

# Financial Advice and Investor Beliefs: Experimental Evidence on Active vs. Passive Strategies

ANTOINETTE SCHOAR  
MIT Sloan and NBER

YANG SUN  
Brandeis University

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## **Abstract**

Using a randomized controlled trial, we examine the demand side of financial advice: how do retail investors assess and update their beliefs based on advice that aligns or contradicts their priors. We compare advice emphasizing passive (diversification, low fees) versus active strategies (stock picking, market-timing). Participants rate advice higher when it aligns with their priors but update beliefs in the direction of the advice received. There is significant heterogeneity by financial literacy: Financially literate subjects react positively to passive strategies and reject active strategies. Less literate subjects respond symmetrically to both. Finally, misaligned advisor incentives reduce the effectiveness of advice.

JEL codes: C91; G41; G53

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Households in the U.S. and other developed economies regularly face complex financial choices, from allocating their retirement savings to insuring against health shocks and beyond. To help consumers with these decisions, a large and almost equally complex market for financial advice has developed alongside. This financial advice can take many forms, from traditional in-person advice by individual advisors, technology-aided (robo) advice tools, to increasingly online financial education resources.

A large and growing literature has analyzed the factors that shape the supply of financial advice, but there is limited evidence on how the demand side perceives and processes this advice. The difficulty of studying the demand for financial advice is that typically researchers can only observe the advice that is provided in equilibrium, which can be significantly shaped by both sides.<sup>1</sup> In this paper we address this gap by conducting a randomized controlled trial (RCT) that allows us to investigate how investors with different priors and varying demand for advice process financial advice, how individuals' perceptions of advice are influenced by their prior beliefs about alternative investment strategies, their financial literacy and their self-assessed financial knowledge. We further evaluate the extent to which advice can successfully change people's posterior beliefs and whether they incorporate this advice when making (incentivized) portfolio choices.

In our experiment we focus on two of the most prominent investment strategies that are available to retail investors: active versus passive investment strategies.<sup>2</sup> These strategies also represent one of the oldest debates in the asset management literature. While most of the academic finance literature suggests that passive strategies dominate active strategies for retail investors, active investment strategies still command a significant market share. In 2022, passive strategies held 46% of all fund assets, up from 13% in 2005 (ICI 2022).<sup>3</sup> Our context allows us to analyze how retail investors, who vary in their priors and understanding of financial markets, assess the quality of advice and update their beliefs in response to different types of advice.

We document four main results. First, the perception of advice is influenced by individuals'

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1. [Gomes, Haliassos, and Ramadorai 2021](#) carefully reviews the distortions and benefits of financial advice focusing on the supply side. [Reuter and Schoar 2024](#) highlights the interaction between supply-side and demand-side constraints.

2. Active strategies aim to outperform a benchmark index through stock selection and market timing, while passive strategies replicate the performance of the index, see for instance, [Gruber 1996](#) and [French 2008](#).

3. Wealthier and more sophisticated investors might have access to other strategies, but we want to capture the type of broad advice that is available to a typical middle class investor.

prior beliefs. While passive advice on average is rated higher than active advice, any advice that contradicts a person's prior beliefs is rated lower than when it aligns with the recipient's existing views. But even though people rate advice lower that contradicts their prior beliefs, it does prompt some updating in the direction of advice. Results from an incentivized portfolio choice question also reveal that the advice significantly impacts participants' choices, even when it contradicts priors. Second, however, there is important heterogeneity in how people update in response to advice depending on their financial literacy. More financially literate participants positively revise their beliefs after watching the passive video but show no change following the active advice. In contrast, those with lower financial literacy are strongly influenced by either type of advice. Third, our results suggest that individuals who are more confident in their (self-perceived) financial knowledge place less weight on financial advice. Finally, individuals appear to be concerned with the incentives of advisors - they update more in the direction of the advice if the advisor has lower conflicts of interest, i.e. they are paid via a flat fee rather than commission-based compensation.

Our experiment is designed to emulate a typical (online) financial advice session, which usually presents retail investors with a set of relevant financial information and a narrative to make sense of this information. We explicitly take into account that financial advice is not equivalent to financial literacy training, since it uses data to support a particular narrative, rather than to teach finance from first principles. Therefore, our study tests how different narratives about financial markets (active versus passive strategies) affect retail investors' response to the advice. For example, advisors who want to promote passive strategies over active ones might provide a narrative of efficient markets and explain the distribution of fund returns and the importance of minimizing fees. Alternatively, financial advisors who want to convince investors that active strategies are better might provide a narrative that highlights the benefit of market timing or stock picking and point out that there are more active funds in the upper tail of the distribution of fund returns.<sup>4</sup>

Ideally, consumers should evaluate the advice by weighing it against all available information to determine which narrative is most convincing, as suggested by, for example, [Eliaz and Spiegler 2020](#) and [Schwartzstein and Sunderam 2021](#). In practice, however, most retail investors face

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4. Thus our paper complements studies that assess the effectiveness of financial literacy training programs. For an overview of randomized controlled trials on financial literacy training, see [Kaiser and Lusardi 2024](#).

constraints such as limited financial knowledge, time, and attention. This makes it is unrealistic that advisors could teach finance or statistics to their customers. Instead, we choose an advice format that follows closely the existing practices in the financial advice industry, offering concise narratives with supporting data, and observe how these narratives are evaluated and adopted by consumers.<sup>5</sup>

We conduct a randomized laboratory experiment. To present both active and passive investment advice, we worked with real financial advisors to develop a set of scripts. These scripts use representative industry language to recommend either a strategy of diversification and low-fee passive index investing (which we call *Pro-Passive*), or a strategy of active management focused on identifying “hot” industries (which we call *Pro-Active*). We recorded these scripts as short videos with trained actors. Both types of videos are fully scripted. The setup, content and language of the videos mirrors those of online investor education videos.

We recruited participants by advertising through a large number of employers in the Boston and Cambridge area. Participants were invited to a lab setting, where they first answered a survey about their demographics, as well as their pre-existing beliefs regarding financial markets and the best investment strategies. From these answers, we classify subjects into “*Pro-Active*” and “*Pro-Passive*” types: investors who came into the study believing a good investment strategy is to identify promising industries or firms and time the market, versus those who believed one should hold a diversified low-fee portfolio. We also assessed the subjects’ financial literacy levels before the video, but participants were randomized independent of their literacy.

The focus of our experiment is a 2-by-2 assignment, where investors are randomly assigned to view a video that either aligns with or contradicts their existing investment beliefs. Independent of being classified as *Pro-Active* or *Pro-Passive*, both sets of subjects are randomly assigned to either an *Active Video* or a *Passive Video*, each promoting the corresponding strategy.<sup>6</sup> Following the videos, participants rate the quality of the advice as well as the advisor. We also reassess participants’ beliefs on the two investment strategies. After the post-video survey, each participant watches a comprehensive debriefing video, which provides academic insights into good investment

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5. It is important to note that we did not provide participants with false information but provided data that selectively highlight the benefits of either active or passive strategies, which is what is typical in the industry. At the end we debriefed all participants in a detail financial literacy session to ensure that people did not leave the experiment with wrong information.

6. This randomization leaves us with four groups (1) Pro-Active, saw Active Video, (2) Pro-Active, saw Passive Video (3) Pro-Passive, saw Active Video, and (4) Pro-Passive, saw Passive Video.

strategies, designed to mitigate any potentially misleading effects of the original video treatments.<sup>7</sup>

We begin by analyzing the participants' post-video ratings of the advice presented. The results show that passive advice is rated higher than the active advice, and advice contradicting participants' prior beliefs receives lower ratings compared to advice aligning with their existing views. On a 1-to-9 scale, both effects are about 0.6 points, roughly one-third of the standard deviation of advice ratings. To ensure that the difference in raw ratings is not driven by varying literacy levels among people with different prior beliefs, we estimate the effects of all treatment groups in regressions that control for differential responses to the videos by literacy levels. The regressions confirm that lower ratings were given in the two groups where the videos contradicted participants' prior beliefs, however, among all groups, people with a pro-passive prior and watch the active advice gave the lowest ratings.

When separating the sample into high- and low-literacy sub-groups, we find that those with high financial literacy showed distinct rankings across the treatment groups, but people with low literacy rate any advice similarly. This suggests that the financially less literate may be unable to effectively evaluate the quality of financial advice. We also find that participants who are more confident about their own financial knowledge tend to give lower ratings if the advice conflicts with their prior beliefs.

When looking at how investors update their beliefs, we find a sizable treatment effect of the videos on the subjects' ex post beliefs. On average, people who watch the video with the active advice become more pro-active in their posterior beliefs, and vice versa for people who watch the passive advice. Our belief measure is constructed as a score that ranges from -4 (highly pro-active) to +4 (highly pro-passive), based on a set of questions to elicit people's priors.

However, we find a large asymmetric impact of the two types of advice: On average passive advice moved participants priors more strongly than active advice: Beliefs are moved by 3.4 points toward more pro-passive beliefs for ex ante pro-active participants who watched the passive video, and 1.6 points toward more pro-active for pro-passive individuals who watched the active video. These effects are measured relative to the reference group which represents pro-active individuals

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7. We also cross the advice treatments, with a sub-treatment, where we randomize within each two by two cell, the description of the advisor's compensation (flat fee, commission, or unspecified). These are detailed later.

watching the active video.

Importantly, we find very different results for participants with high versus low levels of financial literacy. The asymmetric effect of passive versus active videos is entirely driven by the high literacy group: Financially literate individuals rate the passive advice as higher quality and only update when shown the passive advice. In contrast, less financially literate subjects respond with similar magnitudes to both types of advice. This susceptibility to any form of advice potentially makes them vulnerable to lower quality financial advice.<sup>8</sup>

Interestingly, subjects in all groups and literacy levels rank the “likability” of the advisor at a similar level, and their ratings do not depend on whether the advice confirms their priors or not. This implies that participants in the experiment are able to separate the content of the advice from the personality of the advisor in the video.

At the end of the session participants were asked to make a portfolio choice from six portfolios as if they were to invest with their own money. We incentivized the choices: Subjects could win a \$3,000 award, set up as a lottery prize for participating in this experiment, which would be received in the form of the portfolio they picked in this question. The six funds are three pairs, where each pair consists of an index fund and an actively managed fund that have approximately equal risk and net-of-fee return. The results confirm our previous findings - both pre-existing beliefs and the advice received matter for people’s portfolio choices. We find that participants with pro-active priors who watched the passive video were about 58 percentage points more likely to choose an index fund than those who watched active advice. Similarly, among pro-passive participants, the active video increased the likelihood of selecting an actively managed fund by 47 percentage points. Again, the advice that recommends active management has a stronger effect on the portfolio choices of the low-literacy subjects.

Lastly, we investigate how individuals process information about advisors’ incentives, particularly whether they pay attention to potential conflicts of interest and understand that incentive misalignment may affect the quality of the advice. To this end, we embed sub-treatments within the introductory sections of the videos where the advisor explains their compensation structure – either flat fees,

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8. Some prior studies have shown that low financial literacy also leads to low take-up of financial advice ([Bhattacharya et al. 2012](#); [Gaudecker 2015](#); [Chang and Szydlowski 2020](#))

which do not depend on sales generated, or commissions, which do. We randomize this compensation sub-treatment in the videos, with some videos omitting the compensation information altogether. We then examine the effects of these compensation sub-treatments while controlling for the main treatment effects.

We find that, all else being equal, participants rate advice as higher quality when the advisor is compensated by a flat fee rather than a commission, with a rating difference of about 0.55 on a 9-point scale. Moreover, individuals update their beliefs by 0.77 point more (on the -4 to +4 scale) toward the recommendation in the advice for flat-fee advisors than for commission-based advisors. These effects are present across different levels of financial literacy but are stronger for those with low financial literacy, possibly due to their awareness of their limited ability to evaluate the quality of the advice.

**Related Literature** A large and growing literature has examined the effects of financial advice on the portfolios of advisees. The effects include under-performance relative to self-directed portfolios (e.g., [Bergstresser, Chalmers, and Tufano 2009](#); [Hackethal, Haliassos, and Jappelli 2012](#); [Kramer 2012](#); [Del Guercio and Reuter 2014](#); [Egan, Ge, and Tang 2022](#)), favoring active funds (e.g., [Linnainmaa, Melzer, and Previtero 2021](#)), excessive turnovers and risk-taking (e.g., [Bluethgen et al. 2008](#); [Del Guercio and Reuter 2014](#)), and high commissions (e.g., [Christoffersen, Evans, and Musto 2013](#); [Egan 2019](#); [Chalmers and Reuter 2020](#)).<sup>9</sup>

These portfolio outcomes are frequently attributed to supply-side frictions, most notably conflicts of interest between advisors and their clients, e.g., [Edelen, Evans, and Kadlec 2012](#); [Christoffersen, Evans, and Musto 2013](#); [Gurun, Stoffman, and Yonker 2021](#). Several studies have found widespread violations of fiduciary duty among financial advisors ([Dimmock, Gerken, and Graham 2018](#); [Charoenwong, Kwan, and Umar 2019](#)) and persistent misconduct ([Qureshi and Sokobin 2015](#); [Egan, Matvos, and Seru 2019](#)). Other supply-side limitations include advisors' own beliefs and/or incompetence ([Foerster et al. 2017](#); [Linnainmaa et al. 2020](#); [Anagol, Cole, and Sarkar 2017](#); [Andries, Bonelli, and Sraer 2024](#)). But the literature has also highlighted that financial advisors can provide valuable services even in the presence of conflicts of interests between advisers and their clients, as

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9. Beyond individual portfolios, research also suggests that financial advice can influence aggregate asset allocations and returns (e.g., [Da et al. 2018](#); [Parker, Schoar, and Sun 2023](#); [Aldunate et al. 2023](#); [Andonov, Eiling, and Xu 2024](#)).

shown in Gennaioli, Shleifer, and Vishny (2015) and Hackethal, Haliassos, and Jappelli (2012).<sup>10</sup> For a review of the potential value added by financial advice, see Reuter and Schoar (2024).

Several papers use audit studies and online experiments to analyze the quality of financial advice offered by advisors. In an audit study, Mullainathan, Noeth, and Schoar (2012) show that U.S. financial advisors often provide advice biased toward active investment and only correct advisees' misconceptions about financial markets if it benefits the advisors financially. Similarly, Anagol, Cole, and Sarkar (2017) present evidence of low-quality advice in the Indian life insurance market. Bhattacharya et al. (2024) find that female subjects in Hong Kong receive worse financial advice. Bucher-Koenen et al. (2023) confirms this statistical discrimination using administrative data from a German bank.

Studies on the demand side of financial advice have mainly examined factors influencing the uptake of advice. The literature shows that trust in financial advisers can boost advice-taking (Bhattacharya et al. 2012; Agnew et al. 2018; Gurun, Stoffman, and Yonker 2021; Burke and Hung 2021; Fisch and Seligman 2022; see also theory by Georgarakos and Inderst 2014 and Gennaioli, Shleifer, and Vishny 2015), and that trust also drives reliance on personal advice from family and friends, as shown by Balakina et al. 2024. However, reliance on simple default options can discourage more individualized advice (Reuter and Richardson 2022).

Regarding financial literacy, Chang and Szydlowski (2020) demonstrate that in a rational framework, less sophisticated investors should seek more financial advice. Empirically, however, more financially literate individuals are more likely to seek advice (Bhattacharya et al. 2012; Gaudecker 2015), but are less likely to follow it once received (Stolper 2018), consistent with greater confidence in their own judgment. Further, a complementary study by Calcagno and Monticone (2015) find that less financially literate individuals, though less likely to seek advice, are more likely to fully delegate investment decisions to advisors when they do use advice. Finally, Kim, Maurer, and Mitchell (2019) conduct an experiment in the 2016 Health and Retirement and find that financial literacy enhances the quality, but not the quantity, of the advice sought.

Methodologically, two papers are most closely related to our study. First, our paper is complementary to Agnew et al. (2018), who conduct an RCT to test how participants develop trust

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10. Dulleck and Kerschbamer (2006) discuss this general type of information problems in markets for experts' services.

in financial advisors. Their study focuses on how variations in advisors’ personal characteristics, credentials, and the sequencing of advice influence trust and advisor selection. In contrast, our analysis abstracts from the advisor characteristics by controlling for advisor fixed effects in all specifications, which allows us to isolate the impact of the *content* of advice. Conceptually, this distinction is important because the message an advisor conveys can differ from their personal attributes, and trust in the advisor is distinct from learning from the advice.<sup>11</sup> A second related paper is Barron and Fries (2023) who conduct an online experiment to focus on the supply side of advice. The paper tests how subjects, acting as advisors, endogenously generate advice when presented with financial returns and a set of randomized incentives. The advice generated by the subjects is in the form of statistical parameters not financial narratives that are inspired by what is used in the industry (as in our paper). The paper finds that advisees are influenced by the parameters presented by advisors, even if the advisor has no informational advantage.

## 1 Experimental Design and Data Collection

### 1.1 Subject Recruitment and Setup

We conducted an experiment in which we invited people from the greater Boston area to watch financial advice videos. The experiment was conducted between June 4<sup>th</sup> and November 21<sup>st</sup>, 2012 and was run at the MIT and Harvard experimental labs to allow participants more convenient access to different sites. The experiment procedure consists of three parts. First, we elicit people’s priors about investment via a pre-video survey. Independent of their prior beliefs, we randomly assign people to watch two types of videos of financial advice. Lastly, we use a post-video survey to measure people’s perceptions of financial advice and any changes in their beliefs about investment strategies.

