

ONLINE APPENDIX

**Household Matters: Revisiting the Returns to
Capital among Female Micro-Entrepreneurs***

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Appendix Table A1: Balance Check for India Experiment

	Households With Multiple Enterprise Owners		Households Where Only Female Client Owns Enterprises	
	Means of Control	Grace Period Effect	Means of Control	Grace Period Effect
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Age	34.03 [7.32]	-1.52 (0.95)	35.46 [8.22]	0.15 (1.15)
Married	0.96 [0.19]	-0.03 (0.03)	0.88 [0.33]	-0.09* (0.05)
Muslim	0.01 [0.08]	0.02 (0.02)	0.02 [0.14]	0.00 (0.02)
Household Size	4.15 [1.39]	0.22 (0.17)	3.98 [1.45]	-0.22 (0.15)
Household Shock	0.75 [0.44]	0.03 (0.07)	0.79 [0.41]	-0.01 (0.07)
No Drain in Neighborhood	0.16 [0.37]	-0.07 (0.06)	0.11 [0.31]	-0.03 (0.05)
Has Financial Control	0.84 [0.37]	-0.03 (0.06)	0.89 [0.31]	-0.04 (0.06)
Years of Education	6.45 [3.36]	-0.67 (0.48)	6.98 [3.57]	0.05 (0.54)
Is a Homeowner	0.83 [0.37]	-0.03 (0.05)	0.76 [0.43]	0.07 (0.06)
Number of Household Enterprises	2.27 [0.57]	0.00 (0.07)	1.24 [0.47]	0.07 (0.07)
Loan Amount 4,000 (Rs.)	0.02 [0.15]	-0.01 (0.02)	0.01 [0.10]	0.00 (0.01)
Loan Amount 5,000 (Rs.)	0.05 [0.22]	-0.03 (0.03)	0.03 [0.17]	0.01 (0.03)
Loan Amount 6,000 (Rs.)	0.30 [0.46]	-0.04 (0.06)	0.30 [0.46]	-0.11* (0.07)
Loan Amount 8,000 (Rs.)	0.58 [0.50]	-0.00 (0.07)	0.58 [0.50]	0.03 (0.08)
Loan Amount 9,000 (Rs.)	0.00 [0.00]	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 [0.00]	0.02 (0.02)
Loan Amount 10,000 (Rs.)	0.05 [0.22]	0.08** (0.04)	0.09 [0.28]	0.05 (0.05)
χ^2		22.18	17.07	
Joint Test- Prob > χ^2		0.02	0.31	

Notes: * significant at the 10% level; ** significant at the 5% level; *** significant at the 1% level.

(1) All data are from baseline survey. Columns 1 and 3 report means with standard deviations in brackets. Columns 2 and 4 report the test of differences of means between the referenced control and treatment group. We control for stratification strata and cluster standard errors by loan group.

(2) In columns 1 and 2, we limit the sample to treatment and control households in which the borrower lives with at least one other enterprise owner. In columns 3 and 4, we limit the sample to treatment and control households in which the borrower is the sole enterprise owner in the household.

(3) Joint test is the Chi-Sq. Statistic, which is computed by jointly estimating a system of Seemingly Unrelated Regressions where the explanatory variable is a dummy for grace period and where standard errors are clustered by loan group. The regressions also include stratification dummies.

(4) Please see the data dictionary in the Appendix for definitions of the variables.

Appendix Table A2: Balance Check for Sri Lanka Experiment

	Households With Multiple Enterprise Owners		Households Where Only Female Client Owns Enterprises	
	Means of Control	Grant Treatment Effect	Means of Control	Grant Treatment Effect
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Age	40.18 [11.42]	1.00 (2.12)	40.79 [10.90]	1.58 (2.49)
Married	0.68 [0.47]	0.11 (0.08)	0.68 [0.47]	0.12 (0.10)
Muslim	0.02 [0.14]	0.04 (0.04)	0.03 [0.16]	0.00 (0.04)
Household Size	5.10 [1.68]	0.06 (0.33)	4.66 [1.48]	-0.37 (0.36)
Years of Education of Client	9.58 [3.28]	-0.39 (0.59)	9.97 [2.75]	-0.86 (0.71)
Index of Ability	-0.19 [1.38]	0.02 (0.27)	0.17 [1.23]	-0.40 (0.31)
Financially Literate	1.20 [0.98]	0.02 (0.18)	1.05 [1.00]	-0.08 (0.24)
Log Household Income	9.11 [0.67]	-0.04 (0.13)	9.14 [0.64]	-0.13 (0.12)
Age of Enterprise	8.77 [9.56]	1.77 (1.85)	9.79 [11.13]	-1.82 (2.45)
Enterprise Profits	4393.88 [6088.10]	-474.69 (567.00)	3168.53 [3234.41]	549.84 (518.21)
Enterprise Capital	1.3e+05 [1.4e+05]	8784.01 (30105.12)	98262.44 [1.0e+05]	55984.95* (31573.72)
Number of Wage Workers	0.76 [0.89]	0.03 (0.16)	1.03 [0.67]	0.03 (0.17)
	χ^2	9.46	10.45	
	Joint Test- Prob > χ^2	0.66	0.58	

Notes: * significant at the 10% level; ** significant at the 5% level; *** significant at the 1% level.

