

# Citizenship Policy and the Spread of Communicable Diseases: Evidence from the Dominican Republic

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# How can social policy affect the **transmission** of communicable diseases?

- ▶ **Migrants** face increased vulnerability to vector-borne diseases due to crowded conditions and limited healthcare access
- ▶ Recent causal evidence of how immigration policy affects health access: “**chilling effects**” and crowding (Watson (2014); Ager et al. (2023))
- ▶ We focus on a **citizenship policy** in a context where:
  - ▶ Citizenship is highly relevant for accessing public health services
  - ▶ Communicable diseases do not discriminate based on citizenship status

# How can social policy affect the **transmission** of communicable diseases?

## Research Question(s)

- ▶ How does restricting citizenship for a **subpopulation** affect the overall burden of communicable diseases?
  - ▶ Empirically exploring the **indirect** effects on the non-targeted or native population
  - ▶ Documenting “**chilling effects**”
- ▶ Can social integration and assimilation of immigrants mitigate these effects?

## In this paper

- ▶ A controversial policy in the **Dominican Republic (DR)** effectively limited access to health services for as much as 10% of its population
  - ▶ A citizenship policy targeting Haitian-Dominicans (HD)
- ▶ We focus on **dengue**, a mosquito-borne communicable disease that had an outbreak during 2013 in the Dominican Republic
  - ▶ **Highly contagious** (*daytime*) with a RO of 4.25 (COVID-19 Delta RO is 5.08)
- ▶ Two main sources of data:
  - Official counts of communicable and non-communicable diseases
  - Pre-policies Census data on the presence of the Haitian-Dominican (HD) pop
- ▶ We implement a *diff-in-diff* design, exploiting differential exposure to the policy among municipalities in the DR

## A preview of our results

- ▶ **Immediate chilling effects:** CC-168 led to 13.5% decrease in recorded dengue cases (1.2 fewer cases per month per sd increase in exposure)
- ▶ **Spillover transmission emerges:** After 6 months, effects reverse as disease spreads to non-targeted population, with high-exposure areas seeing increases up to 16.7%
- ▶ Effects are robust to outliers and alternative measures. DHS short term analysis reports increases in Dengue symptoms.
- ▶ **Social integration matters:** Low Dominican-Haitian integration areas experience:
  - ▶ Stronger healthcare avoidance (more negative chilling effects)
  - ▶ Greater spillover transmission (2.778 additional cases per 100,000)
- ▶ Effects concentrated in public facilities where targeted population primarily seeks care; minimal effects in private facilities

# Contributions

1. 'At home' effects of both immigration (Watson, 2014; Ibáñez et al., 2021; Rozo and Vargas, 2021; Rozo and Sviatschi, 2021; Ager et al., 2023) and citizenship-related policies (Amuedo-Dorantes et al., 2017; Amuedo-Dorantes and Antman, 2017; Kuka et al., 2020; García-Pérez, 2019; Jácome, 2022)
  - ▶ Closest work is Ibáñez et al. (2021) and Ager et al. (2023)
  - ▶ We provide novel evidence on Dengue and an unusual citizenship policy
2. Spread of communicable diseases.(Oster, 2012; Adda, 2016; Eichenbaum et al., 2020)
  - ▶ We document how policies not directly tied to health can **worsen** the burden of disease
3. Effectiveness of health policies. (Miguel and Kremer, 2004; Bleakley, 2010; Cohen et al., 2010; Dammert et al., 2014)
  - ▶ We show how citizenship policies may limit the effectiveness of health policies

## Constitutional Court's Rule 168-13 (CC-168)

**Historical Tension between the DR and Haiti:** Long-standing conflict between both nations, including the 1937 massacre ordered by Dominican dictator Rafael Trujillo

- ▶ Sparked by a trade war in early 2013, the DR issued the CC-168 in **September 2013** targeting Haitian-Dominicans (HD)
- ▶ The CC-168 was retroactive: Dominicans born to foreign parents between 1929 and 2010 were to be stripped of their Dominican nationality



## Constitutional Court's Rule 168-13 (CC-168)

The CC-168 had a profound impact on the HD population

- ▶ **Impact:** Affected 500K-1.1MM people, leading to struggles in accessing education, work, social security, and health services (IACHR report, 2015).



