All the Single Ladies:
Job Promotions and the Durability of Marriage
Online Appendix

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

FIGURE W1. PLACEMENT OF JOBS IN THE DISTRIBUTION OF ANNUAL EARNINGS, 2011

Notes: Data for the full Swedish working-age population (20–65) that was employed in 2011.

Section W1. Measuring the Division of Parental Leave

Ideally, we would like to measure the division of parental leave in terms of sharing time away from work. But because our dataset only includes this variable from 1993, we approximate the division of leave using the parents' share of total payments from the parental leave insurance program. Figure W2 shows the correlation between these two variables for the time period for which we have access to both (after 1993). The figure shows a clear positive correlation (0.815), with most observations clustered close to the 45-degree line.



FIGURE W2. THE POLITICIAN'S SHARE OF TOTAL PAYMENTS TO THE HOUSEHOLD FROM THE PARENTAL LEAVE PROGRAM (X-AXIS) AND THE POLITICIAN'S SHARE OF THE HOUSEHOLD'S TOTAL DAYS OF PARENTAL LEAVE (Y-AXIS)

Notes: N = 677. The number of days is the "net days," a variable for which half days have been merged into full days by the Swedish Insurance Agency.

Section W2. Comparison of Estimation Sample to the General Population

In this section we compare the family structures (percent married/divorced, and percent with children) between our main estimation sample of political candidates and Sweden's general population separately for women and men. To make the comparison meaningful, we weigh the population data to match the age structure and year of observation for the politicians. This means that we compare the family structures of women politicians to women in the general population, observed in the same year and in the same birth cohort. Because our politicians are middle aged (50 years on average), we want to compare their family situations to other women of the same age, rather than women of all ages. Otherwise the comparison would reflect changes in child and marriage patterns over cohorts and over the life cycle, rather than capturing how our politician sample differs from the general population.

To construct the population average we use the following approach. For each combination of year and age, we measure the average outcome of each family structure variable in Swedish register data. For example, we record the proportion of married women among all 55-year-old women in 1992 etc. For each person in our estimation sample we then use their year of birth and year of observation in the dataset (for example the 1994 election year) to assign the population average for this combination of characteristics in a new variable. A 55-year-old female

candidate observed in year 1994 will be assigned the average marriage rate of all 55-year-old women in 1994, and so on. To calculate the weighted population average, we take the average of the assigned values in the estimation sample. This automatically weights the population data to match the age and year-of-observation structure of the estimation sample. The resulting average is the proportion of married women in the general population – but with the same age and year-of-observation structure as the women in the estimation sample.

Just as we can match the estimation sample to the population data in terms of age and year of observation, we can weigh the population data on other factors as well. In separate calculation, we add weights for education level (both male and female politicians have a higher education level that the general population) and municipality of residence (women are more likely to run in districts with a shorter commute to the Parliament in Stockholm). This gives us three different sets of weights that we use to calculate the population averages: (1) age & year of observation, (2) age, year of observation & municipality of residence and (3) age, year-of-observation & level of education. Table W1 shows these three sets of population averages in

TABLE W1—COMPARISON OF FAMILY STRUCTURES BETWEEN POLITICIANS AND THE GENERAL POPULATION.

Time period	*1991–2010*				*2002–2010*	
	Political candidates	Population (All occupation codes)			Political candidates	Population (Executives only)
Weighted by	None	Cohort, year	Cohort, year, municipality	Cohort, year, educ. level	None	Cohort-year
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Women						
Share divorced	0.14	0.15	0.14	0.15	0.13	0.15
Share married	0.63	0.56	0.58	0.57	0.62	0.58
Child	0.85	0.83	0.85	0.81	0.83	0.82
Child <17	0.39	0.40	0.40	0.41	0.42	0.44
Child <7	0.10	0.12	0.12	0.13	0.12	0.16
Men						
Share divorced	0.07	0.13	0.12	0.12	0.10	0.10
Share married	0.72	0.56	0.57	0.59	0.67	0.66
Child	0.85	0.77	0.78	0.78	0.82	0.85
Child <17	0.43	0.39	0.40	0.41	0.43	0.46
Child <7	0.13	0.13	0.12	0.14	0.14	0.17

Notes: The table compares the shares of divorced and married women and men political candidates (Column 1) to the full Swedish population weighted to match the politicians' i) distribution of birth cohorts and years of political candidacy (Column 2), ii) birth cohort, year and municipality of residence (Column 3), and ii) birth cohort, year and education level (Column 4). Column 5 shows the proportion of divorced and married men and women political candidates in years 2002–2010. Column (6) shows those statistics for the full population of people with ISCO occupation codes with a first digit of 1, i.e. executive jobs.

In the two rightmost columns of the Table (5 and 6), we compare the estimation sample of political candidates to people with senior positions in other sectors. We

restrict the population data to people with executive occupations (having an ISCO occupation code with a first digit of 1). Since occupation codes are only available starting in 2002, we show the averages of the family structure variables for politicians in this time period in column (5) and for executives – matched on age and year of observation – in column (6).

Section W3. Defining Close Elections in PR Systems

There are complexities to measuring close elections in a proportional representation system. One challenge is that the seat share of a single party, or bloc of parties, is not a deterministic function of the vote share; it is jointly determined by the allocation of votes among parties. To measure the closeness of elections, we therefore rely on two different methods: one for municipal elections and another for parliamentary elections.

