Online Appendix for "Do Workers Comply with Salary History Bans? A Survey On Voluntary Disclosure, Adverse Selection, and Unraveling"

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TABLES AND FIGURES



FIGURE A1. POTENTIAL BAN COMPLIANCE TYPES

TABLE A1—CANDIDATES ASKED ABOUT CURRENT AND DESIRED SALARY: DEMOGRAPHICS

	Asked Current Salary	Asked Desired Salary	% of Sample
Male	0.28	0.44	53.8
Female	0.23	0.36	46.2
Asian	0.28	0.59	5.8
Black/African	0.28	0.52	5.8
Caucasian	0.26	0.38	74.2
Hispanic/Latin American	0.19	0.38	5.2
Mixed	0.31	0.40	6.9
Other	0.09	0.27	2.2
2 year undergraduate degree	0.35	0.35	7.4
4 year undergraduate degree	0.26	0.45	44.5
Doctorate	0.27	0.33	3.0
High school graduate or less	0.23	0.46	5.2
Professional or Master's degree	0.28	0.36	19.7
Some college	0.21	0.34	20.3
0-5 years experience	0.25	0.42	16.5
06-10 years experience	0.20	0.37	22.4
11-15 years experience	0.26	0.37	21.8
16-20 years experience	0.24	0.43	16.7
21-25 years experience	0.28	0.38	12.1
26-30 years experience	0.32	0.44	5.0
31+ years experience	0.43	0.50	5.6
Not a Union Member	0.25	0.40	93.1
Union Member	0.43	0.40	6.9
$<$ \$32K	0.23	0.36	24.6
\$32K-\$48K	0.23	0.31	23.9
\$48K-\$68K	0.30	0.46	25.6
$>$\$68K	0.34	0.55	25.9
Paid less than peers	0.30	0.42	43.5
Paid more than peers	0.22	0.38	56.5
Total	0.26	0.40	

Notes: Questions asked were:
In this section we are going to ask you some questions about your own job search experiences.
(1) At any point in the hiring process were you asked to provide your most recent salary?
(2) At any point in the hiring process were you asked for your desired salary for this job?

TABLE A2—**CANDIDATES ASKED ABOUT CURRENT AND DESIRED SALARY: SECTOR AND OCCUPATION**

	Asked Current Salary	Asked Desired Salary	% of Sample
Construction, Extraction, and Maintenance Occupations	0.33	0.50	2.4
Farming, Fishing, and Forestry Occupations	0.00	0.00	0.8
Management, Business and Financial Operations	0.28	0.47	21.6
Military Specific Occupations	0.00	0.00	0.8
Production, Transportation, and Material Moving Occupations	0.21	0.36	2.8
Professional and Related Occupations	0.26	0.40	38.3
Sales and Office Occupations	0.16	0.28	16.5
Service Occupations	0.38	0.51	13.7
Unemployed	0.13	0.31	3.2
Architecture and Engineering Occupations	0.55	0.91	2.2
Arts, Design, Entertainment, Sports, and Media Occupations	0.22	0.31	6.3
Building and Grounds Cleaning and Maintenance Occupations	0.29	0.29	1.4
Business Operations Specialists	0.26	0.52	4.6
Community and Social Services Occupations	0.50	0.50	1.2
Computer and Mathematical Occupations	0.30	0.46	11.3
Construction Trades	0.20	0.40	1.0
Education, Training, and Library Occupations	0.14	0.30	8.5
Extraction Workers	1.00	1.00	0.2
Farming, Fishing, and Forestry Occupations	0.00	0.00	0.8
Financial Specialists	0.18	0.39	6.5
Food Preparation and Serving Occupations	0.27	0.53	6.0
Healthcare Practitioners and Technical Occupations	0.22	0.35	4.6
Healthcare Support Occupations	0.60	0.47	3.0
Installation, Maintenance, and Repair Workers	0.33	0.50	1.2
Legal Occupations	0.29	0.14	1.4
Life, Physical, and Social Science Occupations	0.36	0.43	2.8
Management Occupations	0.36	0.49	10.5
Military Specific Occupations	0.00	0.00	0.8
Office and Administrative Support Occupations	0.14	0.33	8.3
Personal Care and Service Occupations	0.42	0.58	2.4
Production Occupations	0.11	0.33	1.8
Protective Service Occupations	0.40	0.60	1.0
Sales Occupations	0.17	0.22	8.1
Transportation and Material Moving Occupations	0.40	0.40	1.0
Unemployed	0.13	0.31	3.2
Total	0.26	0.40	

