

# Assessing the Impact of PFAS Water Regulation

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# The effects of PFAS regulation remain uncertain

**The EPA is trying to regulate 6 forever chemicals. Just 10,000 to go.**

We're going need a better way to tackle PFASs.

***Trump Promises Clean Water. Will He Clean Up 'Forever Chemicals'?***

Public health advocates worry that Donald Trump could unravel federal clean water efforts, including restrictions on lead pipes and chemicals known as PFAS.

**PFAS may be contaminating drinking water for up to 27% of Americans - study**

**Of 140 million people in the US who draw water from US aquifers via private or public wells, 70% at risk**

## Research Question

What is the effect of tightening regulatory standards for PFAS on water quality?

Intensive margin - Is water cleaned up over time for sources testing before and after the policy?

# Overview

What is the effect of tightening regulatory standards for PFAS on water quality?

**Challenge:** Reporting limits lead to large amounts of interval censoring


**Solution:** Parametric approximation to recover the distribution of PFAS concentration

**Empirical Approach:** Changes-in-changes



**Preview of Results:**

- ① Ignoring censoring or replacing those observations with zeros or the reporting limit can lead to misleading results
- ② Intensive Margin: Cannot detect an effect of the policy on water quality


# California Regulation



# California Regulation



# Regulation Timeline and Research Design




- Treatment: Tightening of Notification Levels for PFOA and PFOS in CA
- CA (Treated) & NJ (Control)

# Econometric challenges from interval-censored data

- Quarter-facility panel of PFOA and PFOS concentration in CA and NJ from 2018 through early 2020.
- **Reporting limits:** If a test detects concentration below the reporting limit, water systems are NOT required to report it.
- Approximately 60% of observations for both contaminants are censored.
- Under SDWA, 30% of observations would be in violation of the new federal standards.



# Econometric Implication I: Observed bounds, not the distribution of PFAS



## Econometric Implication II: Treatment effects are not point-identified in general

**Without further assumptions, we can only bound the ATT.**

$$ATT = E[Y(1)|D = 1] - E[Y(0)|D = 1]$$

If we can only bound  $E[Y(1)|D = 1] \in [\mu_1^r, \mu_1^z]$  and  $E[Y(0)|D = 1] \in [\mu_0^r, \mu_0^z]$

Then we can only bound the ATT,

$$ATT \in [\mu_1^r - \mu_0^z, \mu_1^z - \mu_0^r]$$

## Econometric Implication III: Naïve counterfactual analysis can lead to misleading results

Options to obtain point-estimates:

- $Y_{it}^z$ : Censored observations replaced with zeros
- $Y_{it}^r$ : Censored observations replaced with reporting limit
- $Y_{it}^*|S_{it} = 0$ : Censored observations dropped

	(1)	(2)	(3)
	$Y_{it}^z$	$Y_{it}^r$	$Y_{it}^* S_{it} = 0$
ATT DID	-1.283 (1.047)	-5.277** (1.801)	-5.375* (2.362)
ATT CIC	0.583 (1.735)	-2.864 (2.206)	-0.705 (3.415)
Observations	10063	10063	3967

Standard errors clustered at the public water system level. CIC estimates bootstrapped with 1000 replications.

# Identification Strategy: Applying CIC with interval-censored data

- ① Parametric approximation to uncensored outcome (Ghanem, Shen, and Zhang, 2020)
- ② Apply changes-in-changes (CIC) with its identifying assumptions (Athey and Imbens, 2006)


## Advantages:

- Can bound the ATT
- Can bound the distributional treatment effects

► Censored MLE for NJ


► Identifying Assumptions

## Results: Cannot detect water quality changes following the policy





**Caveat:** Large reporting limits in the pre-period in CA make it difficult to detect effects.

## Are public water systems retrofitting treatment plants to address PFAS?



## Are new wells entering or exiting the system?



# Conclusions

- Not dealing with partial interval censoring appropriately can lead to misleading policy conclusions.
- I pair a parametric approximation with changes-in-changes to overcome this issue.
- I cannot detect effects from a notification level change on water quality at the source.
- I find preliminary evidence of an increase in new or retrofitted treatment plants following the two-part policy.
- The methods shown can be applied to other settings with interval-censored data.

Thank you!  
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# Appendix

Estimates using the upper and lower bound of the distribution do not bound the ATT

**The estimates obtained using the upper and lower bounds of the distribution are NOT the upper and lower bound of the ATT.**

- Take  $F_{Y_{it}^z}(y)$  (upper bound) as the latent distribution then the treatment effect is

$$\mu_1^z - \mu_0^z$$


- Now take  $F_{Y_{it}^r}(y)$  (lower bound) as the latent distribution then the treatment effect is

$$\mu_1^r - \mu_0^r$$

- These bounds fall within the interval  $[\mu_1^r - \mu_0^z, \mu_1^z - \mu_0^r]$  (from implication II)

► Implication III

# Implementation: New Jersey PFOS Concentration



# Identifying Assumptions


- CIC assumptions:
  - ① Monotonicity
  - ② Baseline water quality is the same for facilities with the same unobservables
  - ③ Distribution of unobservables conditional on treatment is time invariant
  - ④ Support condition
- The CDF of  $Y_{it}^* | G_i = g$  is a known function  $H(y; \theta_{gt})$  with density  $h(y; \theta_{gt})$ .

Using censored MLE, I can estimate the counterfactual distribution:

$$H_{11}^{CF}(y) = H_{10}(H_{00}^{-1}(H_{01}(y)))$$


► Identification Strategy

# Number of new treatment plants before and after notification level change




► Work in progress

# Number of newly active wells before and after notification level change




► Work in progress

# Newly active wells are not that much cleaner than those testing before and after



# How does PFAS enter water?





# Public water system flow