W3.1 Municipal Elections

To measure electoral closeness at the municipal level, we use a simulation-based approach that builds on Fiva et al. (2018). The approach and code developed in this paper has also been applied in Folke et al. (2017). This approach constructs a forcing variable, which is continuous (rather than discrete, as is the seat share), and which does not sort or give a low density of observations close to the threshold of winning more than 50 percent of the seats. This simulated forcing variable takes two important features of the electoral system into account. The first is that a municipality may contain multiple electoral districts of different sizes. The second feature is that shifting a vote to (or from) one bloc to the remaining parties has a different impact on the seat share of the bloc winning (or losing) the vote, depending on which party within the winning and losing bloc won or lost it, respectively.

Our simulation departs from data on electoral outcomes. We want to measure how close the election is by capturing which shift of votes to or from a political bloc would have caused (1) a winning bloc to lose its seat majority or (2) a losing bloc to gain a majority of seats. For each election, we will thus have two forcing variable values, one for each bloc. When we measure closeness for a certain bloc, the other

bloc always includes local parties.[1] The two closeness variables are measured in percentage terms, answering the question "which percentage of votes was needed, in a specific election, to give (or take) the seat majority from each of the two political blocs?"

For a bloc that won a seat majority, we start from the electoral result in the relevant election and move successively in the negative direction, incrementally *removing* 0.01 percentage points of the bloc's votes, starting from 0.01, 0.02, etc. For a losing bloc we do the opposite, adding small increments of votes. The goal is to find out, for each bloc at a particular time, what percentage of votes would have needed to move in order to shift the seat majority to the other bloc.

How does our simulated shift in votes affect the distribution of seats? The impact will of course differ between countries depending on the electoral system. In Sweden, seats are distributed based on the highest averages method, using a modified St. Lagué formula. After shifting a small proportion of votes either to or from a bloc, we use this formula to compute the new seat distribution. For each shift of votes, we randomly simulate 1,000 alternatives for how that specific percentage of votes, for example 0.02 percent, shifted in terms of receiving and losing (1) parties and (2) districts. Each time, we also compute the new allocation of seats. In this simulation, we assume that large parties have a greater variance in their vote shares than small parties, but that the variance is not 100 percent proportional. The simulations also abstract from the fact that votes can shift between parties within a bloc.[2] Having computed the new seat allocation for each of the 1,000 shifts of the vote distribution, we tally the number of times the bloc either lost (for winning blocs) or won (for losing blocs) the seat majority under the new distribution. Out of all the simulations for each shift in the vote share, we then set the value of the forcing variable to the size of the smallest vote shift that caused a shift in the bloc's majority status in at least 50 percent of the 1,000 vote shifts.

[1] In Sweden, local parties – defined as not having representation in Parliament – hold, on average, 2 percent of the municipal assembly seats.

[2] In the first step, we take a random number between 0 and 1 for each party in the giving and receiving blocs. We then multiply this random proportion by the party's vote share plus a constant of 0.1. For a party with a random shock of 0.4 and a 20 percent vote share, we thus calculate 0.4*(0.2 + 0.1). We call this variable q. Within each bloc, we then normalize the parties' q values so that they sum to 1, calculating $q_w = \frac{q_p}{\sum_1^p q_p}$, where q_p are the initially computed party shocks and q_w are the normalized shocks. The next step is to subtract fractions of the vote shift, for example 0.01 percentage points of the total votes, from one bloc and reward it in fractions to the other parties in a way that corresponds to the randomly drawn shocks. Finally, a new vote allocation is used to calculate the seat allocation, using the Swedish election formula.

Figure W3 illustrates the process of creating the forcing variable in the example of the municipality of Upplands Väsby in the 2006 election. In this municipality, the center-right bloc won the governing majority, receiving 52.7 percent of the votes and 54.9 percent of the seats. The left bloc won 42.9 percent of the votes and 43.1 percent of the seats. Suppose that we want the value of the forcing variable for the left bloc, i.e., the minimum proportion of votes the bloc would need to win in order to gain a majority of seats. The *x*-axis in the figure shows the proportion of votes shifted, and the *y*-axis shows the proportion of times, out of our 1,000 simulated vote shifts, that caused the left bloc to win at least 50 percent of the seats. The upward slope of the line indicates that the larger the proportion of votes that shifted to the bloc, the greater the probability of a 50 percent seat shift. As illustrated by the vertical line, the left bloc gains a seat majority in about half of the simulations when we give it an additional 5.0 percentage points of the votes. This assigns the value of the forcing variable to 5.0 percent for the left bloc in this election.



FIGURE W3. ILLUSTRATION OF SIMULATION STRATEGY

Notes: The figure shows the proportion of seat majority shifts to the left bloc (y-axis) on 1,000 simulations of shifting a given proportion of votes from the center-right bloc to the left bloc (x-axis). The data used for the illustration comes from the Upplands Väsby municipality in the 2006 election.

A general concern with regression discontinuity designs is that the density of the forcing variable is not smooth across the threshold. A higher density of observations on either side of the seat threshold indicates that the treatment is not random, or that the forcing variable is wrongly specified in some way. In Figure W4, we show that this is not the case for our analysis. For both forcing variables, the frequency of observations is smooth as we cross the seat majority threshold.