## Dengue: A spreading tropical disease

- ▶ Mosquito-borne **viral** disease, with 5 serotypes, transmitted by *Aedes Aegyptis* and *albopictus*
- ▶ Highest historical record of dengue cases in 2023 (6.5 million new infections) mostly driven by surges in South America and Southeast Asia
- ▶ Key features:
  - ▶ **Highly contagious** (*daytime*) with a RO of 4.25 (COVID-19 Delta RO is 5.08)
  - ▶ **Frequently asymptomatic** but affects children (stomach pain, vomiting and diarrhea) and adults (fever and respiratory issues) differently
  - ▶ Serotype-specific immunity (only 1 out of 5 types), **a second infection is more likely to be severe**

**In comparison with Malaria:** Less contagious (*night time*) and no evident immunity

# Dengue in the Central American and the Caribbean




Figure: Source: Ávila-Agüero et al. (2019)

# Healthcare Access Barriers and Dengue Control in the DR

## Pre-existing healthcare barriers for Haitian-Dominicans:

- ▶ **Citizenship requirement:** ID needed to access public health services
- ▶ **Chronic exclusion:** HD immigrants and descendants face persistent barriers to care (Simmons, 2010; Rojas et al., 2011; Brito et al., 2017; Miller et al., 2016)

## Dengue control requires healthcare engagement (PAHO Protocol, 2012):

1. Environmental cleaning and sanitation
  2. Community participation
  3. **Early detection and treatment**
- ▶ Effective control depends on population willingness to seek care
  - ▶ Documentation barriers limit disease surveillance and response

**CC-168 intensified pre-existing barriers**, creating conditions for healthcare avoidance among HD population and subsequent disease spillover

# Data

- ▶ Official disease counts from the DR's Epidemiology Direction (PAHO protocol)
  - ▶ Communicable (Dengue) and non-communicable diseases (Diabetes, Heart Attacks, Strokes)
  - ▶ Data collected from patients showing up at health centers
  - ▶ Data is available at the health-center  $\times$  week level, but we aggregate up to the municipality (155) level in our preferred estimations
- ▶ 2010 Census data from IPUMS for exposure to the policies: proxy this with self-declared immigration status, a likely underestimate
  - ▶ This is likely an underestimate, but this is the closest measure available
  - ▶ We have 2 measures: recent immigrants (in the last 5 years) and long-term immigrants

# Data

- ▶ Other sources of data:
  - ▶ Data from the DHS 2013 (July-Oct'13) to go beyond aggregate counts and explore symptomatology
  - ▶ Epidemiological data on the bioclimatic suitability of disease vectors (Kraemer et al., 2015)
  - ▶ Official Wedding Records

# Empirical Strategy


- ▶ We use a *diff-in-diff* design to identify the effects of the CC 168 on the case incidence of Dengue:

$$y_{mt} = \delta \cdot Exposure_m \cdot \mathbf{1}[\text{CC-168}_t] + X'_{mt}\beta + \gamma_t + \gamma_m + \epsilon_{mt} \quad (1)$$

- ▶ **Parallel trends assumption:** after partialing out municipality-level and time-period FE, the incidence of dengue would have evolved similarly regardless of their HD population around the policy shock

# Exposure to the CC-168

Share of population that are recent Haitian immigrants (up to 5 years)



Notes: National share is 1.6%.