Notes: Questions asked were:
In this section we are going to ask you some questions about your own job search experiences.
(1) At any point in the hiring process were you asked to provide your most recent salary?
(2) At any point in the hiring process were you asked for your desired salary for this job?

TABLE A3—**ASKING CURRENT SALARY AND DESIRED SALARY**

	Percent
Asked Neither	51.98
Asked Desired Salary Only	22.22
Asked both Current and Desired Salary	17.86
Asked Current Salary Only	7.94
Total	100.00

Notes: Questions asked were:
In this section we are going to ask you some questions about your own job search experiences.
(1) At any point in the hiring process were you asked to provide your most recent salary?
(2) At any point in the hiring process were you asked for your desired salary for this job?

TABLE A4—**COMPLIANCE TYPES: DEMOGRAPHICS**

	Always Discloser	Never Discloser	Ban Complier	% of Sample
Male	0.30	0.16	0.54	53.8
Female	0.19	0.18	0.63	46.2
Asian	0.38	0.17	0.45	5.8
Black/African	0.24	0.14	0.59	5.8
Caucasian	0.21	0.18	0.61	74.2
Hispanic/Latin American	0.62	0.08	0.31	5.2
Mixed	0.29	0.17	0.54	6.9
Other	0.27	0.09	0.64	2.2
2 year undergraduate degree	0.14	0.24	0.62	7.4
4 year undergraduate degree	0.24	0.18	0.58	44.5
Doctorate	0.33	0.33	0.33	3.0
High school graduate or less	0.31	0.12	0.54	5.2
Professional or Master's degree	0.31	0.13	0.56	19.7
Some college	0.23	0.13	0.65	20.3
0-5 years experience	0.42	0.12	0.46	16.5
06-10 years experience	0.23	0.15	0.61	22.4
11-15 years experience	0.27	0.15	0.57	21.8
16-20 years experience	0.17	0.29	0.55	16.7
21-25 years experience	0.18	0.13	0.69	12.1
26-30 years experience	0.20	0.20	0.60	5.0
31+ years experience	0.14	0.14	0.71	5.6
Not a Union Member	0.25	0.17	0.58	93.1
Union Member	0.23	0.14	0.63	6.9
$<$ \$32K	0.27	0.10	0.63	24.6
\$32K-\$48K	0.16	0.22	0.61	23.9
\$48K-\$68K	0.30	0.20	0.50	25.6
$>$\$68K	0.28	0.16	0.56	25.9
Paid less than peers	0.24	0.16	0.60	43.5
Paid more than peers	0.25	0.18	0.57	56.5
Total	0.25	0.17	0.58	

Notes: "Ban Defiers" occupied less than 0.5% of our sample, and thus we do not provide a full breakout.
Questions asked were:
In this section we are going to ask you some questions about what you might do in some hypothetical job search scenarios.
(1) Imagine it is perfectly legal for someone involved in the hiring process to ask your most recent salary. If someone asks, would you tell them your most recent salary?
(2) Imagine that nobody involved in the hiring process has asked you about your most recent salary. However, you can disclose this information voluntarily to the employer, even though you haven't been asked. Would you tell them your most recent salary?