To attract residents, particularly employees in the greater Boston area, we contacted a number of local employers to advertise our recruiting materials via their internal email lists and blackboards in public areas such as workplace cafeterias. In addition, we circulated recruiting materials on Craigslist, the Harvard Decision Science Lab and the MIT Behavioral Research Lab websites, and

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11. Consistent with this view, we show in Section 3.3 that participants form separate evaluations of the advisor and the advice content.

school newsletters and emails. We advertised the chance of getting a \$3,000 award in the form of fund portfolios from this experiment to provide a monetary incentive.

Participants must physically come to our research laboratory. Once people show up at the lab, we confirm their IDs and eligibility. This check-in step differentiates our study from online survey experiments. We did not collect names or any personally identifiable information from the participants. Each of them was assigned a randomly generated number for identification purposes throughout the experiment process.

Because participants self-selected into the study, the sample may be more skewed toward individuals who are interested in financial advice, and our findings should speak most directly to that segment. To the extent that those individuals are also more likely to seek and use financial advice, the segment captured is relevant.<sup>12</sup> We explicitly stated in all communications that the objective of the experiment was to examine how retail investors perceive different retirement saving strategies and evaluate various types of financial advice. There were no claims about the quality of the advice, or receiving “free advice”.<sup>13</sup>

## 1.2 Financial Advice Videos

The advice videos are central to our experiment design. We aimed for these videos to emulate pre-recorded (instead of live or customized) professional financial advice, which is common in online investor advice or educational programs, including resources provided by large asset management companies, robo-advisors or even social media.<sup>14</sup> We then screened and hired four actors, two females and two males, to perform in our videos as financial advisors. We provided the actors with a full script to memorize and trained them to act as advisors. They strictly followed the scripts with the help of a teleprompter and with the natural emotions that advisors would normally present.

In each video, a professionally-dressed advisor talks about investment strategies and financial

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12. We acknowledge that some degree of selection bias may be present. Our main goal is not to estimate the overall level of receptiveness, but to examine heterogeneity, i.e., how individuals with different levels of financial literacy or confidence respond to advice. These relative results are less likely to be driven by selection.

13. Holding the experiment at MIT and Harvard could have increased perceived credibility, and we cannot rule out residual credibility effects. However, if this is the case, the contrast between the high- and low-literacy individuals presented later in the result sections would be even more revealing. That is, though all participants were aware of the university affiliations, the financially literate individuals were able to critically evaluate and, in some cases, reject that advice. In contrast, financially less literate individuals may be more susceptible because they relied more on the perceived credibility (e.g., institutional branding), rather than content.

14. Consequently, our findings are most relevant for such arm’s-length contexts where advice is delivered through standardized videos, and speak less to the hand-holding or relationship-based aspects of financial advice, or to contexts involving full delegation to advisors.

advice in front of a plain white background. We keep the screen cuts, camera angles, and lighting the same across the videos. Each video lasts for approximately 4 to 6 minutes. In order to keep the viewers' attention and pass on messages more effectively in a few minutes, we divided the whole video into several sections. Between each section, there was a 3-second black transition screen with the topic of the next section showing on the screen in white.

We wrote scripts that recommend either a passive or an active investment strategy to the audience, providing the most common supporting arguments for each recommendation. To ensure these scripts represent professional advice, we consulted with several local financial advisors to incorporate their typical language. In the *Passive Video*, the advisor argues that no active fund manager can always beat the market and recommends low-cost well-diversified index funds. The supporting arguments highlight that diversification can help reduce risk exposure to any one stock or sector, and the lower cost of index funds makes a large difference at long time horizon. In the *Active Video*, the advisor emphasizes the importance of outperforming the market benchmark and recommends funds managed by competent portfolio managers with a good track record. The advisor further argues that by paying for the professional managers and market research, actively managed funds can assist investors in identifying stocks and sectors that are most promising for high returns, and timing the market to better seize opportunities.

In the first section of every video, the presenter gives a brief self-introduction, highlighting their qualifications. This introductory script is the same in all videos. The second section provides a general overview of what index funds and actively managed funds are and the average annual fees for each. The third section recommends either a passive or active investment strategy. The fourth section supports the recommended strategy with arguments and a histogram. The active investment video underscores the importance of stock selection and market timing, presenting the narrative that market research adds value, and that top-performing funds are often actively managed. In contrast, the passive investment video stresses the benefits of diversification and low fees. The passive narrative explains that no one can predict the market (an argument following the efficient market hypothesis) and that, on average, index funds outperform actively managed funds. While both videos explain in the second segment that actively managed funds generally incur higher fees than index funds, they diverge in the fourth segment: the video promoting passive investment

cautions against high fees, whereas the one on active investment argues that higher fees are justified by better management quality.

In addition to the two types of investment strategies, we cross the advice treatment with a sub-treatment related to the incentive of the advice provider: Advisors in the videos either state that they are compensated via a “flat fee”, “commission fee” or do not mention how they are compensated, “skip fee”. We refer to these sub-treatment groups as “incentive treatments”, designed to assess how participants’ awareness of advisors’ potential conflicts of interest influences their perception of financial advice.<sup>15</sup> This variation in incentives is inserted into the first section of the video. Following the self-introduction, the financial advisor in both the “flat fee” and “commission fee” videos describes how they are compensated via a flat fee or through commission, respectively. Then these two types of videos continue to the second section. The “skip fee” videos, however, exclude the part in which the advisor talks about their compensation. After the opening part, the “skip fee” videos jump to the second section of describing index funds and active funds. The main and sub-treatment arms are tabulated in [Table 1](#) and Appendix A provides the full scripts of the videos.

The main focus of our study is the 2-by-2 treatment groups combining the pro-active and pro-passive priors with the active and passive video treatments. We report most results for only these four groups, thus merging the incentive sub-treatments. Analysis of the incentive treatments is presented at the end.

### **1.3 Pre- and Post-Video Surveys, and Post-Experiment Debrief**

Our pre-video survey starts with collecting a standard set of demographic information, including age, gender, marital status, job status, annual income, etc., from the participants. We also asked them to give a self-assessment of financial literacy on a 7-point scale and on a percentile scale. In order to measure how people think about investment strategies, we asked the subjects to rank seven potential components of investment strategies in the order of importance. This pre-video ranking question is designed to elicit people’s prior beliefs on passive versus active investment strategies.

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15. The flat fee sub-treatment emphasizes that the advisor’s compensation is independent of sales, which promotes unbiased advice. The commission fee sub-treatment states that the advisor’s compensation (commission) is based on the amount of sales they generate for the fund company and fees paid by customers into the mutual funds. This compensation structure can lead to conflict of interest, as advisors might prefer selling higher-fee funds to increase their earnings.

The seven components we used in this question are: *Diversification, Picking Good Fund Managers, Picking Good Stocks, Timing the Market, Minimizing Risks, Minimizing Fees, and Selling Funds That Had Bad Performance Last Year*. We construct belief measures from the answers to these questions, which is discussed in the next section.

After these belief questions, we ask people eight questions that are intended to test their financial literacy levels. These knowledge questions range from relatively easy ones, for example, about the meaning of owning stock, to harder ones that need some calculations or college-level financial knowledge.

After watching the financial advice videos, people filled out a post-video survey. First we asked them to rate the quality of the advice and the advisor, and report how much they agree with what they just saw. We then gave them the same investment strategy ranking question as that in the pre-video survey, which required ranking the seven components of investment strategies in the order of importance. This question serves to elicit people's post-video belief on passive versus active investments. Further, we asked the subjects whether they believe it is possible or impossible to beat the market in the long term.

Finally, the subjects were invited to choose one portfolio from six hypothetical portfolios if they were to invest with their own money. No fund names were given. Graphs displaying the historical annual returns of the six portfolios were shown on screen. The portfolios varied in risk and average returns, with three labeled as actively managed portfolios and the other three as passive. Each actively managed portfolio had the same net-of-fee return and risk as a corresponding passive portfolio.<sup>16</sup> People were also informed that if they were selected to receive the \$3,000 award, they would receive it in the fund portfolio which they picked in this question. Participants were informed that the portfolio prize was only granted after the end of the experiment period, and that transferring the portfolio into their name would require an additional one-month processing period. As a result, the average participant expected a 3-4 month wait time before they can receive the portfolio, this creates an incentive for them to maximize expected portfolio performance even if some may plan to sell it.

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16. By matching the pairs of portfolios on net-of-fee returns, we ensure that participants' decisions to choose an active or passive portfolio were not influenced solely by fee considerations.

After the subjects completed the post-video survey and before they left the lab, we showed them a “debrief” video that was designed to neutralize any potentially misleading information presented by the “advisor”. The debrief videos were recorded by the same actors as those in the treatment videos, and had two scripts depending on whether the advice was passive or active. The debrief highlighted the conflicts of interest facing advisors who are employed by fund companies or compensated by commissions, how the agency conflict can lead them to recommend actively managed funds, and that academic research found only limited merit of active management.

#### **1.4 Advantages and Disadvantages of Methodology**

Research on the impact of financial advice on individual investors has relied on several approaches, including household surveys, online or laboratory experiments, and analyses of administrative data. Administrative data are valuable because they reveal actual portfolio choices and financial outcomes. However, such data rarely allow researchers to observe the content of advice or the causal effect of receiving advice. In contrast, lab experiments offer the main advantage of allowing randomization of the advice given to individuals.

For our question, this randomization is crucial, because it allows us to present some individuals with advice that contradicts their prior beliefs. Such a setup would be highly difficult to achieve in real-world advisory contexts. Financial advisors are often reluctant to challenge client beliefs (Mullainathan, Noeth, and Schoar 2012; Foerster et al. 2017). This implies that advice observed in practice often blends with advisees’ existing beliefs. If the advisee accepts the advice, it is unclear whether they were convinced by the content or simply heard what they already wanted to believe. In addition, randomizing advice content in real settings may raise liability concerns and make advisory firms unwilling to participate in such a study. These constraints limit the range of questions that can be explored with observational advice data and highlight the value of experiments, where researchers can cleanly identify the causal effect of advice on individual responses.

Finally, while real-world studies often document that even unbiased advice fails to change behavior, they cannot pinpoint where the frictions arise. For example, people may distrust the advice, fail to update their beliefs, or fail to act on their beliefs. Each friction has distinct policy implications and isolating them is useful for improving advice design. In this sense, lab experiments

can complement field evidence by clarifying in a controlled environment how advice can shape behavior.

The experimental method, however, has its limitations. The first is that the experimental setup is different from the environments in which individuals typically receive financial advice. As discussed above, to mitigate this concern, we worked with professional advisors to develop realistic videos and require participants to attend in person, which ensures a controlled environment and verification of identities and attentiveness. The second limitation is that we cannot observe the participants' actual portfolios or long-term outcomes. Instead, following standard experimental designs, participants make incentivized portfolio choices with payoffs delayed by several months.

## 2 Measurement and Random Assignment

### 2.1 Construction of “Pro-Passive” Score

We extract people's prior beliefs about active versus passive management from their answers to the pre-video ranking question. This question asked people to rank seven different components of investment strategy in the order of importance. These components were carefully selected to represent a mix of goals and features related to passive investment, active investing, and some that are neutral or irrelevant. The components were presented in a random order. Note that we did not label any strategy components as “active” or “passive,” nor did we reveal the purpose of the experiment. This ranking question was embedded among general items on investment experience, with no indication that it was central to the study.<sup>17</sup> We show the summary statistics of answers to the pre-video ranking question on the seven investment strategies in [Table 2](#).

[Table 2 About Here]

We use these rankings to construct an ex-ante belief score on the passive-active spectrum. Based on academic theory, we expect *Diversification*, *Minimizing Risk*, and *Minimizing Fees* to correlate with passive beliefs; *Picking Good Stocks*, *Picking Good Fund Managers*, and *Timing the Market* to associate with active management; and *Selling Poorly Performed Funds* to be largely neutral. However, investors' actual beliefs may not conform to this theoretical classification.

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17. This design reduces salience and mitigates concerns about participants being reluctant to agree with advice that contradicts their priors or trying to show what they think the experimenters expect. The post-video ranking question is identical to the pre-video ranking question, and the post-video beliefs are assessed in the same way.

Table 3 presents pair-wise correlations between the component rankings, as well as financial literacy and confidence (defined in the next sub-section), to identify which components most strongly reflect “pro-active” versus “pro-passive” beliefs. The detailed analysis is provided in Appendix B. Based on these results, we focus on four key components to construct our main belief score: *Diversification* and *Minimizing Fees* for pro-passive beliefs, and *Picking Good Stocks* and *Timing the Market* for pro-active beliefs.

[Table 3 About Here]

We define a 4-point classification scheme to measure investment beliefs on the active-passive spectrum. Starting with an initial value of zero, we add 1 if *Diversification* is ranked among the top three most important components, and subtract 1 if it is among the bottom three. We repeat this step for the ranking of *Minimizing Fees*. Conversely, we add 1 if *Picking Good Stocks* is among the bottom three components, and subtract 1 if it is among the top three. This is repeated for the ranking of *Timing the Market*. We call the resulting metric the “*Pro-Passive Score*” of a participant. The largest possible Pro-Passive Score is 4, which indicates that the participant has strong preference for passive management in their pre-video belief. The smallest possible value -4 indicates the opposite extreme that the participant has a strong prior preference for active management.

Figure 1 Panel A plots the distribution of the 4-point Pro-Passive Score. Based on the distribution, we categorize the participants with positive scores as the *Pro-Passive* type and those with non-positive points as the *Pro-Active* type. In robustness checks, we single out the participants with zero point as the *Unclear* belief group, while leaving the positive-scored participants in the Pro-Passive group and negative participants in the Pro-Active group, and the results remain unchanged. We explore alternative approaches to measure beliefs and obtain similar results. These alternative measures are also discussed in Appendix B.

[Figure 1 About Here]

## 2.2 Financial Literacy and Confidence

**Measure of Financial Literacy** We assess participants’ financial knowledge using eight questions covering both basic and advanced investment concepts. Most of these questions are adapted from

established measures in the financial literacy literature (e.g., [Lusardi and Mitchell 2007](#); [van Rooij, Lusardi, and Alessie 2011](#)), supplemented with two newer questions. The full text of the questions is provided in [Table 4](#) Panel A. Participants received the questions in random order in the pre-video survey. Based on the percentages of right answers in our sample, one question about the meaning of owning stock turns out to be the easiest one, five questions cluster at the medium level, and two questions are the hardest (Panel B). Panel C shows that participants' performance across easy, medium, and hard financial-literacy questions follows a consistent pattern. Further details on question sources, internal consistency checks, and benchmarking against prior studies are presented in Appendix C. Overall, while some question-level correct rates are similar to those observed in the general U.S. population, others are closer to those of college-educated samples.

[[Table 4](#) About Here]

Summary statistics of the knowledge score can be found in [Table 2](#). The minimum of knowledge score is 0, which means the participant gets no knowledge question right; the maximum is 8, which means the participant gives right answers to all of the questions.<sup>18</sup> In addition, the knowledge score has a strong positive correlation with self-assessed financial literacy (see [Table 3](#)) and is positively associated with having a retirement account, investing in stocks, as well as being male and older, though it has no significant correlation with whether the participant uses a financial advisor or reports high trust in financial institutions.<sup>19</sup>

[Figure 1](#) Panel C plots the distribution of the knowledge score among the Pro-Passive and Pro-Active subjects. Pro-Passive people on average have higher financial knowledge scores, however, the two distributions have substantial overlap and imply that the groups based on prior beliefs are not purely an approximation for financial literacy.<sup>20</sup>

The pre-alignment we observe between financial sophistication and pro-passive priors could be due to broader exposure to the passive narrative, but is unlikely to explain our main findings.

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18. Though the majority of participants in our experiment hold a college degree or higher, [Table IA.1](#) suggests education level serves as a close proxy for financial literacy. Our findings on the difference between high and low financial literacy remain robust when comparing the sub-samples with and without college degrees.

19. See [Table IA.2](#).

20. [Table IA.3](#) reports the correlation between prior beliefs and participants' characteristics. In addition to the *Knowledge Score*, pro-passive beliefs are also associated with having a retirement account and a college degree, both of which are linked to higher financial literacy.

Specifically, our main asymmetric result (that financially sophisticated participants are receptive to passive but not active advice) holds conditional on prior beliefs, so it is not driven by this pre-alignment. Moreover, if sophisticated participants over-reported pro-passive priors (i.e., some are “hidden” pro-active types), the bias would push us toward observing a stronger response to the active video among the sophisticated. Empirically we do not see such a response.

**Measure of Confidence** The ability to make personal financial decisions relies not only on actual financial knowledge but also on an individual’s self-perception and confidence in their own knowledge. To measure confidence, the pre-video survey asked participants to i) rate their overall knowledge of investing on a scale from 1 (not knowledgeable) to 7 (very knowledgeable), and ii) estimate their percentile rank among U.S. individual investors. The two measures are highly correlated (0.88), though many skipped the percentile question, so we use the 7-point self-assessment as our main confidence measure (Table 2). Self-assessed knowledge is strongly correlated with the objective Knowledge Score (Table 3), but Figure 2 shows that there is meaningful variation in confidence within each literacy level. Nonetheless, extreme over- or under-confidence is relatively uncommon among the experiment participants.

