Tariffs Tax the Poor More: Evidence from Household Consumption During the US-China Trade War *

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Abstract

Using disaggregated US household expenditure data, we study the distributional consequences of the US-China trade war. We estimate a highly flexible demand system to compute household-specific price indexes. The increases in US tariffs on Chinese products between 2018 and 2019 led to an average price index increase of 1.09%, with a disproportionately larger impact on low-income households. Specifically, we document a 0.9 percentage point smaller increase in the household price index for the top 20% income households compared to the bottom 20%. The difference stems from wealthier households' greater expenditure adjustments and smaller reductions in product variety.

Keywords: US-China Trade War, Tariffs, Income Inequality, Distributional Effects of Tariffs, Household Consumption.

JEL Codes: F14, D31, F13.

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1 Introduction

The ongoing US-China trade war is unprecedented in the postwar era in both scope and intensity. Six years into the trade war, two thirds of Chinese exports are still subject to additional US tariffs, with an average rate of 21.6%.[1] Consequently, the share of Chinese goods in total US imports decreased from a peak of 21.6% in 2017 to just 14% in 2023. How have these tariff changes affected the price index for US households? While the existing literature has estimated the trade and aggregate welfare effects of the trade war in the US, China, and other countries (Amiti et al., 2019, 2020; Fajgelbaum et al., 2020; Ma et al., 2021; Caliendo and Parro, 2023), little is known about the heterogeneous effects of the trade war across households with different income levels. These heterogeneous effects depend crucially on the sectoral composition of consumption across households and on how different households react to the same price increases.[2]

This paper analyzes the distribution of losses resulting from the recent US-China trade war across US households. We extend existing studies by providing the first evidence of these effects using disaggregated household-level expenditure data from 2016 to 2019. We employ a highly flexible, nested Constant Elasticity of Substitution (CES) demand system, where the appeal of a product, modeled as a demand shifter, varies across households and over time. This approach allows our model to account for different expenditure shares for the same items across consumers and different changes in expenditure shares in response to the same price changes. Moreover, demand shifters in our model can result in zero demand for certain products, enabling the consumption set to vary flexibly across households and over time.[3]

We use detailed NielsenIQ consumer purchase data, which include information on prices and quantities sold at the barcode-household level. These barcodes are categorized into more than a thousand distinct product modules, such as oral hygiene products and batteries. With these data, we estimate the elasticities of substitution within and across product modules, as well as the household-specific demand shifters for barcodes and product modules. With the estimated parameters, we compute the exact price indexes at both the product module-household level and

[1]The average rate of US tariffs on Chinese goods is calculated as a weighted average of the sum of MFN tariff and the additional tariff imposed by the Trump administration. Weights are the import value shares of each targeted eight-digit HS product from China in 2017. On December 1, 2024, the average tariff rate on these targeted Chinese goods is 21.6%. The average rate on all Chinese goods is 14.6%.

[2]Previous research has emphasized that heterogeneity in expenditure shares across different products, i.e., non-homotheticity in preferences, is important to account for consumption and production response to globalization (Neary, 2004; Fajgelbaum et al., 2011; Feenstra and Romalis, 2014; Simonovska, 2015; Fajgelbaum and Khandelwal, 2016; Bertoletti et al., 2018; Hottman and Monarch, 2020; Macedoni, 2022), and other external shocks such as large exchange rate devaluations (Cravino and Levchenko, 2017).

[3]Hence, our model replicates the outcomes of non-homothetic utility functions using a homothetic utility. Hottman and Monarch (2020) describe these preferences as effectively non-homothetic. For an example of a quantification of non-homothetic preferences, see Comin et al. (2021). Our approach allows for a more general relationship between income and preferences that is not restricted to a particular functional form.

the aggregate household level.

To study the effects of tariff hikes on price indexes, we match NielsenIQ product modules to Harmonized System (HS) six-digit codes using the concordance developed by Bai and Stumpner (2019). About 50% of the six-digit HS codes subjected to tariffs involve goods sold in retail markets. To measure the effect of tariffs, we construct a household-specific measure of exposure to tariffs across product modules, based on the household's initial expenditure shares on these modules. The exposure to tariffs is similar across households of different incomes. Our findings indicate that the US-China trade war caused significant losses for US consumers. Our baseline regression results suggest that the additional tariffs imposed by the US on Chinese exports resulted in a 1.09% increase in the household-specific price index.

The household price index is influenced by three primary channels: (1) *the price channel*, reflecting changes in the average price level; (2) *the expenditure share channel*, indicating the ability of households to reshuffle their expenditures across products; and finally (3) *the variety channel*, referring to the impact of changes in the bundles of purchased products. All three channels contribute to the aggregate effects of the trade war. The increase in living costs for households is primarily driven by the price channel and the variety channel: higher import tariffs led to a higher average prices and a reduction in product diversity. However, these effects are partially mitigated by the expenditure share channel, as consumers reorganize their budget shares across products.

Our main finding is that increases in tariffs disproportionately raise the price index of poorer households compared to richer ones: the impact of tariffs on price indexes decreases monotonically with income. For households in the highest 20% income bracket, the increase in the household price index is 0.9 percentage points lower than for those in the lowest 20% income bracket. This heterogeneous effect is primarily driven by differences in the expenditure share and variety channels: Richer households have a greater ability to adjust their spending patterns and experience a smaller reduction in product diversity. In essence, faced with identical price increases, lower-income households tend to eliminate certain barcodes and product modules from their consumption and alter their spending on remaining items to a lesser extent. In contrast, higher-income households adjust their spending across various products more extensively, allowing them to maintain a broader range of products in their purchases.

Tariffs can raise price indexes through two channels: directly, by increasing the prices of goods subject to the tariffs, and indirectly, by driving up the prices of inputs used in production. While our baseline results focus on the direct effect, in an extension, we calculate a measure of upstream exposure to tariffs by assessing, for each module, its dependence on tariffs imposed on its inputs. Our findings indicate that the indirect effects of the US tariff war amount to approximately one-third of the direct effects. Moreover, these indirect effects disproportionately increase the price indexes faced by poorer households.

Related Literature. Our study offers new insight into how the US-China trade war has impacted consumers unevenly. Although it is evident that these tariff increases have led to a rise in prices in the US (Amiti et al., 2019, 2020; Fajgelbaum et al., 2020) and China (Ma et al., 2021; Feng et al., 2023), the distribution of these economic burdens among consumers remains underexplored. The existing literature on the distributional effects of international trade has mainly concentrated on the heterogeneous effects of international trade on households, primarily through changes in their incomes (Goldberg and Pavcnik, 2003; Zhu and Trefler, 2005; Hanson, 2007; Verhoogen, 2008; Topalova, 2010; Han et al., 2012; Autor et al., 2013a; Pierce and Schott, 2016; Autor et al., 2021; Borusyak and Jaravel, 2021). Our paper, however, aligns with a different line of research that investigates the distributional consequences of trade through heterogeneity in consumption (Porto, 2006; McCalman, 2018; Russ et al., 2017; Bai and Stumpner, 2019; Hottman and Monarch, 2020; Borusyak and Jaravel, 2021; Hillrichs and Vannoorenberghe, 2022; Acosta and Cox, 2024).

The scholarly debate on the distributional effects of international trade via consumption is divided. Porto (2006) pioneered the examination of the unequal impacts of trade on household expenditures, identifying a pro-poor effect of Mercosur in Argentina. Fajgelbaum and Khandelwal (2016) argue that trade liberalization disproportionately benefits people with low incomes due to their higher share of consumption in tradable goods. In the context of the US, Russ et al. (2017) observe that poorer consumers spend a higher share of their after-tax income on tariffs, suggesting that tariffs function as a regressive tax. The result is confirmed by Acosta and Cox (2024), who find that tariffs tend to be higher for lower end versions of goods and, thus, they disproportionately affect lower income households. In contrast, this pro-poor effect of trade liberalization is contested by studies such as Bai and Stumpner (2019), Hottman and Monarch (2020), Borusyak and Jaravel (2021), and Hillrichs and Vannoorenberghe (2022). Bai and Stumpner (2019) report that Chinese imports similarly affect the price index across different income levels. Hottman and Monarch (2020) discover that, between 1998 and 2014, poorer households faced higher import price inflation than wealthier ones. Borusyak and Jaravel (2021) identify minimal variations in import exposure across income brackets, and thus the distributional impacts of trade appear to be limited. Lastly, Hillrichs and Vannoorenberghe (2022) augment the model by Fajgelbaum and Khandelwal (2016) with a home bias, and find greatly reduced pro-poor gains from trade.

While existing research focuses primarily on the effects of reduced trade costs, our study uniquely examines the distributional consequences of increased tariffs. Our findings offer a reconciliation between two divergent viewpoints. We observe that higher tariffs disproportionately hurt poorer consumers, suggesting that if the effects are symmetric, lower tariffs disproportionally benefit the poorer, similarly to the findings of Fajgelbaum and Khandelwal (2016). However, unlike Fajgelbaum and Khandelwal (2016) but in agreement with Borusyak and Jaravel (2021), we find that this outcome is not due to a higher import share among poorer consumers. Instead, it is because poorer households change their expenditures by less and are more likely to remove varieties from their consumption bundles.

Another distinction from the aforementioned studies is our methodological approach. To deduce the distributional effects of trade, the canonical method relies on sufficient statistics (i.e., the expenditure share on imports), while our approach is based on reduced-form impacts of tariffs on price indexes. In this respect, our methodology resembles more closely that of Bai and Stumpner (2019) and Hottman and Monarch (2020).