TABLE A5—**VERIFICATION OF SALARY HISTORY DISCLOSURES**

Panel A: If Volunteered:

	Percent
Always.	3.77
Between 0% and 10% of disclosures.	24.40
Between 10% and 25% of disclosures.	18.45
Between 25% and 50% of disclosures.	16.87
Between 50% and 75% of disclosures.	9.92
Between 75% and 90% of disclosures.	2.98
Never.	23.61
Total	100.00

Panel B: If Asked and Answered:

	Percent
Always.	4.76
Between 0% and 10% of disclosures.	19.25
Between 10% and 25% of disclosures.	17.46
Between 25% and 50% of disclosures.	22.62
Between 50% and 75% of disclosures.	14.48
Between 75% and 90% of disclosures.	6.35
Never.	15.08
Total	100.00

Notes: Questions asked were:
In this section we are going to ask you some questions about what you might do in some hypothetical job search scenarios.
Panel A: Suppose you're applying for a job. The employer does not ask for your current salary. But you volunteer a number as your current salary nonetheless. Will employers in this situation make an effort to verify disclosure as your true current salary?
Panel B: Suppose you're applying for a job. The employer asks for your current salary, and you provide an answer to the question. Will employers in this situation make an effort to verify your answer to be your true current salary?

TABLE A6—**UNRAVELING**

Panel A: If Favorable Salary:

	Percent	Cumulative
I would disclose, even if I were the only applicant disclosing.	45.44	45.44
I would disclose, but only if at least 10% of other applicants are disclosing.	5.16	50.60
I would disclose, but only if at least 25% of other applicants are disclosing.	6.75	57.34
I would disclose, but only if at least 50% of other applicants are disclosing.	14.68	72.02
I would disclose, but only if at least 90% of other applicants are disclosing.	9.92	81.94
I would NOT disclose. Even if all other applicants were disclosing.	18.06	100.00

Panel B: If Unfavorable Salary:

	Percent	Cumulative
I would disclose, even if I were the only applicant disclosing.	11.31	11.31
I would disclose, but only if at least 10% of other applicants are disclosing.	2.38	13.69
I would disclose, but only if at least 25% of other applicants are disclosing.	2.98	16.67
I would disclose, but only if at least 50% of other applicants are disclosing.	13.69	30.36
I would disclose, but only if at least 90% of other applicants are disclosing.	18.85	49.21
I would NOT disclose. Even if all other applicants were disclosing.	50.79	100.00

Notes:Questions asked were:
In this section we are going to ask you some questions about what you might do in some hypothetical job search scenarios.
Panel A: Suppose you were applying for a job. For this application, you knew the employer would view your current salary favorably – more so than other applicants' salaries. Would you choose to disclose?
Panel B: Suppose you were applying for a job. For this application, you knew the employer would not view your current salary favorably compared to other applicants'. Would you choose to disclose?

TABLE A7—**WHEN DO EMPLOYERS ASK SALARY HISTORY QUESTIONS?**

	Percent
After an interview	10.00
During an interview	35.38
On the application	45.38
Other	2.31
When they contacted you to set up an interview	6.92
Total	100.00

Notes:Questions asked were:
In this section we are going to ask you some questions about your own job search experiences.
At what point in the process did they ask you to reveal your most recent salary?

TABLE A8—**DISCLOSURE BEHAVIOR BY PROMPTING REGIME**

Panel A: If an employer asked your current salary, would you provide an answer?:

	Percent
Will decline to tell them any salary	17.06
Will tell them a salary higher than my actual salary	21.83
Will tell them a salary lower than my actual salary	3.17
Will tell them my actual salary	57.94

If an employer did *not* ask your current salary, would you volunteer an answer?
Panel B: If the employer was banned by law from asking:

	Percent
Will not disclose any salary	74.80
Will tell them a salary higher than my actual salary	9.92
Will tell them a salary lower than my actual salary	1.39
Will tell them my actual salary	13.89

Panel C: If the employer legally allowed to ask, but chose not to:

	Percent
Will not disclose any salary	73.41
Will tell them a salary higher than my actual salary	9.33
Will tell them a salary lower than my actual salary	1.39
Will tell them my actual salary	15.87

Panel D: If the employer did not ask, and the legal status was ambiguous:

	Percent
Will not disclose any salary	74.80
Will tell them a salary higher than my actual salary	10.12
Will tell them a salary lower than my actual salary	1.59
Will tell them my actual salary	13.49