FIGURE W4. FREQUENCY OF OBSERVATIONS, AS A FUNCTION OF THE MARGIN TO A SEAT MAJORITY FOR THE LEFT BLOC (LEFT-HAND GRAPH) AND THE RIGHT BLOC (RIGHT-HAND GRAPH)

Notes: Each bar corresponds to 0.01 units of the margin to the seat majority.

W3.2 Parliamentary Elections

To define close elections for parliamentary seats, we follow the simulation approach suggested by Freier and Odendahl (2015) and use simulations to define close elections. There are two reasons for not using the same approach as at the municipal level. First, the seats are allocated in two rounds at two different levels, which makes it very technically complicated to implement our municipal-level approach. Second, using the vote share to define close elections would also mean that we would have to adjust the interval to define close elections for the smallest parties.

This approach is similar to the method we use at the municipal level. We start with the actual seat and vote allocation. We then simulate a large number (10,000) of likely vote changes, which allows for vote changes at both the national and local levels.[3] For each new vote allocation, we calculate the seat allocation. The closeness of the election is measured by the frequency of seat changes. If a party loses a seat in at least 30 percent of the simulations, we define that party as being close to losing a seat, and if it loses a seat in 40 percent of the simulations we define it as being

[3] In the first step, we start with a party's actual vote share at the national level. We then add a vote shock at the national level. This shock is normally distributed with a mean of zero and a standard deviation that is defined as the vote share of the party times 0.2 plus a constant of 0.02. For a party with a 10 percent vote share, the standard deviation of the vote shock will thus be 4 percentage points.

In the next step, we allocate this vote shock to the districts by multiplying the districts' share of the parties' vote share multiplied by a random number that has a uniform distribution between 0 and 1. This gives us the variable *q*. For each party, we then normalize the *q* values across districts so they sum up to 1. These normalized *q* values decide how large a share of the national vote shock goes to a district.

We then add a shock at the *district* level. Again, this shock is also normally distributed with a mean of zero and a standard deviation that is defined as the vote share of the party times 0.2 plus a constant of 0.02. Within each district, we normalize the shocks across parties so that the total vote change in the district is zero.

We then add the national and district-level vote shocks to the initial votes. Finally, we distribute the seats according to the new vote distribution using the Swedish election formula, and calculate how often the party gains or loses a seat.

very close to losing a seat. See Freier and Odendahl (2015) for a more detailed description of this approach.

TABLE W2—COMPARISON OF PRE-PROMOTION TRAITS IN THE SUB-SAMPLE OF CLOSE ELECTIONS.

	Women		Men	
Subsequently promoted	Yes	No	Yes	No
Couple characteristics				
Politician's share of earnings (share)	0.59	0.55	**0.69**	**0.66**
Politician's share of parental leave (share)	0.82	0.81	0.14	0.15
Age difference (politician-spouse)	-4.19	-4.13	1.62	2.05
Politician out-earns spouse (share)	0.67	0.58	0.91	0.89
Marriage length (years)	20.63	20.32	20.34	20.47
Second marriage (share)	0.02	0.03	0.02	0.02
Same birth region (share)	0.90	0.91	0.94	0.94
Has children (0–17)	0.37	0.41	0.48	0.41
Has children (0–6)	0.09	0.13	0.12	0.10
Individual characteristics				
Politician's age	48.40	48.44	49.64	50.48
Politician's age at marriage (1)	28.29	28.12	29.54	30.13
Politician's earnings (2)	**355.3**	**310.2**	375.3	367.3
Politician's tertiary education (share)	0.66	0.72	0.54	0.54
Spouse's age	53.13	52.56	48.27	48.55
Spouse's earnings	295.1	283.1	174.8	188.6
Spouse's tertiary education (share)	0.45	0.46	0.54	0.57
Observations	122	151	255	298

Notes: Bold letters represent differences between promoted and non-promoted individuals of the same sex at the 5 percent level or lower, using ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions with standard errors clustered at the individual level. The definition of close elections is described in Section W2. Measurement details for the variables in the table can be found in Section 3.

TABLE W3—DIFFERENCES-IN-DIFFERENCES ESTIMATE OF THE EFFECT OF POLITICAL PROMOTION ON REMAINING MARRIED, INCLUDING ALTERNATIVE DEFINITIONS OF CLOSE ELECTIONS, FOR WOMEN MARRIED AS OF FOUR YEARS PRIOR TO THE ELECTION.