## Results: Significant healthcare avoidance following CC-168

▶ Long-Term


- ▶ 1 s.d. increase in exposure → 1.2 less dengue cases per month, 13.5% decrease
- ▶ Top quartile areas show even larger effects: 3.307 fewer cases (34.7% decline)

	(1)	(2)
	HD pop. (% , s.d.)	HD pop. (Top Quartile)
Pol. x HD Exposure	-1.285** (0.639)	-3.307* (1.787)
Month FE	Yes	Yes
Municipality FE	Yes	Yes
Dep. Var. Mean (2012)	9.532	9.532
N	3696	3696

# Results on Dengue using an Event Study

[▶ Long-Term](#)

## Recent Haitian Immigrants



## Event Study Summary: Short-Term Haitian Migrants (Last 5 Years)

- ▶ **Immediate chilling effect (0-5 months):** Recorded dengue cases decline by 12.7–31.0%
- ▶ **Spillover emerges (6-12 months):** Effects reverse sign, moving toward positive (up to 6.5%)

	Exposure Measure	
	Continuous	Top Quartile
<b>Panel A: First 6 Months (t=0 to 5)</b>		
Average Effect	-1.429*** (0.451)	-3.494*** (1.239)
Percent Change (%)	-12.67	-30.97
<b>Panel B: Months 6-12 (t=6 to 12)</b>		
Average Effect	0.375 (0.287)	0.733 (0.870)
Percent Change (%)	3.33	6.50
Pre-Trend Test (p-value)	0.237	0.117
Observations	3,696	3,696
R-squared	0.699	0.699
Pre-Policy Mean	11.28	11.28

# Event Study Summary: Long-Term Haitian Migrants (All Haitian-Born)

	Exposure Measure	
	Continuous	Top Quartile
<b>Panel A: First 6 Months (t=0 to 5)</b>		
Average Effect	-1.366*** (0.459)	-3.643*** (1.186)
Percent Change (%)	-12.11	-32.29
<b>Panel B: Months 6-12 (t=6 to 12)</b>		
Average Effect	0.581** (0.287)	1.361* (0.790)
Percent Change (%)	5.15	12.07
Pre-Trend Test (p-value)	0.115	0.164
Observations	3,696	3,696
R-squared	0.700	0.701
Pre-Policy Mean	11.28	11.28

# Robustness

- ▶ **Outliers:** robust to dropping Santo Domingo and border regions, and other measures (long-term immigrants) [▶ Outliers](#) [▶ Long-Term](#)
- ▶ **Randomization Inference:** Results survive a randomization inference test [▶ Rand](#)
- ▶ **Non-communicable diseases:** We expect to see no effects on other types of diseases (non-communicable, like diabetes or strokes) [▶ Non-Comm](#)
- ▶ **Symptomatology:** Alternative dataset (DHS) implemented immediately before and after the policy, we explore symptoms
  - ▶ Dengue is **frequently asymptomatic** but affects children (stomach pain, vomiting, diarrhea) and adults (fever, respiratory issues) differently [▶ DHS](#)
- ▶ **Disease-prone environment:** Could results stem from areas being more disease-prone environments with lower healthcare access? [▶ Mosquito](#)

# Mechanism: Differential Chilling Effects by Facility Type

[▶ Estimation](#)

## Public Facilities:

- ▶ **Free/subsidized care** → primary access point for HD population
- ▶ **Government-run** → perceived risk of documentation checks
- ▶ **Immigration enforcement concerns** → fear of deportation
- ▶ **More visible** to authorities

⇒ **Larger chilling effect expected**

## Private Facilities:


- ▶ **Fee-for-service** → less accessible to HD population
- ▶ **Commercial operations** → weaker enforcement incentives
- ▶ **Privacy expectations** → lower perceived risk
- ▶ **Smaller HD baseline usage**

⇒ **Smaller/null effect expected**

If healthcare avoidance drives our results, effects should be **concentrated in public facilities** where the targeted population primarily seeks care


# Results: Chilling Effect Concentrated in Public Facilities

Exposure Measure (s.d.)



