

# AlphaManager: A Data-Driven-Robust-Control Approach to Corporate Finance

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# Corporate Finance Research: Challenges and New Techniques

- Graham (2022, AFA President Address): CF research & reality
  - ▶ CF models limited ability for explaining/predicting outcomes
  - ▶ around 10% of  $R^2$  in-sample, worse out-of-sample
  - ▶ calls for models closer to the reality and new approaches (e.g., surveys)

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  - ▶ p-hacking and theory-fitting in empirical CF
  - ▶ call for unified definition and framework for universal analysis

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  - ▶ call for unified definition and framework for universal analysis
- Spiegel (2023, Financial Review): For corporate finance to truly advance we need more genuinely testable models
  - ▶ CF models are often static
  - ▶ lack of interplay between firms and financial markets
  - ▶ call for more dynamic and testable models


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  - ▶ fragmented and misspecified models

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- Challenges:
  - ▶ many states and controls with endogeneous and nonlinear interactions
  - ▶ fragmented and misspecified models
- AI to the rescue?
  - ▶ big data for firms and financial markets
  - ▶ more flexible and efficient algorithms
  - ▶ more powerful computation
  - ▶ advancement of large models applied to finance

# A Data-Driven-Robust-Control Approach to Corporate Finance




- Firm decisions fundamentally a stochastic control problem

$$\max_{\{u_{t_0}, \dots, u_{t_0+T}\}} \mathbb{E}_{t_0} \sum_{t=t_0}^{t_0+T} r(X_t, u_t) \quad s.t. \quad \Delta X_{t+1} = f(X_t, u_t) + \varepsilon_{t+1}$$

- ▶ e.g., a manager as an economic agent trying to maximize shareholder's equity by making managerial decisions
- ▶  $X_t$ : state
- ▶  $u_t$ : control
- ▶  $f$ : mean law of motion function
- ▶  $r$ : reward function (instantaneous utility function)

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


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- Reduced-form approaches: expertise-driven and ad hoc
  - ▶ identify local causality  $\Rightarrow$  counterfactuals
  - ▶ High internal validity
  - ▶ fragmented knowledge

# A Data-Driven-Robust-Control Approach to Corporate Finance




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- Reduced-form approaches: expertise-driven and ad hoc
- Structural approaches: search within theoretically tractable space
  - ▶ limited state variables of interest (for tractability)
  - ▶ dynamics of these variables exogenously given
  - ▶ micro-founded parameters within the framework
  - ▶ balance between internal and external validity

# A Data-Driven-Robust-Control Approach to Corporate Finance



- Firm decisions fundamentally a stochastic control problem

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- Reduced-form approaches: expertise-driven and ad hoc
- Structural approaches: search within theoretically tractable space
- Our approach: model the whole system and simulate the environment
  - ▶ predictive environment module: supervised learning to estimate the law-of-motions of states and the model uncertainty
  - ▶ decision-making module: reinforcement learning for high-dimensional stochastic control approximation
  - ▶ enhance internal validity using transfer learning and external validity via robust control

## Literature and Contribution

- Corporate Finance:
  - ▶ New DDRC overcoming limitations and unifying framework
  - ▶ Machine learning in Corporate Finance
    - (i) Textual analysis, e.g., Bellstam, Bhagat, & Cookson, 2021, Li et al., 2021, Hanley and Hoberg, 2019, Cong, Liang, & Zhang, 2019, etc.;
    - (ii) Supervised learning, e.g., Erel et al., 2021, Lyonnet and Stern, 2022)
  - ▶ Non-text-based “large” model tailored for CF
- Robust Control:
  - ▶ Mostly theory, focus on macro time series rather than utilizing cross-sectional info (e.g., Hansen and Sargent, 2001; Ju and Miao, 2012)
  - ▶ Application in corporate finance
  - ▶ Use ambiguity to assess the importance of causality/theory
- AI, especially GenAI, for Finance:
  - ▶ Goal-oriented algorithms in large spaces (Cong et al., 2020, 2022, 2023)
  - ▶ Model-based offline reinforcement learning (RL, empirical)
  - ▶ Simulation-based studies: ABM and large environment models
  - ▶ Incorporate theory/reduced-form/structural into DDRC (transfer learning)