[Figure 2 About Here]

To isolate confidence from actual knowledge, we regress self-assessed literacy on the Knowledge Score and use the standardized residuals as our measure of *Confidence*. We report the correlations between *Confidence* and prior beliefs in Table 3, and between *Confidence* and participant characteristics in Table IA.2. Confidence is not strongly correlated with any prior belief type, which is reassuring. For example, it would be concerning if pro-active priors are easier to change than pro-passive priors (if people holding that priors are not confident), but we do not find such pattern. Instead, confidence is correlated with investment experience and with having a financial advisor, though having a financial advisor is uncorrelated with true financial literacy. Finally, men and older individuals tend to be more confident, while education is correlated with true literacy but not with confidence.

### 2.3 Verification of Random Assignment

Independent of their answers to the pre-video ranking question that captures the prior beliefs on passive versus active management, we randomly assigned participants into treatment arms that show the subjects a video where an advisor recommends either a passive or an active investment strategy. The pre- and post-video surveys are the same for all of them. We obtained 521 valid responses after excluding inattentive participants based on embedded screener questions, of which 265 were assigned to be in the active investment advice group (“*Active Video*”), and 256 in the passive investment advice group (“*Passive Video*”).<sup>21</sup> The random assignment of people into the two types of investment advice treatment videos, combined with our classifications of Pro-Passive and Pro-Active prior beliefs, leads to a 2-by-2 division of our whole sample. [Table 1](#) Panel B reports the number of participants in each of these main treatment cells. Each cell is further divided into three sub-treatments, and their respective sample sizes are also presented.

To assess the quality of random assignment, we examine the observed differences between individuals assigned to watch the two types of videos in [Table 5](#). None of the differences are statistically significant, indicating that all co-variates are balanced between the two groups. Balance tests within subgroups defined by prior beliefs yield similar conclusions.<sup>22</sup>

Finally, we compare the demographic characteristics of our sample with those of both the Boston and U.S. populations. Several differences stand out. Our participants are younger, more often single, less likely to hold full-time jobs, and substantially more educated. Personal income levels are roughly comparable to those in the Boston area and higher than the national average. We present more details of the comparison in Appendix C. Importantly, within this highly educated sample, there remains substantial variation in both actual and self-perceived financial literacy, as discussed in the preceding sections.

[[Table 5](#) About Here]

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21. The video recorded by the two male advisors are watched by 101 and 161 participants respectively; the video recorded by the two female advisors are watched by 97 and 162 participants respectively.

22. See [Tables IA.4–IA.5](#). Although a few variables are not perfectly balanced within the sub-samples, our results remain consistent regardless of whether these imbalanced variables are included as controls.

### 3 Perception of Advice

#### 3.1 Differences in Advice Ratings Across Treatment Groups and Financial Literacy

We begin by examining whether the different treatments affect how the subjects evaluate the quality of the advice. The main outcome variable comes from the post-video survey asking: “In general, do you agree with what the advisor recommended?” People were required to choose from a Likert scale for these question, which ranges from 1 (strongly disagree/not very believable) to 9 (strongly agree/very believable). The mean rating is 6.44 and the standard deviation is 1.71 (see Table 2).<sup>23</sup>

Our baseline regression analysis follows an OLS specification:

$$Y_i = \alpha + \beta \text{Prior Belief \& Video Treatment Dummies}_i + \text{Advisor FE}_i + \varepsilon_i \quad (1)$$

The dependent variable  $Y_i$  represents participants’ evaluations of the advice in this section.<sup>24</sup> The main independent variables of interest are dummy variables representing the 2-by-2 treatment groups, categorized based on participants’ prior beliefs and the type of advice video they watched. We also estimate variations of this equation where the dummy variables represent specific subsets of the four treatment groups, such as those grouped by the type of advice or by whether the advice contradicts pre-existing beliefs. Importantly we include advisor fixed effects in all regressions, which allows us to single out the effect of the advice content from the characteristics of the advisor.  $\alpha$  is a constant and  $\varepsilon_i$  is an error term.<sup>25</sup>

Table 6 column 1 indicates that advice contradicting prior beliefs is rated lower (0.64 point higher on a 9-point scale), indicating that people employ existing beliefs when evaluating financial advice. Column 2 shows that, on average, participants perceive the passive advice as higher quality. These magnitudes are about one third of the standard deviation of the dependent variable. Further

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23. Similarly, we collected the subjects’ opinions on whether the advice was convincing, whether the advisor was likable, and whether they would return to the advisor in the video with their own money. Analyses of these other measures are discussed later.

24. The dependent variable is measured on a Likert scale, where the distances between categories may not be equal. Our focus is on directional effects rather than on the precise magnitudes of the treatment effects. Results are similar in sign, magnitude and significance when estimated using ordered logit models, consistent with prior evidence that when ordinal variables have many categories, OLS and response models yield similar conclusions (e.g., Ferrer-i-Carbonell and Frijters 2004).

25. We drop one of the advisor dummy in the advisor fixed effects, so the constant can be estimated.

evidence in [Table IA.6](#) demonstrates that individuals with stronger priors exhibit stronger reactions to financial advice: they respond more favorably to advice aligned with their priors and more negatively to advice opposed to the priors. These results further support the finding in column 2 of [Table 6](#), i.e. participants are consistent in their responses to financial advice based on the level of their prior beliefs.<sup>26</sup>

Columns 3-4 examine the effects of all four treatment groups. The regressions replace the treatment dummies with three of the groups and omit Pro-Active subjects watching the Active Video as the baseline group. Given the correlation between pro-passive beliefs and financial literacy, we control for the direct effects of financial literacy on the responses to both videos by including the interaction between the *High Literacy* dummy variable with the two types of videos in equation 2 below. *High Literacy* is an indicator for whether the *Knowledge Score* is six or above.<sup>27</sup> This ensures that the estimated effects of the 2-by-2 treatment groups are not simply driven by difference in financial literacy.

$$Y_i = \alpha + \beta \text{Prior Belief \& Video Treatment Dummies}_i + \eta \text{High Literacy}_i \times \text{Video Treatment Dummies}_i + \delta \text{Controls}_i + \text{Advisor FE}_i + \varepsilon_i \quad (2)$$

Estimation of this equation is presented in columns 3. Consistent with column 2 we observe that people agree less with advice that is opposite to their prior beliefs. Both pro-active individuals watching the passive video and those pro-passive watching the active video exhibit negative coefficients relative to the omitted group (pro-active individuals watching the active video). In contrast, pro-passive individuals watching passive video tend to give slightly higher ratings. There is also some asymmetry in the disagreement, with the pro-passive group showing particularly strong disagreement with the active advice video. Further, as shown by the coefficients on the interaction terms, people with high financial literacy are significantly less likely to agree with the active video.

26. The heterogeneity examined here focuses on the “first moment,” or the level of belief. In the next subsection, we explore the “second moment,” where we try to capture the certainty or confidence in these beliefs.

27. This classification results in two sub-samples (*High Literacy* and *Low Literacy*) that are almost equal in size. Moreover, 94% of the *High Literacy* subjects answered at least one “hard” question (as indicated in [Table 4](#)) correctly, and 48% answered both hard questions correctly in the financial literacy test, so the *High Literacy* dummy seems to correlate with a high degree of financial knowledge.

Nevertheless, the pro-passive group's low rating of the active video persists even after accounting for the potentially higher literacy level of the pro-passive participants.

Although including control variables is not strictly necessary in a randomized controlled experiment, we include participant characteristics as control variables in column 4 as they may improve the precision of our estimates. These control variables include continuous measures of actual and self-perceived financial literacy (ranging from 0 to 8 and 1 to 7, respectively), as well as measures of experience with the financial sector, such as indicators of having a retirement account, investing in stocks, having a financial advisor, and a rating of the degree of trust in financial institutions (1 to 7). Moreover, we include demographic variables, such as gender, age, whether they have a college degree and employment status. We find that the main coefficients change little when controls are introduced, confirming the effectiveness of our randomization, and some become more precisely estimated. The estimated constant is lower, as the covariates explain part of the outcome variable for the omitted group. The coefficients on the control variables (unreported) indicate a strong correlation between trusting financial institutions and agreeing with the advice.

[Table 6 About Here]

In columns 5 and 6, we split the sample by high and low financial literacy. Individuals with high literacy may be better positioned to assess the logic of the advice and its fit with the data which is either provided as part of the advice or informed by the individual's prior experiences. In contrast, those with low financial literacy may lack the ability to adequately evaluate the advice. The results indicate an important difference: The high-literacy group shows clear and distinct reactions across treatment groups. In contrast, the low-literacy group does not exhibit significant variation in responses. This finding suggests that less sophisticated investors may have difficulty evaluating financial advice, generally agreeing with any advice presented to them.

In column 7, we report tests for coefficient differences between the high- and low-literacy subsamples. The Wald tests show that the only significant difference arises in the treatment group where pro-passive individuals watched the active video. For individuals with pro-active priors who watched the passive video, there's no difference between the two subsamples, but the mechanisms are different: individuals with low financial literacy tend to find all advice persuasive, whereas those

with high literacy are especially receptive to passive advice.<sup>28</sup>

To mitigate concerns that participants may be reluctant to endorse advice that contradicts their prior beliefs, we also examine an alternative measure: whether they rate the advice as convincing (see [Table IA.7](#), which shows similar results to [Table 6](#)). Moreover, if participants only seek to look consistent, they would not have subsequently updated their beliefs or made portfolio choices following the advice.

In [Table IA.8](#), we further examine the roles of both advisor and advisee gender, with additional details provided in Appendix E. The observed gender effects are weak and may partly reflect idiosyncratic features of the specific actors used in our videos.

Moreover, the estimated treatment effects are almost identical across months during the experiment, possibly because of the relatively flat stock market during the period. Our results remain almost identical when month fixed effects are included in all regressions.

### 3.2 Role of Confidence

In [Table 7](#) we explore how confidence influences people's evaluation of financial advice. This analysis is particularly relevant when the narrative in the video contradicts one's prior belief, as confidence can then affect the relative weight given to prior beliefs versus the advice. In columns 1-3, we interact the indicator for advice contradicting priors with our measure of confidence, based on self-assessed financial knowledge, and examine the full, high-literacy, and low-literacy samples, respectively. The dependent variable is the rating on agreeing with the financial advice. The *Confidence* measure, as explained in [Section 2.2](#), is the residual of the self-assessment after accounting for true financial literacy, thus, it is uncorrelated with true financial literacy. The measure has a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one. The results indicate that when faced with advice that contradicts their prior beliefs, individuals with higher confidence are less likely to agree with the advice. This effect is especially pronounced among those with higher financial literacy.

In columns 4-6, we examine how confidence interacts with the treatment effects across the 2-by-2 groups. Within the high-literacy sub-sample, the coefficients on the interaction terms between the treatment groups and *Confidence* show relatively large coefficients, reinforcing that

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28. While sample sizes are limited, this asymmetry is consistent across subsequent belief updating and portfolio choice results, and remains similar when control variables are included.

financially literate and confident individuals tend to rate advice that contradicts their prior beliefs more negatively. However, these effects are not statistically significant at traditional levels. In contrast, for the low literacy group, confidence has little influence, which might suggest that they struggle to form clear evaluations of the advice they receive. These results also show that less financially literate but over-confident individuals (those who self-rank their knowledge higher than it actually is) are not particularly resistant to advice that challenges their prior beliefs.

To complement the survey-based measure of *Confidence*, we also examine investment experience, proxied by whether an individual holds a retirement account. While experience may correlate with or even shape literacy and confidence, it represents a distinct dimension of financial sophistication. Like confidence in one's financial knowledge, experience can reinforce existing beliefs and conviction in one's own judgments related to investment strategies, but different from *Confidence*, it is an objective characteristic rather than self-assessment. We find that experience with retirement accounts is associated with greater disagreement with financial advice that challenges one's priors and with less belief updating in the direction of the advice video. These results are summarized in [Table IA.9](#) and discussed in greater detail in Appendix E.

### **3.3 Ratings of “Advisors”**

While we focus on how people respond to the financial advice content, we also examine whether they form assessments of the characteristics of the advisor featured in the video. [Table 8](#) shows the effects of the treatment groups on whether the subject finds the advisor to be likable (columns 1-3), and whether they would return to the advisor with their own money (columns 4-6). Both dependent variables are again on a 9-point Likert scale.

The estimated treatment effects on the advisor's likability are small and insignificant. In addition, there is no difference between the high- and low-Literacy sub-samples. This suggests experiment participants did not mix the content of the advice with the personality traits of the advisor, This suggests that experiment participants did not confuse the content of the advice with the advisor's personality traits, indicating that they evaluated the advice content in an objective, arms-length context.<sup>29</sup>

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<sup>29</sup>. We also see no effect when using the subject's rating of the advisor's competency as the dependent variable. Those results are omitted.

When examining whether subjects would return to the advisor with their own money - a proxy for their “trust” in the advisor - we find that financially literate individuals are less likely to return to the advisor recommending the active strategy, consistent with their rating of the advice. Another finding is that although pro-passive subjects rated the passive advice significantly higher compared with the reference group, they are not more likely to return to the advisor who recommends the passive strategy. If generalized, this result implies that recommending passive funds is unlikely to be profitable for financial advisors.

## 4 Update of Investment Beliefs

### 4.1 Shifts in the Pro-Passive Score

We now examine the changes in people’s beliefs about active versus passive management following the video treatment, starting with the *Pro-Passive Score*. From the post-video ranking question (identical to the pre-video question), we create a *Posterior Pro-Passive Score*, which again ranges from -4 (strongly pro-active) to +4 (strongly pro-passive), and compute the difference between the posterior and the prior. A positive change means a subject’s belief becomes more pro-passive, and vice versa.<sup>30</sup>

Figure 3 offers graphical evidence of how beliefs shifted. Panel A plots the levels of the posterior beliefs, showing a marked divergence among people who shared the same prior but watched different videos: beliefs shifted toward the strategy recommended in the corresponding video. The asymmetric effects of the two types of videos are also evident: after the passive video, a large portion of the subjects adopted a strong pro-passive belief. In contrast, those who watched the active video exhibited more varied posterior beliefs.

Panel B plots the distributions of changes in pro-passive scores. In the top row, representing treatment groups where the advice video aligned with people’s prior beliefs, changes cluster around zero, implying that beliefs respond little when financial advice confirms existing views. This result is consistent with the prediction of Schwartzstein and Sunderam (2021). The bottom row indicates

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30. Note that the constructed belief scores already account for the ordinal nature of participants’ rankings. Specifically, the *Pro-Passive Score* is based on whether each component is among the top three or bottom three out of seven components. This measure coarsens the underlying ordinal rankings into an index. Both the belief scores and the changes are assumed to be approximately continuous in the OLS regressions.

that when the advice in the video contradicts prior beliefs, both videos generally shift beliefs toward the video's narrative, with the passive video having a stronger impact.

[Figure 3 About Here]

Figure 4 illustrates the changes in beliefs among participants with different financial literacy levels, with Panel A and Panel B displaying high- and low-literacy sub-samples, respectively. As discussed earlier, individuals with high financial literacy may update their beliefs based on their evaluation of the advice. In contrast, those with lower financial literacy might be more easily influenced by the advice due to weaker prior beliefs or limited external knowledge, or they might disregard the advice altogether, either because of difficulty understanding it or overconfidence in their own judgment.

In Panel A, the bottom two charts reveal that high-literacy individuals responded differently to the two types of videos. After watching the passive video, high-literacy participants originally inclined toward active management shifted their beliefs by +2.8 toward a pro-passive stance (bottom left). Conversely, those with pro-passive beliefs who watched the active advice video shifted only 0.85 toward pro-active (bottom right). 30% of the group had zero change in their beliefs.

Panel B, particularly the bottom row, reveals that the low-literacy subjects are strongly swayed by both types of advice. The mean shifts in beliefs after the passive and active advice are +3.3 and -2.3, respectively, indicating a high and almost unconditional receptivity to advice. This is consistent with the earlier result that this group rates advice similarly regardless of its content and their prior beliefs. This finding contrasts with prior literature, which suggests that low-literacy individuals may be less inclined to adopt financial advice. However, at the same time, their lack of financial sophistication puts them at a disadvantage when it comes to discerning the quality of advice.

[Figure 4 About Here]

Table 9 presents the regression analysis. The dependent variable is the change in the four-point *Pro-Passive Score*. The model in column 1 regresses this dependent variable on an indicator *Video Direction* ( $\pm 1$ ) that equals +1 for the passive video and -1 for the active video. The coefficient indicates the magnitude of belief shifts toward the video's suggested investment strategy, showing

a shift of 1.34 points on a scale of -4 to +4. This is an average effect without conditioning on the investor's prior or the type of advice. In column 2, we interact *Video Direction* with the participants' confidence in their own financial knowledge, measured as the residual of the self-assessed financial knowledge after accounting for true financial literacy. The result indicates that individuals whose confidence is one standard deviation above the mean update their beliefs by 15% ( $= 0.205/1.343$ ) less according to the advice, compared with individuals with average confidence.

We then estimate Equation (1) in column 3. The group with pro-active priors who watched the active video is omitted.<sup>31</sup> Relative to this reference group, those with pro-active priors who viewed the passive video show a significant 3.1-point shift toward pro-passive beliefs. The coefficient for the pro-passive group who watched the passive video group is much smaller, suggesting less updating when the advice confirms prior beliefs. However, it is significantly different from zero, implying that the pro-passive and pro-active groups' beliefs became more polarized after watching videos that support their existing views. For individuals with pro-passive priors who watched the active video, the coefficient shows a 1.6-point shift toward pro-active beliefs, which is less than the effect of passive advice on the pro-active group. We then interact the treatment group dummies with *Confidence* in column 4. The coefficients on these interaction terms confirm that the more confident individuals are less likely to revise beliefs in the direction of the video. However, this effect is absent among the pro-passive individuals who watched the active video. As indicated by [Figure 4](#) (to be confirmed by columns 3-6 of the current table), the treatment effect of that group is mainly driven by the low-literacy individuals and [Table 6](#) indicates confidence has little impact for them.