A study closely related to ours is Waugh (2019), which investigates the effects of Chinese retaliatory tariffs on the consumption patterns of new cars in various US counties. The differential impact on consumption in Waugh (2019) stems from varying labor market exposures to tariff changes. In contrast, our paper delves into the influence of different consumption baskets and diverse household demand responses.[4] Our paper complements the findings of Cavallo et al. (2021), who focus on the broader economic effects, such as tariff passthrough to import and retail prices and the response of US exporters to foreign retaliatory tariffs. While both Cavallo et al. (2021) and our work find that US consumers largely bear the cost of tariffs, our paper provides a more granular analysis of household-level impacts, highlighting uneven distributional effects and offering critical insights for policymakers to consider the regressive nature of tariffs in future trade policies. Our paper also complements Jaravel and Sager (2024), who find that trade between the US and China led to lower prices, especially for poorer households. While Jaravel and Sager (2024) focus only on price levels, we examine the role of expenditure switching and variety changes.[5]

Finally, our paper relates to the work of Auer et al. (2023), who examine the distributional effects of exchange rate appreciation across different income groups in Switzerland. Our study, however, has two key differences. First, the approach by Auer et al. (2023) uses sufficient statistics to measure the unequal impacts of price changes, whereas we provide reduced-form evidence of the effects of rising import prices. This allows us to distinctly analyze the variations in both the number of varieties consumed (which is lower for richer households) and changes in expenditures across product modules (which is higher for richer households). Second, Auer et al. (2023) identify whether a product is imported or domestically produced based on labeling information for a subset of barcodes. In contrast, our tariff information is available at the product module level.

The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data sources. Section 3 presents the structural framework, which we estimate in section 4. Section 5 discusses our empirical findings and Section 6 concludes.

[4] In a parallel line of research, Faber and Fally (2022) find that larger, more productive firms are inclined to cater to the preferences of wealthier individuals, resulting in uneven effects on household price indexes.

[5] Direct evidence of expenditure switching in the literature is limited, with Bems and Di Giovanni (2016) being one of the earliest contributions. Their study demonstrates that shifts in income can drive expenditure switching. In contrast, we show that tariff-induced expenditure switching varies with income levels.

2 Data Description

This section describes the main data sources and how we construct the key variables used in the empirical analysis. Our variable of interest is the household's exposure to increasing import tariffs, and its construction uses US household consumption data and trade and import tariff information.

2.1 Consumer Panel Database

We use the Consumer Panel (or Home Scanner) Database for the US, collected by NielsenIQ and provided by the Kilts Center for Marketing Data Center at the University of Chicago Booth School of Business.[6] The data contain approximately 263 million unique transactions on non-service retail spending made by 91,535 households distributed across 2,803 US counties from 2016 to 2019. We observe the associated price and quantity at the barcode level for each purchase by a consumer in different stores on a weekly frequency.[7]

A product is defined by a unique barcode, a 12-digit Universal Product Code (UPC). UPCs are categorized into more than a thousand product modules, such as oral hygiene products and batteries. We follow Bai and Stumpner (2019) and aggregate these product modules into 232 product categories and further into seven broad product groups, which we use in the descriptive tables and figures of this section. The hierarchical relationship among broad product groups, categories, product modules, and individual UPCs is illustrated in Figure B1.1.

The analysis focuses on household consumption of UPCs regardless of where they are purchased. Thus, we aggregate consumer purchases at the household barcode level to an annual frequency. Our empirical regression is based on a balanced household panel consisting of households appearing in 2016-2019.[8] The final dataset contains 39,403 households in 2,467 counties that cover the entire mainland United States (i.e., 48 states and the District of Columbia) between 2016 and 2019.

In addition to detailed budget shares for households, the Consumer Panel Database also contains information on household characteristics such as race, age, education, marital status, income level, and presence of children. In particular, household incomes are reported as 16 different discrete income ranges, from under \$5,000 per year to above \$100,000 per year. As the proportion of households in each income group varies greatly, we categorize households into five distinct income groups (i.e., lowest income, lower-middle income, middle income, upper-middle income, and high-

[6]For more detailed information about the Retail Scanner and Consumption Panel Database, refer to Hottman et al. (2016), Faber and Fally (2022), and Feenstra et al. (2022).

[7]NielsenIQ collects these data using scanner devices, with which households scan each transaction they have made after shopping.

[8]Table E5.8 shows that the results remain robust when we use an unbalanced household panel.

est income) based on the quintiles of household per capita income in 2016 to study heterogeneous responses across income groups.[9]

In Appendix A1, we present descriptive statistics on expenditure shares across product modules and broad categories, comparing households across different income levels. The highest-income households allocate a smaller share of their expenditures to food and miscellaneous items compared to the lowest-income households, with a difference of 5.2 percentage points. Conversely, high-income households spend a larger proportion on drinks and household, office, and school supplies, with differences of 1.7 and 1.5 percentage points, respectively. Differences also emerge within specific product modules. For example, in the drinks category, the lowest-income group allocates relatively more to soft drinks, beer, and malt liquor, while the highest-income group spends more on domestic dry wine and scotch. Wealthier households tend to allocate a higher share to animal food, cellular phones, and both anti-smoking and tobacco-smoking products. Meanwhile, lower-income households spend more on disposable diapers, dairy and milk products, ready-to-eat cereals, and frozen poultry and pizza. Finally, low-income households display more concentrated expenditure shares across a narrower set of product modules than wealthier households.

2.2 US Trade and Import Tariff Data

The MFN import tariffs imposed by the United States during 2016 and 2019 are from the World Integrated Trade Solution (WITS) database.[10] The additional trade war tariffs are collected from the US International Trade Commission (USITC) and we aggregate them into annual average rates. Specifically, we scale tariffs in proportion to their duration within a 12-month interval. For example, a 20% tariff implemented for six months in a year would be assigned a value of 10% (=20% $\times$ 6/12). Online Appendix A provides information on the seven waves of tariffs imposed by the US on Chinese products.

There is no direct link between the product classifications used in tariffs and in the consumer panel data: tariffs are reported at the Harmonized System (HS) level, while consumer data classifies UPCs into different product modules. We use the classification concordance between product modules and HS six-digit codes developed by Bai and Stumpner (2019) to trace the average expo-

[9]We aggregate the provided income ranges in quintiles in order to compare income groups of similar size. In fact, in 2016, only 0.54% of the household total income was in the range of \$5,000-\$7,999, while 21.61% of the household total income was in the range of \$70,000-\$99,999. The per capita income is computed by dividing the midpoint of the self-reported income interval by the household size.

[10]In our sample, approximately 8% of the US MFN tariff data is missing, which account for only 1.81% of the expenditure share in the consumption data. Applying the method proposed by Teti (2020) we could fill approximately 1 percentage point of the missing data. The remaining 7 percentage points is missing due to non-ad valorem tariffs. We did not use the ad valorem equivalent (AVE) tariffs because these rates are excessively high for certain products (e.g., the AVE tariff for cigarettes is 3000%) and exhibit significant fluctuations from year to year. Teti (2020) also considers the potentially missing AVEs to be a relatively minor issue.

sure to tariffs for each product module.[11] In our sample, 1,279 six-digit HS products were matched, and the products subject to additional tariffs covered 47.3% of the products subject to additional tariffs imposed by the US on China. As there is no more disaggregated concordance between barcodes and HS codes, in our analysis, tariffs vary only across product modules and not across barcodes within a product module. This inherent data limitation implies that we can precisely trace the effects of trade war tariffs across different product modules but not across different barcodes within the same product module.

Appendix A2 provides summary statistics regarding the distribution of tariffs imposed by the US on China across various product modules. The data reveal that most product modules were affected by these tariffs, with only 77 modules exempted from additional charges during the trade conflict. The tariff impact varies significantly across modules, largely depending on the tariff wave that primarily affected each category. Modules facing the highest additional tariffs include 'water softeners & conditioners,' 'salt water softening,' 'ice cream and yogurt makers,' 'water conditioner filters and units,' and 'water filtration storage containers,' each subject to an additional 18.75% tariff (refer to Appendix Table B2.1).

Figure 1 plots the additional US tariff imposed across product modules against both the import share and import penetration rate from China.[12] Among these modules, the average share of US imports from China is 17.6%, while the average import penetration rate is 6.5%. Notably, many product modules, such as toasters, baby accessories, and bathroom scales, exhibit high import penetration rates and substantial import shares from China. The figure further suggests that the tariff-induced price effects could potentially have been greater if modules with high import shares from China had been subject to the highest tariffs. Instead, these products generally face low to medium additional tariffs.

2.3 Household Exposure to Trade War Tariffs

Our key explanatory variable is a measure of exposure to US import tariffs for household h in year t, which we denote as TAR_{ht} and is constructed by combining the consumer panel and import tariff data. We measure each household's exposure to tariffs by summing module-level tariffs, weighted by each household's expenditure share on each module before the trade war. TAR_{ht} is

[11] Bai and Stumpner (2019) generate the concordance between product modules and HS six-digit codes by using a search engine made by the US Census Bureau's Schedule B and the Canadian Importers Database, which aims to produce the largest number of merged categories possible, while ensuring all relevant NielsenIQ modules and HS codes are included within each category. The resulting concordance contains 324 distinct categories, spanning 1,147 NielsenIQ product modules and 878 HS six-digit codes. In matching HS six-digit codes to NielsenIQ modules, there are 125 one-to-one matches. In addition, there are 51 NielsenIQ modules that can be matched to multiple six-digit HS codes, and there are 87 six-digit HS codes that each can be matched to multiple NielsenIQ modules.

[12] Appendix B2 details the computation of these measures.

Figure 1: US Additional Tariffs on China and Import Metrics



(a) Import Share from China



(b) Import Penetration from China

Notes: The vertical axis in both figures represents the average additional tariff imposed during 2018-2019. In (a), the horizontal axis illustrates the import share from China in 2016, defined as the share of imports from China in total US imports. In (b), the horizontal axis represents the import penetration rate from China in 2016, defined as the share of imports from China in total expenditure, calculated as domestic output plus imports minus exports. Blue circles represent the means of 100 evenly-sized bins. The red line is a linear fit.

computed according to the following equation:

$$TAR_{ht} = \sum_{m \in \Omega^{M}_{ht_0}} S_{hmt_0} \tau^{US,CHN}_{mt} \tag{1}$$

where S_{hmt_0} denotes household h's expenditure share on module m before the trade war in $t_0 = 2016$ and $\Omega^{M}_{ht_0}$ denotes the set of modules purchased by household h in $t_0 = 2016$. By construction, $\sum_{m \in \Omega^{M}_{ht_0}} S_{hmt_0} = 1$ for any household. The variable $\tau^{US,CHN}_{mt}$ is the tariff rate imposed by the US on Chinese goods in module m, including MFN tariff rates and additional tariffs during the 2018-2019 trade war. The intuition behind this measure is to exploit the exogenous changes in tariff rates imposed by the US, while maintaining a stable composition of consumption baskets for each household over time.