	Full	Close elections				
Definition of close municipal elections		7 percent	6 percent	**5 percent**	4 percent	3 percent
Definition of close parliamentary elections		.2 prob	.25 prob	**.3 prob**	.35 prob	.4 prob
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Treat*t-4	0.65	-0.48	0.71	2.00	4.38	6.17
	(2.39)	(2.48)	(3.13)	(3.27)	(3.76)	(3.79)
Treat*t-3	-0.32	-1.34	0.87	1.71	3.80	3.86
	(2.12)	(2.14)	(2.77)	(2.84)	(3.19)	(3.20)
Treat*t-2	0.97	-0.46	0.38	0.86	2.79	2.83
	(1.89)	(1.86)	(2.38)	(2.57)	(2.85)	(2.68)
Treat*t-1	0.63	0.60	0.76	1.15	1.71	1.81
	(1.39)	(1.44)	(1.81)	(1.91)	(2.08)	(1.87)
			Election year = reference category			
Treat*t+1	-3.36**	-2.79*	-2.64	-0.44	-0.35	-0.09
	(1.53)	(1.50)	(2.02)	(1.83)	(2.24)	(2.84)
Treat*t+2	-4.78**	-4.20**	-6.24**	-4.31	-3.23	-3.07
	(1.94)	(1.96)	(2.78)	(2.86)	(3.24)	(3.69)
Treat*t+3	-7.04***	-6.09**	-7.68**	-6.08*	-5.26	-3.22
	(2.47)	(2.51)	(3.36)	(3.53)	(4.11)	(4.58)
Treat*t+4	-7.46***	-6.57**	-7.59**	-5.07	-3.91	-1.11
	(2.69)	(2.76)	(3.61)	(3.79)	(4.41)	(5.00)
Treat*t+5	-8.41***	-7.71**	-8.02*	-5.89	-5.33	-1.40
	(3.01)	(3.07)	(4.13)	(4.49)	(5.20)	(5.71)
Treat*t+6	-9.52***	-9.08***	-8.54**	-6.25	-6.57	-2.77
	(3.11)	(3.15)	(4.15)	(4.51)	(5.30)	(5.81)
Treat*t+7	-	-10.33***	-7.41	-5.11	-6.04	-1.73
	(3.33)	(3.40)	(4.61)	(4.92)	(5.76)	(6.49)
Treat*t+8	-9.53***	-9.25**	-6.33	-4.40	-5.19	-0.40
	(3.48)	(3.58)	(4.84)	(4.99)	(5.83)	(6.59)
Observations	7,780	6,839	4,205	3,571	2,929	2,339

Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the level of the candidate in parentheses*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Details about the estimation and content of the table are available in the notes below Figure 5 in the main text.

TABLE W4—DIFFERENCES-IN-DIFFERENCES ESTIMATE OF THE EFFECT OF POLITICAL PROMOTION ON REMAINING MARRIED, INCLUDING ALTERNATIVE DEFINITIONS OF CLOSE ELECTIONS, FOR MEN MARRIED AS OF FOUR YEARS PRIOR TO THE ELECTION.

	Full	Close elections				
Definition of close municipal elections		7 percent	6 percent	**5 percent**	4 percent	3 percent
Definition of close parliamentary elections		.2 prob	.25 prob	**.3 prob**	.35 prob	.4 prob
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Treat*t-4	-0.63	-0.47	-0.49	-0.81	-0.04	0.59
	(1.21)	(1.26)	(1.73)	(1.92)	(2.16)	(2.50)
Treat*t-3	-0.72	-0.44	-1.23	-1.25	-1.34	0.04
	(1.07)	(1.11)	(1.48)	(1.68)	(1.95)	(2.31)
Treat*t-2	-0.91	-0.43	-1.08	-1.34	-1.31	-0.75
	(0.82)	(0.84)	(1.06)	(1.24)	(1.45)	(1.70)
Treat*t-1	-0.67	-0.17	-0.48	-0.56	-0.72	-0.82
	(0.50)	(0.45)	(0.59)	(0.66)	(0.83)	(0.99)
			Election year = reference category			
Treat*t+1	-0.26	-0.31	-0.68	0.20	1.07	2.45**
	(0.80)	(0.79)	(1.12)	(1.00)	(1.05)	(1.14)
Treat*t+2	-0.55	-0.36	-0.37	0.65	1.29	2.01
	(1.09)	(1.10)	(1.55)	(1.59)	(1.77)	(2.03)
Treat*t+3	-0.60	-0.69	0.15	1.46	1.60	3.93
	(1.39)	(1.43)	(2.01)	(2.04)	(2.24)	(2.51)
Treat*t+4	-0.06	-0.54	0.45	1.85	1.65	4.33
	(1.50)	(1.54)	(2.16)	(2.25)	(2.46)	(2.78)
Treat*t+5	-1.13	-1.84	-0.73	0.71	0.62	3.31
	(1.66)	(1.71)	(2.38)	(2.53)	(2.79)	(3.27)
Treat*t+6	-0.84	-1.65	-0.72	0.12	0.00	2.05
	(1.77)	(1.81)	(2.50)	(2.63)	(2.90)	(3.59)
Treat*t+7	-0.41	-1.40	-0.58	0.42	0.39	2.67
	(1.89)	(1.93)	(2.65)	(2.76)	(2.95)	(3.64)
Treat*t+8	-0.52	-1.59	-1.25	-0.22	0.20	1.82
	(1.99)	(2.03)	(2.79)	(2.94)	(3.16)	(3.80)
Observations	15,481	14,315	8,286	7,224	6,127	4,679

Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the level of the candidate in parentheses*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Details about the estimation and content of the table are available in the notes below Figure 5 in the main text.

TABLE W5—DIFFERENCES-IN-DIFFERENCES ESTIMATES OF THE EFFECT OF POLITICAL PROMOTION ON REMAINING MARRIED, INCLUDING ALTERNATIVE DEFINITIONS OF CLOSE ELECTIONS, FOR WOMEN MARRIED AS OF FOUR YEARS PRIOR TO THE ELECTION.