[Table 9 About Here]

We break down the sample by the level of financial literacy in columns 3-6. The main differences between the two sub-samples based on financial literacy are the coefficients for the *Pro-Passive, Active Video* treatment group. Column 3 shows that the active video does not influence high-literacy individuals with pro-passive beliefs, but column 5 shows that it substantially changes the beliefs of low-literacy participants holding similar initial views. The magnitudes of the coefficients 3.03

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31. Equation (2) yields very similar estimates, and the inclusion of control variables for participant characteristics has minimal impact on the results. To conserve space, we report only the baseline estimates. We obtain a small and insignificant effect on the treatment group of Pro-Active, watching the Active Video, if the regression includes all four treatment group dummies and suppress the constant term.

and 2.57 are not statistically different. Thus, we fail to reject the null hypothesis that low-literacy individuals respond equally to the two types of financial advice.

We allow the treatment effects to vary by confidence in columns 4 and 6. Interestingly, although financially literate individuals generally responded positively to the passive video, even if they held pro-active prior beliefs, the coefficient on the interaction term of *Pro-Active, Passive Video* with *Confidence* is significantly negative. This implies that confidence reduces the openness of these individuals to the passive advice. This effect may stem from their more well-defined prior beliefs or from a sense of greater capability among confident individuals to successfully engage in active strategies.

In [Table 10](#) we present the same analysis using the level of the posterior *Pro-Passive Score* as the dependent variable. The main conclusions remain the same: both prior beliefs and financial advice significantly impact posterior beliefs. When the financial advice aligns with pre-existing beliefs, it leads to the most extreme ex-post beliefs. In contrast, those who change their views in response to opposing advice adopt more moderate beliefs.

In [Table IA.10](#), we present several robustness tests of belief shifts, with the motivations outlined in [Section 2.1](#) and the measure construction detailed in [Appendix B](#). All alternative measures show similar results. We further verified that the observed changes in belief scores are not driven by a single belief component. Instead, participants' rankings of all investment strategy components (except for 'selling poorly performed funds') shifted in ways that align with the overall belief changes.

## **4.2 Shifts in Beliefs about Beating the Market**

To mitigate the possibility that participants might change their rankings of investment strategy components based on what they thought the experimenters expected, we included another question in the post-video questionnaire asking whether participants believed it was possible to consistently outperform the market. This aspect of belief did not factor into the rankings used to construct the pro-passive score, but it plays a crucial role in how investors value active and passive strategies: Those who believe in a higher likelihood of beating the market are typically more inclined to prefer active management.

The question asked respondents to rate their agreement with the statement, “It is possible to always beat the market,” on a scale of 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). Analysis of answers to this question is presented in [Table 11](#). The result from the full sample shown in column 1 indicates that participants with a pro-passive prior who watched the passive video were least likely to believe in the potential to outperform the market, while the omitted group (pro-active individuals who watched the active video) expressed the strongest convictions in beating the market. The beliefs of the other two groups were similar and leaning slightly towards skepticism about beating the market. Column 2 examines the interactions between treatment dummies and our confidence measure and finds that confidence does not significantly influence the treatment effects.

Columns 3-4, focusing on participants with high financial literacy, show large negative coefficients on *Pro-Passive, Active Video*, and these coefficients are not significantly different from those on *Pro-Passive, Passive Video*. These results suggest that the active video does not significantly alter the beliefs of pro-passive participants with high literacy, who consistently believed that beating the market was unlikely. In contrast, columns 5-6, focusing on low-literacy participants, reveal a small and insignificant coefficient on *Pro-Passive, Active Video*, indicating that their beliefs after the viewing the active video were similar to those of the omitted group *Pro-Active, Active Video*. This shift suggests that even initially pro-passive participants adopted the belief on the possibility to beat the market, aligning their views with those who were pro-active from the start. These results support the conclusions in Gruber (1996) and French (2008) that the clientele of actively managed funds may be influenced by financial advisors or marketing materials to believe in stock-picking.

## 5 Portfolio Choice

In the post-video questionnaire, participants were asked to select one from six portfolios as if they were to invest their own money. They were informed that the \$3,000 prize money they might win would be invested in their chosen portfolio. Each portfolio’s historical annual returns were displayed in a bar chart, with three portfolios labeled as actively managed and the other three as passive. The fund names were not provided. These portfolios displayed different risk-return profiles to appeal to various risk preferences. Each passive portfolio was chosen to match the average historical returns of a corresponding actively managed portfolio after fees.

Figure 5 presents participants' portfolio selections and highlights the influence of both prior beliefs and financial advice. Those with pro-active priors were more likely to choose an actively managed fund compared to those with pro-passive priors (70% vs. 49% among those who watched the active advice, and 94% vs. 81% among those who watched the passive advice). In addition, the passive video increased the likelihood of selecting a passive index fund (81% vs. 25% for those with pro-active priors and 94% vs. 49% for those with pro-passive priors). Interestingly, despite the combination of a pro-active prior belief and the active video fostering the strongest pro-active beliefs, a quarter of that group still chose a passive fund.

[Figure 5 About Here]

Figure 6 breaks down the fund choices by financial literacy levels. While the main patterns of Figure 5 remain, we note that when the advice and the prior belief conflicted (the middle two bars), individuals with high financial literacy were more likely to choose a passive fund than those with low literacy. This observation reinforces the earlier findings regarding their post-treatment beliefs.

[Figure 6 About Here]

Table 12 estimates the effects of the treatment groups in a linear probability model.<sup>32</sup> The dependent variable equals one (zero) if the subject chose a passive index fund (actively managed fund). Subjects who replied "Do not want to answer" are dropped from this regression analysis. The treatment effects mirror the patterns in Table 10, suggesting that portfolio choices are generally consistent with post-treatment beliefs. Furthermore, priors appear to have less influence than the advice on portfolio choices. For example, column 1 suggests that watching the passive video increases the likelihood of choosing a passive fund by 58% (0.576) for people with pro-active priors and by 47% (0.705-0.237) for those with pro-passive priors. In contrast, the influence of prior beliefs is much smaller, with effects of 24% (0.237) and 13% (0.705-0.576) under the active and passive video treatments, respectively. Column 2 shows very similar estimates when the treatment groups are interacted with *Confidence*, where the main coefficients represent the treatment effects for individuals with average confidence. The interactive effects with confidence are small and statistically insignificant in the full sample.

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32. The results remain similar with a Probit model.

We then divide the sample by high- and low financial literacy. Columns 3 and 5 reveal distinct patterns. Among financially sophisticated individuals (column 3), the passive video has a strong influence, leading to similar portfolio selections regardless of prior beliefs. The difference between the first two groups *Pro-Active, Passive Video* and *Pro-Passive, Passive Video* is statistically insignificant. However, among the financially unsophisticated group (column 5 reveals that for the financially unsophisticated people, the effect of priors is undone after participants see the active video. Specifically, the *Pro-Passive, Active Video* group is statistically indistinguishable from the omitted *Pro-Active, Active Video* group, while the first two groups (*Pro-Active, Passive Video* and *Pro-Passive, Passive Video*) remain significantly different (p-value < 0.01).

Columns 4 and 6 examine the effect of confidence and uncover a few nuanced findings. Among financially literate individuals, higher confidence makes them more open to the narrative of active management. This is reflected in the negative coefficients on the interaction terms with *Confidence*, indicating that all else equal, more confident (high-literacy) individuals are more likely to select an actively managed fund. In contrast, among the low-literacy sub-sample, the interaction terms with confidence are positive, and statistically significant for the groups with pro-passive priors. This suggests that while low-literacy individuals are influenced by both types of advice, those with more confidence in pro-passive priors are more likely to select a passive fund. Thus, in this sub-sample, confidence appears to measure the strengths of prior beliefs.

[Table 12 About Here]

## 6 Perceived Conflict of Interest

In this final section, we analyze the sub-treatment groups that provide different information about advisor compensation, as outlined in Table 1. We study whether the compensation types affect people's perceptions of advice quality and the impact of the advice on beliefs. Specifically we estimate effects of dummy variables for two sub-treatments – flat fee and commission – while the omitted category merges the groups that provide no compensation information and those that skip both the compensation information and the overview of the two types of funds. As no significant differences were found between those two groups, we combine them into a single baseline group to simplify comparisons.

Table 13 columns 1-3 examine the rating of agreement with the advice as the dependent variable. We regress this variable on the stated compensation types while controlling for the primary 2-by-2 treatments and participant characteristics.<sup>33</sup> Results are shown for the full sample as well as sub-samples segmented by financial literacy levels. Across the columns we consistently find positive coefficients for *Flat Fee* conditional on the advice content and people's prior beliefs. This suggests that advice from incentive-aligned advisors is perceived as higher quality compared to the baseline. On average, advice from flat-fee advisors is rated 0.55 point higher than advice from commission-based advisors.

When we break down the effects by financial literacy in columns 2 and 3, we find that although both groups value flat-fee compensated advisors, the difference between flat-fee and commission is larger and only statistically significant for the low literacy group. Column 2 reaffirms that individuals with high literacy assess advice based on its content and how well it aligns with their prior beliefs. In contrast, column 3 indicates that low literacy participants primarily evaluate advice based on the advisor's compensation. These imply that individuals lacking financial literacy can still recognize incentives. Moreover, because they may lack the expertise to assess advice content, low literacy individuals place greater weight on incentives to gauge advice quality.

In columns 4-6, we test whether people are more likely to update their beliefs based on financial advice when it is perceived to be free of conflicts of interest. In column 4 we regress the dependent variable on an indicator (*Video Direction* =  $\pm 1$ ) that represents the direction of the video: +1 for the passive advice video and -1 for the active advice video. The coefficient estimates the magnitude of belief shift in the direction of the video. We further interact this variable with different types of advisor compensation.

The results in column 4 suggest that, on average, participants update their beliefs by 1.37 points toward the recommended strategy in the video. Point estimates suggest that this effect increases to 1.7 points when the advisor in the video discloses flat fee compensation, implying minimal conflict of interest. In contrast, the magnitude shrinks to 0.94 when the advice is offered by a commission-based advisor. The difference between the effects of the flat-fee and commission sub-treatments is 0.77 points, which is statistically significant with a p-value less than 0.01. Columns

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33. Including or excluding controls for the main treatment groups and/or participant characteristics has little impact on the results.

5 and 6 indicate similar results within the high-literacy and low-literacy sub-samples, with the effects being more pronounced among financially less literate individuals.

[Table 13 About Here]

## 7 Conclusion

This paper investigates the demand side of financial advice by setting up a randomized controlled experiment that focuses on advice that recommends either active or passive investment strategies. The experiment captures participants' prior beliefs and randomly assigns them to receive either active or passive advice.

We first show that participants, especially those with lower financial literacy, are receptive to financial advice and their posterior beliefs move in the direction of the advice they received. However, there are significant differences in the type of advice that people with high versus low financial literacy are willing to accept. Participants with high financial literacy are tend to update their beliefs strongly in response to passive advice, but not to active advice, and rate active advice very poorly. In contrast, people with low financial literacy are similarly affected by passive and active advice, even independent of their priors.

These results suggest that more informed and financially sophisticated consumers are looking for specific advice that aligns with the knowledge that they have acquired and they are more confident in their own knowledge. In contrast, less financially sophisticated investors seem to be more easily swayed by any advice they receive, which could make them also more susceptible to bad advice. Our results also suggest that advisors are not uniformly constrained in the advice they can provide, and to cater to their clients "bad" priors. We see that especially less sophisticated customers are open to advice, while more sophisticated consumers might be looking for specific advice that aligns with their prior. This is an important finding since it highlights how demand side considerations can shape the supply side.<sup>34</sup>

Our findings also show that subjects on average understand the importance for advisors to have well aligned financial incentives. Interestingly, we find that people with lower financial literacy,

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<sup>34</sup>. It is important to keep in mind that the priors of our participants were shaped within the US market where passive investing is already widely known.

tend to be more sensitive to incentive misalignment and discount any type of advice more heavily, if the advisor does not have well aligned incentives. This might suggest that these individuals are aware of their limited ability to evaluate the quality of the advice.


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
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**Figure 1: Distribution of Prior Beliefs and Financial Literacy**


Panel (a) plots the distribution of the pre-video *Pro-Passive 4-Point Score* ranging from -4 to 4. This score is calculated based on participants' rankings of seven investment strategy components. Starting at zero, 1 point is added if *Diversification* is in the top three components and 1 point is subtracted if it is in the bottom three. The same process is applied to *Minimizing Fees*. Additionally, 1 point is added if *Picking Good Stocks* is in the bottom three and 1 point is subtracted if it is in the top three, with the same steps for *Timing the Market*. Panel (b) shows the distribution of the *Knowledge Score*, which counts the correct answers to eight financial literacy questions. Participants whose *Pro-Passive Score* is one or above are classified as pro-passive, indicated by the blue bars. Participants whose *Pro-Passive Score* is zero or below are classified as pro-active and indicated by the green bars.



**Figure 2: Distribution of Self-Assessed Financial Knowledge**

This figure illustrates the distribution of participants' self-assessed financial knowledge levels across different actual financial literacy scores. The x-axis represents the *Knowledge Score*, ranging from 0 to 8, indicating the number of correctly answered questions in the 8-question financial literacy test. This score reflects the participants' actual financial literacy. The y-axis shows the *Self-Assessed Financial Knowledge* levels, representing how participants perceive their own financial knowledge on a scale of 1 to 7.

(a) Posterior Pro-Passive Score



(b) Change in Pro-Passive Score





Figure 3: **Posterior Beliefs and Changes in Beliefs about Investment Strategy**

Panel A plots the distributions of the post-video *Pro-Passive Scores* for the two-by-two treatment groups. Panel B plots the changes in the *Pro-Passive Scores* from before to after the video treatment. The posterior scores range from -4 (strongly pro-active) to +4 (strongly pro-passive). The changes range from -8 to +8.

(a) High Literacy Sub-Sample



(b) Low Literacy Sub-Sample






Figure 4: **Changes in Beliefs about Investment Strategy by Financial Literacy**

Panel A plots distributions of the changes in the *Pro-Passive Scores* from before to after the video treatment for the two-by-two treatment groups for the sub-sample of high-literacy subjects whose knowledge score is 6 or above out of 8. Panel B plots the changes for the sub-sample of low-literacy subjects whose knowledge score is below 6. The changes of beliefs range from -8 to +8.



**Figure 5: Choice of Fund: Full Sample**

This figure shows by the four treatment groups the fractions of subjects choosing an index fund, an actively managed fund, or answering “Do not want to answer” in the post-video portfolio choice question.



**Figure 6: Choice of Fund: by Financial Literacy**

Panels (a) and (b) show in sub-samples of high- and low financial literacy by the four treatment groups the fractions of subjects choosing an index fund, an actively managed fund, or answering “Do not want to answer” in the portfolio choice question post-video. The high-literacy sub-sample contains subjects who correctly answered at least 6 of the financial knowledge questions. The low-literacy sub-sample contains those who answered 5 or fewer questions correctly.

**Table 1: Structure and Size of Treatment Arms**

Panel A outlines the structure of the main investment strategy treatment arms and the sub-treatments related to advisor compensation in our financial advice videos. A check mark indicates that the video includes a certain content, whereas a cross mark indicates its absence. Panel B reports the numbers of participants in each of the main 2-by-2 treatment cells and each sub-treatment cell.

<b>Panel A: Video Structure</b>		<b>Section 1</b>	<b>Section 2</b>	<b>Section 3</b>	<b>Section 4</b>	
		Self-intro	Compensation	Basics of strategies	Recommend one strategy	Reasons for recommendation
<b>Active Video</b>	Flat Fee	✓	Flat	✓	Active	✓
	Commission	✓	Commission	✓	Active	✓
	Skip Fee	✓	×	✓*	Active	✓
<b>Passive Video</b>	Flat Fee	✓	Flat	✓	Passive	✓
	Commission	✓	Commission	✓	Passive	✓
	Skip Fee	✓	×	✓*	Passive	✓

**Panel B: Size of Treatment Cells**

	Total	Active Video	Index Video
<b>Pro-Active Prior</b>	<b>253</b>	<b>125</b>	<b>128</b>
Commission	59	30	29
Flat	69	35	34
Skip fee	125	60	65
<b>Pro-Index Prior</b>	<b>248</b>	<b>128</b>	<b>120</b>
Commission	64	32	32
Flat	59	31	28
Skip fee	125	65	60

\* Some “skip fee” videos also omit section 2 (basics of strategies). Our analysis shows skipping section 2 has no effect, so we have merged these treatments with the rest of the “skip fee” group.

**Table 2: Descriptive Statistics**

This table reports the summary statistics of participants' answers to the pre- and post-video questionnaires. The pre-video ranking question on investment strategies is about ranking the seven randomly ordered potential components of an investment strategy in the order of importance. 1 indicates the least important, and 7 indicates the most important. *Knowledge Score* is the number of correct answers out of the 8 financial literacy questions. *Self-Assessed Financial Knowledge* is on a scale of 1 (not knowledgeable) to 7 (very knowledgeable). *Self-Ranked Pct. Financial Knowledge* is a subject's rank of their investment knowledge as a percentile among individual investors in the U.S. and is on a scale of 0 (bottom) to 1 (top). Post-video perception of advice includes rating questions about the quality of the advice and the advisor on a scale of 1 (lowest) to 9 (highest). *Choosing Index Fund* equals one if a participant chooses an index fund in the post-video portfolio choice question.