Since we match tariffs at the product module level, it remains unclear whether the observed price effects, measured by our tariff exposure, stem from higher prices of UPCs originating from China or from price increases by Chinese competitors in response to the tariffs. The tariff impacts that we quantify encompass both effects. Additionally, in our baseline regression, we abstract from the indirect effects of the trade war caused by higher tariffs on intermediate inputs, which could contribute to increased prices of final goods. We explore this channel in a subsequent extension presented below.

Figure 2 illustrates the correlation between the change in household tariff exposure (i.e., before and after the US-China trade war) and per capita household income. Notably, the upward-sloping lines in Figure 2 suggests that richer households experienced higher tariff shocks, while poorer households faced lower tariff shocks. Yet, the difference between income groups is minimal, ranging from 5.0% for the lowest-income group to 5.2% for the second highest-income group. As we demonstrate below, the results of our reduced-form regressions suggest that richer households experience a smaller increase in the price index. Therefore, relying solely on the tariff exposure measure as a sufficient statistic would yield misleading conclusions.

Figure 2: Changes in Tariff Exposure and Household Income



Notes: The figure describes the correlation between changes in household tariff exposure (i.e., 2016-2017 average and 2018-2019 average) and per capita household income in 2016. Each observation is a household. Blue circles represent the means of 18 evenly-sized bins. The red line is a linear fit.

3 Quantification Framework

This section presents the structural model we use to quantify the effects of tariffs on the price indexes of households across different income levels. Our model provides a framework designed to capture the responses of various income groups to tariff-induced price changes and dissects the channels through which tariffs impact household-specific price indexes.

3.1 Model Environment

Households enjoy the consumption of a discrete number of varieties of differentiated goods. We denote each household with the subscript h and varieties with v, equivalent to a UPC in the empirical application. Each UPC belongs to a single module, denoted by m. For example, a UPC is "Colgate Total Toothpaste" and the corresponding product module is "Oral Hygiene Products". Households have a nested preference structure with two layers. The first layer is a CES aggregation over product modules $m \in \Omega^M_{ht}$, such that the utility of household h at time t, denoted with U_{ht}, is given by the following equation:

$$U_{ht} = \Big[\sum_{m \in \Omega^M_{ht}} \Phi_{hmt}^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}} Q_{hmt}^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}} \Big]^{\frac{\sigma}{\sigma-1}} \tag{2}$$

where Q_{hmt} is the consumption index of module m for household h at time t; $\Phi_{hmt} \geq 0$ is household h's taste parameter for module m; $\sigma > 0$ denotes the elasticity of substitution across modules, and Ω^M_{ht} is the set of product modules. If $\Phi_{hmt} = 0$, the household does not purchase any varieties of module m. The consumption index Q_{hmt} of module m for household h at time t is the second layer of the preference, and it is a CES aggregation over UPCs:

$$Q_{hmt} = \Big[\sum_{v \in \Omega_{hmt}} \varphi_{hvt}^{\frac{\sigma^m-1}{\sigma^m}} q_{hvt}^{\frac{\sigma^m-1}{\sigma^m}} \Big]^{\frac{\sigma^m}{\sigma^m-1}} \tag{3}$$

where q_{hvt} is the consumption of product v in module m for household h at time t; φ_{hvt} captures the demand shifter of household h for UPC v; σ^m is the elasticity of substitutions across varieties within the product module m; Ω_{hmt} is the set of varieties in module m at time t. While in a standard CES framework, households purchase all varieties, in our model, if φ_{hvt}, UPC v is not purchased by household h. Given the demand system, we derive the household-specific price index in the following equation:

$$P_{ht} = \Big[\sum_{m \in \Omega^M_{ht}} (P_{hmt}/\Phi_{hmt})^{1-\sigma} \Big]^{1/(1-\sigma)}, \quad P_{hmt} = \Big[\sum_{v \in \Omega_{hmt}} (p_{vt}/\varphi_{hvt})^{1-\sigma^m} \Big]^{1/(1-\sigma^m)} \tag{4}$$

where P_{hmt} is the household module-specific price index. The utility-maximizing expenditures of household h on module m and variety v are expressed in equation (5):

$$Y_{hmt} = \frac{\Phi_{hmt}^{\sigma-1} P_{hmt}^{1-\sigma}}{\sum_{n \in \Omega^M_{ht}} \Phi_{hnt}^{\sigma-1} P_{hnt}^{1-\sigma}} Y_{ht}, \quad Y_{hvt} = \frac{\varphi_{hvt}^{\sigma^m-1} p_{vt}^{1-\sigma^m}}{\sum_{v' \in \Omega_{hmt}} \varphi_{hv't}^{\sigma^m-1} p_{v't}^{1-\sigma^m}} Y_{hmt} \tag{5}$$

where Y_{ht} denotes the total household income, and Y_{hmt} and Y_{hvt} are the expenditures on module m and UPC v, respectively. As implied by the demand system, heterogeneity across households in demand shifters for modules and UPCs generates heterogeneity in product expenditure shares across consumers of different incomes, conditional on the same prices.

The market demand for product v in module m at time t (i.e., $q_{vt} = \sum_h q_{hvt}$) can be written in equation (6):

$$q_{vt} = \sum_h \left(\frac{\varphi_{hvt}^{\sigma^m - 1} p_{vt}^{-\sigma^m}}{P_{hmt}^{1-\sigma^m}} \right) Y_{hmt} = \sum_h \left(\frac{\varphi_{hvt}^{\sigma^m - 1} Y_{hmt}}{P_{hmt}^{1-\sigma^m}} \right) p_{vt}^{-\sigma^m} \tag{6}$$

Given the structure of the demand, we want to specify the supply of product v in a way that is both tractable and flexible enough to be applicable to many studies. Following the framework established by Feenstra (1994) and Broda and Weinstein (2006, 2010), we assume that the supply curve is upward-sloping with constant elasticity, represented as:

$$p_{vt} = exp(\delta_{vt}) q_{vt}^{\omega^m} \tag{7}$$

where $\omega^m \geq 0$ is the inverse supply elasticity in sector m, δ_{vt} capture unobservable variety-specific supply shocks.

The above quantitative framework extends the models of Bai and Stumpner (2019) and Hottman and Monarch (2020) by introducing heterogeneity in consumer taste across households over the same product in a similar way to Feenstra et al. (2022). In particular, the CES framework in Bai and Stumpner (2019) cannot capture heterogeneity in expenditure shares over an identical product across households. Hence, that framework cannot fully capture the variance in how individuals with different income levels respond to price changes. With a more general setting, Hottman and Monarch (2020) construct household-specific import price indexes within a two-tier CES framework, where they allow the household-specific taste shifters to vary across sectors but not across products within a sector. Our approach extends this framework by introducing heterogeneity in demand shifters at a more granular level.[13]

In the non-homothetic CES preferences model described by Comin et al. (2021), the product demand shifters are influenced by both household-utility and product-specific income elasticity. Our methodology differs from Comin et al. (2021) in that it does not prescribe a specific functional relationship between income and demand shifters. As a result, our approach accommodates any possible relationship between these variables, including non-monotonic relationships and scenarios where demand shifters may be zero. Additionally, our model simplifies the identification of product-specific demand shifters within a nested preference framework, treating them as demand residuals.

[13] In a robustness exercise, we quantify the welfare costs of the tariffs using the model by Hottman and Monarch (2020). Without assuming heterogeneity in demand shifters across households within a product module, we overestimate the increase in the price index due to the tariffs (1.6% relative to our baseline result of 1.09%) for all households and, in particular, for richer households.

3.2 Household-specific Consumer Price Indexes

We follow Redding and Weinstein (2020) and express the exact price index as a function of four components: the average UPC prices, the average UPC expenditure share within the product module, the average module expenditure share, and the variety adjustment term accounting for entry and exit of UPCs.

To derive this decomposition, we proceed as follows. Inverting the demand Y_{hvt} in (5), we solve for the household-module specific price index, which is shown in equation (8):

$$P_{hmt} = s_{hvt}^{1/(\sigma^m-1)}\left(\frac{p_{vt}}{\varphi_{hvt}}\right) \tag{8}$$

where $s_{hvt} = Y_{hvt}/Y_{hmt}$ is the expenditure on UPC v as a share of total expenditure in module m for household h in year t. Taking the unweighted geometric mean across all N_{hmt} varieties in Ω_{hmt}, we obtain the following expression for the price index:

$$P_{hmt} = \left[\prod_{v\in\Omega_{hmt}} s_{hvt}^{\frac{1}{N_{hmt}(\sigma^m-1)}}\right]\left[\prod_{v\in\Omega_{hmt}} (p_{vt})^{\frac{1}{N_{hmt}}}\right] \tag{9}$$

To derive the expression in the second bracket, we normalize the geometric mean of the demand shifters across UPCs to one, i.e., $\widetilde{\varphi_{hvt}} = \prod_{v\in\Omega^{N_{hmt}}_{hmt}}(\varphi_{hvt})^{\frac{1}{N_{hmt}}} = \widetilde{\varphi_{hv}} = 1$, following Hottman and Monarch (2020).[14] Thus, the changes in the household-module-specific price index are driven by changes in the prices of UPCs and changes in expenditure shares.

Next, we invert equation (5) to obtain P_{ht} as a function of the expenditure share S_{hmt} on module m for household h:

$$P_{ht} = S_{hmt}^{1/(\sigma-1)}\left(\frac{P_{hmt}}{\Phi_{hmt}}\right) \tag{10}$$

where $S_{hmt} = Y_{hmt}/Y_{ht}$ is the expenditure on module m as a share of total expenditure for household h in year t.

To capture the effect of the entry and exit of product modules in the households' consumption bundles, we compute the share of expenditures on product modules that are continuously purchased by households. This expenditure share is informative of the welfare gains from variety as purchases of new product modules lead to a smaller expenditure share on continuously purchased products (Feenstra, 1994). Let $\bar{\Omega}_h^M$ denote the set of common product modules that appear in the consumption basket of household h continuously from 2016 to 2019, defined as: $\bar{\Omega}_h^M = \Omega_{ht}^M \cap \Omega_{hk}^M$, $\forall t, k = 2016, ..., 2019$.[15] Let λ_{ht} denote the spending on the set of common modules $\bar{\Omega}_h^M$ in year t

[14] We use a tilde above a variable to denote a geometric mean across common modules.