## Data and Variables

- Data: Compustat (firm fundamentals), CRSP (market return and volatility), and Chicago Fed (macro state variables)
- From 1976 to 2023, quarterly; 20,485 different firms ranging from 1976:Q1 to 2023:Q2, with 784,460 firm-quarter observations
- State variables (built from 10 fundamental + 4 market + 4 macro)
  - ▶ Total asset, current asset, gross revenue, accounts payable, cogs, interest paid net, inventories, book current liabilities, receivables, revenue
  - ▶ Market cap, enterprise value, quarterly equity return, quarterly volatility
  - ▶ Chicago Fed indices: risk, credit, leverage, and non-financial leverage
  - ▶ Plus their History (last 4 observations) and their growth rate version
- Decision variables (9 dimensions of actions in the current quarter)
  - ▶ Leverage, acquisitions, investment, cash savings, dividend, debt issuance, equity issuance, R&D expenses, repurchases
- Total over 3M parameters; trained using A100 GPU (RedCloud)/P100 (Azure)/T4 (RedCloud) with training time  $\sim 3 - 7$  days per set

# AlphaManager Architecture: Baseline Modules

**Predictive Environment Module (PEM)**, 11 aux, DL, 3 x 300 (40 epochs):

- ~30% training. 1976Q1 - 1991Q4; Transformer-based; quarterly rolling.

**Decision-Making Module (DMM)**, RL/policy-gradient, 4 x 256 (200 epochs):

$$\max_g \mathbb{E}_{t_0} \sum_{t=t_0}^{t_0+T} \{r(X_t, u_t) - \lambda \cdot \text{BoostingError}(X_t, u_t)\}$$

s.t.  $\Delta X_{t+1} = f(X_t, u_t) + \varepsilon_{t+1}, u_t = g(X_t)$

**Robust Control and Ambiguity** (Hansen and Sargent, 2023):

- Overfit and data shifts.
- Misspecification - limited power of the model class
- Risk - in-model stochastic innovation
- **Ambiguity** - uncertainty about detailed modeling choice
- Inspiration from climate finance (Barnett, Brock, and Hansen, 2020):  
max-min + relative-entropy punishment + probability adjustment.
- Pick the “worst” environment and punish/avoid ambiguity

## Validation: Holmstrom-Tirole (1997 QJE) Moral Hazard Model

- An ideal setting for validation:
  - (i) analytical solutions for data-generation and optimal policy,
  - (ii) simple and convincing channels/mechanisms demonstration, and
  - (iii) sufficiently flexible to generate distributional shifts:
    - ▶ An entrepreneur has an investment opportunity, can exert unobservable effort to increase success rate, but cannot afford required initial investment
    - ▶ The entrepreneur writes a contract to share a proportion of return (if successful) to external investor in exchange of initial investment
    - ▶ An external investor chooses to take or reject proposed contract
    - ▶ Moral hazard: the investor cannot observe the entrepreneur's effort
- Formulation in stochastic control setting
  - ▶ States: entrepreneur's initial wealth ( $A$ ), entrepreneur's utility of not exerting effort ( $B$ ), change in probability of success  $\Delta p$ , the successful rate when no effort is exerted ( $p_L$ ), total return of the investment opportunity ( $R$ )
  - ▶ Controls: contractual return to the entrepreneur  $R_b$ , effort  $e \in \{0, 1\}$
  - ▶ Environment: given states and controls, whether the external investor takes or rejects the proposed contract  $q \in [0, 1]$



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$$\begin{aligned} \max_{R_b, e \in \{0, 1\}} \quad & q \cdot \max\{A, (p_e \cdot R_b + \mathbf{1}_{e=0} \cdot B)\} + (1 - q) \cdot A \\ \text{s.t.} \quad & R_b + R_l = R \\ & q = q(\Delta p, A, R_b; B, p_L) \\ & R_b \geq 0, R_l \geq 0, A < 1 < R \\ & p_0 = p_L, \quad p_1 = p_L + \Delta p \end{aligned}$$

# Learning the Environment & DMM Performance in Test Sample

- Modeling the environment and the role of robust control
  1. Entrepreneur has perfect info on  $q()$ , standard Q-learning suffices, RL is perfect.
  2. With unknown  $q()$ , entrepreneur learns from data, distributional shifts makes environment model less accurate.
  3. Robust control overcome label shift in states and covariate shift in states and actions.
- In Holmstrom-Tirole, state distributional shift leads to higher ambiguity



- Under ambiguity aversion, the correlation between empirical DMM controls and analytical solutions is consistently over 93%.

## Empirical Results: PEM's Predictions of Firm Outcomes

- High-dimensional, high-fidelity OOS, reduce costly experiments.