	Full	Close elections				
Definition of close municipal elections		7 percent	6 percent	**5 percent**	4 percent	3 percent
Definition of close parliamentary elections		.2 prob	.25 prob	**.3 prob**	.35 prob	.4 prob
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
			Election year = reference category			
Treat*t+1	-3.63**	-3.27**	-3.35	-1.28	-1.42	-1.31
	(1.65)	(1.62)	(2.14)	(1.96)	(2.42)	(2.96)
Treat*t+2	-5.36**	-5.22**	-7.78***	-6.07**	-5.47	-5.54
	(2.10)	(2.12)	(2.96)	(3.05)	(3.50)	(3.90)
Treat*t+3	-8.16***	-7.61***	-9.94***	-8.68**	-8.65**	-6.77
	(2.54)	(2.56)	(3.42)	(3.57)	(4.18)	(4.52)
Treat*t+4	-8.01***	-7.31**	-9.00**	-7.20*	-6.82	-4.11
	(2.77)	(2.83)	(3.70)	(3.84)	(4.47)	(4.95)
Treat*t+5	-9.41***	-8.51***	-9.54**	-8.05*	-8.43	-4.38
	(3.04)	(3.13)	(4.25)	(4.55)	(5.27)	(5.70)
Treat*t+6	-10.51***	-9.85***	-10.02**	-8.37*	-9.64*	-5.82
	(3.16)	(3.22)	(4.28)	(4.59)	(5.39)	(5.83)
Treat*t+7	-11.36***	-11.80***	-8.95*	-7.38	-9.36	-5.21
	(3.45)	(3.52)	(4.64)	(4.99)	(5.82)	(6.47)
Treat*t+8	-10.43***	-10.65***	-7.83	-6.66	-8.51	-4.00
	(3.58)	(3.69)	(4.81)	(5.05)	(5.89)	(6.54)
Observations	5,216	4,537	2,826	2,423	1,994	1,609

Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the level of the candidate in parentheses*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Details about the estimation and content of the table are available in the notes below Figure 5 in the main text.

TABLE W6—DIFFERENCES-IN-DIFFERENCES ESTIMATES OF THE EFFECT OF POLITICAL PROMOTION ON REMAINING MARRIED, INCLUDING ALTERNATIVE DEFINITIONS OF CLOSE ELECTIONS, FOR MEN MARRIED IN THE ELECTION YEAR

	Full	Close elections				
Definition of close municipal elections		7 percent	6 percent	**5 percent**	4 percent	3 percent
Definition of close parliamentary elections		.2 prob	.25 prob	**.3 prob**	.35 prob	.4 prob
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
			Election year = reference category			
Treat*t+1	-0.31	-0.33	-0.66	0.19	1.04	2.36**
	(0.81)	(0.82)	(1.10)	(0.98)	(1.04)	(1.12)
Treat*t+2	-0.67	-0.48	-0.71	0.25	0.83	1.31
	(1.10)	(1.12)	(1.54)	(1.59)	(1.79)	(2.09)
Treat*t+3	-0.91	-1.01	-0.17	1.06	1.19	3.21
	(1.40)	(1.45)	(1.98)	(2.01)	(2.24)	(2.55)
Treat*t+4	-0.62	-1.06	-0.21	1.08	0.87	3.06
	(1.52)	(1.56)	(2.15)	(2.25)	(2.49)	(2.85)
Treat*t+5	-1.44	-2.17	-1.18	0.33	0.35	2.83
	(1.65)	(1.71)	(2.32)	(2.49)	(2.77)	(3.25)
Treat*t+6	-1.04	-2.00	-1.16	-0.24	-0.23	1.62
	(1.77)	(1.80)	(2.45)	(2.59)	(2.88)	(3.57)
Treat*t+7	-1.09	-2.22	-1.80	-0.79	-0.41	1.59
	(1.91)	(1.95)	(2.66)	(2.79)	(2.99)	(3.67)
Treat*t+8	-1.41	-2.62	-2.75	-1.79	-1.06	0.16
	(2.02)	(2.06)	(2.82)	(2.99)	(3.23)	(3.88)
Observations	10,918	10,087	5,856	5,097	4,271	3,237

Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the level of the candidate in parentheses*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Details about the estimation and content of the table are available in the notes below Figure 5 in the main text.

Section W4. Additional Sensitivity Tests



FIGURE W5. THE EFFECT OF POLITICAL PROMOTION ON REMAINING MARRIED, INCLUDING CONTROL VARIABLES

Notes: The figure shows results from estimating the main result (the bottom graph in Figure 5) after including as control variables all the variables listed in Table 1, Section 3, with the exception of the division of parental leave, which is excluded due to missing data. Details about the estimation and content of the figure are available in the notes below Figure 5 in the main text.



FIGURE W6. THE EFFECT OF POLITICAL PROMOTION ON REMAINING MARRIED, EXCLUDING REPEATING LOSERS FROM THE SAMPLE

Notes: The figure shows results from estimating the main result (the bottom graph in Figure 5) after excluding observations for politicians who previously appeared in the sample as a losing job candidate. Details about the estimation and content of the figure are available in the notes below Figure 5 in the main text.



FIGURE W7. THE EFFECT OF POLITICAL PROMOTION ON REMAINING MARRIED FOR DIFFERENT START YEARS

Notes: Details about the estimation and content of the figure are available in the notes below Figure 5 in the main text. The plots in the figure vary the starting year for the sample selection procedure described in Section 2.1, from six years prior to the election that assigns the promotion, and to the year of the election. The starting year used in the main analysis, *t=-4*, is excluded.



FIGURE W8. THE EFFECT OF POLITICAL PROMOTION ON REMAINING MARRIED, EXCLUDING CANDIDATES WITH RETIRED (>65 YEARS OLD) OR RETIRING SPOUSES

Notes: The figure shows results from estimating the main result (the bottom graph in Figure 5) after excluding politicians whose spouse (or ex-spouse) reached the age of 65 during the election period after the promotion, i.e. between t=1 and t=4. Details about the estimation and content of the figure are available in the notes below Figure 5 in the main text.