(1) All data are from baseline survey. Columns 1 and 3 report means with standard deviations in brackets. Columns 2 and 4 report the test of differences of means between the referenced control and treatment group. We control for stratification strata and cluster standard errors by loan group.

(2) We limit the analysis to female businesses sampled for the study. In columns 1 and 2, we limit the sample to treatment and control households in which the borrower lives with at least one other enterprise owner. In columns 3 and 4, we limit the sample to treatment and control households in which the borrower is the sole enterprise owner in the household.

(3) Joint test is the Chi-Sq. Statistic, which is computed by jointly estimating a system of Seemingly Unrelated Regressions where the explanatory variable is a dummy for receiving a grant. Robust standard errors in parentheses.

Appendix Table A3: Balance Check for Ghana Experiment

	Households With Multiple Enterprise Owners		Households Where Only Female Client Owns Enterprises	
	Means of Control	Grant Treatment Effect	Means of Control	Grant Treatment Effect
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Age	37.42 [8.93]	-0.43 (1.28)	36.28 [8.55]	-1.17 (1.02)
Married	0.68 [0.47]	0.04 (0.07)	0.64 [0.48]	-0.01 (0.06)
Muslim	0.13 [0.33]	0.00 (0.05)	0.08 [0.27]	0.03 (0.03)
Household Size	3.12 [2.15]	-0.01 (0.28)	2.48 [2.12]	-0.13 (0.24)
Years of Education of Client	7.73 [3.90]	0.02 (0.57)	8.48 [3.77]	-0.24 (0.45)
Digitspan	4.34 [2.20]	0.23 (0.33)	4.81 [2.06]	0.02 (0.25)
Asset Index	-0.33 [1.99]	-0.04 (0.28)	-0.16 [1.85]	0.18 (0.22)
Age of Enterprise	6.33 [6.21]	0.89 (0.91)	7.15 [7.84]	-1.71* (0.89)
Enterprise Profits	75.06 [76.02]	18.64 (14.99)	100.06 [131.03]	7.67 (17.99)
Enterprise Capital	294.05 [489.84]	-36.47 (98.41)	380.53 [640.32]	95.92 (124.15)
Number of Wage Workers	0.13 [0.47]	-0.02 (0.06)	0.07 [0.30]	0.05 (0.08)
Enterprise is Registered	0.01 [0.11]	-0.00 (0.01)	0.05 [0.21]	-0.03 (0.02)
χ^2		7.79	13.35	
Joint Test- Prob > χ^2		0.80	0.34	

Notes: * significant at the 10% level; ** significant at the 5% level; *** significant at the 1% level.

(1) All data are from baseline survey. Columns 1 and 3 report means with standard deviations in brackets. Columns 2 and 4 report the test of differences of means between the referenced control and treatment group. We control for stratification strata and cluster standard errors by loan group.

(2) We limit the analysis to female businesses sampled for the study. In columns 1 and 2, we limit the sample to treatment and control households in which the borrower lives with at least one other enterprise owner. In columns 3 and 4, we limit the sample to treatment and control households in which the borrower is the sole enterprise owner in the household.

(3) Joint test is the Chi-Sq. Statistic, which is computed by jointly estimating a system of Seemingly Unrelated Regressions where the explanatory variable is a dummy for receiving a grant. Robust standard errors in parentheses.

Appendix Table A4: Comparison of Female Enterprise Profits in Single Enterprise Households and Male Profits in All Households in India, Sri Lanka, and Ghana

	Enterprise Profits	Enterprise Profits	Enterprise Profits
	(1)	(2)	(3)
<i>Panel A: India</i>			
Treatment Indicator*Female	-325.78 (347.70)		
Treatment Indicator	826.09*** (294.09)		
Female	-560.51* (334.63)		
<i>Panel B: Sri Lanka</i>			
Treatment Amount*Female		-0.47 (4.57)	
Treatment Amount		7.35** (2.87)	
<i>Panel C: Ghana</i>			
Treatment Indicator*Female			-11.87 (30.85)
Treatment Indicator			55.15** (23.07)
Control Mean	1625.44 [1717.80]	67.67 [47.39]	144.65 [276.25]
Number of Enterprises	469	254	601
Enterprise-Period Observations	469	2,146	3,292

Notes: * significant at the 10% level; ** significant at the 5% level; *** significant at the 1% level.

(1) The question and unit that defines the outcome variables in columns 1, 2, and 3 are defined in Table 2 footnote 2 1, Table 2 footnote 4, and Table 3 footnote 2, respectively.

(2) In all columns, the sample is limited to the outcomes of women in single enterprise households and of men across all household types. In columns 2 and 3, we compare the profits of sampled women in single enterprise household to the profits of sampled men in both multiple and single enterprise households. In column 1, we compare the profits of sampled women in single enterprise households to the profits of other household members in multiple enterprise households (column 2 vs column 3 of Table 3, Panel A). In 97.5% of multiple enterprise households in India, the businesses of other household members are operated by male entrepreneurs.

(4) We use the base regressions described in Table 2 footnote 2 (for column 1), Table 2 footnote 5 (column 2), and Table 3 footnote 3 (column 3). We add an interaction term between treatment and female as well as a dummy for female (which is absorbed by the fixed effects in columns 2 and 3). The omitted group in column 1 are other enterprise owners in control group households. The omitted group in columns 2 and 3 are men in the control group.