# Results: Chilling Effect Concentrated in Public Facilities

## Exposure Measure (top quartile)



## Results: Chilling Effect Concentrated in Public Facilities

- ▶ **Public facilities:** Large, immediate negative effects post-policy. Peak decline around  $t=2-4$  months, indicating severe healthcare avoidance
- ▶ **Private facilities:** Much smaller effects, confidence intervals include zero. Minimal evidence of avoidance
- ▶ Healthcare avoidance concentrated where HD population primarily seeks care (public facilities), consistent with discrimination-driven chilling effect
- ▶ **Confirms discrimination mechanism:** Public facilities, where HD population faces greater documentation barriers and enforcement risk, show concentrated effects

# Mechanism: CC-168's effects by high vs. low integration areas

Can't directly observe discrimination or healthcare barriers. **Solution:** Use pre-policy intermarriage rates (2009-2012) as proxy for social integration [▶ Maps](#)

## Two marriage types:

- ▶ **Dominican-Haitian**  
Integration with targeted group
- ▶ **Dominican-Foreign**  
Robustness (given negative bias)

## Classification:

- ▶ High vs. low based on top 10% of distribution

⇒ Intermarriage reveals where policy barriers are weakest

## Why intermarriage matters:

- ▶ **Information:** Mixed families navigate barriers together
- ▶ **Social pressure:** Healthcare workers less likely to discriminate in integrated communities
- ▶ **Self-selection:** High intermarriage signals tolerant communities

# Triple-Difference Strategy: Social Integration as Moderator

Does social integration moderate the policy's health impacts?

## Empirical Model:

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Cases}_{mt} = & \beta_1(\text{Exposure}_m \times \text{Post}_{0-5}) \\ & + \beta_2(\text{Exposure}_m \times \text{Post}_{0-5} \times \text{LowIntegration}_m) \\ & + \beta_3(\text{Exposure}_m \times \text{Post}_{6-12}) \\ & + \beta_4(\text{Exposure}_m \times \text{Post}_{6-12} \times \text{LowIntegration}_m) \\ & + \gamma_m + \delta_t + X'_{mt}\Gamma + \epsilon_{mt} \end{aligned}$$

## Key Parameters:

- ▶  $\beta_1, \beta_3$ : Policy effects in **high integration** areas (reference)
- ▶  $\beta_2, \beta_4$ : **DDD coefficients** – differential effects in low integration areas
- ▶ High integration = reference

## Two-Stage Mechanism: Chilling Effects + Spillover

### Stage 1 (0-5 months):

#### Healthcare Avoidance

- ▶ HD stop accessing health centers
- ▶ Recorded cases **decline**
- ▶ Low integration → more discrimination → worse avoidance

#### Expected:

- ▶  $\beta_1 < 0$
- ▶  $\beta_2 < 0$

### Stage 2 (6-12 months):

#### Spillover to Dominicans

- ▶ Untreated cases remain infectious
- ▶ Disease spreads to Dominicans
- ▶ Dominicans get diagnosed → recorded cases **increase**

#### Expected:

- ▶  $\beta_3 \approx 0$  (spillover begins)
- ▶  $\beta_4 > 0$  (more spillover in low integration)


Positive  $\beta_4$  means low integration areas move toward positive/zero *faster*, indicating greater spillover transmission to non-targeted population

## Results: Social Integration Matters

- ▶ **Stage 1:** All DDD coefficients **negative** – low integration → worse chilling effect
- ▶ **Stage 2:** All DDD coefficients **positive** – low integration → more spillovers

	Short-term Migrants		Top Quartile Exposure	
	(1) Haitian Int.	(2) Foreign Int.	(3) Haitian Int.	(4) Foreign Int.
Exposure × Post (0-5 months)	-1.751** (0.710)	-1.210** (0.579)	-2.685 (2.148)	-1.100 (2.526)
× Low Integration (DDD)	-0.272 (1.050)	-0.900 (0.978)	-2.856 (3.102)	-4.486 (3.372)
Exposure × Post (6-12 months)	-0.590 (0.541)	-0.910** (0.425)	-1.655 (1.440)	-3.033** (1.344)
× Low Integration (DDD)	0.353 (0.652)	0.803 (0.520)	0.996 (1.676)	2.778* (1.559)
Observations	4896	4928	4896	4928
R-squared	0.680	0.680	0.680	0.680
Municipality FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Month FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