FIGURE W9. THE EFFECT OF POLITICAL PROMOTION ON REMAINING MARRIED, ESTIMATED SEPARATELY IN THE PARLIAMENTARY (LEFT-HAND FIGURE) AND MUNICIPAL SAMPLE (RIGHT-HAND FIGURE)

Notes: The figure shows results from estimating the main result (the bottom graph in Figure 5) separately for parliamentarians and mayors. Details about the estimation and content of the figure are available in the notes below Figure 5 in the main text.



FIGURE W10. THE EFFECT OF POLITICAL PROMOTION ON REMAINING MARRIED, ALTERNATIVE DEFINITION OF MUNICIPAL TREATMENT THAT ELIMINATES COALITION BARGAINING AS A FACTOR DETERMINING THE PARTY OF THE MAYOR

Notes: The figure shows results from estimating the main result (the bottom graph in Figure 5) after excluding excludes municipal elections in which the treatment could have been determined by coalitional bargaining. Details about the estimation and content of the figure are available in the notes below Figure 5 in the main text.

Section W5. Career Success and Divorce in Four Occupations

To examine the external validity of our finding that women with successful careers are more likely to divorce than men with successful careers, we turn to four additional occupations in which, arguably, persons with the same education type have comparable career paths that occur within the same types of organizations: medical doctors, police, priests, and pharmacists.[4] Although we cannot measure the exact timing of promotion events for these occupations, we can use income to determine who has had a successful career. As a comparison, we also report the proportions of divorced men and women in the occupations analyzed above: CEOs, mayors, and parliamentarians.

From our dataset that covers the full Swedish working-age population, we select all individuals who graduated from the relevant education programs between 1989 and 1993. In order to only compare the career trajectories of persons who remained in the occupation, we drop those who earned a degree in another field at any point until 2012. We also remove individuals who retired before 2012.

Divorce rates and career outcomes are measured within occupation-gender groups 20–23 years after graduation. Within each occupation, we compute the median of annual earnings in 2010–2012. We then benchmark each individual's average annual earnings to those of his or her peers. We denote persons who have reached a level of annual earnings above the median as having had a "high" career performance, and those below the median as having had a "low" performance. We compute the proportion of divorced persons by gender and occupation, divided by their career performance (high or low) and report these proportions in Figure W11.

[4] We use industry codes for the post-graduation period to check if this is the case. The data show that for medical doctors, 92 percent of the year-individual observations have industry codes within medical care (2-digit SNI92 of 85). For the Police Academy, 93 percent of the observations are found in the police force industry code (4-digit SNI92 of 7425). Priests are found in religious organizations, as 75 percent of the observations occur in the 4-digit code of 9131. Finally, for pharmacists, 57 percent of the data is found in the 3-digit code 244 (medical companies) or the 5-digit code of 52310 (pharmacies).



FIGURE W11. PROPORTION OF DIVORCED INDIVIDUALS BY GENDER, OCCUPATION, AND CAREER PERFORMANCE

Notes: For the first four occupations, career performance and divorce are measured in the 20–23rd year of the individual's career. Parliamentarians and mayors form a pooled sample of the 1991–2010 election periods. CEOs in firms with more than 100 employees represent a pooled sample for 2002–2012.

The descriptive statistics indicate that our baseline findings reach beyond the political sector. Among all the professions, women are more likely to be divorced than men. But there is a striking gender difference between persons who have reached high and low levels of earnings. For men, the divorce rate is consistently higher among those with below-median earnings across all four occupations. For women, divorce is instead more common among high earners than low earners within the same profession. The only profession that does not show this pattern for women is pharmacists.

Section W6. Additional Mechanism Analysis



FIGURE W12. THE EFFECT OF POLITICAL PROMOTION ON REMAINING MARRIED IN SUB-SAMPLES BASED ON THE PRE-PROMOTION SHARE OF CO-WORKERS OF THE OPPOSITE SEX

Notes: Details about the estimation and content of the figure are available in the notes below Figure 5 in the main text. The sample is sub-divided in two ways. For each political job candidate, we depart from the plant-level workplace ID code (Cfar in LISA). We then compute two variables for the total number of other people who have the same code in that year: the share of employees of the opposite sex from the politician, and the number of employees of the opposite sex. The sample is then split by the median of each of these variables. Only workplaces with more than 10 employees are included, and the sample size is also reduced when non-employed people are automatically dropped from the sample.

FIGURE W13. THE EFFECT OF POLITICAL PROMOTION ON REMAINING MARRIED DIFFERENTIATED BY THE SIZE OF THE PROMOTED POLITICIAN'S INCREASE IN EARNINGS

Notes: Details about the estimation and content of the figure are available in the notes below Figure 5 in the main text. The DID estimates come from an expanded version of equation (1) in which the promotion treatment variable is subdivided into two different dummy variables before being included in the specification. This division is done in three ways, creating three sets of two mutually exclusive treatments. The first set of treatments is to be promoted and to have an earnings increase above the median of promoted politicians of the same sex. The second set is to be promoted and to have an earnings increase below the median. Earnings increases are measured as (1) the difference in the sum of earnings before and after the promotion, (2) the difference in relative earnings before and after the promotion, and (3) the difference in earnings before and after the promotion as a share of total household earnings. The estimated treatment effects of having earnings increases above the median are shown by gray markers, and the estimated treatment effects from below-median increases are shown with black markers. Since earnings relative to the household's total earnings can only be measured for married couples, and we measure this ratio in the years just prior to the promotion, we use the sample of politicians married in the election year. For comparability, the other two sample splits are also done on this same sample.