<b>Summary Statistics</b>	N	mean	s.d.	min	p25	p50	p75	max
<b><i>Pre-video ranking question on investment strategies</i></b>								
Diversification	501	5.07	1.84	1	4	5	7	7
Picking Good Stocks	501	4.81	1.70	1	4	5	6	7
Picking Good Fund Managers	501	4.35	1.89	1	3	4	6	7
Minimizing Risk	501	4.33	1.77	1	3	4	6	7
Minimizing Fees	501	4.05	1.84	1	2	4	6	7
Timing the Market	501	3.29	1.84	1	2	3	5	7
Selling Poorly Performed Funds	501	2.10	1.45	1	1	2	3	7
<b><i>Pre-video knowledge score and confidence</i></b>								
Knowledge Score	501	4.91	2.08	0	3	5	6	8
Self-Assessed Financial Knowledge	500	3.74	1.56	1	3	4	5	7
Self-Ranked Pct. Financial Knowledge	436	0.44	0.23	0	0.25	0.45	0.61	0.98
<b><i>Post-video perception of advice</i></b>								
Agree with Recommendation	500	6.44	1.71	1	5	7	7	9
Advice Convincing	501	6.45	1.78	1	5	7	7	9
Advisor Likable	501	6.59	1.64	1	6	7	8	9
Advisor Competent	498	6.92	1.45	1	6	7	8	9
Advisor Convincing	501	6.44	1.76	1	5	7	7	9
Will Return	499	5.47	1.94	1	4	5	7	9
<b><i>Post-video portfolio choice</i></b>								
Choosing Index Fund	484	0.64	0.48	0	0	1	1	1

**Table 3: Pearson Correlations**

This table shows the Pearson correlation coefficients between *Knowledge Score*, *Self-Assessed Financial Knowledge*, *Confidence* and the pre-video rankings of components of investment strategies. *Knowledge Score* is the number of correct answers out of the 8 financial literacy questions. *Self-Assessed Financial Knowledge* is the participant's self-rating on a scale of 1 (not knowledgeable) to 7 (very knowledgeable). *Confidence* is the residual after regressing the *Self-Assessed Financial Knowledge* on the *Knowledge Score* and normalized to have a standard deviation of one. p-values are reported in parentheses.

	Knowledge Score	Self-Assessed Knowledge	Confidence	Diversification	Picking Good Stocks	Picking Good Fund Managers	Minimizing Risk	Minimizing Fees	Timing the Market
Knowledge Score	1.000								
Self-Assessed Financial Knowledge	0.444 (0.000)	1.000 -							
Confidence	0.000 (1.000)	0.896 (0.000)	1.000 -						
Diversification	0.340 (0.000)	0.186 (0.000)	0.039 (0.382)	1.000 -					
Picking Good Stocks	-0.069 (0.122)	0.022 (0.627)	0.058 (0.195)	-0.288 (0.000)	1.000 -				
Picking Good Fund Managers	0.079 (0.077)	-0.052 (0.242)	-0.097 (0.030)	-0.105 (0.018)	-0.084 (0.060)	1.000 -			
Minimizing Risk	-0.087 (0.051)	-0.040 (0.372)	-0.002 (0.969)	-0.200 (0.000)	-0.247 (0.000)	-0.232 (0.000)	1.000 -		
Minimizing Fees	0.040 (0.375)	0.016 (0.718)	-0.002 (0.967)	-0.064 (0.156)	-0.335 (0.000)	-0.265 (0.000)	0.081 (0.071)	1.000 -	
Timing the Market	-0.108 (0.016)	-0.047 (0.291)	0.001 (0.990)	-0.198 (0.000)	0.107 (0.017)	-0.199 (0.000)	-0.283 (0.000)	-0.370 (0.000)	1.000 -
Selling Poorly Performed Funds	-0.261 (0.000)	-0.105 (0.019)	0.012 (0.787)	-0.220 (0.000)	-0.106 (0.017)	-0.199 (0.000)	-0.117 (0.009)	-0.081 (0.072)	-0.072 (0.108)

**Table 4: Knowledge Questions Consistency**

<b>Panel A: Knowledge Questions</b>	
Q1:	Imagine you invested \$1,000 in a stock two years ago. The stock's price declined 40% the first year and rose 40% the next year. As a result, you have: Lost money / Made money / Just broken even / Do not know / Do not want to answer.
Q2:	Let's say you have 200 dollars in a savings account. The account earns 10 percent interest per year. How much would you have in the account at the end of two years? \$210 / \$220 / \$240 / \$242 / \$264 / Do not know / Do not want to answer.
Q3:	Assume a friend inherits \$10,000 today and his sibling inherits \$10,000 3 years from now. Who is richer because of the inheritance? My friend / His sibling / They are equally rich / Do not know / Do not want to answer.
Q4:	Considering a long time period (for example 30 years), which asset has historically generated the highest return? Savings accounts / Bonds / Stocks / Do not know / Do not want to answer.
Q5:	Do you think that the following statement is true or false? "Buying a single company stock usually provides a safer return than a stock mutual fund." True / False / Do not know / Do not want to answer.
Q6:	If the interest rate rises, what should happen to bond prices? They should Rise / Fall / Stay the same / None of the above / Do not know / Do not want to answer.
Q7:	If a mutual fund charges management fees of 2% per year this means that: As an investor you receive only 98% of the returns of the fund every year / 2% of the current value of your investment in the fund is paid in management fees every year / Do not know / Do not want to answer.
Q8:	Which of the following statements is correct? If somebody buys the stock of firm B in the stock market: He owns a part of firm B / He has lent money to firm B / He is liable for firm B's debts / None of the above / Do not know / Do not want to answer.

<b>Panel B: Summary Statistics of the Correctness of Knowledge Questions</b>				
	N	Mean	Level	Frac. "I do not know"
Q1 (percentage changes)	501	0.65	Medium	2.79%
Q2 (compound interest)	501	0.63	Medium	1.20%
Q3 (time value of money)	501	0.65	Medium	8.78%
Q4 (long horizon returns)	501	0.52	Hard	17.17%
Q5 (risk diversification)	501	0.71	Medium	23.55%
Q6 (interest rate and bond price)	501	0.34	Hard	34.53%
Q7 (mutual fund fees)	501	0.60	Medium	21.56%
Q8 (meaning of owning stocks)	501	0.80	Easy	7.39%

<b>Panel C: Consistency</b>			
	Question Level	Sub-sample right %	Whole sample right %
<b><i>For people who answered the two hard questions right</i></b>			
Q8 (meaning of owning stocks)	Easy	87.82%	80.04%
Q5 (risk diversification)	Medium	83.33%	71.06%
Q7 (mutual fund fees)	Medium	60.08%	60.08%
Q1 (percentage changes)	Medium	75.64%	65.27%
Q2 (compound interest)	Medium	71.15%	62.67%
Q3 (time value of money)	Medium	71.47%	65.47%
<b><i>For people who answered at least three of the medium level questions right</i></b>			
Q8 (meaning of owning stocks)	Easy	89.14%	80.04%
<b><i>For people who answered the easy questions right but at least three medium level questions wrong</i></b>			
Q4 (long horizon returns)	Hard	31.46%	52.30%
Q6 (interest rate and bond price)	Hard	20.22%	34.13%

**Table 5: Balance Table**

This table reports results of the balance tests on subject characteristics and demographics between the groups watching the active and passive videos. Columns (1) and (2) report the means (standard deviations) for each group, respectively. Column 3 reports the p-values from two-sample t-tests on the differences of means between active and passive video treatment groups. *Knowledge Score* is the number of correct answers out of the 8 financial literacy questions. *Self-Assessed Financial Knowledge* is the participant's self-rating on a scale of 1 (not knowledgeable) to 7 (very knowledgeable). *Self-Ranked Pct. Financial Knowledge* is a subject's self-rank of their investment knowledge as a percentile among individual investors in the U.S. and is on a scale of 0 (bottom) to 1 (top). *Use Financial Advisor* equals one if the participant indicates they obtain financial advice from an advisor, financial planner, or accountant. *Willingness to Take Investment Risk*, *Trust Financial Institutions*, and *Trust People* are participants' answers ranging from 1 (low) to 7 (high). *Pro-Active* equals one if the prior *Pro-Passive Score* is zero or below.

	(1) Active Video	(2) Passive Video	(3) p-value (1)-(2)
Gender (1=Male)	0.50 (0.50)	0.56 (0.50)	0.16
Age	38.25 (11.78)	39.84 (12.82)	0.15
Marital Status (1=Married)	0.27 (0.45)	0.30 (0.46)	0.53
Country of Birth (1=US)	0.83 (0.38)	0.85 (0.36)	0.52
Citizenship (1=US)	0.92 (0.28)	0.94 (0.23)	0.24
Have a Full-Time Job	0.45 (0.50)	0.45 (0.50)	0.88
Unemployed	0.08 (0.28)	0.06 (0.24)	0.34
Income under 35k	0.43 (0.50)	0.43 (0.50)	0.92
Save at Least 10% of Income	0.36 (0.48)	0.35 (0.48)	0.91
Have Retirement Account	0.53 (0.50)	0.60 (0.49)	0.13
Invest in Stocks	0.32 (0.47)	0.29 (0.45)	0.41
College Degree	0.81 (0.40)	0.83 (0.38)	0.56
Knowledge Score (0-8)	4.88 (2.08)	4.94 (2.10)	0.76
Self-Assessed Financial Knowledge (1-7)	3.76 (1.62)	3.72 (1.50)	0.75
Self-Ranked Pct. Financial Knowledge (0-1)	0.45 (0.23)	0.43 (0.24)	0.34
Use Financial Advisor	0.21 (0.41)	0.22 (0.41)	0.82
Willingness to Take Investment Risk (1-7)	4.09 (1.44)	4.04 (1.46)	0.72
Trust Financial Institutions (1-7)	3.74 (1.47)	3.64 (1.55)	0.43
Trust People (1-7)	3.54 (1.65)	3.48 (1.62)	0.69
Prior Belief (1=Pro-Active)	0.49 (0.50)	0.52 (0.50)	0.62
Observations	253	248	501

**Table 6: Evaluation of Advice Quality**

The dependent variable is the subject's rating of how much they agree with the recommendation of the video on a scale of 1 to 9. *Contradict* equals 1 if the recommendation in the video contradicts a subject's prior belief. *Passive Video* (*Active Video*) indicates if the subject watched the video recommending the passive (active) strategy. *Pro-Active* equals 1 if the subject's pre-video four-point score was less than or equal to zero. *Pro-Passive* equals 1 if the subject's pre-video four-point score was greater than zero. *High Literacy* equals 1 if the subject correctly answered at least 6 of the financial knowledge questions and 0 if they answered 5 or fewer questions correctly. *High Lit* and *Low Lit* indicate the sub-samples where *High Literacy* equals one and zero, respectively. Control variables, whose coefficients are omitted, include knowledge score, self-assessed financial knowledge, whether the subject has a retirement account, invests in stocks, uses a financial advisor, rating of how much they trust financial institutions, gender, age, college education, and employment status. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. Coefficients significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels are marked with \*, \*\*, and \*\*\*, respectively. Differences in coefficients across subsamples are reported in column 7 and standard errors are calculated from Wald tests.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	
	Agree with Recommendation							
	9-Point Likert scale: 1(Strongly Disagree) ~ 9(Strongly Agree)							
	Full Sample					High Literacy	Low Literacy	Diff. (5)-(6)
<i>Contradict</i>	-0.641*** (0.149)							
<i>Passive Video</i>		0.639*** (0.149)						
<i>Pro-Active, Passive Video</i>			-0.252 (0.216)	-0.370* (0.210)	-0.177 (0.346)	0.062 (0.231)		-0.239 (0.410)
<i>Pro-Passive, Passive Video</i>			0.335 (0.219)	0.262 (0.218)	0.898*** (0.331)	0.320 (0.242)		0.578 (0.405)
<i>Pro-Passive, Active Video</i>			-0.610*** (0.219)	-0.573*** (0.213)	-1.075*** (0.371)	-0.231 (0.253)		-0.844* (0.443)
<i>High Literacy × Passive Video</i>			-0.175 (0.191)	0.033 (0.287)				
<i>High Literacy × Active Video</i>			-0.799*** (0.228)	-0.750*** (0.282)				
<i>Constant</i>	6.765*** (0.098)	6.122*** (0.115)	6.807*** (0.154)	4.751*** (0.928)	6.282*** (0.267)	6.629*** (0.161)		
Advisor F.E.	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes		
Control Variables	No	No	No	Yes	No	No		
Observations	500	500	500	493	231	269		
R-squared	0.051	0.051	0.115	0.184	0.171	0.046		

**Table 7: Role of Confidence in Advice Evaluation**

The dependent variable is the subject's rating of how much they agree with the recommendation of the video on a scale of 1 to 9. *Contradict* equals 1 if the recommendation in the video contradicts a subject's prior belief. *Passive Video (Active Video)* indicates if the subject watched the video recommending the passive (active) strategy. *Pro-Active* equals 1 if the subject's pre-video four-point score was less than or equal to zero. *Pro-Passive* equals 1 if the subject's pre-video four-point score was greater than zero. *Confidence* is the residual after regressing the *Self-Assessed Financial Knowledge* on the *Knowledge Score* and normalized to have a standard deviation of one. *High Literacy* equals 1 if the subject correctly answered at least 6 of the financial knowledge questions and 0 if they answered 5 or fewer questions correctly. *High Lit* and *Low Lit* indicate the sub-samples where *High Literacy* equals one and zero, respectively. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. Coefficients significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels are marked with \*, \*\*, and \*\*\*, respectively.

Sample	Agree with Recommendation Likert scale: 1(Strongly Disagree) ~ 9(Strongly Agree)					
	(1) Full	(2) High Lit	(3) Low Lit	(4) Full	(5) High Lit	(6) Low Lit
<i>Contradict</i>	-0.644*** (0.148)	-1.198*** (0.234)	-0.213 (0.171)			
<i>Contradict</i> × <i>Confidence</i>	-0.138 (0.150)	-0.506** (0.247)	0.074 (0.164)			
<i>Pro-Active, Passive Video</i>				-0.019 (0.199)	-0.258 (0.351)	-0.027 (0.225)
<i>Pro-Active, Passive Video</i> × <i>Confid.</i>				0.005 (0.184)	-0.470 (0.342)	0.178 (0.209)
<i>Pro-Passive, Passive Video</i>				0.550*** (0.196)	0.899*** (0.335)	0.331 (0.243)
<i>Pro-Passive, Passive Video</i> × <i>Confid.</i>				0.011 (0.212)	0.131 (0.335)	-0.065 (0.280)
<i>Pro-Passive, Active Video</i>				-0.720*** (0.222)	-1.020*** (0.366)	-0.177 (0.248)
<i>Pro-Passive, Active Video</i> × <i>Confid.</i>				-0.255 (0.222)	-0.194 (0.373)	-0.136 (0.231)
<i>Confidence</i>	0.183* (0.107)	0.073 (0.173)	0.259* (0.135)	0.178 (0.139)	-0.013 (0.241)	0.289* (0.167)
<i>Constant</i>	6.777*** (0.100)	6.798*** (0.160)	6.789*** (0.121)	6.508*** (0.147)	6.279*** (0.271)	6.651*** (0.161)
Advisor F.E.	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	499	231	268	499	231	268
R-squared	0.055	0.141	0.085	0.093	0.186	0.101

**Table 8: Advisor Likability and Trust**

The dependent variable in columns 1-3 is the rating of the advisor's likability, and in columns 4-6 is the likelihood that the subject would want to return to the advisor. Both variables are from responses to post-video survey questions, on a scale of 1 to 9. *Pro-Active* equals 1 if the subject's pre-video four-point score was less than or equal to zero, and 0 otherwise. *Pro-Passive* equals 1 if the subject's pre-video four-point score was greater than zero, and 0 otherwise. *Passive Video (Active Video)* indicates if the subject watched the video recommending the passive (active) strategy. *High Literacy* equals 1 if the subject correctly answered at least 6 of the financial knowledge questions and 0 if they answered 5 or fewer questions correctly. *High Lit* and *Low Lit* indicate the sub-samples where *High Literacy* equals one and zero, respectively. Control variables, whose coefficients are omitted, include knowledge score, self-assessed financial knowledge, whether the subject has a retirement account, invests in stocks, uses a financial advisor, rating of how much they trust financial institutions, gender, age, college education, and employment status. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. Coefficients significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels are marked with \*, \*\*, and \*\*\*, respectively.