Notes: Questions asked were:
In this section we are going to ask you some questions about what you might do in some hypothetical job search scenarios.
Panel A: Imagine it is perfectly legal for someone involved in the hiring process to ask your most recent salary. If someone asks, would you tell them your most recent salary?
Panel B: Imagine it is illegal for someone involved in the hiring process to ask your most recent salary, but it is legal for applicants to disclose this information voluntarily. Would you tell them your most recent salary even though you weren't asked?
Panel C: Imagine it is perfectly legal for someone involved in the hiring process to ask your most recent salary. However, nobody involved in the hiring process has asked. You can nonetheless disclose this information voluntarily, even though you haven't been asked. Would you tell them your most recent salary?
Panel D: Imagine that nobody involved in the hiring process has asked you about your most recent salary. However, you can disclose this information voluntarily to the employer, even though you haven't been asked. Would you tell them your most recent salary?

TABLE A9—**WHY CANDIDATES DO NOT DISCLOSE**

Would the following would make you more comfortable disclosing?:
Strongly Disagree =1. Strongly Agree = 7.

	Percent	SD
Unprompted Disclosures: Greater Privacy Protection	4.29	2.06
Unprompted Disclosures: Knowing how the disclosure would affect my outcome	5.49	1.83
Prompted Disclosures: Greater Privacy Protection	4.57	2.00
Prompted Disclosures: Knowing how the disclosure would affect my outcome	5.76	1.61

Notes: Questions asked were:
In this section we are going to ask you some questions about what you might do in some hypothetical job search scenarios.
Unprompted Disclosure: Suppose you're applying for a job, and the employer does not ask for your current salary.
What would help you feel more comfortable volunteering your salary (without being asked) to an employer during a job search? Rate the following:
Prompted Disclosure: Suppose you're applying for a job, and the employer asks for your current salary.
What would help you feel more comfortable volunteering your salary to an employer during a job search? Rate the following:
More privacy protections to protect my disclosure.
Knowing How the disclosure would affect my outcome from the job application (offer, amount, terms, relationships, etc.).

TABLE A10—**ARE HIGHER SALARIES MORE LIKELY TO BE DISCLOSED?**

Panel A: Your current salary within the normal range for applicants for the job, but relatively high compared to others who are applying for the same job. Are you more likely or less likely to disclose the salary?:

	Percent
Less Likely	18.06
No Change	52.98
More likely	28.97

Panel B: Your current salary is **higher** *than the typical range for applicants for the job. Are you more likely or less likely to disclose the salary?*:

	Percent
Less Likely	32.14
No Change	37.10
More likely	30.75

Panel C:Your current salary is **lower** *than the typical range for applicants for the job. Are you more likely or less likely to disclose the salary?*:

	Percent
Less Likely	47.42
No Change	34.33
More likely	18.25

Notes: Questions asked were:
In this section we are going to ask you some questions about what you might do in some hypothetical job search scenarios.
Panel A: Suppose you're applying for a job. Your current salary within the normal range for applicants for the job. Your salary is one relatively high compared to others who are applying for the same job – but still within the expected range. Does being above average (but still within the expected range) make you more likely or less likely to disclose the salary?
Panel B: Suppose you're applying for a job. Your current salary is higher than the typical range for applicants for the job. Does being above the typical range make you more likely or less likely to disclose the salary?
Panel C: Suppose you're applying for a job. Your current salary is lower than the typical range for applicants for the job. Does being below the typical range make you more likely or less likely to disclose the salary?

TABLE A11—**DISCLOSURE AND LATENT PERSONALITY TYPES**

Panel A: Personality Characteristics of Disclosure Types:

	Agreeableness	Conscientiousness	Extraversion	Neuroticism	Openness	% of Sample
Always Discloser	-0.05	-0.17	0.24	-0.24	-0.25	24.8
Complier	0.07	0.02	-0.07	0.08	0.08	58.1
Never Discloser	-0.21	0.17	-0.12	0.10	0.08	16.7

Panel B: Personality Implications of Unprompted vs Prompted Disclosures:

	Agreeableness	Conscientiousness	Extraversion	Neuroticism	Openness
Discloses When Prompted	.24	-.085	.011	-.11	.0081
	(.21)	(.19)	(.17)	(.21)	(.2)
Discloses Unprompted (Volunteers)	-.065	-.072	.28*	-.28	-.25
	(.18)	(.19)	(.14)	(.18)	(.17)
Observations	504	504	504	504	504
R^2	.079	.13	.094	.19	.13

Notes: Our measure of Big Five personality characteristics came from Rammstedt and John (2007).
All regressions control for gender, ethnicity, industry, occupation and years of experience.