W6.1 Norms on Relative Earnings

A promotion may move the division of household earnings in a more or less specialized direction, which could affect the utility of the marriage. Recent work on identity economics has argued that individuals receive utility by complying with norms on this division, and lose utility if they break those norms (Akerlof and Kranton 2000; Bertrand, Pan, and Kamenica 2015). If norms prescribe that "the husband should earn more than the wife," promotions that cause couples to break this norm could be particularly harmful to marriage durability.

To investigate whether promoted men and women who break this norm are driving the main result, we subdivide the treatment variable into two separate

dummy variables. Both of these treatment dummies are then put into equation (1) at the same time.[5] One is a dummy for being promoted and surpassing the spouse in earnings. This dummy takes a value of 1 for promoted persons whose earnings were lower than their spouse's in the year before the promotion and higher in the year after. The other dummy denotes being promoted and not surpassing the spouse in earnings between these two time points, i.e. remaining in the position of earning either less or more than the spouse. We then expand the DID regression (equation 1) to simultaneously estimate the effects of both treatments. In the sample, 16 percent of the promoted women and 7 percent of the promoted men start to earn more than their spouse after they are promoted.

The results in Figure W14 show that the promotion effect is not due to female politicians breaking the norm that "the husband should earn more." The estimated effect of a woman being promoted and surpassing her husband in earnings is basically the same as for being promoted without starting to earn more. This means that the divorce effect is equally strong regardless of whether the promoted woman surpasses the spouse in earnings or not.



FIGURE W14. THE EFFECT OF POLITICAL PROMOTION ON REMAINING MARRIED, DIFFERENTIATED BY WHETHER THE POLITICIAN SURPASSES THEIR SPOUSE IN EARNINGS OR NOT

Notes: Details about the estimation and content of the figure are available in the notes below Figure 5 in the main text. The DID estimates come from an expanded version of equation (1) in which the promotion treatment variable is subdivided into two different dummy variables before being included in the specification. One is a dummy that denotes being promoted and surpassing the spouse in earnings (gray markers) and the other is a dummy for being promoted and not surpassing the spouse in earnings (black markers). Since earnings are measured in the years prior to the election, we restrict the sample to those that were married as of the election year.

In addition to identifying the specific point in the earnings division when the wife starts to earn more than her husband, a promotion can also make the wife the household's dominant earner. This cut-off might be more relevant in our case, since many women in our sample already out-earned their spouses before the promotion

[5] We cannot perform the same type of split-sample analysis as when we look at pre-promotion characteristics, because we lack information about who in the control group would have earned more than their spouse if they had been promoted.

(Table 1). But it is also more demanding to test because there are more possible transitions. We divide the sample into three categories of earnings divisions prior to the promotion: traditional, dual earner, and reverse traditional (following, e.g., Becker, Landes, and Michael 1977; Becker 1981; Lundberg and Pollak 2007). In traditional households, the husband is the dominant earner with more than 60 percent of total household earnings (e.g. Fortin 2005; Bertrand, Pan, and Kamenica 2015); in reverse traditional households, the wife is the dominant earner; and in dual-earner households, neither spouse earns more than 60 percent. Descriptive statistics for this categorization show that about one-fourth of the promoted women and more than two-thirds of the men were the dominant earner in their household before the promotion. The women were over-represented in dual-earner households, 50 percent compared to 20 percent of the men. The distributions of the politicians' earnings shares are shown in Figure W15.



FIGURE W15. DISTRIBUTION OF THE POLITICIANS' SHARE OF HOUSEHOLD EARNINGS BEFORE PROMOTION

Notes: Earnings are measured as the sum of deflated annual earnings from jobs and business ownership in an average of the three years prior to the election. The black lines represent divisions into three household types. If the woman makes less than 40 percent of total earnings, the household is defined as "traditional"; if neither spouse earns more or less than 40–60 percent of earnings, the household is defined as "dual earner"; and if the wife makes more than 60 percent of total earnings, the household is defined as "reverse traditional."

For each promoted politician, we construct a matrix for shifts between the three household categories, comparing the status before and after promotion. We then compute the proportion of divorces in the first three years after the promotion for couples in each type of transition (or non-transition). These probabilities are recorded in Table W7. In accordance with the norm story, women who start out in dual-earner households are more likely to divorce when they move into reverse-traditional territory (15 percent) than if they remain in a dual-earner household (6 percent). Furthermore, men exhibit the opposite pattern: a transition from a dual-earner household to a traditional household is associated with a lower divorce rate (3 percent) than remaining in the dual-earner category (6 percent). Arguably, shifting household earnings to make the wife the dominant earner is correlated with

divorce, while shifting earnings *in accordance with* the norm of the male as the dominant earner has a positive effect on marriage durability. But given the small sample size and rudimentary empirical analysis, the reliability of these findings should not be overstated.