(5) For a detailed description of how a household is defined as having a single female enterprise owner in each of the samples, see Section 2.2.

Appendix Table A5: Distribution of Household Types in India, Sri Lanka, and Ghana

	Female Sampled		Male Sampled	
	Single Enterprise Household	Multiple Enterprise Household	Single Enterprise Household	Multiple Enterprise Household
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
India	213 44.94%	261 55.06%		
Sri Lanka	73 38.42%	117 61.58%	115 58.38%	82 41.62%
Ghana	287 59.92%	192 40.08%	237 75.48%	77 24.52%

Notes: This table shows the distribution of the sample in each of the countries across household types.

Appendix Table A6: Household Income by Gender of Grant Recipient in Multiple Enterprise Households in Sri Lanka

	Households with Multiple Enterprises
	Log Household Monthly Income
	(1)
Treatment Amount*Female	-0.06 (0.07)
Treatment Amount	0.14*** (0.05)
Control Mean	9.18 [0.63]
Number of Enterprises	191
Enterprise-Period Observations	1,505

Notes: * significant at the 10% level; ** significant at the 5% level; *** significant at the 1% level.

(1) The question and unit that defines the outcome variable in columns 1, 2, and 3 are defined in Table 2 footnote 4.

(2) The sample is limited to sampled male and female enterprises in multiple enterprise households.

(4) We use the base regressions described in Equation 2 in the text. We add an interaction term between treatment and female. The female indicator is absorbed by the entrepreneur fixed effects. The comparison group is multiple enterprise household men in the control group.

(5) For a detailed description of how a household is defined as having a multiple enterprise owners in each of the samples, see Section 2.2.

Appendix Table A7: Full Main Table 3

	HHs with Multiple Enterprise Owners		HHs with Single Enterprise Owner	Differences in Treatment Effects (Col 3 vs. Col 1)
	Female	Other HH Members	Female	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Panel A: India				
β_1 : Treatment Indicator	-39.60 (64.14)	709.50** (288.02)	446.14** (211.30)	447.09** (188.42)
Control Mean	356.51 [596.03]	1625.44 [1717.80]	549.73 [980.47]	
Number of Enterprises	260	257	212	472
Panel B: Sri Lanka				
θ_1 : Treatment Amount	-4.84 (3.76)		6.88* (3.58)	11.72** (5.17)
Control Mean	41.55 [42.56]		31.59 [32.48]	
Number of Enterprises	111		71	
Enterprise-Period Observations	938		591	1,529
Panel C: Ghana				
η_1 : In-Kind Treatment Indicator	22.95* (12.68)		43.28** (20.50)	25.86 (23.70)
η_0 : Cash Treatment Indicator	12.53 (13.04)		-7.69 (12.29)	
Control Mean	75.06 [76.02]		100.06 [131.03]	
Number of Enterprises	191		287	
Enterprise-Period Observations	1,062		1,566	2,628

Notes: * significant at the 10% level; ** significant at the 5% level; *** significant at the 1% level.

Panels A (India Data) and B (Sri Lanka Data):

(1) The question and unit that defines the outcome variables in columns 1-3 of Panels A and B are define in Table 2 (footnotes 1 and 4). The regression specifications are described in footnotes 2 and 5 of Table 2. In column 1, we report the profits of the female enterprise in households with multiple enterprise owners. In column 2, we report the profits of all other household businesses (excluding the profits of the targeted female enterprise). In column 3, we report the profits of the female enterprise in households in which the targeted recipient is the sole enterprise owner in her household. In Panel A, profits are aggregated across all the enterprises of the entrepreneur listed in the column title. The equivalent measure cannot be constructed for the Sri Lanka and Ghana sample as the authors did not collect information on non-targeted businesses. For a detailed description of a sole/multiple female enterprise owner household in each of the samples, see Section 2.2.

Panels C (Ghana Data):

(2) The outcome variable in Panel C is derived from the question “What was the total income the business earned during [month] after paying all expenses including wages of employees, but not including any income you paid yourself. That is, what were the profits of your business during [month]?”. The units in Panel C are Cedis.

(3) Regressions in Panel C are created using the authors’ original code (Equation 3 in this paper). They include enterprise and survey wave fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the enterprise level and are shown in parentheses. The sample in this table is limited to sampled female entrepreneurs.

(4) Column 4 shows the coefficient on the interaction term between the treatment indicator and a dummy for single enterprise household. Following the regression specifications described in each of the samples, we regress profits on the interaction term, as well as the levels. In Panels B and C, the firm fixed effect absorbs the level effect.

Appendix Table A8: Full Main Table 4

	Households with Multiple Enterprises		
	India	Sri Lanka	Ghana
	(1)	(2)	(3)
<i>Panel A: India</i>			
Treatment Indicator*Female	-967.88*** (338.32)		
Treatment Indicator	823.08*** (285.59)		
Female	-1271.05*** (145.46)		
<i>Panel B: Sri Lanka</i>			
Treatment Amount*Female		-17.96*** (5.32)	
Treatment Amount		13.12*** (3.77)	
<i>Panel C: Ghana</i>			
In-Kind Treatment Indicator*Female			-50.63 (46.74)
Cash Treatment Indicator*Female			9.87 (37.66)
In-Kind Treatment Indicator			73.58 (44.99)
Cash Treatment Indicator			2.66 (35.33)
Control Mean	1625.44 [1717.80]	65.44 [44.06]	151.13 [292.72]
Number of Enterprises	517	191	268
Enterprise-Period Observations	517	1,627	1,485

Notes: * significant at the 10% level; ** significant at the 5% level; *** significant at the 1% level.