MATHEMATICAL APPENDIX

B1. Proof of Proposition 1

Using Bayes' rule, we calculate the employer's posterior beliefs about a candidate's value in the presence of a question (or a ban). Under a ban, an employer who sees a disclosure knows the candidate is an always-discloser whose value is v_a. An employer who sees no disclosure believes the candidate is a complier with probability $p_c/(p_c+p_n)$, and a never-discloser with probability $p_n/(p_c+p_n)$. The posterior belief about the candidate's value is $(v_n p_n + v_c p_c)/(p_c+p_n)$.

By contrast, when the employer has prompted and sees no disclosure, she knows the candidate is a never-discloser whose value is v_n. If she sees a disclosure, she disclosure the candidate is a complier with probability $p_c/(p_c+p_a)$, and an always-discloser with probability $p_a/(p_c+p_a)$. The posterior belief about the candidate's value is $(v_a p_a + v_c p_c)/(p_c+p_a)$. □

B2. Proof of Proposition 2

- For always-disclosers, the wages under a ban are v_a. The wages without a ban are $(v_a p_a + v_c p_c)/(p_c+p_a)$. These wages are derived in Proof B1 for Proposition 1. They are equivalent only if $p_a = 1$ and $p_c = 0$ (i.e., there are no compliers).
- For never-disclosers, the wages under a ban is $(v_n p_n + v_c p_c)/(p_c+p_n)$. The wages without a ban are v_n. These wages are derived in Proof B1 for Proposition 1. They are equivalent only if $p_n = 1$ and $p_c = 0$ (i.e., there are no compliers).

□

B3. Proof of Proposition 3

Effects of the ban if willingness-to-disclose is positively correlated with productivity for a particular employer's tasks ($v_a > v_c > v_n$). All wages are derived in Proof B1 for Proposition 1.

- **Compliers' Wages Decrease**: Compliers' wages under the ban are $(v_n p_n + v_c p_c)/(p_c + p_n)$. Their wages without the ban are $(v_a p_a + v_c p_c)/(p_c+p_a)$. Wages under the ban are lower if: $(v_a p_a + v_c p_c)(p_c+p_n) > (v_n p_n + v_c p_c)(p_c+p_a) \implies v_a p_a p_c + v_c p_c^2 + v_a p_a p_n + v_c p_c p_n > v_n p_n p_c + v_c p_c^2 + v_n p_n p_a + v_c p_c p_a \implies v_a p_a p_c + v_a p_a p_n + v_c p_c p_n > v_n p_n p_c + v_n p_n p_a + v_c p_c p_a \implies (v_a - v_c) p_a p_c + (v_a - v_n) p_a p_n + (v_c - v_n) p_c p_n > 0$. The LHS side is positive if $v_a > v_c > v_n$ and all ps are weakly positive.
- **Always-Disclosers' Wages Increase**: Always-Disclosers' wages under the ban are v_a. Their wages without the ban are $(v_a p_a + v_c p_c)/(p_c+p_a)$. Wages under the ban are higher if $v_a > (v_a p_a + v_c p_c)/(p_c+p_a) \implies v_a(p_c+p_a) > v_a p_a + v_c p_c \implies v_a p_c + v_a p_a > v_a p_a + v_c p_c \implies v_a p_c > v_c p_c \implies v_a > v_c$.
- **Never-Disclosers' Wages Increase**: Never-Disclosers' wages under the ban are $(v_n p_n + v_c p_c)/(p_c+p_n)$. Their wages without the ban are v_n. Wages under the ban are higher if $v_n < (v_n p_n + v_c p_c)/(p_c+p_n) \implies v_n(p_c+p_n) < v_n p_n + v_c p_c \implies v_n p_c + v_n p_n < v_n p_n + v_c p_c \implies v_n p_c < v_c p_c \implies v_n < v_c$.