[15] In our price index decomposition, we do not consider the entry and exit of UPCs within a module, although later we will examine the effects of tariffs on the number of UPCs consumed. The reason for this choice is the

by household h, relative to her total spending at time t, which can be expressed by the following equation:

$$\lambda_{ht} \equiv \frac{\sum_{m\in\bar{\Omega}_h^M} \sum_{v\in\Omega_{hmt}} p_{vt} q_{hvt}}{\sum_{m\in\,\Omega_{ht}^M} \sum_{v\in\Omega_{hmt}} p_{vt} q_{hvt}} = 1 - \frac{\sum_{m\in\Omega_{ht}^M\setminus\bar{\Omega}_h^M} \sum_{v\in\Omega_{hmt}} p_{vt} q_{hvt}}{\sum_{m\in\,\Omega_{ht}^M} \sum_{v\in\Omega_{mt}} p_{vt} q_{hvt}} \tag{11}$$

where λ_{ht} also equals one minus household h's expenditure share on modules consumed only at time t.

The expenditure share on common products λ_{ht} can be written as $S_{hmt}/S_{hmt}(\bar{\Omega}_h^M)$, where $S_{hmt}(\bar{\Omega}_h^M) \equiv \frac{\sum_{v\in\Omega_{hmt}} p_{vt} q_{hvt}}{\sum_{g\in\bar{\Omega}_h^M} \sum_{v\in\Omega_{hgt}} p_{vt} q_{hvt}}$ for $\forall m \in \bar{\Omega}_h^M$. We can replace the share S_{hmt} in equation (10) by using $S_{hmt} = S_{hmt}(\bar{\Omega}_h^M)\lambda_{ht}$, as shown in following equation:

$$P_{ht} = S_{hmt}(\bar{\Omega}_h^M)^{1/(\sigma-1)} \left(\frac{P_{hmt}}{\Phi_{hmt}}\right) \lambda_{ht}^{1/(\sigma-1)} \tag{12}$$

We derive the exact price index by substituting equation (9) into equation (12), and taking the unweighted geometric mean over the modules in the common set $\bar{\Omega}_h^M$. We follow the normalization assumption of Hottman and Monarch (2020), that is, $\widetilde{\Phi_{hmt}} = \prod_{m\in\bar{\Omega}_h^M} (\Phi_{hmt})^{\frac{1}{M_h}} = \widetilde{\Phi_{hm}} = 1$, where $M_h = \|\bar{\Omega}_h^M\|$ denotes the number of common modules consumed by the household h. The exact price index is equal to:

$$P_{ht} = \left[\prod_{m\in\bar{\Omega}_h^M} \prod_{v\in\Omega_{hmt}} (p_{vt})^{\frac{1}{M_h N_{hmt}}}\right] S_{ht}(\bar{\Omega}_h^M) \Lambda_{ht}(\bar{\Omega}_h^M) \tag{13}$$

where the expenditure share term $S_{ht}(\bar{\Omega}_h^M)$ and the variety adjustment term $\Lambda_{ht}(\bar{\Omega}_h^M)$ are defined as:

$$S_{ht}(\bar{\Omega}_h^M) \equiv \left[\prod_{m\in\bar{\Omega}_h^M} S_{hmt}(\bar{\Omega}_h^M)^{\frac{1}{M_h(\sigma-1)}}\right] \left[\prod_{m\in\bar{\Omega}_h^M} \prod_{v\in\Omega_{hmt}} s_{hvt}^{\frac{1}{M_h N_{hmt}(\sigma^m-1)}}\right] \tag{14}$$

$$\Lambda_{ht}(\bar{\Omega}_h^M) \equiv \left[\prod_{m\in\bar{\Omega}_h^M} \lambda_{ht}^{\frac{1}{M_h(\sigma-1)})}\right] = \lambda_{ht}^{\frac{1}{\sigma-1}} \tag{15}$$

The decomposition of the exact price index has an intuitive interpretation. We refer to the first term on the right-hand side of equation (13) as the *price channel*, as it represents the geometric mean of prices across varieties within the common module set. This corresponds to the Jevons price index established by Jevons (1865), which is widely used in official statistics for measuring

small number of UPCs that are consumed continuously by households. For instance, in approximately 82.46% of the household-module segments in the sample, there is no UPC consumed in all periods, i.e., the set of common UPCs is empty. Since the modules are sufficiently disaggregated, our analysis is confined to accounting for the entry and exit of product modules.

inflation at the lowest level of aggregation. In the special case where UPCs are perfect substitutes, the exact price index simplifies to the Jevons index, since the exponents on the second and third terms of equation (13) converge to zero.

The second term $S_{ht}(\bar{\Omega}_h^M)$, which we refer to as the *expenditure share channel*, depends on the geometric mean of expenditure shares for varieties and modules. This term was first introduced by Redding and Weinstein (2020). We interpret this term as an adjustment in the price index driven by differences in tastes for specific products, but subject to normalizations $\widetilde{\varphi_{hvt}} = \widetilde{\varphi_{hv}} = 1$ for UPCs and $\widetilde{\Phi_{hmt}} = \widetilde{\Phi_{hm}} = 1$ for modules in the common set $\bar{\Omega}_h^M$. The term $S_{ht}(\bar{\Omega}_h^M)$ can be further decomposed into two components as shown in equation (14): the geometric mean of expenditures shares across common product modules and the geometric mean of expenditure shares across varieties within a module. The first component captures the extent of heterogeneity in expenditure share among common modules, and the second component captures the degree of heterogeneity in expenditure shares across barcodes within modules.

The expenditure share channel is influenced by the dispersion of expenditure shares across modules and UPCs. As expenditure shares become more concentrated, the term increases. Hence, a higher concentration of expenditures on fewer modules or UPCs increases the price index, and a more even distribution of expenditures reduces the price index. The underlying intuition for this share term is that when faced with varieties of a differentiated good, consumers inherently benefit from a spread in taste-adjusted prices. This spread among varieties is valuable because it affords them the flexibility to maximize their utility by selecting varieties with lower taste-adjusted prices over those with higher taste-adjusted prices.[16]

The last term of equation (13) represents the *variety channnel* as it captures how the availability of varieties affects the exact price index and accounts for the effect resulting from the entry and exit of product modules, a canonical term first introduced in the literature by Feenstra (1994). In the case that new varieties are more attractive than disappearing ones for household h, her share of expenditures on modules only available at time t increases, which reduces $\Lambda_{ht}(\bar{\Omega}_h^M)$ and thus lowers the consumer price index.

4 Calibration of Model Parameters

To apply our method to compute the exact price index for households and investigate the distributional impact of tariff changes, we need to calibrate the key model parameters, which include the elasticities of substitution across modules and UPCs and the consumer demand shifters over

[16] Concerns may arise regarding how to evaluate the welfare effects of tariffs if they are linked to preference changes caused by shifting demand shifters. In this context, the price index serves as a valid welfare measure because it incorporates adjustments in consumer preferences. Specifically, the price index captures changes in the cost of achieving a given level of utility, reflecting both changes in prices and demand shifters induced by the tariff.

product modules and UPCs. The estimation proceeds in two stages: first, we estimate the second-layer utility parameters; second, we estimate the first-layer parameters. To address the issue of endogeneity in estimating demand parameters, we closely follow the method of Feenstra (1994) in estimating parameters in the first stage and that of Hottman and Monarch (2020) in the second stage. The estimation is based on the data from the NielsenIQ's Consumer Panel Database.

4.1 Estimating Parameters of the Second Layer

For each module m, we estimate the following parameters: 1) the elasticity of substitution σ^m, 2) the inverse supply elasticity ω^m, 3) the UPC-specific demand shifters φ_{vt}, and 4) the UPC-specific supply shifters δ_{vt}. We follow Feenstra (1994)'s approach of identification based on heteroskedasticity to estimate the first two parameters, as this method has been widely used (Broda and Weinstein, 2006; Hausmann and Xu, 2019; Feenstra et al., 2020; Hottman and Monarch, 2020).

Double-Differenced Demand. First, we take logs of equation (6), and further take a double difference with respect to time t and another UPC k in the same module m to obtain the expression characterizing the demand relationship between expenditures and prices:

$$\Delta^{k,t} \ln(p_{vt}q_{vt}) = (1 - \sigma^m)\Delta^{k,t} \ln p_{vt} + \nu_{vt} \tag{16}$$

where $\Delta^{k,t} x_{vt} \equiv (x_{vt} - x_{vt-1}) - (x_{kt} - x_{kt-1})$ denotes the double difference operation and ν_{vt} is the unobserved error term, defined by the following equation $\nu_{vt} \equiv \Delta^t \ln \sum_h \left(\frac{\varphi_{hvt}^{\sigma^m-1} Y_{hmt}}{P_{hmt}^{1-\sigma^m}}\right) - \Delta^t \ln \sum_h \left(\frac{\varphi_{hkt}^{\sigma^m-1} Y_{hmt}}{P_{hmt}^{1-\sigma^m}}\right)$, and $\Delta^t x_t \equiv x_t - x_{t-1}$ denotes the single difference across time. The term ν_{vt} captures the unobserved double-differenced idiosyncratic demand shocks.

Double-Differenced Supply. Taking logs of equation (7) and adding $\omega^m \ln p_{vt}$ to both sides, we then double-difference the equation with respect to time and to another product k. This yields the following equation for the supply relationship between product expenditures and prices:

$$\Delta^{k,t} \ln p_{vt} = \frac{\omega^m}{\omega^m + 1}\Delta^{k,t} \ln(p_{vt}q_{vt}) + \kappa_{vt} \tag{17}$$

where $\kappa_{vt} \equiv 1/(1 + \omega^m)[\Delta^t\delta_{vt} - \Delta^t\delta_{kt}]$ measures the unobserved double-differenced idiosyncratic supply shocks.