(1) The question and unit that defines the outcome variables in columns 1, 2, and 3 are defined in Table 2 footnote 2 1, Table 2 footnote 4, and Table 3 footnote 2, respectively.

(2) In all columns, the sample is limited to the outcomes of multiple enterprise households. In columns 2 and 3, we compare the profits of sampled women in multiple enterprise household to the profits of sampled men in multiple enterprise households. In column 1, we compare the profits of sampled women in multiple enterprise households to the profits of other household members (column 1 vs column 2 of Table 3, Panel A). In 97.5% of multiple enterprise households in India, the businesses of other household members are operated by male entrepreneurs.

(4) We use the base regressions described in Table 2 footnote 2 (for column 1), Table 2 footnote 5 (column 2), and Table 3 footnote 3 (column 3). We add an interaction term between treatment and female as well as a dummy for female (which is absorbed by the fixed effects in columns 2 and 3). The omitted group in column 1 are other enterprise owners in control group households. The omitted group in columns 2 and 3 are multiple enterprise household men in the control group.

(5) For a detailed description of how a household is defined as having a multiple enterprise owners in each of the samples, see Section 2.2.

Data Appendix

In this section, we describe each column of each regression table presented in the paper. Specifically, we describe

1. The survey question that generates the variable
2. The data source
3. The sample that the analysis is limited to
4. The regression model

We note the following about the general sampling methods and household definitions in India, Sri Lanka, and Ghana:

India

- **Sample:** Only women were sampled for the loan (by the MFI’s own guidelines). We further restrict our sample to the 474 households in which the client (the borrower) owns an enterprise.
- **Definitions:** We consider all investment opportunities available over the three-year period between the baseline and the follow-up survey (2010 survey).

Multiple enterprise household: If any household member other than the client had an enterprise at baseline, or opened an enterprise between baseline and follow-up, the household is classified as having multiple enterprise owners.

Single enterprise owner: If the client was the sole entrepreneur at the time of intervention and no other household member opened an enterprise between baseline and the follow-up survey, then the household is classified as a single enterprise household.

Sri Lanka

- **Definitions:** In three of the nine survey rounds (1, 5, and 9) study participants were asked to describe the employment status of all household members. Respondents were asked, “what activities is [household member] involved in at the present?” with “self-economic activities” as one of eleven response options.¹

Multiple enterprise household: Female entrepreneurs who report that another

¹Q.12 in Round 1 and question H.6 in Rounds 5 and 9.

household member is engaged in self-employment activities in any of the three survey rounds are considered to live in a multiple-enterprise household.

Single enterprise owner: Female entrepreneurs who do not report that another household member is engaged in self-employment activities in any of the three survey rounds are considered to live in a single-enterprise household.

Ghana

- **Definitions:** Respondents are asked about the employment status of other household members.

Multiple enterprise household: A female entrepreneur is defined as having access to multiple investment opportunities if, during any of the survey rounds, she reports that another household member is also engaged in a self-employment activity.

Single enterprise owner: A female entrepreneur is defined as being in a single enterprise household if, during any of the survey rounds, she reports that no other household member is also engaged in a self-employment activity.

Table 2

- Column 1
 - **Outcome:** The response to “Can you please tell us the average weekly profit you have now? By ‘profits’, I mean the income you receive from sales (revenues) after subtracting the costs (raw materials, wages to employees, etc.) of producing the items or services.”
 - **Data:** 2010 India survey
 - **Sample:** The sample is limited to all households in which the client operates an enterprise. We show the profits for the client’s largest enterprise (largest defined by baseline profits).
 - **Regression:** Equation 1 in the main text.

$$Y_{ihg} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 G_g + B_g + \gamma_1 X_{hg} + \mu_{ihg}.$$

where Y_{ihg} are the weekly enterprise profits of client i who lives in household h and belongs to microfinance group g . G_g is the treatment indicator: an indicator variable that equals one if the group was assigned to the grace period contract. The comparison group consists of clients’ enterprise profits in households assigned to the standard loan contract. B_g is an indicator of the stratification batch and X_{hg} is a vector of controls (listed in Table A1). Standard errors are

clustered at the group-level.

β_1 is the client enterprise-level average treatment effect of being assigned the grace period contract.

- Column 2

- **Outcome:** The response to “Can you please tell us the average weekly profit you have now? By ‘profits’, I mean the income you receive from sales (revenues) after subtracting the costs (raw materials, wages to employees, etc.) of producing the items or services.”
- **Data:** India 2010 survey
- **Sample:** The sample is limited to all households in which the client operates an enterprise. Profits are summed across all household enterprises (including all of the client’s enterprises).
- **Regression:** An amended version of Equation 1 in the main text.

$$Y_{hg} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 G_g + B_g + \gamma_1 X_{hg} + \mu_{hg}.$$

where Y_{hg} are the *total* weekly enterprise profits of household h which belongs to microfinance group g . G_g is the treatment indicator: an indicator variable that equals one if the group was assigned to the grace period contract. The comparison group consists of the household profits in households assigned to the standard loan contract. B_g is an indicator of the stratification batch and X_{hg} is a vector of controls (listed in Table A1). Standard errors are clustered at the group-level.