Sample	Advisor Likable			Will Return		
	(1) Full	(2) High Lit	(3) Low Lit	(4) Full	(5) High Lit	(6) Low Lit
	<i>Likert scale: 1(Not at All/Never) ~ 9(Extremely/Certainly)</i>					
<i>Pro-Active, Passive Video</i>	0.223 (0.213)	-0.177 (0.305)	0.119 (0.244)	-0.299 (0.267)	-0.237 (0.411)	-0.073 (0.297)
<i>Pro-Passive, Passive Video</i>	0.320 (0.228)	0.046 (0.282)	0.114 (0.266)	0.070 (0.286)	0.144 (0.379)	-0.003 (0.335)
<i>Pro-Passive, Active Video</i>	-0.105 (0.222)	0.102 (0.304)	-0.501 (0.339)	-0.394 (0.244)	-0.681* (0.398)	-0.336 (0.319)
<i>High Literacy × Passive Video</i>	-0.372 (0.285)			-0.413 (0.343)		
<i>High Literacy × Active Video</i>	0.012 (0.295)			-0.719** (0.334)		
<i>Constant</i>	3.701*** (0.886)	6.429*** (0.224)	6.771*** (0.186)	4.534*** (1.131)	5.276*** (0.307)	5.906*** (0.208)
Advisor F.E.	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Control Variables	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No
Observations	494	231	270	492	229	270
R-squared	0.171	0.085	0.108	0.134	0.039	0.020

**Table 9: Shifts in *Pro-Passive Scores***

This table shows the effects of the treatments on changes in beliefs. The dependent variable is the change in a subject's *Pro-Passive Score* from before to after the video treatment. *Video Direction* equals 1 for the passive video and -1 for the active video. *Confidence* is the residual after regressing the *Self-Assessed Financial Knowledge* on the *Knowledge Score* and normalized to have a standard deviation of one. *Pro-Active* equals 1 if the subject's pre-video four-point score was less than or equal to zero. *Pro-Passive* equals 1 if the subject's pre-video four-point score was greater than zero. *Passive Video (Active Video)* indicates if the subject watched the video recommending the passive (active) strategy. *High Lit* and *Low Lit* indicate the sub-samples where participants correctly answered at least 6 of the financial knowledge questions and where they answered 5 or fewer questions correctly. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. Coefficients significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels are marked with \*, \*\*, and \*\*\*, respectively. Differences in coefficients across subsamples are reported in column 9 and standard errors are calculated from Wald tests.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
	<i>Change in Pro-Passive Score</i>								
	Full		High Lit			Low Lit		(5) - (7)	
<i>Video Direction</i>	1.341*** (0.104)	1.343*** (0.104)							
<i>Video Direction</i> × <i>Confidence</i>		-0.205* (0.112)							
<i>Pro-Active, Passive Video</i>			3.122*** (0.262)	3.088*** (0.260)	3.178*** (0.376)	3.046*** (0.364)	3.030*** (0.352)	2.982*** (0.349)	0.148 (0.508)
<i>Pro-Active, Passive Video</i> × <i>Confidence</i>				-0.511** (0.243)		-1.000*** (0.369)		-0.363 (0.301)	
<i>Pro-Passive, Passive Video</i>			0.553** (0.229)	0.504** (0.226)	0.818*** (0.286)	0.798*** (0.284)	0.566 (0.345)	0.424 (0.341)	0.252 (0.443)
<i>Pro-Passive, Passive Video</i> × <i>Confidence</i>				-0.605*** (0.227)		-0.244 (0.319)		-0.950*** (0.301)	
<i>Pro-Passive, Active Video</i>			-1.587*** (0.278)	-1.675*** (0.277)	-0.574 (0.370)	-0.646* (0.389)	-2.570*** (0.396)	-2.621*** (0.399)	1.997*** (0.535)
<i>Pro-Passive, Active Video</i> × <i>Confidence</i>				-0.017 (0.270)		-0.214 (0.426)		-0.138 (0.339)	
<i>Confidence</i>		0.127 (0.111)		0.413*** (0.151)		0.422* (0.237)		0.439** (0.183)	
<i>Constant</i>	0.559*** (0.104)	0.553*** (0.104)	0.021 (0.178)	0.053 (0.175)	-0.397* (0.240)	-0.378 (0.236)	0.275 (0.245)	0.313 (0.240)	
Advisor F.E.	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	
Observations	493	492	493	492	229	229	264	263	
R-squared	0.255	0.264	0.415	0.429	0.372	0.394	0.475	0.492	

**Table 10: Posterior *Pro-Passive* Scores**

This table shows the effects of the treatments on posterior beliefs. The dependent variable is a subject's *Pro-Passive Score* after the video treatment. *Pro-Active* equals 1 if the subject's pre-video four-point score was less than or equal to zero. *Pro-Passive* equals 1 if the subject's pre-video four-point score was greater than zero. *Passive Video (Active Video)* indicates if the subject watched the video recommending the passive (active) strategy. *Confidence* is the residual after regressing the *Self-Assessed Financial Knowledge* on the *Knowledge Score* and normalized to have a standard deviation of one. *High Lit* and *Low Lit* indicate the sub-samples where participants correctly answered at least 6 of the financial knowledge questions and where they answered 5 or fewer questions correctly. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. Coefficients significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels are marked with \*, \*\*, and \*\*\*, respectively. Differences in coefficients across subsamples are reported in column 7 and standard errors are calculated from Wald tests.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
	<i>Posterior Pro-Passive Score</i>						
	Full	High Lit		Low Lit		(3)-(5)	
<i>Pro-Active, Passive Video</i>	2.755*** (0.241)	2.717*** (0.238)	2.977*** (0.403)	2.810*** (0.385)	2.569*** (0.303)	2.548*** (0.302)	0.408 (0.497)
<i>Pro-Active, Passive Video</i> × <i>Confidence</i>		-0.695*** (0.228)		-1.397*** (0.361)		-0.372 (0.273)	
<i>Pro-Passive, Passive Video</i>	4.045*** (0.199)	3.994*** (0.196)	4.444*** (0.296)	4.413*** (0.283)	3.792*** (0.276)	3.693*** (0.280)	0.652 (0.399)
<i>Pro-Passive, Passive Video</i> × <i>Confidence</i>		-0.641*** (0.205)		-0.711** (0.309)		-0.674** (0.275)	
<i>Pro-Passive, Active Video</i>	1.797*** (0.263)	1.728*** (0.261)	2.925*** (0.370)	2.850*** (0.366)	0.573 (0.363)	0.536 (0.369)	2.352*** (0.511)
<i>Pro-Passive, Active Video</i> × <i>Confidence</i>		-0.153 (0.269)		-0.552 (0.389)		-0.165 (0.324)	
<i>Confidence</i>		0.453*** (0.143)		0.716*** (0.233)		0.311* (0.164)	
<i>Constant</i>	-1.168*** (0.159)	-1.133*** (0.154)	-1.553*** (0.255)	-1.519*** (0.241)	-0.902*** (0.198)	-0.875*** (0.193)	
Advisor F.E.	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	
Observations	493	492	229	229	264	263	
R-squared	0.377	0.394	0.451	0.485	0.381	0.392	

**Table 11: Beliefs about Beating the Market**

The dependent variable is the post-video assessment of “It is possible to always beat the market” (1=Strongly Disagree, 7=Strongly Agree). *Pro-Active* equals 1 if the subject’s pre-video four-point score was less than or equal to zero. *Pro-Passive* equals 1 if the subject’s pre-video four-point score was greater than zero. *Passive Video (Active Video)* indicates if the subject watched the video recommending the passive (active) strategy. *Confidence* is the residual after regressing the *Self-Assessed Financial Knowledge* on the *Knowledge Score* and normalized to have a standard deviation of one. *High Lit* and *Low Lit* indicate the sub-samples where participants correctly answered at least 6 of the financial knowledge questions and where they answered 5 or fewer questions correctly. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. Coefficients significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels are marked with \*, \*\*, and \*\*\*, respectively. Differences in coefficients across subsamples are reported in column 7 and standard errors are calculated from Wald tests.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
	Posterior Possibility to Beat the Market						
	7-Point Likert scale: 1(Strongly Disagree) ~ 7(Strongly Agree)						
	Full Sample		High Lit		Low Lit		(3)-(5)
<i>Pro-Active, Passive Video</i>	-0.887*** (0.239)	-0.884*** (0.239)	-1.125*** (0.412)	-1.071** (0.415)	-0.692** (0.295)	-0.623** (0.291)	-0.434 (0.499)
<i>Pro-Active, Passive Video</i> × <i>Confidence</i>		-0.201 (0.212)		0.203 (0.356)		-0.427 (0.267)	
<i>Pro-Passive, Passive Video</i>	-1.393*** (0.239)	-1.386*** (0.240)	-1.705*** (0.357)	-1.725*** (0.360)	-1.198*** (0.324)	-1.162*** (0.323)	-0.507 (0.475)
<i>Pro-Passive, Passive Video</i> × <i>Confidence</i>		-0.011 (0.242)		-0.249 (0.363)		0.182 (0.329)	
<i>Pro-Passive, Active Video</i>	-0.885*** (0.256)	-0.932*** (0.257)	-1.485*** (0.373)	-1.682*** (0.370)	-0.253 (0.358)	-0.322 (0.358)	-1.232** (0.510)
<i>Pro-Passive, Active Video</i> × <i>Confidence</i>		-0.005 (0.244)		0.416 (0.337)		-0.189 (0.337)	
<i>Confidence</i>		0.162 (0.144)		0.237 (0.223)		0.122 (0.198)	
<i>Constant</i>	4.798*** (0.169)	4.796*** (0.168)	5.111*** (0.264)	5.128*** (0.265)	4.566*** (0.218)	4.560*** (0.217)	
Advisor F.E.	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	
Observations	453	452	225	225	228	227	
R-squared	0.073	0.078	0.102	0.134	0.067	0.083	

**Table 12: Post-Video Portfolio Choice**

This table shows the effects of the treatments on subjects' selection of a fund portfolio at the end of the experiment. The dependent variable is an indicator that equals 1 if the subject chooses a passive fund and 0 if they choose an actively managed fund. *Pro-Active* equals 1 if the subject's pre-video four-point score was less than or equal to zero. *Pro-Passive* equals 1 if the subject's pre-video four-point score was greater than zero. *Passive Video (Active Video)* indicates if the subject watched the video recommending the passive (active) strategy. *Confidence* is the residual after regressing the *Self-Assessed Financial Knowledge* on the *Knowledge Score* and normalized to have a standard deviation of one. *High Lit* and *Low Lit* indicate the sub-samples where participants correctly answered at least 6 of the financial knowledge questions and where they answered 5 or fewer questions correctly. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. Differences in coefficients across subsamples are reported in column 7 and standard errors are calculated from Wald tests.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
<i>Choose Index Fund</i>							
	Full Sample		High Lit		Low Lit		(3)-(5)
<i>Pro-Active, Passive Video</i>	0.576*** (0.052)	0.578*** (0.052)	0.628*** (0.082)	0.624*** (0.081)	0.559*** (0.067)	0.570*** (0.066)	0.069 (0.104)
<i>Pro-Active, Passive Video</i> × <i>Confidence</i>		-0.037 (0.049)		-0.198** (0.084)		0.034 (0.056)	
<i>Pro-Passive, Passive Video</i>	0.705*** (0.044)	0.703*** (0.044)	0.668*** (0.073)	0.677*** (0.071)	0.731*** (0.055)	0.733*** (0.055)	-0.063 (0.090)
<i>Pro-Passive, Passive Video</i> × <i>Confidence</i>		-0.009 (0.045)		-0.189** (0.082)		0.083* (0.045)	
<i>Pro-Passive, Active Video</i>	0.237*** (0.061)	0.230*** (0.061)	0.335*** (0.091)	0.379*** (0.088)	0.093 (0.082)	0.083 (0.079)	0.242** (0.120)
<i>Pro-Passive, Active Video</i> × <i>Confidence</i>		0.040 (0.061)		-0.283*** (0.097)		0.201*** (0.066)	
<i>Confidence</i>		-0.021 (0.039)		0.137* (0.073)		-0.089** (0.040)	
<i>Constant</i>	0.262*** (0.040)	0.262*** (0.041)	0.282*** (0.068)	0.276*** (0.066)	0.249*** (0.050)	0.246*** (0.049)	
Advisor F.E.	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	
Observations	484	483	225	225	259	258	
R-squared	0.332	0.339	0.314	0.356	0.382	0.418	

**Table 13: Effects of Perceived Conflict of Interest**

The dependent variable in columns 1-3 measures the subject's agreement with the recommendation on a scale of 1-9 and in columns 4-6 measures the change in the four-point *Pro-Passive Score* from before to after the video. *Flat Fee* equals 1 if the advisor in the video explains that they are compensated with a flat fee which does not depend on the amount of business generated. *Commission* equals 1 if the advisor says they are compensated by sales commissions. The baseline reference sub-treatment group merges the skip-fee and skip-fee-and-basics groups, both of which do not mention the advisors' incentives. *Video Direction* equals +1 if the subject watched the passive advice video -1 if they watched the active advice video. *Pro-Active* equals 1 if the subject's pre-video four-point score was less than or equal to zero. *Pro-Passive* equals 1 if the subject's pre-video four-point score was greater than zero. *Passive Video (Active Video)* indicates if the subject watched the video recommending the passive (active) strategy. Differences in coefficients and their standard errors are calculated using the delta method. *High Lit* and *Low Lit* indicate the sub-samples where *High Literacy* equals one and zero, respectively. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. Coefficients significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels are marked with \*, \*\*, and \*\*\*, respectively.

	(1) (2) (3)			(4) (5) (6)		
	<i>Agree with Recommendation</i>			<i>Change in Pro-Passive Score</i>		
	Full	High Lit	Low Lit	Full	High Lit	Low Lit
<i>Flat Fee (A)</i>	0.295 (0.183)	0.136 (0.305)	0.509*** (0.191)	0.440* (0.266)	-0.065 (0.359)	0.964** (0.384)
<i>Commission (B)</i>	-0.240 (0.192)	-0.277 (0.314)	-0.064 (0.240)	0.018 (0.252)	-0.077 (0.335)	0.160 (0.374)
(A)-(B)	0.535*** (0.206)	0.413 (0.323)	0.574** (0.240)			
<i>Video Direction</i>				1.388*** (0.145)	1.132*** (0.204)	1.554*** (0.206)
<i>Video Direction</i> × <i>Flat Fee (C)</i>				0.261 (0.263)	0.077 (0.321)	0.544 (0.390)
<i>Video Direction</i> × <i>Commission (D)</i>				-0.451* (0.244)	-0.380 (0.314)	-0.398 (0.362)
(C)-(D)				0.712** (0.293)	0.456 (0.345)	0.941** (0.446)
<i>Pro-Active, Passive Video</i>	-0.063 (0.192)	-0.062 (0.339)	0.002 (0.213)			
<i>Pro-Passive, Passive Video</i>	0.645*** (0.200)	1.287*** (0.344)	0.287 (0.235)			
<i>Pro-Passive, Active Video</i>	-0.641*** (0.211)	-0.798** (0.360)	-0.083 (0.236)			
<i>Constant</i>	6.470*** (0.166)	6.295*** (0.308)	6.508*** (0.180)	0.445*** (0.150)	0.361* (0.218)	0.486** (0.209)
Advisor F.E.	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	500	231	269	493	229	264
R-squared	0.099	0.177	0.070	0.269	0.247	0.330

Internet Appendix of

**“Financial Narratives and Investor Beliefs:  
Experimental Evidence on Active vs. Passive Advice”**

## Appendix A: Full Video Scripts

### Section 1

[self-intro]

Good morning! My name is Cynthia Johnson (Thomas Jenkins) and I've been a financial adviser for eight years, and I'm a certified financial planner, which is the most widely recognized and demanding set of requirements for technical knowledge and ethical standards in the industry.

[fee] - flat

My investment advisory services extend to a broad range of products with different fees, so it's important to provide you with information you need to make well-informed investment decisions. Part of this information is how I am paid. My company charges a flat fee for all of its financial advisory services, and I am compensated on either a meeting-by-meeting or yearly basis. This means, my compensation does not depend on the amount of business I generate, or the specific funds I recommend to my clients, and I have no financial incentive to recommend a particular product to my clients. For example, if you want to invest \$10,000, the up-front costs would be \$300 per visit to cover all financial advisory services. In addition, you only pay the management fee of the funds that applies to all investors.

[fee] - commission

My investment advisory services extend to a broad range of products with different fees, so it's important to provide you with information you need to make well-informed investment decisions. Part of this information is how I am paid. My company works with a number of select mutual fund families from which we receive compensation. We are paid a commission based on the amount of investments we generate for the mutual fund firm and on the fees that the customers pay. For example, if you want to invest \$10,000, the up-front cost would be 3 percent or \$300, a fraction of which goes to my firm for advising investors to put their money into this fund.

### Section 2

[basics of strategies]

*(The transition slide between section 1 and section 2 shows: "Introduction to Investment Strategies".)*

In general, you should know there are two types of mutual funds. The first set is called index funds, which are funds that track the market or part of the market, hence the name. That means they hold a maximally diversified portfolio of stocks across all the firms in the market, and they aim to meet average market returns. These funds have an average fee of about 0.2 percent per year since they require little intervention from the fund's manager. The second set of mutual funds is called actively managed funds. These funds are run by portfolio managers who pick specific companies they invest in based on their market research and investment philosophy. This means they try to set up a balanced portfolio which aims to beat average market returns. These funds have an average fee of about 1.6 percent per year to cover the costs of the managers and market research.

### Section 3

[recommend one strategy] - Passive Investment Strategy

*(The transition slide between section 2 and section 3 shows: “Which Strategy to Choose?”)*

The investment strategy that I recommend to all the clients I work with is to build a well-diversified portfolio of stocks, bonds, and mutual funds. I focus on funds with low fees and turnover. This approach will allow you to capture a larger percentage of the total returns and minimize exposure to any one investment. The aim is to meet the average return of the market and not to be exposed to the ups and downs of any one stock or sector. So how do you implement the strategy? Optimally, diversify your investments with index funds.