## Low Integration Intensifies Negative Externalities



- ▶ Discriminatory citizenship policies create **negative externalities** on non-targeted populations
- ▶ Low integration areas experience up to **2.8 additional spillover cases**

## Conclusion

- ▶ **Exclusionary citizenship policies have unintended public health consequences** that extend beyond the targeted population
- ▶ We document a two-stage result:
  1. Healthcare avoidance among Haitian-Dominicans (chilling effects)
  2. Disease spillover to Dominican population through untreated transmission
- ▶ **Social integration serves as a protective factor:** Communities with higher Dominican-Haitian intermarriage experienced weaker chilling effects and less spillover transmission
- ▶ For communicable diseases, restricting healthcare access based on citizenship status is counterproductive creating negative externalities that affect the entire population

# Thank you!

# Gracias

Any comments or suggestions, email me at  
[albavif@wfu.edu](mailto:albavif@wfu.edu)

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## Testimonies [◀ Back](#)


*“I was born in a hospital in Mao in the Dominican Republic in 1999. My mom and dad are Haitians. **At school, they are already asking me for a birth certificate, but they don't give it to me...** I feel bad because in the street they call me damn, dirty, and treat me badly. We are all equal and that's not right. I have as much right to be Dominican as the others. I just want to study. This is not fair”.*

- A 15-year-old woman born in the Dominican Republic

*“I have a 3-year-old little girl. She has been unable to go to school; I have been unable to register her; **I can't get health insurance because she is not registered and I don't have the identity card.**”*

- A Haitian woman referring to her Dominican-born daughter

# Time Series

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## Political Context Timeline [◀ Back](#)

- 03/2010** | **New DR Constitution**  
*Jus soli* citizenship is no longer included
- 01/2012** | **Beginning of PAHO protocol for data collection**  
Weekly, health-center level, for different diseases.
- 09/2013** | **DR-Constitutional Court's Ruling 168-13**  
7% – 10% of DR pop. gets their citizenship contested
- 06/2014** | **Regularization program for those with contested citizenship**  
< 10% Success rate
- 06/2015** | **Mass Deportations begin**  
End of Regularization period.  
Deportations amount to 10% of HD pop., and 1% of DR pop.
- 06/2019** | **Maximum span of data before COVID-19**

# Results

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
## Long Term Immigrants

	(1)	(2)
	HD pop. (% , s.d.)	HD pop. (Top Quartile)
Pol. x HD Exposure	-1.242** (0.581)	-4.754*** (1.803)
Month FE	Yes	Yes
Municipality FE	Yes	Yes
Dep. Var. Mean (2012)	9.532	9.532
N	3696	3696

# Results using a Event Study

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## Long Term Immigrants

Reference period:  $t=-1$  (August 2013)

## Robustness: Randomization Inference [◀ Back](#)

Could our results arise by chance from random variation?

1. **Randomly reassign treatment:**
  - ▶ Generate fake HD exposure (matching true distribution)
  - ▶ Randomize policy timing ( $\pm 12$  months from actual date)
2. **Re-estimate model:** Run same DD specification with placebo treatment

$$\text{Cases}_{mt} = \beta(\text{FakeExposure}_m \times \text{FakePolicy}_t) + \gamma_m + \delta_t + X'_{mt}\Gamma + \epsilon_{mt}$$


3. **Collect placebo t-statistics:** Store  $|t|$  from each iteration
4. **Repeat 400 times:** Build distribution under null hypothesis
5. **Compare:** Locate true t-statistic ( $\delta$ ) within placebo distribution

**Interpretation:** If true  $|t|$  is in far right tail  $\rightarrow$  result unlikely due to chance

## Robustness: Randomization Inference [◀ Back](#)

Results are unlikely to arise from chance assignment of treatment timing or exposure levels

- ▶ Most fake t-statistics cluster below 1.5 (blue histogram)
- ▶ Our actual t-statistic ( $\delta \approx 2.0$ ) falls in far right tail
- ▶ Very few placebo iterations (less than 5%) produce t-statistics as large as our true estimate