Moment Conditions. As in Feenstra (1994), we obtain a set of moment conditions holding for each UPC based on an orthogonality condition between the unobserved double-differenced idiosyncratic shocks to demand (ν_{vt}) and to supply (κ_{vt}):

$$G_v(\beta_m) = \mathbb{E}_T[\nu_{vt}(\beta_m)\ \kappa_{vt}(\beta_m)] = 0 \tag{18}$$

where $\mathbb{E}_T$ denotes the expectation over time and $\beta_m = (\sigma^m, \omega^m)$. The identification assumption that the expectation of the double-differenced demand shocks and supply shocks equal to zero defines a rectangular hyperbola in the (σ_m, ω_m) space for each UPC within a given product module m (Leamer, 1981). As a result, this rectangular hyperbola effectively delineates bounds on the demand and supply elasticities for each unique UPC within the product module, even in the absence of instruments for demand and supply. Additionally, when the variances of double-differenced demand and supply shocks are heteroskedastic across UPCs, the rectangular hyperbolas differ for each pair of UPCs within the product module. Thus, the intersection of these hyperbolas enables us to separately identify the demand and supply elasticities for that specific product module (Feenstra, 1994). The double-difference operation is critical in our analysis, as it differences out the UPC and module-time fixed effects, thereby addressing most standard endogeneity concerns.[17]

For each module m, we estimate $\hat{\beta}_m$ by minimizing the following objective function:

$$\hat{\beta}_m = \arg\min_{\beta_m}\{G(\beta_m)' W G(\beta_m)\} \tag{19}$$

where $G(\beta_m)$ is a vector of the UPC-specific moments G_v defined in (18) and W is a positive definite weighting matrix. We follow Broda and Weinstein (2006) and Hottman and Monarch (2020)'s choice of weighting matrix that gives larger weights to varieties appearing in the data for longer periods and being sold with larger quantities, which are expected to have less measurement error in their unit value.[18]

With the estimated σ^m and ω^m for module m, we recover the variety-specific demand shifters. Recall that we normalize the geometric average of demand shifters in each module to be one for all periods ($\widetilde{\varphi_{hvt}} = \widetilde{\varphi_{hv}} = 1$). With this parametrization, the demand shifter for each UPC v can be recovered by differencing Y_{hvt} in (5) relative to its geometric mean:

$$\ln \varphi_{hvt} = \frac{1}{\sigma^m - 1}\Big[\ln p_{vt}q_{hvt} - \ln \widetilde{p_{kt}q_{hkt}} + (\sigma^m - 1)(\ln p_{vt} - \ln \widetilde{p_{kt}})\Big] \tag{20}$$

where $\widetilde{p_{kt}q_{hkt}}$ and $\widetilde{p_{kt}}$ denote the geometric mean of $p_{kt}q_{hkt}$ and p_{kt} across all UPCs $k \in \Omega_{hmt}$ at time t. Finally, we can directly compute δ_{vt} using equation (7).

[17] By differencing across UPCs within the module, we eliminate common module-level shocks that could affect both demand residuals and supply residuals. Similarly, differencing over time within UPCs eliminates time-invariant heterogeneity between varieties (e.g. different production technologies).

[18] Specifically, we weight products according to $T_v^{3/2}(\frac{1}{q_{vt}} + \frac{1}{q_{vt-1}})^{-1/2}$, where T_v denotes the number of periods that UPC v is present in the sample, and q_{vt} is the quantity of UPC v purchased by all households.

4.2 Estimating Parameters of the First Layer

In the second stage, we estimate the elasticity of substitution across product modules σ. We take logs of equation (5) and take the double difference over time and relative to a product module k to obtain:

$$\Delta^{k,t} \ln Y_{hmt} = (1-\sigma)\Delta^{k,t} \ln P_{hmt} + \nu_{hmt} \tag{21}$$

where $\nu_{hmt} = (\sigma - 1)\Delta^{k,t} \ln \Phi_{hmt}$. Given the estimated parameters from the first stage, we can compute the household-module-specific price index using equation (8). Then, we estimate the above equation by pooling the double-differenced variables across households h, modules m, and time t. After the double difference, any time-invariant heterogeneity across modules does not affect the estimation.

Instrumental Variable. A regression of $\Delta^{k,t} \ln Y_{hmt}$ on $\Delta^{k,t} \ln P_{hmt}$ is subject to endogeneity bias, as the price index is affected by ν_{hmt}, the error term of (21), which includes household-module-specific demand shifters. To address this bias, we employ an instrumental variable (IV) approach as in Hottman et al. (2016) and Hottman and Monarch (2020), who decompose the module-level price index into four components and use the component unaffected by demand shifters as the instrumental variable. Specifically, the change in the log of the module price index can be linearly decomposed into four terms:

$$\begin{aligned}\Delta^{k,t} \ln P_{hmt} = {}& \Delta^{k,t}\left(\frac{1}{N_{hmt}}\sum_{v\in\Omega_{hmt}} \ln p_{vt}\right) - \left(\frac{1}{N_{hmt}}\sum_{v\in\Omega_{hmt}} \ln \varphi_{hvt}\right) \\ & - \Delta^{k,t}\frac{1}{\sigma^m - 1}\ln N_{hmt} - \Delta^{k,t}\frac{1}{\sigma^m - 1}\ln\left(\frac{1}{N_{hmt}}\sum_{v\in\Omega_{hmt}} \frac{(p_{vt}/\varphi_{hvt})^{1-\sigma^m}}{(\widetilde{p_{vt}/\varphi_{hvt}})^{1-\sigma^m}}\right)\end{aligned}$$

where N_{hmt} is the number of UPCs consumed by household h in module m at time t.[19] The change in the sector-level demand shifter is likely correlated with the first and third terms on the right-hand side of this equation. For instance, positive sector demand shocks could lead to increasing average prices and entry of new varieties. In contrast, the last term measures the change in dispersion in demand shifter-adjusted prices across UPCs within a module. The validity of the IV requires that the changes in dispersion in quality-adjusted prices within a module m are uncorrelated with the changes in the module-level demand shifter, as argued in Hottman et al. (2016) and Hottman and Monarch (2020). Hence, we use this term as an instrument for the change in the price index. The

[19] For the detailed derivation process, please refer to Appendix B.

instrument Z_{hmt} is defined as:

$$Z_{hmt} = -\Delta^{k,t} \frac{1}{\sigma^m - 1} \ln \left(\frac{1}{N_{hmt}} \sum_{v \in \Omega_{hmt}} \frac{(p_{vt}/\varphi_{hvt})^{1-\sigma^m}}{\widetilde{(p_{vt}/\varphi_{hvt})}^{1-\sigma^m}} \right) \tag{22}$$

The parameter σ can be obtained by estimating (21) using two-stage least squares with Z_{hmt} as IV to $\Delta^{k,t} \ln P_{hmt}$. The first-stage F statistics exceeds the recommended threshold of 10 from Stock et al. (2002), suggesting that the relevance condition is satisfied.

Given the estimated σ, we can recover the household-specific demand shifters for each module. Similarly to how we estimate φ_{hvt}, we obtain them from (5) by normalizing $\widetilde{\Phi_{hmt}} = \widetilde{\Phi_{hm}} = 1$ for modules in the common set $\bar{\Omega}_h^M$:

$$\ln \Phi_{hmt} = \frac{1}{\sigma - 1} \Big[\ln Y_{hmt} - \ln \widetilde{Y_{hkt}} + (\sigma - 1)(\ln P_{hmt} - \ln \widetilde{P_{hkt}}) \Big] \tag{23}$$

where the demand shifter Φ_{hmt} depends on household h's expenditure on product module m and the aggregate household module-level price index, relative to the household's geometric mean across the common product modules consumed in all periods by the household.

4.3 Calibration Results

Panel (A) of Table 1 shows the distribution of the GMM estimates for the elasticity of substitution among varieties within a product module (σ_m). The estimated elasticity ranges from 3.06 at the 10th percentile to 7.96 at the 90th percentile, with a median of 5, aligning with trade elasticities reported by Broda and Weinstein (2006).[20] Additionally, Panel (A) reports the inverse supply elasticity (ω_m), which spans from 0.13 at the 10th percentile to 0.99 at the 90th percentile, with a median of 0.30.

Panel (B) of Table 1 presents the elasticity of substitution across product modules, with OLS results in column (2) and IV estimates in column (3). The estimated elasticity of substitution across product modules using the instrumental variable approach is about 2.86, consistent with that in Hottman and Monarch (2020), who use the BLS Consumer Expenditure Survey and trade data for the United States.

With these parameters, we can compute the change in the consumer price index according to (13) as implied by the model. We winsorize the price indexes by dropping those below the

[20]We also present the elasticity of substitution within each product module and display them in Figure B3.1. Broda and Weinstein (2006) estimate σ^m at the HS ten-digit code level for US imports from 1990-2001. For comparison, we map HS ten-digit level code with NielsenIQ product modules using the concordance between HS six-digit and product modules provided by Bai and Stumpner (2019). As shown in Figure B3.1, our estimates are strongly positively correlated with those by Broda and Weinstein (2006) with the 10th percentile value of sigma being 2.29, the median being 6.05, and the 90th percentile being 21.37.

Table 1: Summary of Estimated Parameters

Panel A: Estimates for σ^m and ω^m												
Percentiles	1%	5%	10%	25%	50%	75%	90%	95%	99%	Mean	Observations
σ^m	1.70	2.49	3.06	3.89	5.00	6.29	7.96	9.86	21.21	5.72	953
ω^m	0.04	0.09	0.13	0.19	0.30	0.47	0.99	2.03	8.88	0.71	953
Panel B: Estimates for σ											
	OLS	IV	IV 95% C.I.								
σ	1.66	2.86	2.838-2.872								

Notes: The parameter σ^m denotes the elasticity of substitution among UPCs within a product module m; ω^m is the inverse supply elasticity; σ is the elasticity of substitution across product modules. The 95% confidence intervals for σ are computed using heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors.

1st percentile and above the 99th percentile to mitigate the impact of extreme values. Figure 3 provides the distribution of the log of household price index before and after the US-China trade war. In 2016, the average log of household price index was -2.27. However, by 2019, the average log of household price index increases to -2.20, indicating a substantial increase of approximately 7% in the exact price index.

Figure 3: Change of Household Price Index



Notes: This figure displays the distribution across households of the log of price index before and after the US-China trade conflict. We also show the change of price index by household income group in Figure B3.3.