[recommend one strategy] - Active Investment Strategy

*(The transition slide between section 2 and section 3 shows: “Which Strategy to Choose?”)*

The investment strategy that I recommend to all the clients I work with is to build a well-balanced portfolio of stocks, bonds, and mutual funds. I focus on funds that are managed by experienced portfolio managers with a great track record. This approach will allow you to generate the highest returns on your investments and minimize exposure to the movements of the market. The aim is to beat the market and not just to mimic the ups and downs of average market returns. So how do you implement the strategy? Focus your investments on actively managed funds.

### Section 4

[reasons for the recommendation] - Passive Investment Strategy

*(The transition slide between section 3 and section 4 shows: “Why Index Funds?”)*

What are the benefits of this strategy? Savvy investors say: “it’s not timing the market, it’s time in the market”. These investors know that no one has a crystal ball, and that not even the best managers can predict the future. So they seek to reduce their risk exposure to any one stock or sector by diversifying, rather than trying to predict the market and picking individual stocks or sectors. Also, they benefit from profitable upswings in the market by keeping their money invested when most other investors are pulling out of the market. In fact, research highlights the importance of picking diversified funds since on average well-diversified portfolios consistently deliver higher returns in the long run. Let me give you the numbers. When you look at short or long-time horizons, more than half of U.S. index funds performed above the median or middle performance of their respective categories. What this means is that by investing in funds that aim to meet the average return on the market, you’re likely to have a better than average mutual fund. In addition, index funds cost less than actively managed funds, since diversification is a simple yet effective strategy that doesn’t require a manager picking stocks and timing the market. This way you benefit from the long-term growth of the overall market while more of the returns go to you instead of the fund manager. Over time, even a small difference in costs can make a huge difference in your overall portfolio. Let’s look at an example. Over the 20-year time period ending in 2009, the average returns of index funds and actively managed funds were close to the same while the average yearly fee was under 0.5 percent for index funds and around 1.5 percent for actively managed funds. Why should you pay so much attention to fees? While it may seem that a small difference in fees shouldn’t matter, even a one percent difference in fees makes a huge difference in the long run. The data is clear. If you want your investment to have the strongest performance in the long run, you need to invest in low-cost well-diversified index funds. In a nutshell, if you want to build wealth by investing, make sure you work with advisers who recommend low-cost well-diversified index funds. Thank you for your time, and good luck investing.

[reasons for the recommendation] - Active Investment Strategy

*(The transition slide between section 3 and section 4 shows: “Why Actively Managed Funds?”)*

What are the benefits of this strategy? Savvy investors say: “The wise man puts all his eggs in one basket and watches the basket.” These investors know that no one builds wealth with plain vanilla funds and that even large or popular stocks can vary greatly in their returns from year to year. So they seek to reduce their exposure to underperforming stocks and to market movements in down periods rather than just sitting through them. Also, they take advantage of the opportunities that arise in boom periods by focusing on sectors that have the most promise for high returns. In fact, research highlights the importance of picking the right fund, since there are many funds that actually underperform the market, while others consistently outperform the market over long periods of time. Let me give you the numbers. When you look at the U.S. mutual fund industry over the last 3 years, for example, data shows that over 80 percent of large-cap value funds outperform their index after fees. So, by actively picking stocks in trying to time the market, these funds do better than their benchmark. When you invest in an actively managed fund, what you pay for is the unique advantages of detailed market research, experience, and the skill of the portfolio managers. Actively managed funds also have the flexibility and tools to react to the movements of the market, allowing them to seize opportunities in the moment as they arise. Over time, even a small difference in returns can make a huge difference in your portfolio. Let’s look at an example. Over the 20-year period ending in 2007, every one of the 20 top performing funds was actively managed. Why should you pay so much attention to returns? Well, it might seem that small difference in returns shouldn’t matter. In fact, even a one percent difference in returns makes a huge difference in the long run. The data is clear: if you want your investments to have superior performance you need to invest in high performing well managed funds. In a nutshell, if you want to build wealth by investing, make sure you work with advisers who recommend high-performing well-managed mutual funds. Thank you for your time and good luck investing.

## Appendix B: Pearson Correlation Analysis and Alternative Belief Measures

Table 3 suggests that the rank of *Diversification* has a significant negative relationship with *Picking Good Fund Managers*, *Picking Good Stocks*, *Timing the Market*, and *Selling Poorly Performed Funds*, all of which are representative of the philosophy of active management, suggesting *Diversification* be categorized as a pro-passive belief component. For the same reason, *Minimizing Fees* is a clear indicator for the pro-passive belief, though *Diversification* and *Minimizing Fees* appear to be uncorrelated with each other.

*Picking Good Stocks* and *Timing the Market* are strongly negatively correlated with both *Diversification* and *Minimizing Fees*, and we count for them as pro-active beliefs. *Picking Good Fund Managers* is potentially a component of pro-active beliefs, but it appears negatively correlated with both passive and active beliefs, and in particular has a strong negative correlation with *Timing the Market*. In the same vein, *Minimizing Risk* and *Selling Poorly Performed Funds* are also irrelevant to beliefs on whether passive or active management is important, because they are ambiguously related to more clearly narrated strategies like *Timing the Market* and *Minimizing Fees*.

In addition to the main 4-point belief score defined in Section 2.1 which we use throughout the paper, we also create an “*Intensity Score*” of beliefs, which is a more granular measure. The calculation still sets the initial value at zero for each participant. Based on the ranking answers which range from 1 (the least important) to 7 (the most important), we apply the adding and subtracting rules as follows. Given the ranking of *Diversification* being  $X$ , we add  $X-4$  to the score. For example, if the person ranks *Diversification* as the second most important component so that  $X$  equals 6, we add 2 to the his or her current value of intensity score. We repeat this step with the ranking of *Minimizing Fees*. Next, if the ranking answer to *Picking Good Stocks* is  $Y$ , we add  $4-Y$  to the score. For example, if the person ranks *Picking Good Stocks* as the third most important component so that  $Y$  equals 5, we add -1 to the current value of intensity score. We repeat this with the ranking of *Timing the Market*. In the end, the largest possible value for intensity score is 10, which means the person is very pro-passive in the pre-video ranking answers. The smallest possible value is -10, which means the person is very pro-active.

Figure IA.1 plots the distribution of the *Pro-Passive Intensity Score*, and shows that our classification of the subjects into the two prior types based on the 4-point score discussed above naturally separates the two modes in the distribution of the intensity score.

Since the revealed correlations between the components could be affected by noise in people’s beliefs,

we consider two alternative ways of categorizing the belief components. The first alternative simply follows the ex ante classification and counts *Diversification*, *Minimizing Fees*, and *Minimizing Risk* as passive components, and *Picking Stocks*, *Timing the Market*, and *Picking Fund Managers* as active components, resulting in a 6-point score. The second alternative considers the fact that *Diversification* tends to be ranked highly by both pro-passive and pro-active investors, and replaces it with *Minimizing Risk* in the 4-point score calculation. Our results are robust under these alternative measures. We present the results Appendix E and discuss them briefly in Section 4.

## Appendix C: Benchmarking Participants' Financial Literacy and Demographics Against External Data

**Financial Literacy Question Sources** These eight questions used to measure participants' financial literacy were mainly derived from the questions widely used in the existing literature. The “risk diversification” question (Q5) was taken from one of the three questions, which are later known as the “Big Three”, piloted in the 2004 Health and Retirement Study (HRS) by [Lusardi and Mitchell 2007; 2011a; 2011b](#). The “compound interest” question (Q2) was adapted from interest compounding question from the “Big Three”. The “time value of money” question (Q3) is the same as one of the five *Basic Literacy Questions* in [van Rooij, Lusardi, and Alessie 2011](#). Three other questions (Q4, Q6, Q8) are from the *Advanced Literacy Questions* in [van Rooij, Lusardi, and Alessie \(2011\)](#). The remaining two questions are relatively new. The “percentage changes” question (Q1) aims to test the numeracy of how percentage changes are calculated, and the “mutual fund fees” question (Q7) is designed to test people's basic knowledge of how annual management fees are charged.

**Internal Consistency Checks** In Panel C of [Table 4](#), we show the results of consistency checks. First, for people who answered the two hard-level questions (Q4 and Q6) right, they indeed perform better on average (i.e., higher right %) in lower-level questions than the whole sample. For example, the average correct rate among the sub-sample who answered the hard questions right is 87.27% for the easiest question about the meaning of owning stock, while the whole sample average is 79.27%. Second, for people who answered at least three out of the five medium-level questions (Q1, Q2, Q3, Q5, and Q7) right, on average they have higher correctness in answering the easy question (Q8) than the whole sample (i.e., 88.58% versus 79.27%). Third, for people who answered the easy question right but got at least three out of the five medium-level questions wrong, they perform much worse (i.e., lower right fraction) in hard questions than the whole sample average right fraction.

**Benchmarking Financial Literacy** We benchmark the literacy statistics of our sample against several widely-cited studies: First, [Lusardi and Mitchell 2007; 2011a](#): Based on the 2004 U.S. Health and Retirement Study (HRS), surveyed adults aged 50 and older about basic financial concepts (the “Big Three”). Second, [van Rooij, Lusardi, and Alessie 2011](#): Fielded in the 2005–2006 De Nederlandsche Bank (DNB) Household Survey in the Netherlands, including both “Basic” and “Advanced” literacy questions. Third, National

Financial Capability Studies (NFCS): online surveys of adults representative of the U.S. population by age, gender, income, and education. The NFCS included five literacy questions: three from the “Big Three” and two advanced items on mortgages and bond pricing. We compare our summary statistics with those reported by Lusardi and Mitchell (2011b) based on the 2009 NFCS and by FINRA Foundation 2013 based on the 2012 NFCS.

- Q1 (Percentage changes): New question; no benchmark correct rate available.
- Q2 (compound interest): The correct response rate in our sample (63%) is similar to that reported in Lusardi and Mitchell (2011a) (67%), suggesting comparability with the Big Three studies. The share of “I don’t know” responses is lower in our sample (1.2% vs. 9.4%), likely reflecting our participants’ higher education levels and more closely aligning with rates among college and postgraduate respondents in Lusardi and Mitchell (2011b).
- Q3 (time value of money): The correct response rate in our sample (65%) is slightly lower than the 72% reported based on De Nederlandsche Bank’s Household Survey in van Rooij, Lusardi, and Alessie (2011). The shares of “I don’t know” responses are similar.
- Q4 (long horizon return): The correct response rate is comparable to that reported in van Rooij, Lusardi, and Alessie (2011) (52% vs. 47%). The shares of “I don’t know” responses are also comparable.<sup>1</sup>
- Q5 (risk diversification): The correct response rate in our sample (71%) exceeds the overall rate in Lusardi and Mitchell (2011a) (52%) but is consistent with the higher rates observed among more educated respondents in Lusardi and Mitchell (2011b): 70% for college graduates and 82% for postgraduates.
- Q6 (interest rate and bond price): The correct response rate (34%) is slightly higher than that of the general Dutch population (25%) and the 2012 NFCS (28%). In the NFCS, this was also the least correctly answered of the five literacy questions. van Rooij, Lusardi, and Alessie (2011) documents that both basic and advanced financial literacy increase with education, although they do not report raw correct-answer rates by education group.

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1. Note that there are minor differences in the wording between our Q4 and the “risk diversification question” in van Rooij, Lusardi, and Alessie 2011. Our wording is: “Considering a long time period (*for example 30 years*), which asset *has historically generated* the highest return?” The wording in van Rooij, Lusardi, and Alessie (2011) is: “Considering a long time period (*for example 10 or 20 years*), which asset *normally gives* the highest return?”


- Q7 (mutual fund fees): New question; no benchmark correct rate available.
- Q8 (meaning of owning stocks): The correct response rate (80%) is higher than that of the general Dutch population (62%). van Rooij, Lusardi, and Alessie (2011) documents that both basic and advanced financial literacy increase with education, although they do not report raw correct-answer rates by education group.

**Demographic Comparisons** Our participants are younger, more single, and fewer have full-time jobs. The median age in our sample is 34, compared with 39 for both the Boston metropolitan area and the U.S. overall, according to the 2011 American Community Survey (ACS) administered by the U.S. Census Bureau. 29% of participants are married, compared with 48% in Boston and 51% nationwide. 45% hold a full-time job, versus 59% in Boston and 53% countrywide. In terms of income, our participants' personal income levels are similar to those in the Boston area and somewhat higher than the national average. 43% report annual personal income below \$35,000. The median household income in 2011 was \$71,000 in Boston and \$51,000 nationwide, implying median individual incomes of roughly \$35,500 and \$25,500, respectively. The median income in our sample is thus likely slightly above Boston's and considerably above the national median. Finally, our sample is much more educated: 82% of participants hold a college degree, compared with 66% in the Boston area and 29% nationwide.

# Appendix D: Additional Tables and Figures

Figure IA.1: **Alternative Belief Measure: Pro-Passive Intensity Score**

This figure plots the distribution of the pre-video *Pro-Passive Intensity Score*, an alternative belief measure described in Appendix B and ranging from -10 to 10. Blue represents subjects classified as “pro-passive”. Green represents subjects classified as “pro-active”.



**Table IA.1: Financial Literacy Measure by Education Level**

This table reports the summary statistics of the *Knowledge Score* by education level. *Knowledge Score* is the number of correct answers out of the 8 financial literacy questions.

<i>Knowledge Score</i>	N	mean	s.d.	min	p25	p50	p75	max
By Education:								
High school or less	16	3.06	2.17	0	1.5	2.5	4.5	7
Some college	76	3.66	1.97	0	2	3	5.5	8
College degree	138	4.51	2.30	0	3	4.5	6	8
Some graduate work	76	5.24	1.61	0	4	5	6	8
Graduate degree	195	5.71	1.70	0	5	6	7	8

**Table IA.2: Correlations between Financial Literacy and Other Control Variables**

This table reports the Pearson correlation coefficients between *Knowledge Score*, *Self-Assessed Financial Knowledge*, *Confidence* and other participant characteristics. *Knowledge Score* is the number of correct answers out of the 8 financial literacy questions. *Self-Assessed Financial Knowledge* is the participant's self-rating on a scale of 1 (not knowledgeable) to 7 (very knowledgeable). *Confidence* is the residual after regressing the *Self-Assessed Financial Knowledge* on the *Knowledge Score* and normalized to have a standard deviation of one. p-values are reported in parentheses.

	Knowledge Score	Self-Assess. Knowledge	Confidence	Have Retire. Account	Invest Stocks	Use Fin. Advisor	Trust Fin. Institutions	Gender (1=Male)	ln(Age)	College Degree
Knowledge Score	1.000									
Self-Assessed Knowledge	0.444 (0.000)	1.000								
Confidence	0.000 (1.000)	0.896 (0.000)	1.000							
Have Retirement Account	0.296 (0.000)	0.229 (0.000)	0.109 (0.015)	1.000						
Invest in Stocks	0.370 (0.000)	0.395 (0.000)	0.257 (0.000)	0.256 (0.000)	1.000					
Use Financial Advisor	0.061 (0.174)	0.118 (0.009)	0.102 (0.024)	0.148 (0.001)	- (0.000)	1.000				
Trust Financial Institutions	0.036 (0.417)	0.145 (0.001)	0.144 (0.001)	0.054 (0.227)	0.080 (0.076)	0.102 (0.024)	1.000			
Gender (1=Male)	0.132 (0.003)	0.272 (0.000)	0.237 (0.000)	-0.106 (0.018)	0.074 (0.098)	-0.053 (0.240)	0.021 (0.636)	1.000		
ln (Age)	0.105 (0.019)	0.201 (0.000)	0.172 (0.000)	0.096 (0.032)	0.097 (0.031)	0.145 (0.001)	0.085 (0.057)	0.094 (0.036)	1.000	
College Degree	0.309 (0.000)	0.108 (0.016)	-0.033 (0.465)	0.216 (0.000)	0.160 (0.000)	0.100 (0.025)	-0.032 (0.469)	-0.148 (0.001)	-0.052 (0.244)	1.000
Unemployed	-0.081 (0.070)	-0.078 (0.083)	-0.046 (0.302)	-0.161 (0.000)	-0.118 (0.008)	-0.050 (0.268)	0.011 (0.805)	-0.032 (0.472)	0.062 (0.167)	-0.207 (0.000)

**Table IA.3: Determinants for Prior Beliefs**

This table reports the regression coefficients showing the relationships between the prior *Pro-Passive Score* and various participant characteristics. *Knowledge Score* is the number of correct answers out of the 8 financial literacy questions. *Self-Assessed Financial Knowledge* is the participant's self-rating on a scale of 1 (not knowledgeable) to 7 (very knowledgeable). *Use Financial Advisor* equals one if the participant indicates they obtain financial advice from an advisor, financial planner, or accountant. *Trust Financial Institutions* is how much the participant agrees with the statement that financial institutions are trustworthy, ranging from 1 (low) to 7 (high).

	(1)	(2)	(3)
	<i>Prior Pro-Passive Score</i>		
<i>Knowledge Score (0-8)</i>	0.211*** (0.051)	0.153*** (0.055)	0.107* (0.056)
<i>Self-Assessed Financial Knowledge (1-7)</i>	0.000 (0.069)	-0.015 (0.071)	-0.000 (0.073)
<i>Have Retirement Account</i>		0.766*** (0.208)	0.631*** (0.214)
<i>Invest in Stocks</i>		-0.007 (0.237)	0.052 (0.237)
<i>Use Financial Advisor</i>		0.404* (0.241)	0.270 (0.245)
<i>Trust Financial Institutions (1-7)</i>		-0.089 (0.064)	-0.076 (0.064)
<i>Gender (1=Male)</i>			-0.185 (0.204)
<i>ln (Age)</i>			0.432 (0.321)
<i>College Degree</i>			0.951*** (0.261)
<i>Unemployed</i>			0.559 (0.343)
<i>Constant</i>	-0.620** (0.280)	-0.446 (0.371)	-2.515** (1.182)
Observations	500	496	494
R-squared	0.041	0.078	0.107

**Table IA.4: Balance Table Conditional on *Pro-Active* Beliefs**

This table reports the results of balance tests on subject characteristics and demographics between the groups watching the active and passive videos, conditional on people having *Pro-Active* prior beliefs. p-values are from two-sample t-tests on the differences of mean values between the active and passive video treatment groups.