β_1 is the household-level average treatment effect of being assigned the grace period contract.

- Column 3

- **Outcome:** The log responses to the question “What was your total household income over the previous 30 days?” Households that report 0 income are missing.
- **Data:** India 2010 Survey
- **Sample:** The sample is limited to all households in which the client operates an enterprise.
- **Regression:** An amended version of Equation 1 in the main text.

$$Y_{hg} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 G_g + B_g + \gamma_1 X_{hg} + \mu_{hg}.$$

where Y_{hg} is the log of total household income in household h which belongs to microfinance group g . G_g is the treatment indicator: an indicator variable that equals one if the group was assigned to the grace period contract. The comparison group consists of the log of household income in households assigned to the standard loan contract. B_g is an indicator of the stratification batch and X_{hg} is a vector of controls (listed in Table A1). Standard errors are clustered at the group-level.

β_1 is the household-level average treatment effect of being assigned the grace period contract.

- Column 4

- **Outcome:** The response to “Can you please tell us the average weekly profit you have now? By ‘profits’, I mean the income you receive from sales (revenues) after subtracting the costs (raw materials, wages to employees, etc.) of producing the items or services.”
- **Data:** India 2010 Survey
- **Sample:** The sample is limited to all households in which the client operates an enterprise. Profits are summed across all household enterprises (including all of the client’s enterprises).
- **Regression:** An amended version of Equation 1 in the main text.

$$Y_{hg} = \beta_0 + \beta_3 G_g * Aggregate + \beta_2 G_g + \beta_1 Aggregate + B_g + \gamma_1 X_{hg} + \mu_{hg}.$$

where Y_{hg} are *either* the total weekly enterprise profits of household (column 2) h *or* the weekly enterprise profits of client i who lives in household h (column 1). We stack the data to estimate an SUR regression.

G_g is the treatment indicator: an indicator variable that equals one if the group was assigned to the grace period contract. *Aggregate* is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the outcome profits are profits aggregated at the household. The comparison group is the enterprise-level profits of clients who received the standard loan contract. B_g is an indicator of the stratification batch and X_{hg} is a vector of controls (listed in Table A1). Standard errors are clustered at the group-level.

β_1 is the difference between the client’s enterprise-level and the sum of all household enterprise profits for groups assigned to the standard contract.

β_2 is the effect of the treatment on the client’s enterprise-level profits.

β_3 is the effect of the treatment on the sum of all household enterprise profits over and above the effect of the treatment on the client’s enterprise-level profits

(β_2) .

In Table 4, we report β_3 .

Table 3

Panel A - India

- Column 1
 - **Outcome:** The response to “Can you please tell us the average weekly profit you have now? By ‘profits’, I mean the income you receive from sales (revenues) after subtracting the costs (raw materials, wages to employees, etc.) of producing the items or services.”
 - **Data:** India 2010 Survey
 - **Sample:** Sample limited to the profits of women in multiple enterprise households. Profits are aggregated for that woman across all of the enterprises that she owns.
 - **Regression:** Equation 1 in the main text.

$$Y_{ihg} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 G_g + B_g + \gamma_1 X_{hg} + \mu_{ihg}.$$

where Y_{ihg} are the weekly enterprise profits of client i who lives in household h and belongs to microfinance group g . G_g is the treatment indicator: an indicator variable that equals one if the group was assigned to the grace period contract. The comparison group consists of clients’ enterprise profits in households assigned to the standard loan contract. B_g is an indicator of the stratification batch and X_{hg} is a vector of controls (listed in Table A1). Standard errors are clustered at the group-level.

In column 1, we report β_1 which is the client enterprise-level average treatment effect of being assigned the grace period contract.

- Column 2
 - **Outcome:** The response to “Can you please tell us the average weekly profit you have now? By ‘profits’, I mean the income you receive from sales (revenues) after subtracting the costs (raw materials, wages to employees, etc.) of producing the items or services.”
 - **Data:** India 2010 Survey
 - **Sample:** Sample limited to households with multiple enterprise households. The profits in this column are aggregated across all household enterprises, but excludes the enterprises owned by the female borrower.

- **Regression:** Equation 1 in the main text.

$$Y_{ihg} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 G_g + B_g + \gamma_1 X_{hg} + \mu_{ihg}.$$

where Y_{ihg} are the weekly enterprise profits of client i who lives in household h and belongs to microfinance group g . G_g is the treatment indicator: an indicator variable that equals one if the group was assigned to the grace period contract. The comparison group consists of clients’ enterprise profits in households assigned to the standard loan contract. B_g is an indicator of the stratification batch and X_{hg} is a vector of controls (listed in Table A1). Standard errors are clustered at the group-level.

In column 2, we report β_1 which is the client enterprise-level average treatment effect of being assigned the grace period contract.

- Column 3

- **Outcome:** The response to “Can you please tell us the average weekly profit you have now? By ‘profits’, I mean the income you receive from sales (revenues) after subtracting the costs (raw materials, wages to employees, etc.) of producing the items or services.”
- **Data:** India 2010 Survey
- **Sample:** Sample limited to the profits of women in single enterprise households. Profits are aggregated for that woman across all of the enterprises that she owns.
- **Regression:** Equation 1 in the main text.

$$Y_{ihg} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 G_g + B_g + \gamma_1 X_{hg} + \mu_{ihg}.$$

where Y_{ihg} are the weekly enterprise profits of client i who lives in household h and belongs to microfinance group g . The comparison group consists of clients’ enterprise profits in households assigned to the standard loan contract. Standard errors are clustered at the group-level. G_g is the treatment indicator: an indicator variable that equals one if the group was assigned to the grace period contract. B_g is an indicator of the stratification batch and X_{hg} is a vector of controls (listed in Table A1).