5 Empirical Results

We proceed to investigate the distributional consequences of tariffs on Chinese imports and discuss potential mechanisms. First, we find that tariff hikes led to a notable increase in the household price index, with higher-income households experiencing a relatively lower impact. Second, we find that this difference in effects is attributed to the greater ability of richer households to adjust spending patterns and to reduce their purchased varieties by less.

5.1 Baseline Results

Our baseline regression investigates the impact of tariff shocks on the household-specific exact price index, which captures the expenditure required to attain a fixed level of utility.[21] We estimate the following regression specification:

$$\ln P_{ht} = \mu_h + \mu_{ct} + \mu \ln(1 + TAR_{ht}) + \epsilon_{ht}, \tag{24}$$

where $\ln P_{ht}$ is the price index of household h at time t from equation (13). In all regressions, we control for time-invariant household-specific characteristics with household fixed effects μ_h, and county-specific time trend with county-year fixed effects.

Panel (A) of Table 2 reports the baseline estimation results. The first column indicates that the increase in tariff exposure has a significant positive effect on the household price index. According to the estimates in column (1) of panel (A), on average, a 10% increase in import tariffs tends to raise the household price index by 2.32%. To quantify the economic magnitude of the US-China tariff war on US consumer's price index, we conduct a back-of-the-envelope calculation. In particular, we compute the effect on the price index of increasing the tariff exposure $\ln(1 + TAR_{ht})$ from 4.8%, which is its average value before the trade war, to its average trade war value of 9.5%. Using the coefficient from column (1), we conclude that the additional tariff imposed by the US on China's exports resulted in a $1.09\% = (9.5\% - 4.8\%) * 0.232$ increase in the average household's price index.

[21] While our analysis focuses on the consumption channel through which tariffs affect consumers, a parallel line of research examines the income channel, i.e., the effects of tariffs on income. Both channels are required to examine the welfare effects of tariffs, as utility is determined by income divided by the exact price index. Moreover, our approach implicitly assumes that the share of income spent on grocery items is similar between richer and poorer households, despite Russ et al. (2017) showing that wealthier households tend to allocate a smaller portion of their income to tradable goods. The disparity in the effects of tariffs between rich and poor households would likely be even more pronounced if we introduced an additional layer in the utility function to capture the aggregation of expenditures on grocery items and other non-tradable goods. In such a scenario, poorer households would allocate a larger share of their income to grocery purchases. Consequently, the higher increase we document in their price index for grocery

Table 2: Tariff Shock and Household Price Index

	$\ln P_{ht} = \ln \widetilde{p_{hvt}} + \ln S_{ht} + \ln \Lambda_{ht}$				$\ln S_{ht} = \ln \widetilde{s_{hmt}} + \ln \widetilde{s_{hvt}}$	
Dep var.	(1) $\ln P_{ht}$	(2) $\ln \widetilde{p_{hvt}}$	(3) $\ln S_{ht}$	(4) $\ln \Lambda_{ht}$	(5) $\ln \widetilde{s_{hmt}}$	(6) $\ln \widetilde{s_{hvt}}$
Panel (A): Tariff Shock and Household price index						
$\ln(1 + TAR_{ht})$	0.232***	0.097***	-0.107**	0.242***	-0.131***	0.024
	(0.062)	(0.034)	(0.043)	(0.034)	(0.040)	(0.023)
Household FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
County-Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	152,359	152,359	152,359	152,359	152,359	152,359
R^2	0.951	0.963	0.974	0.865	0.978	0.692
Panel (B): Heterogeneous Effects Across Households						
$\ln(1 + TAR_{ht})$	0.346***	0.107***	-0.017	0.256***	-0.117***	0.100***
	(0.067)	(0.037)	(0.046)	(0.037)	(0.041)	(0.025)
$\ln(1 + TAR_{ht}) \times Second\ Income_{t_0}$	-0.023	0.006	-0.031*	0.003	-0.010	-0.021*
	(0.031)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.015)	(0.014)	(0.012)
$\ln(1 + TAR_{ht}) \times Third\ Income_{t_0}$	-0.081***	-0.003	-0.075***	-0.002	-0.028*	-0.048***
	(0.029)	(0.017)	(0.018)	(0.015)	(0.014)	(0.012)
$\ln(1 + TAR_{ht}) \times Fourth\ Income_{t_0}$	-0.127***	-0.015	-0.094***	-0.018	-0.003	-0.091***
	(0.031)	(0.018)	(0.019)	(0.016)	(0.015)	(0.012)
$\ln(1 + TAR_{ht}) \times Highest\ Income_{t_0}$	-0.192***	-0.021	-0.141***	-0.030*	-0.016	-0.125***
	(0.031)	(0.018)	(0.019)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.012)
Household FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
County-Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	152,359	152,359	152,359	152,359	152,359	152,359
R^2	0.951	0.963	0.974	0.865	0.978	0.693

Notes: Observations are at the household-year level from 2016 to 2019. The dependent variable in column (1) is the household price index ($\ln P_{ht}$) as shown in equation (13), which can be decomposed into three components: price term ($\ln \widetilde{p_{hvt}}$), share term ($\ln S_{ht}$), and variety adjustment term ($\ln \Lambda_{ht}$). Specifically, columns (2)-(4) use price term, share term, and variety adjustment term as dependent variables respectively. The share term can be decompose into two components: the expenditure share adjustment across product modules ($\ln \widetilde{s_{hmt}}$), corresponding to the dependent variable in column (5); and the expenditure share adjustment within product modules ($\ln \widetilde{s_{hvt}}$), corresponding to the dependent variable in column (6). In panel B, households are divided into five groups based on their income quantile, with the lowest income group serving as the reference group. All columns include household fixed effects and county-year fixed effects. Robust standard errors clustered at household level are in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.

To shed light on the underlying driving factors, we use each of the components of the index separately as dependent variables. The three components correspond to the three channels through which tariffs affect the price index: the average price, the expenditure share, and the variety channels. These results are reported in columns (2) to (4), respectively. A 10% increase in import tariffs is associated with a 0.97% increase in average product prices. The existing literature suggests that US tariffs are nearly fully passed through to the prices of imported goods, meaning that a 10% increase in tariffs typically leads to a corresponding 10% increase in prices of imports (Amiti et al., 2020; Fajgelbaum et al., 2020). However, our analysis reveals a significantly smaller effect: average prices increase by only about 1% in response to a 10% tariff. This more modest impact reflects the relatively small share of Chinese goods in total retail sales.

In contrast, it leads to a 1.07% decrease in the share term, suggesting that households respond to the additional tariffs by reallocating their expenditure shares across product modules and UPCs. We split the share term into expenditure reallocation across product modules and that across UPCs with a module according to equation (14). Columns (5) and (6) indicate that this reallocation of expenditure shares is primarily driven by shifts between different modules.

The additional tariffs also decrease product varieties, as shown in column (4) – a 10% increase in import tariffs comes with a 2.42% increase in $\Lambda_{ht}(\bar{\Omega}_h^M)$ suggesting the significant impact of the entry and exit of products on households' price index. The product modules most likely to be dropped belong to the electrical appliances category (e.g., various types of lamps) and the household, office, and school supplies category, including items such as inkjet and toner cartridges, different types of pencils, and kitchen utensils and gadgets. On average, the dropped product modules tend to have higher average prices and lower consumption shares compared to those that remain in the common set. A detailed comparison of average prices and consumption shares across continuously purchased modules and dropped modules is provided in Appendix Table B1.2.

To shed light on the distributional consequences of tariff shocks on the price index of US households of different income groups, we divide households into five groups based on per capita income and introduce interaction terms between tariff exposure and dummy variables for income groups. We use the lowest-income group of households as the reference group. The estimated impact of tariffs on the exact price index across consumers with different income levels is reported in column (1) of panel (B) of Table 2.

Compared to households with the lowest income, additional tariffs have a smaller impact on higher income groups, as evidenced by the negative and statistically significant coefficients for the interaction variables for the third, fourth, and highest income groups, respectively. In addition, the magnitude of the coefficients is found to increase with income levels, indicating that the effect of tariffs decreases monotonically with income. A simple back-of-the-envelope calculation reveals

items would have a more significant impact on their overall cost of living compared to richer households.

that, compared to households in the lowest 20% income bracket, the increase in the price index for households in the highest 20% income bracket is 0.9 percentage points lower (calculated as $(9.5\% - 4.8\%) * 0.192$).[22]

5.2 Mechanism Analysis

In this section, we explore several explanations for why the impact of tariff hikes is heterogeneous across households of different income levels. We first examine the decomposition of the price index into a price channel, an expenditure share channel, and a variety channel. Then, we further investigate the expenditure and variety channels, quantifying the effects of tariffs on the number of UPCs and product modules purchased by households of different incomes. We find that heterogeneity in the tariff response is mainly related to the difference in the expenditure share and variety channels.

Mechanism 1: Price Channel. As shown in column (2) at panel (B) of Table 2, rising tariffs significantly increase the average price for a barcode. However, the pattern does not show a meaningful difference in the impact across households with different income levels, and thus, the increase in average prices does not seem to play a role in generating heterogeneity among households in different income groups.

Mechanism 2: Expenditure Share Channel. In column (3) of panel (B) of Table 2, we find that the share term of the price index tends to decrease more for richer households. This result implies that expenditure reallocation helps mitigate the increase in the price index, and rich families can better take advantage of such an adjustment margin. As richer households readjust their expenditures, their budget shares across products become less concentrated and, as a result, the price index declines.

For an example of reshuffled expenditures, consider the following purchases of lighting products by high- and low-income households before and after a tariff increase. Before the tariff, low-income households primarily opted for cost-effective lighting products, such as the "Cyber Tech Lighting" brand model "S-W 43W," priced at \$3.96. After the tariff, the price of this model rose modestly to \$4.12, yet these households continued to purchase the same product. In contrast, high-income households displayed greater flexibility in their purchasing behavior following the tariff. Initially, they often chose the "FEIT ELECTRIC" brand model "S-W 11.5W" at an average

[22] Besides household income, we also explore the effects of tariffs across different household characteristics. We find that households with low education, younger households (i.e. measured by whether their head is aged under 45), Black/African American, married, and those with children tend to experience a more pronounced increase in the price index. The detailed results are reported in Tables E2.1-E2.5.

price of \$12.51. After the tariff, they shifted to other models within the same brand, such as "FEIT ELECTRIC ENHANCE" options like "T-L 8.8W" (\$11.14) and "T-L 17.5W" (\$11.50).