State Variable	Ignoring Control		With Control	
	Training $R^2$	Test $R^2$	Training $R^2$	Test $R^2$
Book Asset Growth	-4.09%	-8.15%	55.44%	62.56%
Current Asset Growth	-3.58%	-7.10%	44.49%	51.21%
Gross Revenue Growth	29.54%	28.68%	31.33%	30.88%
Accounts Payable Growth	21.46%	24.43%	24.40%	27.64%
COGS Growth	25.68%	26.76%	27.00%	28.56%
Net Interest Paid Growth	73.26%	77.17%	73.36%	77.28%
Inventory Growth	12.78%	13.71%	17.04%	18.92%
Current Liability Growth	8.88%	7.72%	21.89%	22.69%
Receivables Growth	17.52%	18.77%	21.59%	23.20%
Net Income Growth	29.51%	28.59%	31.31%	30.80%
Trading Volume Growth	12.81%	16.53%	15.77%	20.75%
Log Gross Return Growth	47.90%	45.27%	50.04%	48.19%
Market Cap Growth	1.32%	-3.33%	9.32%	7.07%
Enterprise Value Growth	-0.97%	-5.73%	14.61%	13.14%

- Controls/managerial actions more important for some state evolution
- Consistent with known local patterns from the literature

## Heterogeneous PEM Performance (MSE) for System States

variable		full sample		pre-dotcom		dotcom-GFC		post-GFC	
		mean	std	mean	std	mean	std	mean	std
Total Assets	high	2.16%	8.53%	2.57%	9.42%	2.23%	8.48%	1.76%	7.68%
	low	4.40%	13.33%	4.84%	13.77%	4.30%	12.80%	4.08%	13.26%
COGS	high	2.84%	11.01%	3.30%	12.32%	2.74%	10.64%	2.50%	9.95%
	low	4.49%	13.75%	4.94%	14.67%	4.32%	13.33%	4.20%	13.15%
CurrentLiability	high	5.48%	13.98%	6.12%	14.75%	5.59%	14.20%	4.84%	13.09%
	low	6.69%	15.66%	6.83%	15.42%	6.58%	15.47%	6.64%	15.98%
MarketCap	high	7.49%	15.51%	9.77%	18.45%	7.79%	15.74%	5.30%	11.83%
	low	12.42%	21.40%	12.88%	21.69%	13.42%	22.53%	11.40%	20.34%
EnterpriseValue	high	6.11%	13.87%	8.60%	17.90%	5.99%	12.75%	4.02%	9.47%
	low	10.37%	19.01%	11.55%	20.73%	11.34%	19.67%	8.73%	16.75%

- Subsample episodes: pre-dotcom, dotcom to GFC, post-GFC
- Book asset: small firms has higher prediction error and std, pre-dotcom has the highest mean and std
- COGS: both higher and lower halves have declining average MSE
- Market cap and enterprise value: lower half has higher MSE

# PEM: Heterogeneous Ambiguity for System States



variable		full sample		pre-dotcom		dotcom-GFC		post-GFC	
		mean	std	mean	std	mean	std	mean	std
Total Assets	high	6.93%	3.72%	7.18%	3.74%	7.02%	3.65%	6.64%	3.72%
	low	6.82%	3.79%	6.90%	3.84%	6.84%	3.69%	6.72%	3.82%
COGS	high	5.50%	2.70%	5.46%	2.40%	5.68%	2.68%	5.42%	2.93%
	low	5.21%	2.67%	4.97%	2.33%	5.42%	2.70%	5.30%	2.89%
CurrentLiability	high	7.30%	3.67%	7.21%	3.52%	7.44%	3.66%	7.29%	3.79%
	low	6.84%	3.55%	6.57%	3.49%	6.91%	3.46%	7.02%	3.63%
MarketCap	high	4.68%	2.78%	4.51%	2.40%	5.54%	3.59%	4.28%	2.35%
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EnterpriseValue	high	5.85%	2.67%	5.70%	2.50%	6.57%	2.98%	5.54%	2.53%
	low	6.11%	2.91%	5.45%	2.52%	6.78%	3.15%	6.27%	2.94%

- Book asset and current liability: lower half has lower ambiguity, pre-dotcom episode has the lowest mean and std
- COGS: both higher and lower halves have increasing average ambiguity
- Market cap, and enterprise value: highest ambiguity in the middle period

# PEM Power Illustrated in Traditional/Low-Dimensional settings



Recapitalization: how does enterprise value change if a firm

1. raises \$1 more debt and put that \$1 into its cash savings?
2. raises \$1 more equity and put that \$1 into its cash savings?
3. raises \$1 more debt and \$1 less equity?
4. puts \$1 cash into investment?
5. raises \$1 more debt and put that \$1 into investment?
6. raises \$1 more equity and put that \$1 into investment?