TABLE W7—DIVORCE RATES AND TRANSITIONS BETWEEN HOUSEHOLD TYPES

		Promoted female politicians			Promoted male politicians			
		Pre-promotion type				Pre-promotion type		
		T	DE	RT		T	DE	RT
Post-promotion type	T	-	-	-	T	7% N = 335	3% N = 72	-
	DE	5% N = 20	6% N = 53	-	DE	6% N = 17	6% N = 47	-
	RT	-	15% N = 54	10% N = 50	RT	-	-	-

Notes: The table shows the proportion of marriages that ended in divorce within three years after the promotion, subdivided by transitions of household types before and after the promotion. Households are divided into three categories based on the division of earnings, which are computed as the average division in the three years prior to the promotion (pre-promotion) and the three years after (post-promotion). "T" stands for a traditional division of household earnings, in which the husband makes more than 60 percent. "DE" stands for a dual-earner division in which neither spouse makes more than 60 percent or less than 40 percent, and "RT" stands for reverse-traditional households in which the wife earns more than 60 percent of the household earnings. Cells are left blank (-) if the sample size is smaller than 10 couples. Since earnings are measured in the years prior to the election, we restrict the sample to those that were married as of the election year.

W6.2 Dual-Earner Couples and Children in the Household

The previous section showed that female politicians were more likely to be in dual-earner relationships than their male counterparts. This could result in more divorces among women if the spouses in dual-earner relationships lose more utility from a promotion. Compared to specialized relationships, dual-earner relationships derive more utility from consumption and leisure complementarities, that is, spending leisure time together and consuming things that they both like (Lam 1988; Stevenson and Wolfers 2007). When the promotion takes time away from these joint activities, it could reduce the gains from marriage more in dual-earner families than in specialized households that derive utility from specialization rather than complementarity.[6]

We again categorize households into traditional, dual earner, and reverse traditional to investigate if divorces are concentrated among dual-earner couples. The sample is split into the three household types before re-running the baseline analysis (see Figure W16). Figure W16 shows that women's divorces are not concentrated in the dual-earner category but seem to be about as common (at least

[6] Under specialization, spouses gain from production complementarities as each of them becomes an expert in his or her own domain (Becker 1973, 1974, 1981; Parsons 1949). With regard to the two types of relationships, an increase in household income from the promotion would be expected to raise utility more in dual-earner families, as it expands the scope for consumption complementarities (Lam 1988; Lundberg 2012).

in the short term) in reverse-traditional families. For men, being in a dual-earner family is, if anything, *less* likely to result in divorce upon promotion. In sum, we find little support that the baseline finding stems from a particular sensitivity of dual-earner families to the promotion of one spouse.



FIGURE W13. THE EFFECT OF POLITICAL PROMOTION ON REMAINING MARRIED BASED ON SUB-SAMPLES FOR THREE CATEGORIES OF EARNINGS DIVISIONS IN THE HOUSEHOLD PRIOR TO THE PROMOTION

Notes: The figure shows DID estimates from equation (1), and corresponding to the lower half of Figure (5), for categories of the average division of earnings between the spouses in the three years prior to the promotion. Estimates for women are shown in the top row of graphs, and estimates for men in the bottom row. Couples are divided into types based on the share of the wife's contribution to total household earnings. Dual-earner couples are those in which the wife earns 40–60 percent of the total household income. Traditional households are those in which the wife earns less than 40 percent, and reverse traditional are those in which she earns more than 60 percent. Since earnings are measured in the years prior to the election, we restrict the sample to couples that were married as of the election year.

We also consider the presence of children in the household. Most people in our dataset have children over 18, and only 10 percent have children under 6 (see Table 1). This means that the intense parenting responsibilities associated with having younger children can, at most, be a problem for only a subset of the politicians in our estimation sample. Only a small number of people in the data have children under 6, disallowing a split-sample analysis based on this variable. In Figure W17 we split the sample according to whether the politician has at least one child under 18. This analysis does not reveal more (or fewer) divorces for politicians with children. One interpretation could be that older children are less relevant as a measure of total household and care work in a family. Another interpretation is that forces related to the presence of children are pulling on marriage durability in opposite directions. Children imply a larger workload, accentuating the impact of the promotion on total work, but families with children are also more likely to strive to avoid divorce.



FIGURE W17. THE EFFECT OF POLITICAL PROMOTION ON REMAINING MARRIED IN SUB-SAMPLES BASED ON HAVING CHILDREN UNDER 18

Notes: Details about the estimation and content of the figure are available in the notes below Figure 5 in the main text. The sample is subdivided according to whether a couple has a child under 18 as of the election year.

W6.3 Age at Marriage

Age at marriage is sometimes used to approximate the amount of information that spouses have about each other when they get married. At a younger age, observable traits are less informative for predicting a person's future earnings trajectory. We split the sample according to the median age at marriage for our sample of women job candidates (29). Figure W18 shows that if anything, in our data promotions are associated with more divorces when a couple married at an older age. Restricting the sample to people who are in their first marriage does not alter this picture (not reported). Given the small substantive size of the estimates, their lack of significance and counter-theoretical direction, we do not further pursue this explanation of the main results.



FIGURE W18. THE EFFECT OF POLITICAL PROMOTION ON REMAINING MARRIED IN SUB-SAMPLES BASED ON THE POLITICIAN'S AGE AT MARRIAGE

Notes: Details about the estimation and content of the figure are available in the notes below Figure 5 in the main text. The sample is subdivided according to whether the politician was above or below age 29 in the year he or she married the current spouse (the sample median for women and men combined).

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