We further investigate the factors driving the expenditure share channel, which can be due to changes in expenditures across product modules or across UPCs within a module. To distinguish between these two scenarios, we split the expenditure share into two parts as shown in Equation (14). As presented in columns (5) and (6) of panel (B), the primary driving force for reallocation of expenditure shares is product switching across UPCs within the same product modules rather than switching between modules. A simple back-of-the-envelope calculation reveals that the mechanism of product switching within the product module accounts for 73.4% (= 0.141/0.192) of the smaller increase in the price index for the highest income group compared to the lowest income group.

Mechanism 3: Variety Channel. The variety adjustment term (i.e., $\Lambda_{ht}(\bar{\Omega}_h^M)$) takes into account the entry and exit of product modules, which can also contribute to the relatively lower increase in the price index for high-income households (Feenstra, 1994). An increase in the expenditure share on products appearing in both periods raises the price index of the household. As reported in column (4) in panel (B), compared to the group with the lowest income, additional tariffs lead to a smaller increase in the variety adjustment term, indicating richer consumers face a smaller reduction in product diversity. Overall, the variety adjustment accounts for 15.6% (= 0.030/0.192) of the relatively smaller rise in the price index for the highest-income group compared to the lowest-income group.

In Table 3, we investigate whether the increase in tariffs leads households to consume fewer product modules, and the outcome variable is the number of product modules per household. Column (1) suggests that households consume fewer product modules in response to tariff increases. On average, a 1% increase in import tariffs reduces the number of product modules by 2.5%. To provide some insights into which characteristics might be associated with the new and disappearing products, we categorize non-common product modules into "high-tariff products" and "low-tariff products" according to whether the additional tariff rate is above the top 25 percentile of the distribution of tariffs. As shown in columns (2) and (3) of Table 3, households tend to consume fewer products in modules exposed to high tariff shock, while there is no obvious decrease in module number among those with low-tariff exposure. We add interaction terms between tariff exposure and household income groups in columns (4)-(6) of Table 3, and all interaction terms exhibit a statistically significant positive coefficient, suggesting that higher-income households experienced comparatively less variety loss compared to lower-income households.

Next, we use the number of UPCs of a module consumed by a household as the dependent variable in column (1) of Table 4, and the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) that captures the

Table 3: Mechanism: variety loss

Dep var.:Log module number	(1) Total number in Ω_{hmt} $\ln N_{ht}$	(2) High tariff products in $\Omega_{hmt} \setminus \bar{\Omega}_h^M$ $\ln N_{ht,high\ tariff}$	(3) Low tariff products in $\Omega_{hmt} \setminus \bar{\Omega}_h^M$ $\ln N_{ht,low\ tariff}$	(4) Total number in Ω_{hmt} $\ln N_{ht}$	(5) High tariff products in $\Omega_{hmt} \setminus \bar{\Omega}_h^M$ $\ln N_{ht,high\ tariff}$	(6) Low tariff products in $\Omega_{hmt} \setminus \bar{\Omega}_h^M$ $\ln N_{ht,low\ tariff}$
$\ln(1 + TAR_{ht})$	-0.245***	-1.401***	-0.064	-0.406***	-1.792***	-0.382***
	(0.079)	(0.172)	(0.130)	(0.086)	(0.186)	(0.141)
$\ln(1 + TAR_{ht}) \times Second\ Income_{t_0}$				0.021	0.152*	0.047
				(0.039)	(0.088)	(0.067)
$\ln(1 + TAR_{ht}) \times Third\ Income_{t_0}$				0.111***	0.287***	0.203***
				(0.037)	(0.085)	(0.064)
$\ln(1 + TAR_{ht}) \times Fourth\ Income_{t_0}$				0.188***	0.431***	0.370***
				(0.039)	(0.089)	(0.068)
$\ln(1 + TAR_{ht}) \times Highest\ Income_{t_0}$				0.268***	0.607***	0.544***
				(0.039)	(0.089)	(0.067)
Household FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
County-Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	152,359	152,333	152,359	152,359	152,333	152,359
R^2	0.907	0.685	0.711	0.907	0.685	0.711

Notes: Observations are at the household-year level from 2016 to 2019. The dependent variables in column (1) and (4) represent the logarithm of the number of modules consumed by household h. Further, by categorizing the product modules outside the common set into "high tariff modules" and "low tariff modules", column (2) and (5) correspond to the number of high tariff modules, while column (3) and (6) correspond to the number of low tariff modules. Households are divided into five groups based on their income quantile, with the lowest income group serving as the reference group. All columns include household fixed effects and county-year fixed effects. Robust standard errors clustered at household level are in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

within-module concentration of expenditure as the outcome variable in column (2).[23] Therefore, the HHI is related to the expenditure share channel discussed above. We find that households concentrate their expenditures on fewer UPCs within a module, although the estimated impact of tariffs on the number of UPCs lacks precision because of the sparsity in a household's within-module consumption. However, in columns (3) and (4), the rich suffer less loss of variety within the module than the poor. To be consistent with the decomposition of the exact price index, we repeat the same regressions using product modules in the common set (i.e., $m \in \bar{\Omega}_h^M$), and this set of results are reported in columns (5)-(8). Again, columns (7) and (8) indicate that tariff shocks decrease the number of UPCs and increase the concentration of expenditure within a module, but the change is comparatively smaller for high-income groups.

Figure 4: Impact on Household Price Index



Notes: This figure illustrates the estimated effects on household price index due to the increase of US import tariffs on China during 2018-2019, along with the results of a mechanism decomposition.

In summary, the US tariffs have a more pronounced impact on the price index for lower-income households, while the effects are relatively milder for top earners. Figure 4 shows the estimated impact of the increase in US import tariffs during 2018-2019 on the overall household price index across various income groups.[24] Moreover, we decompose the change in the index into the con-

[23] $HHI_{hmt} = \sum_{v \in \Omega_{hmt}} (esh_{hvt})^2$, where esh_{hvt} is the expenditure share on UPC v within the module m consumed by household h. A higher HHI indicates a higher concentration of consumption within a module and vice versa.

[24] Specifically, we calculate the average increase in US tariffs on China's exports before and after the US-China trade conflict for each income quintile (Table B3.1) and multiply the tariff changes by the corresponding tariff pass-through rate (Table 2, panel B) to estimate the impact for each income group.

tribution of the three mechanisms we discussed above. While richer households exhibit slightly greater exposure to additional tariffs (Figure 2), the results indicate that tariff increases led to an increase in the price index and households with higher income experienced a relatively lower impact. This discrepancy is attributed to wealthier households' greater ability to adjust their spending patterns and to reduce product diversity to a lesser extent.

Discussion of Theoretical Implications. Appendix E presents a purposefully simple conceptual framework to provide a microfoundation of the two principal mechanisms identified in our empirical analysis, which describe how consumers with varying income levels react to increased tariffs. The focus is to explain why wealthier consumers typically face a smaller reduction in the variety of goods they purchase and demonstrate a greater tendency to shift their spending. In contrast to the empirical analysis model, where any changes in consumption patterns can be rationalized with an appropriate change in demand shifters, in the theory part, we rely on a generalized Constant Elasticity of Substitution (CES), also known as the Pollak preference structure (Arkolakis et al., 2019; Jung et al., 2019), to better understand the consumer's decision making process. For the expenditure share channel, we show that although richer consumers exhibit less sensitivity to price fluctuations, they predominantly opt for the pricier products, which inherently have a more elastic demand. Hence, this higher demand elasticity implies that richer households are more likely to mitigate the impact of tariffs through changes in expenditures. For the variety channel, we show that richer households, with higher reservation prices, are less affected by tariff-induced price increases, as these remain within their affordability range, resulting in minimal loss of product variety. In contrast, for poorer households with lower reservation prices, these tariff increases often exceed their spending capacity, leading to a more significant reduction in available product choices.

5.3 Robustness Analysis

We proceed to perform various regression analyses to support our identification assumption and show the robustness of our baseline results.

Accounting for Input-Output Linkages. Our baseline exposure measure assumes that an increase in tariffs on a given product module raises its price, although we remain agnostic about the degree of pass-through. However, the price of a product module may also increase indirectly if tariffs increase the cost of inputs used in its production.

To capture these indirect effects of US import tariffs through input-output linkages (Acemoglu et al., 2016), we construct an upstream exposure measure for each module m using the BAE input-output table for the US economy in 2012. We then reconstruct the household tariff shock as spec-

Table 4: Product Switching Within Module

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	All sample				Common module set			
	Log UPC number	HHI_{hmt}	Log UPC number	HHI_{hmt}	Log UPC number	HHI_{hmt}	Log UPC number	HHI_{hmt}
$\ln(1+TAR_{ht})$	-0.136***	0.057***	-0.316***	0.121***	-0.167***	0.066***	-0.394***	0.138***
	(0.051)	(0.020)	(0.055)	(0.022)	(0.063)	(0.023)	(0.068)	(0.025)
$\ln(1+TAR_{ht}) \times Second\ Income_{t_0}$			0.055**	-0.019*			0.074**	-0.023*
			(0.028)	(0.011)			(0.034)	(0.012)
$\ln(1+TAR_{ht}) \times Third\ Income_{t_0}$			0.116***	-0.043***			0.149***	-0.049***
			(0.026)	(0.010)			(0.032)	(0.011)
$\ln(1+TAR_{ht}) \times Forth\ Income_{t_0}$			0.204***	-0.068***			0.267***	-0.081***
			(0.028)	(0.011)			(0.034)	(0.012)
$\ln(1+TAR_{ht}) \times Highest\ Income_{t_0}$			0.302***	-0.107***			0.371***	-0.119***
			(0.027)	(0.011)			(0.034)	(0.012)
Household-Module FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
County-Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	26,120,982	26,120,982	26,120,982	26,120,982	13,681,112	13,681,112	13,681,112	13,681,112
R^2	0.724	0.635	0.724	0.635	0.705	0.594	0.705	0.594

Notes: Observations are at the household-module-year level from 2016 to 2019. The dependent variable $LogUPCnumber$ represents the number of barcode variety consumed by household within module m. The dependent variable HHI_{hmt} is the concentration of household consumption, using the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) to measure the concentration within each module product. Households are divided into five groups based on their income quantile, with the lowest income group serving as the reference group. All columns include household-module fixed effects and county-year fixed effects. Robust standard errors clustered at household level are in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

ified in Equation (1). The upstream tariff shock for industry i is calculated as $\tau_{it}^{U} = \sum_{j=1}^{N} \omega_{ij}\tau_{jt}$, where ω_{ij} represents the cost share of input j in the production of i. As a robustness check, we also construct an alternative measure of upstream exposure that excludes diagonal elements from the input-output matrix. This adjustment removes double counting and reduces the collinearity between direct and indirect channels (Wang et al., 2018).