In column 3, we report β_1 which is the client enterprise-level average treatment effect of being assigned the grace period contract.

- Column 4

- **Outcome:** The response to “Can you please tell us the average weekly profit you have now? By ‘profits’, I mean the income you receive from sales (revenues) after subtracting the costs (raw materials, wages to employees, etc.) of producing the items or services.”

- **Data:** India 2010 Survey
- **Sample:** The sample is limited to all households in which the client operates an enterprise.
- **Regression:** An amended version of Equation 1 in the main text.

$$Y_{hg} = \alpha_0 + \alpha_3 G_g * Other + \alpha_2 G_g + \alpha_1 Other + B_g + \gamma_1 X_{hg} + \mu_{hg}.$$

where Y_{hg} are *either* the total weekly enterprise profits of household (column 2) h or the weekly enterprise profits of client i who lives in household h (column 1). G_g is the treatment indicator: an indicator variable that equals one if the group was assigned to the grace period contract. *Aggregate* is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the outcome profits are profits aggregated at the household. The comparison group is the enterprise-level profits of clients who received the standard loan contract. B_g is an indicator of the stratification batch and X_{hg} is a vector of controls (listed in Table A1). Standard errors are clustered at the group-level.

α_1 is the difference between the client’s enterprise-level and the sum of all household enterprise profits for groups assigned to the standard contract.

α_2 is the effect of the treatment on the client’s enterprise-level profits.

α_3 is the effect of the treatment on the sum of all household enterprise profits over and above the effect of the treatment on the client’s enterprise-level profits (α_2).

In column 4, we report α_3 .

Table 3

Panel B

- Column 1

- **Outcome:** The response to “What was the total income the business earned during [month] after paying all expenses including wages of employees, but not including any income you paid yourself. That is, what were the profits of your business during [month]?”.
- **Data:** 9 rounds of Sri Lanka data
- **Sample:** Sample limited to the profits of women in multiple enterprise households. The sample is also limited to female’s largest enterprise as authors only asked about this enterprise.

- **Regression:** Equation 2 in the main text.

$$Y_{it} = \theta_0 + \theta_1 Treatment_{igt} + \sum_{t=2}^9 \delta_t + \gamma_i + \epsilon_{it}$$

where $Treatment_{igt}$ indicates the grant amount (in-kind or cash) that entrepreneur i receives in wave t and later and Y_{it} is her monthly enterprise profits. We maintain the authors’ heuristic to divide the treatment amount and the outcomes by 100. So the coefficient, θ_1 is interpreted as the effect of a 100 Sri Lankan rupee increase in the capital stock. δ_t are survey wave fixed effects and γ_i are enterprise fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at enterprise level.

In column 1, we report θ_1 .

- Column 2

- The authors did not collect data about the profits of other household enterprises.

- Column 3

- **Outcome:** The response to “What was the total income the business earned during [month] after paying all expenses including wages of employees, but not including any income you paid yourself. That is, what were the profits of your business during [month]?”.
- **Data:** 9 rounds of Sri Lanka data
- **Sample:** Sample limited to the profits of women in single enterprise households. The sample limited is also limited to female’s largest enterprise as authors only ask about this enterprise.
- **Regression:** Equation 2 in the main text.

$$Y_{it} = \theta_0 + \theta_1 Treatment_{it} + \sum_{t=2}^9 \delta_t + \gamma_i + \epsilon_{it}$$

where $Treatment_{it}$ indicates the grant amount (in-kind or cash) that entrepreneur i receives in wave t and later and Y_{it} is her monthly enterprise profits. We maintain the authors’ heuristic to divide the treatment amount and the outcomes by 100. So the coefficient, θ_1 is interpreted as the effect of a 100 Sri Lankan rupee increase in the capital stock. δ_t are survey wave fixed effects and γ_i are enterprise fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at enterprise level.

In column 1, we report θ_1 .

- Column 4

- **Outcome:** The response to “What was the total income the business earned during [month] after paying all expenses including wages of employees, but not including any income you paid yourself. That is, what were the profits of your business during [month]?”.
- **Data:** 9 rounds of Sri Lanka data
- **Sample:** Sample limited to the profits of sampled women in single enterprise households (column 3) and in multiple enterprise households (column 1).
- **Regression:** Amended Equation 2 in the main text.

$$Y_{it} = \alpha_0 + \alpha_2 Treatment_{it} * FemaleSEH + \alpha_1 Treatment_{it} + \sum_{t=2}^9 \delta_t + \sum_{t=2}^9 \delta_t * FemaleSEH + \gamma_i + \epsilon_{it}$$

where $Treatment_{it}$ indicates the grant amount (in-kind or cash) that entrepreneur i receives in wave t and later and Y_{it} is her monthly enterprise profits. $FemaleSEH$ is an indicator variable that takes the value 1 for women in single enterprise households. We maintain the authors’ heuristic to divide the treatment amount and the outcomes by 100. So the coefficient, θ_1 is interpreted as the effect of a 100 Sri Lankan rupee increase in the capital stock. δ_t are survey wave fixed effects and γ_i are enterprise fixed effects. We also interact the single enterprise indicator with the wave fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at enterprise level.