## DMM & Out-Performance of AlphaManager

- Objectives: next Q and next 8Q market cap and enterprise value
- Next Q market cap increase (short-termist)
- Overall short-horizon outperformance: **8.44%** and 10.19%.
- Long-horizon objective: 8.73% and 4.43%
- Heterogeneity: mainly driven by value firms




## Short-Termism VS. Long-Term DMM

- Short-termism doesn't hurt LT performance much, at least not post financial crisis.
  - ▶ Counter-intuitive: LT RL should be optimal in LT

## Short-Termism VS. Long-Term DMM

- Short-termism doesn't hurt LT performance much, at least not post financial crisis.



- ST RL does a better job along the term structure. Why?



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- Short-termism doesn't hurt LT performance much, at least not post financial crisis.
- ST RL does a better job along the term structure. Why?
- ST and LT RLs have different ambiguity constraints
  - ▶ ST RL doesn't care about LT ambiguity  $\Rightarrow$  looser constraint
  - ▶ Constrained instead of unconstrained optimization

## Short-Termism VS. Long-Term DMM

- Short-termism doesn't hurt LT performance much, at least not post financial crisis.
- ST RL does a better job along the term structure. Why?
- ST and LT RLs have different ambiguity constraints
- Use ambiguity-adjusted reward to test

$$\text{Ambiguity Adj. Reward}_t = \frac{\text{Reward}_t}{\sqrt{\max\left\{1, \frac{\text{BoostingError}_t}{\text{BoostingError}_{t_0}}\right\}}}$$



# Optimal Actions Versus Historical Actions




Figure: Optimal decisions (blue lines) vs real decisions (red lines): cash holdings (left) and leverage (right)

Maximizing **next Q enterprise value**: more acquisitions, increasing cash holdings more, keeping the same leverage, paying out more dividend, and increasing investment, especially in R&D, allowing more variations in investments, and more repurchases during bad times.


# Three Perspectives on Out-performance of AlphaManager

- Explanation #1: managers are not skilled enough to realize their goals
  - ▶ Intuition: managerial decisions are not aligned with their preferences
  - ▶ Example: bad execution or limited information
  - ▶ Out-performance  $\Leftrightarrow$  how irrational the manager is
- Explanation #2: the objective is misspecified
  - ▶ Intuition: if managers were to be rational and the preference were correctly specified, then the expected out-performance of AM would be 0
  - ▶ Example: ESG, lobbying threat, personal achievement
  - ▶ Out-performance  $\Leftrightarrow$  how misspecified the preference is
- Explanation #3: firms face unobservable constraints
  - ▶ Intuition: managers wanted to but are not able to do so
  - ▶ Example: financial constraints in borrowing, lack of investment opportunities
  - ▶ Out-performance  $\Leftrightarrow$  shadow prices of binded constraints

# Understanding Managerial Objectives

- Exogeneously-specified objectives may not be accurate
- Simple projection:  $R^2 \sim 10\%$ ; the rest nonlinearity or mis-specification


$$\min_{\beta_k} \left( \sum_{k=1}^4 \beta_k \cdot u_{j,t,k} - u_{j,t}^* \right)^2 \quad \text{s.t.} \quad \sum_{k=1}^4 \beta_k = 1$$



# Understanding Managerial Objectives

- Exogeneously-specified objectives may not be accurate
- Simple projection:  $R^2 \sim 10\%$ ; the rest nonlinearity or mis-specification

$$\min_{\beta_k} \left( \sum_{k=1}^4 \beta_k \cdot u_{j,t,k} - u_{j,t}^* \right)^2 \quad \text{s.t.} \quad \sum_{k=1}^4 \beta_k = 1$$



- First data-drive investigation of managerial objectives:
  - ▶ Actions not additive: no holistic study learning revealed preference,
  - ▶ A high-dim min-max problem → GANs to the rescue (companion paper).

## Further Discussion and Takeaways

### Informing and Piecing Together Corporate Finance Research

- Ambiguity tells the boundary of data-driven/computational approach.
  - ▶ robust control avoids those situations, but can we do better?
- Transfer learning (e.g., Cao et al., 2025; Chen et al., 2024), but ambiguity-guided
  - ▶ combining insights and predictions from other approaches and models  
⇒ lower ambiguity, improved internal validity

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### Takeaways:

- DL and robust control for building “large world model” of corporate finance, the first non-text-based GenAI CF model.
- DRL as heuristic search for optimizing arbitrary managerial goals/objectives (Cong et al. 2019, 2022); AI tool for managers.
- A data-driven-robust-control approach to corporate finance: inference & predictions, understanding managerial objectives, combining approaches, defining boundaries/guiding focus, and more.