□

B4. Proof of Proposition 4

A useful intermediary result for proving Proposition 4 is

PROPOSITION 6: *The ban does not change average wages.*

PROOF:

Recall that in our model, wages are equal to expected values. Average wages before the ban are equal to: $\bar{v}_{pre} = p_n v_n + (1-p_n)(v_a p_a + v_c p_c)/(p_c + p_a)$ using Proposition 1. Note that $1 - p_n = p_c + p_a$, so $\bar{v}_{pre} = p_n v_n + (p_c + p_a)(v_a p_a + v_c p_c)/(p_c + p_a) = p_n v_n + v_a p_a + v_c p_c$.

Average wages after the ban are equal to: $\bar{v}_{ban} = p_a v_a + (1-p_a)(v_n p_n + v_c p_c)/(p_c + p_n)$ using Proposition 1. Note that $1 - p_a = p_c + p_n$, so $\bar{v}_{ban} = p_a v_a + (p_c + p_n)(v_n p_n + v_c p_c)/(p_c + p_n = p_n v_n + v_a p_a + v_c p_c = \bar{v}_{pre} = \bar{v}$. □

The model in Cullen and Pakzad-Hurson (2016) shows that transparency and disclosure increases wages through dynamic mechanisms.

We now proceed with the proof of Proposition 4

- "A wage gap can arise from gender-specific beliefs about compliance or from gender-specific valuations." Suppose that all vs and ps can take gender-specific values. Through Proposition 6, wages are the same before and after the ban for both men and women.

  Average male wages are denoted $\bar{v}_m = p_{n|m} v_{n|m} + v_{a|m} p_{a|m} + v_{c|m} p_{c|m}$ and average female wages are $\bar{v}_w = p_{n|w} v_{n|w} + v_{a|w} p_{a|w} + v_{c|w} p_{c|w}$. Note that if valuations are gender specific, that is $v_{a|m} \neq v_{a|w}$, $v_{c|m} \neq v_{c|w}$ or $v_{n|m} \neq v_{n|w}$, then there is a gender gap ($\bar{v}_m \neq \bar{v}_w$). Similarly if beliefs about compliance are gender specific, that is $p_{a|m} \neq p_{a|w}$, $p_{c|m} \neq p_{c|w}$ or $p_{n|m} \neq p_{n|w}$, then there is also a gender gap ($\bar{v}_m \neq \bar{v}_w$).

- "If employers have gender-specific priors, the ban will *not* change the gender gap." Again suppose that all vs and ps can take gender-specific values. Through Proposition 6, we know that the ban will not change average wages for either gender.

- "Otherwise, if employers have no gender-specific priors or valuations, the ban changes the gender wage gap *only if* compliance types are correlated with gender."

  Suppose that employers do not have gender-specific beliefs, and instead have p_a, p_c and p_n that pool over both genders.[7] They also have no gender-specific valuations. They value a, c and n types equally for men and women. Wages come from Proposition 1.

  Applying Prop 6 to this, population average wages will not change with the ban. However, the distribution of wages by gender may change. Note that per Proposition 3 and 7, men's average will rise or fall depending on what proportion are compliers, always-disclosers or defiers.

B5. Proof of Proposition 5

Suppose that employers do not have gender-specific beliefs, and instead have p_a, p_c and p_n that pool over both genders. They value a, c and n types equally for men and women.

Note that per Proposition 3, the ban raises wages for always-disclosers and never-disclosers. If these subjects are men, then men will receive wage increases. By Proposition 3, the ban also lowers compliers' wages. If these subjects are more likely to be women, it will lower average women's wages.

B6. Additional Propositions

PROPOSITION 7: *If willingness-to-disclose is negatively correlated with productivity ($v_n > v_c > v_a$), the ban increases pay for compliers and lowers pay for always-disclosers and never-disclosers.*

PROOF:

Effects of the ban if willingness-to-disclose is negatively correlated with productivity for a particular employer's tasks ($v_n > v_c > v_a$). All wages are derived in Proof B1 for Proposition 1.