In column 4, we report α_2 , which are the extra profits that grant winner women in single enterprise households earn over the profits that grant winner women in multiple enterprise households earn (α_1).

Table 3

Panel C

- Column 1

- **Outcome:** The response to “What was the total income the business earned during [month] after paying all expenses including wages of employees, but not including any income you paid yourself. That is, what were the profits of your business during [month]?”.
- **Data:** 6 rounds of Ghana data
- **Sample:** Sample limited to the profits of women in multiple enterprise households. The sample is also limited to female’s largest enterprise as authors only asked about this enterprise.

- **Regression:** Equation 3 in the main text.

$$Y_{it} = \psi + \eta_0 M_{it} + \eta_1 E_{it} + \sum_{t=2}^6 \delta_t + \gamma_i + \epsilon_{it}$$

where M_{it} indicates whether or not entrepreneur i received a cash treatment in wave t . Similarly, E_{it} indicates whether or not the entrepreneur received an in-kind treatment. Y_{it} is monthly enterprise profits, δ_t are survey wave fixed effects, and γ_i are enterprise fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the enterprise level. In column 1, we report η_1 . Since the authors do not find a treatment effect as a result of the cash grant, for simplicity, we do not show the coefficient η_0 in the main tables though it is included in the regression.

- Column 2

- The authors did not collect data about the profits of other household enterprises.

- Column 3

- **Outcome:** The response to “What was the total income the business earned during [month] after paying all expenses including wages of employees, but not including any income you paid yourself. That is, what were the profits of your business during [month]?”.
- **Data:** 6 rounds of Ghana data
- **Sample:** Sample limited to the profits of women in single enterprise households. The sample limited is also limited to female’s largest enterprise as authors only ask about this enterprise.
- **Regression:** Equation 3 in the main text.

$$Y_{it} = \psi + \eta_0 M_{it} + \eta_1 E_{it} + \sum_{t=2}^6 \delta_t + \gamma_i + \epsilon_{it}$$

where M_{it} indicates whether or not entrepreneur i received a cash treatment in wave t . Similarly, E_{it} indicates whether or not the entrepreneur received an in-kind treatment. Y_{it} is monthly enterprise profits, δ_t are survey wave fixed effects, and γ_i are enterprise fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the enterprise level. In column 3, we report η_1 . Since the authors do not find a treatment effect as a result of the cash grant, for simplicity, we do not show the coefficient η_0 in the main tables though it is included in the regression.

- Column 4

- **Outcome:** The response to “What was the total income the business earned during [month] after paying all expenses including wages of employees, but not including any income you paid yourself. That is, what were the profits of your business during [month]?”.
- **Data:** 6 rounds of Ghana data
- **Sample:** Sample limited to the profits of sampled women in single enterprise households (column 3) and in multiple enterprise households (column 1).
- **Regression:** Amended Equation 3 in the main text.

$$Y_{it} = \alpha_0 + \alpha_4 M_{it} * FemaleSEH + \alpha_3 E_{it} * FemaleSEH + \alpha_2 M_{it} + \alpha_1 E_{it} + \sum_{t=2}^6 \delta_t + \sum_{t=2}^6 \delta_t * FemaleSEH + \gamma_i + \epsilon_{it}$$

where M_{it} indicates whether or not entrepreneur i received a cash treatment in wave t . Similarly, E_{it} indicates whether or not the entrepreneur received an in-kind treatment. $FemaleSEH$ is an indicator variable that takes the value 1 for women in single enterprise households. Y_{it} is monthly enterprise profits, δ_t are survey wave fixed effects, and γ_i are enterprise fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the enterprise level.

In column 4, we report α_2 , which are the extra profits that grant winner women in single enterprise households earn over the profits that grant winner women in multiple enterprise households earn (α_1).

Table 4

Panel A

- **Outcome:** The response to “Can you please tell us the average weekly profit you have now? By ‘profits’, I mean the income you receive from sales (revenues) after subtracting the costs (raw materials, wages to employees, etc.) of producing the items or services.”
- **Data:** India 2010 Survey
- **Sample:** Sample limited to the profits of women in multiple enterprise households (Table 3, column 1) AND to the profits of all other household members in multiple enterprise households (Table 3, column 2). Profits are aggregated across all of the enterprises that the firm owner manages.
- **Regression:** An amended version of Equation 1 in the main text.

$$Y_{hg} = \alpha_0 + \alpha_3 G_g * FemaleMEH + \alpha_2 G_g + \alpha_1 FemaleMEH + B_g + \gamma_1 X_{hg} + \mu_{hg}.$$

where Y_{hg} are *either* the weekly enterprise profits of multiple enterprise household women (Table 3, column 1) *or* the weekly enterprise profits of all other household members (Table 3, column 2). G_g is the treatment indicator: an indicator variable that equals one if the group was assigned to the grace period contract. $FemaleMEH$ is an indicator variable that takes the value 1 for the client’s enterprise profits. The comparison group are other household enterprises in multiple enterprise households that received the standard contract. B_g is an indicator of the stratification batch and X_{hg} is a vector of controls (listed in Table A1). Standard errors are clustered at the group-level.