	(1) Active Video	(2) Passive Video	(3) p-value (1)-(2)
Gender (1=Male)	0.44 (0.50)	0.62 (0.49)	0.00***
Age	37.60 (11.34)	38.37 (12.08)	0.61
Marital Status (1=Married)	0.27 (0.45)	0.26 (0.44)	0.80
Country of Birth (1=US)	0.79 (0.41)	0.82 (0.38)	0.50
Citizenship (1=US)	0.89 (0.32)	0.93 (0.26)	0.27
Have a Full-Time Job	0.43 (0.50)	0.39 (0.49)	0.46
Unemployed	0.06 (0.25)	0.09 (0.29)	0.37
Income under 35k	0.45 (0.50)	0.53 (0.50)	0.18
Save at Least 10% of Income	0.33 (0.47)	0.38 (0.49)	0.44
Have Retirement Account	0.47 (0.50)	0.45 (0.50)	0.67
Invest in Stocks	0.26 (0.44)	0.23 (0.43)	0.69
College Degree	0.76 (0.43)	0.76 (0.43)	0.97
Self-Assessed Financial Knowledge (1-7)	3.54 (1.63)	3.64 (1.51)	0.60
Self-Ranked Pct. Financial Knowledge (0-1)	0.40 (0.24)	0.41 (0.24)	0.61
Willingness to Take Investment Risk (1-7)	4.05 (1.33)	4.13 (1.52)	0.67
Knowledge Score (0-8)	4.59 (1.99)	4.55 (2.05)	0.88
Use Financial Advisor	0.18 (0.38)	0.21 (0.41)	0.58
Trust Financial Institutions (1-7)	3.80 (1.48)	3.78 (1.59)	0.92
Trust People (1-7)	3.56 (1.58)	3.51 (1.61)	0.80
Observations	125	128	253

**Table IA.5: Balance Table Conditional on *Pro-Passive* Beliefs**

This table reports the results of balance tests on subject characteristics and demographics between the groups watching the active and passive videos, conditional on people having *Pro-Passive* prior beliefs. p-values are from two-sample t-tests on the differences of mean values between the active and passive video treatment groups.

	(1) Active Video	(2) Passive Video	(3) p-value (1)-(2)
Gender (1=Male)	0.55 (0.50)	0.50 (0.50)	0.39
Age	38.87 (12.21)	41.41 (13.44)	0.12
Marital Status (1=Married)	0.27 (0.45)	0.34 (0.48)	0.25
Country of Birth (1=US)	0.87 (0.34)	0.88 (0.32)	0.81
Citizenship (1=US)	0.94 (0.23)	0.96 (0.20)	0.60
Have a Full-Time Job	0.46 (0.50)	0.53 (0.50)	0.32
Unemployed	0.10 (0.30)	0.03 (0.16)	0.01**
Income under 35k	0.42 (0.49)	0.31 (0.47)	0.10*
Save at Least 10% of Income	0.38 (0.49)	0.32 (0.47)	0.34
Have Retirement Account	0.59 (0.49)	0.76 (0.43)	0.00***
Invest in Stocks	0.39 (0.49)	0.35 (0.48)	0.51
College Degree	0.85 (0.36)	0.90 (0.30)	0.25
Self-Assessed Financial Knowledge (1-7)	3.98 (1.59)	3.80 (1.48)	0.35
Self-Ranked Pct. Financial Knowledge (0-1)	0.51 (0.21)	0.45 (0.23)	0.05*
Willingness to Take Investment Risk (1-7)	4.13 (1.54)	3.95 (1.40)	0.35
Knowledge Score (0-8)	5.16 (2.13)	5.35 (2.08)	0.49
Use Financial Advisor	0.23 (0.43)	0.23 (0.42)	0.86
Trust Financial Institutions (1-7)	3.69 (1.46)	3.48 (1.49)	0.28
Trust People (1-7)	3.52 (1.71)	3.45 (1.63)	0.76
Observations	128	120	248

**Table IA.6: Effects of Strong Beliefs**

The dependent variable is the subject's rating of how convincing the advice was on a scale of 1 to 9. *Contradict* equals 1 if the recommendation in the video contradicts a subject's prior belief. *Belief Score Mag. = 4* equals 1 if the pre-treatment *Pro-Passive Score* is 4 or -4, which are the most extreme values. *Belief Score Mag.  $\geq 3$*  equals 1 if the pre-treatment *Pro-Passive Score* is greater than or equal to 3 or less than or equal to -3. *Full Score in Passive/Active* equals 1 if a participant ranks both passive components in the top three or ranks both active components in the top three in the pre-video ranking question on investment strategies. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. Coefficients significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels are marked with \*, \*\*, and \*\*\*, respectively.

	(1)	(2)	(3)
	<i>Agree with Recommendation</i>		
	<i>1(Strongly Disagree) ~ 9(Strongly Agree)</i>		
<i>Contradict</i>	-0.497*** (0.161)	-0.403** (0.192)	-0.391* (0.200)
<i>Contradict</i> $\times$ <i>Belief Score Mag. = 4</i>	-1.359*** (0.380)		
<i>Contradict</i> $\times$ <i>Belief Score Mag. <math>\geq 3</math></i>		-0.702** (0.303)	
<i>Contradict</i> $\times$ <i>Full Score in Passive/Active</i>			-0.579* (0.299)
<i>Belief Score Mag. = 4</i>	1.108*** (0.245)		
<i>Belief Score Mag. <math>\geq 3</math></i>		0.428** (0.201)	
<i>Full Score in Passive/Active</i>			0.354* (0.198)
<i>Constant</i>	6.653*** (0.105)	6.626*** (0.123)	6.618*** (0.134)
Observations	500	500	500
R-squared	0.071	0.061	0.058

**Table IA.7: Evaluation of Advice Quality - Alternative Measure**

The dependent variable is the subject's rating of how convincing the advice was on a scale of 1 to 9. *Passive Video (Active Video)* indicates if the subject watched the video recommending the passive (active) strategy. *Contradict* equals 1 if the recommendation in the video contradicts a subject's prior belief. *Pro-Active* equals 1 if the subject's pre-video four-point score was less than or equal to zero. *Pro-Passive* equals 1 if the subject's pre-video four-point score was greater than zero. *High Literacy* equals 1 if the subject correctly answered at least 6 of the financial knowledge questions and 0 if they answered 5 or fewer questions correctly. *High Lit* and *Low Lit* indicate the sub-samples where *High Literacy* equals one and zero, respectively. Control variables, whose coefficients are omitted, include knowledge score, self-assessed financial knowledge, whether the subject has a retirement account, invests in stocks, uses a financial advisor, rating of how much they trust financial institutions, gender, age, college education, and employment status. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. Coefficients significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels are marked with \*, \*\*, and \*\*\*, respectively.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	<i>Advice Convincing</i>					
	<i>Likert scale: 1(Not a All) ~ 9(Extremely)</i>					
	Full Sample				High Lit	Low Lit
<i>Passive Video</i>	0.653*** (0.156)					
<i>Contradict</i>		-0.487*** (0.158)				
<i>Pro-Active, Passive Video</i>			-0.011 (0.237)	-0.020 (0.230)	-0.050 (0.383)	0.251 (0.261)
<i>Pro-Passive, Passive Video</i>			0.443* (0.245)	0.414* (0.249)	0.871** (0.353)	0.346 (0.272)
<i>Pro-Passive, Active Video</i>			-0.479** (0.232)	-0.374 (0.228)	-0.804** (0.389)	-0.253 (0.286)
<i>High Literacy × Passive Video</i>			-0.471** (0.206)	-0.048 (0.297)		
<i>High Literacy × Active Video</i>			-0.879*** (0.238)	-0.581* (0.311)		
<i>Constant</i>	6.128*** (0.121)	6.700*** (0.110)	6.784*** (0.183)	4.295*** (0.948)	6.087*** (0.288)	6.676*** (0.205)
Advisor F.E.	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Control Variables	No	No	No	Yes	No	No
Observations	501	501	501	494	231	270
R-squared	0.037	0.023	0.096	0.182	0.113	0.028

**Table IA.8: Gender Effects in Advice Evaluation and Belief Updating**

The dependent variable in columns 1-4 is the subject's rating of how much they agree with the recommendation of the video on a scale of 1 to 9. The dependent variable in column 5 is the change in a subject's *Pro-Passive Score* from before to after the video treatment. *Same Gender* equals 1 when the advisor's gender matches that of the participant. *Male to Female*, *Male to Male*, *Female to Male* refer to the gender pairings of advisor and participant, respectively. *Contradict* equals 1 if the recommendation in the video contradicts a subject's prior belief. *Video Direction* equals 1 for the passive video and -1 for the active video. Columns 1-2 control for fixed effects of the main treatments (combinations of prior beliefs and video assignments). Coefficients significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels are marked with \*, \*\*, and \*\*\*, respectively.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	<i>Agree with Recommendation</i>			<i>Change in Pro-Passive Score</i>		
<i>Same Gender</i>	0.205 (0.148)		0.307 (0.198)		0.086 (0.208)	
<i>Male to Female</i>		-0.276 (0.201)				
<i>Male to Male</i>		0.114 (0.203)				
<i>Female to Male</i>		-0.029 (0.220)				
<i>Contradict</i>			-0.560** (0.219)	-0.394* (0.222)		
<i>Contradict × Same Gender</i>			-0.157 (0.300)			
<i>Contradict × Male Advisor</i>				-0.505* (0.299)		
<i>Video Direction</i>					1.463*** (0.152)	1.297*** (0.142)
<i>Video Direction × Same Gender</i>					-0.245 (0.208)	
<i>Video Direction × Male Advisor</i>						0.087 (0.207)
<i>Male Advisor</i>				0.227 (0.196)		-0.154 (0.207)
<i>Constant</i>	6.399*** (0.167)	6.559*** (0.185)	6.607*** (0.150)	6.656*** (0.153)	0.519*** (0.152)	0.635*** (0.142)
Main Treatment Group F.E.	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	No
Advisor F.E.	No	No	No	No	No	No
Observations	500	500	500	500	493	493
R-squared	0.076	0.079	0.041	0.041	0.256	0.255

**Table IA.9: Effects of Investment Experiences**

The dependent variable in columns 1-2 is the subject's rating of how much they agree with the recommendation of the video on a scale of 1 to 9. The dependent variable in columns 3-4 is the change in a subject's *Pro-Passive Score* from before to after the video treatment. *Contradict* equals 1 if the recommendation in the video contradicts a subject's prior belief. *Retirement Acct Holder* equals 1 if a participant indicates that they have a retirement account. *Knowledge Score* is the number of correct answers out of the 8 financial literacy questions. *Confidence* is the residual after regressing the *Self-Assessed Financial Knowledge* on the *Knowledge Score* and normalized to have a standard deviation of one. *Video Direction* equals 1 for the passive video and -1 for the active video. Coefficients significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels are marked with \*, \*\*, and \*\*\*, respectively.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	<i>Agree with Recommendation</i>		<i>Change in Pro-Passive Score</i>	
<i>Contradict</i>	-0.112 (0.222)	0.561 (0.393)		
<i>Contradict</i> × <i>Retirement Acct Holder</i>	-0.913*** (0.298)	-0.686** (0.298)		
<i>Contradict</i> × <i>Knowledge Score</i>		-0.163** (0.077)		
<i>Contradict</i> × <i>Confidence</i>		-0.114 (0.146)		
<i>Video Direction</i>			1.706*** (0.160)	2.006*** (0.284)
<i>Video Direction</i> × <i>Retirement Acct Holder</i>			-0.621*** (0.210)	-0.481** (0.221)
<i>Video Direction</i> × <i>Knowledge Score</i>				-0.078 (0.049)
<i>Video Direction</i> × <i>Confidence</i>				-0.187* (0.112)
<i>Retirement Acct Holder</i>	0.693*** (0.204)	0.589*** (0.202)	-0.258 (0.220)	-0.244 (0.219)
<i>Knowledge Score</i>	-0.118*** (0.039)	-0.037 (0.051)	-0.091* (0.050)	-0.099** (0.050)
<i>Confidence</i>	0.097 (0.072)	0.151 (0.105)	0.159 (0.111)	0.136 (0.111)
<i>Constant</i>	6.932*** (0.231)	6.595*** (0.271)	1.172*** (0.286)	1.193*** (0.287)
Adivsor F.E.	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	499	499	492	492
R-squared	0.090	0.100	0.280	0.288

**Table IA.10: Robustness of Belief Shift Result**

This table shows the robustness of the main results in Table 9 under alternative sample selection and measures. Panel A columns 1-3 exclude the subjects with a prior *Pro-Passive Score* of zero and columns 4-6 examine the change in a subject's *Pro-Passive Intensity Score*. Panel B examine changes in alternative belief score constructions using a 4-point or 6-point scheme. Constructions of the alternative measures and their motivations are described in Appendix B. *Pro-Active* equals 1 if the subject's pre-video four-point score was less than or equal to zero. *Pro-Passive* equals 1 if the subject's pre-video four-point score was greater than zero. *Passive Video (Active Video)* indicates if the subject watched the video recommending the passive (active) strategy. *High Lit* and *Low Lit* indicate the sub-samples where *High Literacy* equals one and zero, respectively. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. Coefficients significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels are marked with \*, \*\*, and \*\*\*, respectively.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	<i>Change in Pro-Passive Belief</i>					
Panel A.	<i>Excl. Zero Prior</i>			$\Delta$ Intensity Score		
Sample	Full	High Lit	Low Lit	Full	High Lit	Low Lit
<i>Pro-Active, Passive Video</i>	3.332*** (0.363)	3.439*** (0.440)	2.726*** (0.414)	6.874*** (0.634)	6.658*** (0.788)	6.218*** (0.713)
<i>Pro-Passive, Passive Video</i>	0.552 (0.349)	0.790*** (0.279)	-0.034 (0.389)	2.102*** (0.607)	2.218*** (0.618)	1.413** (0.666)
<i>Pro-Passive, Active Video</i>	-2.005*** (0.303)	-0.589 (0.366)	-3.143*** (0.437)	-2.997*** (0.564)	-1.195 (0.725)	-4.584*** (0.814)
Advisor F.E.	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
High Literacy $\times$ Video Types	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No
Observations	422	199	223	493	229	264
R-squared	0.446	0.372	0.515	0.423	0.406	0.455
Panel B.	$\Delta$ Alt. 6-Point Score			$\Delta$ Alt. 4-Point Score		
<i>Pro-Active, Passive Video</i>	4.667*** (0.391)	4.362*** (0.449)	4.226*** (0.439)	3.419*** (0.347)	3.033*** (0.385)	3.097*** (0.398)
<i>Pro-Passive, Passive Video</i>	2.254*** (0.397)	1.978*** (0.357)	1.944*** (0.454)	1.438*** (0.345)	1.028*** (0.285)	1.184*** (0.399)
<i>Pro-Passive, Active Video</i>	-1.466*** (0.342)	-0.274 (0.450)	-2.389*** (0.492)	-1.237*** (0.291)	-0.407 (0.360)	-1.904*** (0.439)
Advisor F.E.	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
High Literacy $\times$ Video Types	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No
Observations	501	231	270	501	231	270
R-squared	0.410	0.394	0.445	0.349	0.334	0.374

## Appendix E: Demographic Differences in Treatment Effects

Table IA.8 examines the effects of both advisor and advisee genders. Column (1) estimates the effect of sharing the same gender, and Column (2) breaks it down into four groups (male advising female, male advising male, etc.). Both regressions indicate a small positive effect of gender alignment, but neither estimate is statistically significant. We then explore how gender affects the reactions to advice that contradicts participants' priors. Column (3) suggests that gender alignment has no effect on the rating of such advice. In contrast, column (4) shows that participants rate contradictory advice lower if it is delivered by a male advisor, although column (5) shows no significant difference in belief updating under male and female advisors.

The results in Table IA.8 are consistent with Agnew et al. 2018 and other studies beyond the financial advice context (e.g., Bertrand et al. 2010; Landry et al. 2006). However, because we only had two male and two female actors, the results could be driven by idiosyncratic characteristics of our actors – a point that is also acknowledged by Agnew et al. 2018.

Table IA.9 investigates how prior experience with retirement accounts shapes the perception of and belief updating in response to financial advice. We use self-reported indicators for whether participants have a retirement account and interact this measure with receiving advice that contradicts one's priors. Column (1) shows that participants with retirement accounts are significantly more likely to disagree with advice that challenges their prior beliefs. Because having a retirement account is associated with higher financial literacy and confidence, column (2) directly controls for the effects of the latter two. The experience effect remains significant. In columns (3)-(4), we find that investment experience is associated with less belief updating in the direction of the financial advice, even after controlling for the effects of literacy and confidence. Altogether, these results suggest that prior investment experience independently reinforces existing priors, beyond the roles of literacy and confidence.