[7] Assuming the population is half male and half female, $p_a = (p_{a|m} + p_{a|w})/2$, $p_c = (p_{c|m} + p_{c|w})/2$, and $p_n = (p_{n|m} + p_{n|w})/2$.

- **Compliers' Wages Increase**: Compliers' wages under the ban are $(v_n p_n + v_c p_c)/(p_c + p_n)$. Their wages without the ban are $(v_a p_a + v_c p_c)/(p_c + p_a)$. Wages under the ban are higher if: $(v_a p_a + v_c p_c)(p_c + p_n) < (v_n p_n + v_c p_c)(p_c + p_a) \implies v_a p_a p_c + v_c p_c^2 + v_a p_a p_n + v_c p_c p_n < v_n p_n p_c + v_c p_c^2 + v_n p_n p_a + v_c p_c p_a \implies v_a p_a p_c + v_a p_a p_n + v_c p_c p_n < v_n p_n p_c + v_n p_n p_a + v_c p_c p_a \implies (v_a - v_c) p_a p_c + (v_a - v_n) p_a p_n + (v_c - v_n) p_c p_n < 0$. The LHS side is negative if $v_n > v_c > v_a$ and all ps are weakly positive.

- **Always-Disclosers' Wages Decrease**: Always-Disclosers' wages under the ban are v_a. Their wages without the ban are $(v_a p_a + v_c p_c)/(p_c + p_a)$. Wages under the ban are lower if $v_a < (v_a p_a + v_c p_c)/(p_c + p_a) \implies v_a(p_c + p_a) < v_a p_a + v_c p_c \implies v_a p_c + v_a p_a < v_a p_a + v_c p_c \implies v_a p_c < v_c p_c \implies v_a < v_c$.

- **Never-Disclosers' Wages Decrease**: Never-Disclosers' wages under the ban are $(v_n p_n + v_c p_c)/(p_c + p_n)$. Their wages without the ban are v_n. Wages under the ban are lower if $v_n > (v_n p_n + v_c p_c)/(p_c + p_n) \implies v_n(p_c + p_n) > v_n p_n + v_c p_c \implies v_n p_c + v_n p_n > v_n p_n + v_c p_c \implies v_n p_c > v_c p_c \implies v_n > v_c$. □

EMPLOYER COMPLIANCE

Although our paper focuses mostly on *worker* compliance, similar issues arise with firms. Suppose that bans effectively prohibit firms from asking, thus eliminating one compliance issue. Many employers might not have asked for salary history anyway. An obvious extension to our model in Section I shows that firms may not always *want* to ask the salary history question, even if they could. If an employer derives the most value value from separating always-disclosers from the rest (that is, if $v_a >> v_c, v_n$, then *not* asking is optimal even if firms are technically permitted.

In addition, certain labor markets feature posted wages or little wage dispersion. In this case, historical salary information may be widely known without employer questions. In unionized and government workers, historical salary rates may be public information already. This fact is used by researchers such as Cullen and Pakzad-Hurson (2016); Card et al. (2012) to examine the effects of pay transparency. For other types of jobs, websites like PayScale and Glassdoor contain granular salary information indexed by employer×location×job×seniority cells. These factors allow employers to assess worker salaries, even *without* asking, and suppress the effects of bans.

As salary history questions have become focal in public policy, many private firms have voluntarily banned their recruiters from asking historical rates. This is perhaps because the question wasn't providing much utility, for the reasons discussed above. Like the other reasons, self-imposed bans suppress the effects of legal bans by limiting the impact of the new law. Uncertainties around employer reactions – rather than candidate reactions, the main topic of this paper – *also* affect the size and scope of changes attributed to salary history legislation.

SURVEY DETAILS

Our survey was conducted on November 22, 2019, using Prolific Academic, a survey platform that performs well in independent academic assessments (Peer et al., 2017). To target Americans in the labor force, we limited participation to individuals who listed their nationality as United States; between the ages of 22 and 55; who said they were employed full-time, part-time, due to start a job within a month, or unemployed but job seeking.

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