α_1 is the difference between the client’s enterprise-level profits and the profits of other household members for groups assigned to the standard contract.

α_2 is the effect of the treatment on the profits of other household members.

α_3 is the effect of the treatment on client profits over and above the effect of the treatment on the profits of other household enterprises (α_2).

Table 4

Panel B

- **Outcome:** The response to “What was the total income the business earned during [month] after paying all expenses including wages of employees, but not including any income you paid yourself. That is, what were the profits of your business during [month]?”.
- **Data:** 9 rounds of Sri Lanka data
- **Sample:** Sample limited to the profits of women in multiple enterprise households AND to the profits of men in multiple enterprise households.
- **Regression:** Amended Equation 2 in the main text.

$$Y_{it} = \alpha_0 + \alpha_2 Treatment_{it} * FemaleMEH + \alpha_1 Treatment_{it} + \sum_{t=2}^9 \delta_t + \sum_{t=2}^9 \delta_t * FemaleMEH + \gamma_i + \epsilon_{it}$$

where $Treatment_{it}$ indicates the grant amount (in-kind or cash) that entrepreneur i receives in wave t and later and Y_{it} is her monthly enterprise profits. $FemaleMEH$ is an indicator variable that takes the value 1 for the client’s enterprise profits. The comparison group are men in multiple enterprise households that did not receive the grant. We maintain the authors’ heuristic to divide the treatment amount and the

outcomes by 100. So the coefficient, θ_1 is interpreted as the effect of a 100 Sri Lankan rupee increase in the capital stock. δ_t are survey wave fixed effects and γ_i are enterprise fixed effects. We also interact the female indicator with the wave fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at enterprise level.

α_1 is the effect of the treatment on the profits of men in multiple enterprise households.

α_2 is the effect of the treatment on client profits over and above the effect of the treatment on the profits of men in multiple enterprise households (α_1).

Table 4

Panel C

- **Outcome:** The response to “What was the total income the business earned during [month] after paying all expenses including wages of employees, but not including any income you paid yourself. That is, what were the profits of your business during [month]?”.
- **Data:** 6 rounds of Ghana data
- **Sample:** Sample limited to the profits of women in multiple enterprise households AND to the profits of men in multiple enterprise households.
- **Regression:** Amended Equation 3 in the main text.

$$Y_{it} = \alpha_0 + \alpha_4 M_{it} * FemaleMEH + \alpha_3 E_{it} * FemaleMEH + \alpha_2 M_{it} + \alpha_1 E_{it} + \sum_{t=2}^6 \delta_t + \sum_{t=2}^6 \delta_t * FemaleMEH + \gamma_i + \epsilon_{it}$$

where M_{it} indicates whether or not entrepreneur i received a cash treatment in wave t . Similarly, E_{it} indicates whether or not the entrepreneur received an in-kind treatment. $FemaleSEH$ is an indicator variable that takes the value 1 for women in single enterprise households. Y_{it} is monthly enterprise profits, δ_t are survey wave fixed effects, and γ_i are enterprise fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the enterprise level.

α_1 is the effect of the treatment on the profits of men in multiple enterprise households.

α_2 is the effect of the treatment on client profits over and above the effect of the treatment on the profits of men in multiple enterprise households (α_1).

Table 5

In column 1, we present the mean of the variable in the row for multiple enterprise households.

$$Y_{hg} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 SEH + B_g + \mu_{hg}.$$

where Y_{hg} is the outcome of household h that belongs to microfinance group g . SEH is an indicator variable that takes the value 1 if it is a single enterprise household. B_g is an indicator of the stratification batch. The comparison group is multiple enterprise households. Standard errors are clustered at the group-level.

In column 2, we show β_1 .

Panel B

- The sector variables show the proportion of all client enterprises across all of their businesses. The sum is greater than 100% for that reason.
- Reason for Enterprise Flexibility: one of the coded responses to the question “Why did you choose to operate an enterprise over taking a wage job?”
The sample is limited to the control group as the data was collected at endline.

Table 5

Panel C

All of the data in this Panel was collected at endline. We therefore limit responses to the responses of the control group.

- Minutes spent: comes from a section in which we ask a woman to enumerate how many minutes she has spent on each of these activities in the past week.
- Total HH Wage Income and Enterprise Profits: this is the sum of the three variables below (Client’s enterprise profits, Spouse’s Enterprise Profits, and HH Wage Income)
- Client’s enterprise profits: The response to “Can you please tell us the average weekly profit you have now? By ‘profits’, I mean the income you receive from sales (revenues) after subtracting the costs (raw materials, wages to employees, etc.) of producing the items or services.”
Profits are aggregated for that woman across all of the enterprises that she owns.
- Spouse’s Enterprise Profits: The profits of the husband of the client aggregated over all the enterprises he owns.

- HH Wage Income: The response to the question “What was the total income that your household earned from wage or salaried activities over the past 30 days.”
- We cannot separate the husband’s earnings from the earnings of other household members, but in 87% of single enterprise households with a spouse, the husband is the only wage earner.
- Client Earns More than Spouse: An indicator variable for when Client’s Enterprise Profits are greater than Spouse’s Enterprise Profits in multiple enterprise households. In single enterprise households the indicator is equal to one if Client’s Enterprise Profits are greater than HH Wage Income