political capital. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table C14—Are the results robust to excluding particular benches

	Excluding Criminal Bench	Excluding Property Bench	Excluding Tax Bench	Excluding Writ Bench
<i>State Wins</i>				
Retirements in 2010 X Post 2010	-0.264*** [0.0279]	-0.207*** [0.0657]	-0.185*** [0.0557]	-0.144** [0.0684]
District-by-Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
District and Case Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	6,194	6,823	6,266	6,487
R-squared	0.165	0.171	0.165	0.176
Mean of dependent variable	0.435	0.485	0.495	0.483

Robust standard errors appear in brackets (clustered at district-bench level). The dependent variable is State Wins, a dummy variable for the case being ruled in favor of the State. Retirements in 2010 is fraction of mandatory retirements in a given district bench in reform year 2010. Post 2010 is a dummy for post-reform period. The controls include all case and district bench characteristics shown in Table 1. The case controls also include case-type fixed effects. Every column excludes cases one-by-one for the mentioned political capital. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table C15—Is a particular bench driving the results?

	Criminal Bench	Property Bench	Tax Bench	Writ Bench
<i>State Wins</i>				
Retirements in 2010 X Post 2010	0.363 [0.550]	-0.358** [0.138]	-0.249*** [0.0673]	-0.161 [0.153]
District-by-Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
District and Case Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	2,396	1,767	2,324	2,103
R-squared	0.101	0.060	0.091	0.079
Mean of dependent variable	0.547	0.456	0.437	0.468

Robust standard errors appear in brackets (clustered at district-bench level). The dependent variable is State Wins, a dummy variable for the case being ruled in favor of the State. Retirements in 2010 is fraction of mandatory retirements in a given district bench in reform year 2010. Post 2010 is a dummy for post-reform period. The controls include all case and district bench characteristics shown in Table 1. The case controls also include case-type fixed effects. Every column considers cases for the mentioned specialized bench. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table C16—Impact of Selection Reform on State Wins with different starting years

	State Wins			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	1990-2019	1995-2019	2000-2019	2005-2019
Retirements in 2010 X Post 2010	-0.210*** [0.0385]	-0.225*** [0.0367]	-0.242*** [0.0345]	-0.249*** [0.0353]
District-by-Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
District and Case Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	7,900	6,954	5,900	4,755
R-squared	0.152	0.158	0.163	0.167
Mean of dependent variable	0.476	0.470	0.460	0.438

Robust standard errors appear in brackets (clustered at district-bench level). The dependent variable is State Wins, a dummy variable for the case being ruled in favor of the State. Retirements in 2010 is fraction of mandatory retirements in a given district bench in reform year 2010. Post 2010 is a dummy for post-reform period. The controls include all case and district bench characteristics shown in Table 1. The case controls also include case-type fixed effects. Column (1) excludes from our sample cases decided from 1986-1989, column (2) excludes all cases decided from 1986-1994, column (3) cases decided from 1986-1999 and so on. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table C17—The Effect of Reform on State Wins on aggregated district-bench-year panel

	OLS		IV, 2 nd Stage	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	State Wins			
Appointments in 2010 X Post 2010	-0.306*** [0.0969]	-0.260*** [0.0971]	-0.360*** [0.111]	-0.305*** [0.0963]
District-by-Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
District and Case Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes
Observations	1,529	1,529	1,529	1,529
R-squared	0.414	0.440	0.414	0.439
Mean of dependent variable	0.494	0.494	0.494	0.494

Robust standard errors appear in brackets (clustered at district-bench level). The dependent variable is State Wins, averaged by district-bench-year. Retirements in 2010 is fraction of mandatory retirements in a given district bench in reform year 2010. Post 2010 is a dummy for post-reform period. The controls include all case and district bench characteristics shown in Table 1. The case controls also include case-type fixed effects. The dependent variable is aggregated at district-bench-year level, the level of variation of Appointments in 2010 X Post 2010. This is instrumented with Retirements in 2010 X Post 2010. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table C18—The Impact of Selection Reform on State Wins – Non-Linear Models

	Logit Marginal Effects		Probit Marginal Effects	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
<i>State Wins</i>				
Retirements in 2010 X Post 2010	-0.299*** [0.047]	-0.258*** [0.051]	-0.280*** [0.041]	-0.241*** [0.045]
District-by-Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
District and Case Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes
Observations	8,167	8,167	8,167	8,167
R-squared (Pseudo)	0.083	0.089	0.083	0.088
Log-likelihood	-5186.08	-5155.77	-5186.89	-5165.20
Mean of dependent variable	0.490	0.490	0.490	0.490

Robust standard errors appear in brackets (clustered at the district-bench level). The dependent variable is State Wins, a dummy for the case being ruled in favor of the State. Retirements in 2010 is fraction of mandatory retirements in a given district bench in reform year 2010. Post 2010 is a dummy for post-reform period. The marginal effects from the corresponding Logit and Probit regressions are reported. The controls include all the case and district bench characteristics in Table 1 and case-type fixed effects. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table C19—The Impact of Selection Reform on State Wins at Different Levels of Clustering

	Before-After Clustering	Before- After Clustering	District- Level Clustering	Bootstrap Clustering
	District- Bench	District		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
<i>State Wins</i>				
Retirements in 2010 X Post 2010	-0.202*** [0.0659]	-0.202** [0.0967]	-0.202*** [0.0412]	-0.191*** [0.0571]
District-by-Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
District and Case Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	8,446	8,446	8,446	8,446
R-squared	0.142	0.142	0.142	0.142
Mean of dependent variable	0.482	0.482	0.482	0.482

Robust standard errors appear in brackets. The first and second column clusters within each district bench and district separately before and after the 2010 reform, respectively. The third column clusters at the district level. The fourth column uses bootstrap clustering as per Ng et al. (2013). For wild bootstrap clustering that imposes a small cluster correction a la Cameron et al. (2008), see Figure C5 for these results. The controls include all the case and district bench characteristics in Table 1 and case-type fixed effects. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table C20—Robustness to using data coded by Team 2

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	<i>State Wins</i>	<i>Case Delay</i>	<i>Merit</i>	<i>Correct Decisions</i>	<i>Process Followed</i>
Retirements in 2010 X Post 2010	-0.151*** [0.0437]	-0.907** [0.376]	0.185*** [0.0326]	0.181*** [0.0515]	0.322** [0.126]
District-by-Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Case and Bench Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	8,446	8,446	8,446	8,446	8,446
R-squared	0.117	0.217	0.132	0.094	0.073
Mean of dependent variable	0.563	3.336	0.672	0.445	3.222

Robust standard errors appear in brackets (clustered at district-bench level). In Column 1, the dependent variable is State Wins, a dummy variable for the case being ruled in favor of the State. In Column (2), the dependent variable is case delay i.e. the difference between filing and decision year. In Column (3) it is a dummy variable for the case being ruled on case merits. In Column (4), the dependent variable is a dummy variable for the case being judged as correct by legal experts. In Column (5), the dependent variable is a rating from 1-5 on due process followed. Retirements in 2010 is the fraction of mandatory retirements in a given district bench in reform year 2010. Post 2010 is a dummy for post-reform period. The controls include all case and district bench characteristics shown in Table 1. The case controls also include case-type fixed effects. The variables coded by Team 2 are used in this Table. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1