## Sensitivity to outliers: big regions [◀ Back](#)

Excluding Santo Domingo (capital) and border provinces

	(1)	(2)	(3)
	Full sample	W/o Capital Region	W/o border
Pol. x HD Exposure	-1.285** (0.639)	-1.098* (0.607)	-1.185* (0.669)
Month FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
Municipality FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
Dep. Var. Mean (2012)	9.532	8.862	9.850
N	3696	3672	3120
Rel. effect	-0.135	-0.124	-0.120

## Negative Results on non-communicable diseases [◀ Back](#)

- We interpret the negative coefficients as mechanical undercounting of the targeted population and as reduced congestion at health centers.

	HD pop. (% , s.d.)		HD pop. (Top Quartile)	
	(1) Diabetes	(2) Stroke	(3) Diabetes	(4) Stroke
Pol. x HD Exposure	1.841 (3.531)	-2.127 (1.649)	-3.881 (7.788)	-5.296* (2.677)
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Municipality FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Dep. Var. Mean (2012)	21.55	11.19	21.55	11.19
N	476	444	476	444

# Short-term effects using 2013 DHS Data [◀ Back](#)

- Results are consistent with symptoms for adults and children.




Figure: Adults




Figure: Children

## Disease Suitability: *Aedes Aegypti* Mosquito


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Figure: Suitability of *Aedes Aegypti* mosquitos (Kraemer et al., 2015)

# Disease Suitability: *Aedes Aegypti* Mosquito [◀ Back](#)

## ► Horse racing the HD population and disease suitability

	(1)	(2)
	HD pop. (% , s.d.)	HD pop. (Top Quartile)
Pol. x HD Exposure	-1.339** (0.622)	-3.448* (1.750)
Pol. x Main Vector Suit.	-0.416 (0.651)	-0.442 (0.651)
Month FE	Yes	Yes
Municipality FE	Yes	Yes
Dep. Var. Mean (2012)	9.532	9.532
N	3696	3696

# Event Study: Public vs Private Medical Centers [◀ Back](#)

$$\text{Cases}_{mt}^{\text{Public}} = \sum_{k=-6, k \neq -1}^{12} \beta_k^{\text{Pub}} (\text{Exposure}_m \times \mathbb{1}[t = k]) + \gamma_m + \delta_t + X'_{mt} \Gamma + \epsilon_{mt}$$


$$\text{Cases}_{mt}^{\text{Private}} = \sum_{k=-6, k \neq -1}^{12} \beta_k^{\text{Priv}} (\text{Exposure}_m \times \mathbb{1}[t = k]) + \gamma_m + \delta_t + X'_{mt} \Gamma + \epsilon_{mt}$$

## Interpretation:

- ▶  $\beta_k^{\text{Pub}}$ : Effect on public facility cases at time  $k$  relative to policy
- ▶  $\beta_k^{\text{Priv}}$ : Effect on private facility cases at time  $k$  relative to policy
- ▶ **Prediction:**  $|\beta_k^{\text{Pub}}| > |\beta_k^{\text{Priv}}|$  in post-period (stronger avoidance of public)

# Dominican-Haitian/Foreign Marriages [◀ Back](#)


Figure: Share of Dominican-Haitian marriages (2009-2012 average)



Notes: 2012-2009 national average is .004 %.

# Dominican-Haitian/Foreign Marriages [◀ Back](#)


Figure: Share of Dominican-foreign marriages (2009-2012)



Notes: 2012-2009 national average is .125 %.

# Results on Dengue using an Event Study

## Recent Haitian Immigrants (Top Quartile)



## Policy Recommendations

- ▶ **Universal access to basic healthcare**, regardless of citizenship status
  - ▶ Communicable disease treatment generates positive externalities for entire population
- ▶ **Target vector-borne disease prevention in vulnerable communities**
  - ▶ Intensify sanitation and health education in areas with marginalized populations
- ▶ **Reform citizenship and documentation policies** to reduce administrative barriers
  - ▶ Create pathways to regularization for long-term residents