Appendix Table E3.1 presents our findings. Columns (2) and (4) incorporate the upstream tariff shock, revealing statistically significant coefficients. These results suggest that tariff shocks on upstream inputs are passed on to consumers through input-output linkages, with the magnitude of the effect being approximately one-third of the direct impact shown in our baseline regression. Furthermore, Columns (3) and (5) highlight the distributional consequences of tariffs on inputs, showing that poorer households bear a disproportionate share of the burden.

Homogeneous UPC Demand Shifters for All Households. In our baseline model, the demand shifters for each UPC are household-specific, as shown in Equation (3). We now consider a model where these demand shifters are not household-specific, aligning with the approaches of Hottman et al. (2016) and Hottman and Monarch (2020). Specifically, we replace ϕ_{hvt} with ϕ_{vt} in equation (3); however, the demand shifters in the outer layer of the utility function continue to be the household-specific for each module. Under this revised framework, we derive a new household price index, which we then use as the dependent variable in our analysis.

The results, as presented in Table E3.2, are qualitatively similar to our baseline regression. However, there is an important quantitative difference between our model and the predictions implied by the model by Hottman and Monarch (2020). In fact, the assumption that demand shifters within a module are the same across all households, and are unaffected by tariffs, causes an overestimation of the tariff's effect on the price index and an underestimation of its pro-rich effects. Using the coefficient from column (1) of Table E3.2, a simple back-of-the-envelope calculation reveals that the additional tariff imposed by the US on China's exports resulted in a $1.59\% = (9.5\% - 4.8\%) * 0.339$ increase in the average household's price index, significantly higher than our baseline calculation of 1.09%. Regarding the distributional impact, households in the highest 20% income bracket experienced a 0.27 percentage point (calculated as $(9.5\% - 4.8\%) * 0.058$) lower increase in the price index compared to those in the lowest 20% income bracket, notably lower than our baseline calculation of 0.9 percentage points.

This is because failing to account for changes in UPC-specific demand shifters reduces the adjustment in expenditure shares in response to price increases, leading to a higher price index driven by larger average prices. Since all households switch expenditures identically, the variation in tariff impacts across income levels is underestimated. In fact, we showed that richer households are less impacted by tariffs because they can more easily adjust their spending patterns. However, this adjustment is only properly measured by assuming heterogeneity in demand shifters within a product module. As this extension does not allow for it, the difference between rich and poor households in response to tariffs is reduced.

Validating the Bartik Strategy. Next, we address concerns that could affect the validity of the Bartik identification strategy, given that our household-level tariff shocks are constructed using a shift-share approach. The "shock" component captures module-level tariff increases, while the "share" component reflects each household's initial consumption share. The Bartik strategy can be implemented in two ways: one relies on the exogeneity of the shock for identification (Borusyak et al., 2022), and the other relies on the exogeneity of the share (Goldsmith-Pinkham et al., 2020). In our analysis, the US tariff increases on Chinese imports during the 2018–2019 trade war function as an exogenous shock.[25] The validity of the shift-share design in this context hinges on the assumption that these shocks are indeed exogenous. To further ensure robustness, following Borusyak et al. (2022), we test whether the module-level tariff shocks are balanced across households' initial characteristics, weighted by exposure. The results, presented in Table E4.1, indicate that none of these correlations are statistically significant at conventional levels, supporting the reliability of our identification strategy.

Borusyak et al. (2022) demonstrate that the estimating equation can be reformulated as a module-level regression, yielding an export shock effect of the same magnitude. We present the results of these module-level regressions in column (2) of Table E4.2. As noted by Borusyak et al. (2022) and Adao et al. (2019), households with similar initial expenditure shares may experience correlated shocks, indicating that clustering by household alone may be insufficient. The module-level regressions reported in Table E4.2 address this concern by enabling more accurate statistical inference after collapsing the household dimension.

Furthermore, we confirm that if the household-level regression were maintained as the baseline, the results remain robust under various alternative clustering protocols. These include clustering by county and using a separate partitioning of households based on the similarity of their consumption baskets. Specifically, we employ the k-means algorithm to group households with similar expenditure shares. The corresponding results are shown in columns (3)–(5) of Table E4.2, demonstrating that the baseline findings hold consistently across these alternative clustering approaches.

A final concern is that our results may be confounded by industry-specific shocks or influenced by initial specialization in industries with pre-existing trends.[26] To address the possibility of un-

[25]First, this trade conflict functions as a quasi-natural experiment, characterized by the abrupt and broad implementation of tariffs across a wide range of industries and products—events that households could neither foresee nor influence. Second, tariff policies are determined at the national level, driven largely by political and strategic factors, rather than by household consumption patterns or preferences, further ensuring their exogeneity relative to individual households.

[26]For instance, a sudden technological advance in the consumer electronics sector could lead to reduced consump-

observed shocks disproportionately affecting certain industries (Goldsmith-Pinkham et al., 2020), we adopt the approach of Campante et al. (2023). Specifically, we re-estimate the baseline regressions, systematically excluding one product category at a time and reconstructing the household tariff shock. The maximum and minimum coefficient estimates, along with their standard errors, are presented in Table E4.3. Both extremes remain highly significant, confirming that our baseline findings are robust and not driven by any single industry.

Controlling for China's Retaliatory tariff. During 2018–2019, China significantly escalated retaliatory tariffs on US goods, raising the simple average tariff rate from 9.32% to 22.53%. These tariffs likely impacted US prices through multiple channels. For instance, by reducing US exports to China, they created excess supply in the domestic US market, potentially driving prices downward. Moreover, due to supply chain linkages (Handley et al., 2024), these tariffs likely increased input costs for Chinese firms reliant on US imports, which could, in turn, elevate the prices of Chinese exports to the US To capture these effects, we incorporated exposure to China's retaliatory tariffs into our analysis, as shown in Table E3.3, revealing a significant negative impact on the household price index. Importantly, controlling for these retaliatory tariffs does not alter our baseline regression results.

Differential Substitution Elasticities Across Household Groups. In our baseline analysis, the elasticities of substitution, both between modules (σ) and within modules (σ^m), are assumed to be the same across household groups. In this robustness exercise, we relax this assumption to allow for the possibility that rich and poor households have distinct elasticities of substitution. To this end, we divide the sample into high-income and low-income groups based on whether household per capita income exceeds the median income level. Then, we re-estimate the elasticities applying the algorithm of Section 4 for each group separately and we calculate the corresponding price index. The estimation parameters for wealthy households are summarized in Table E3.4, while the estimation parameters for poor households are summarized in Table E3.5. Within product modules, the elasticities of substitutions are higher for richer households than poorer households, which is in line with the appendix's theoretical model that richer consumers purchase a higher share of high-elasticity goods. Table E3.6 presents the estimation results using the new household price index as the dependent variable. Our baseline results are robust to this specification.

Alternative Measurement of Tariff Shock. The household tariff exposure measure in our baseline analysis is constructed using tariffs levied by the US on imports from China, aligned with

tion prices for households with a preference for such products, independent of tariff shocks.

the households' consumption structure pre-tariff shock, i.e., $TAR_{ht} = \sum_{m \in \Omega^M_{h0}} S_{hmt_0} \tau^{US,CHN}_m$. Alternatively, we adjust this term by adding the US import penetration rate from China; that is, $TAR\_IMP_{ht} = \sum_{m \in \Omega^M_{h0}} S_{hmt_0} IMP^{CHN}_{mt-1} \tau^{US,CHN}_m$, where IMP^{CHN}_{mt-1} denotes the US import penetration rate of product module m from China in the initial equilibrium $t-1$. As in the baseline model, we use 2016 as the initial period. Table E3.7 reports results using the new tariff exposure measure, which remains consistent with our baseline results. In this case, the average exposure to tariffs increases from 0.08% before the tariff war to 0.23% after the tariff war. Using the results from the estimation, a simple back-of-the-envelope calculation indicated that the additional tariffs levied by the US on China's goods led to an increase of 0.46%(= (0.23% − 0.08%) ∗ 3.078) in the price index for US households. Moreover, this increase in the price index is lower for the highest-income group, compared to the lowest-income group, by 0.71 percentage points (=(0.23% − 0.08%) ∗ 4.755), which is consistent to the baseline estimation. In addition, we also incorporate US import share from China when constructing household tariff exposure. The results are shown in Table E3.8, which is align with our baseline results.

Heterogeneous Effects across Counties. The regression analysis incorporates county-year fixed effects to account for county-specific time trends. To explore potential heterogeneity in responses to tariff shocks, we interact tariffs with regional characteristics, including counties with high exposure to China shocks, higher income levels, and larger Gini indices. As reported in Appendix Table E2.6, the results reveal no significant heterogeneity, mitigating concerns about the influence of pre-existing county-specific trends on the findings.

Additional Robustness Checks. Appendix E5 provides further robustness tests, including placebo exercises, alternative measurements, alternative specifications, controls for household income, and analyses with an alternative sample. These exercises reinforce the validity of the results and confirm their robustness across various specifications and datasets.

6 Conclusion

During the US-China trade war in 2018-2019, both countries implemented significant changes to their trade policies, including higher tariff rates. This paper investigates how these changes in import prices impact consumers' price index and assesses the distribution of losses across US households. Existing research has focused on national product-level data to understand the aggregate welfare effects of trade war tariffs, but little attention has been given to the variation in losses among different income groups.

The paper focuses on how the losses resulting from the trade war are distributed across US households. In light of the potential for households to make substitutions across products and adjust their consumption patterns, accurately measuring the consumer price index is crucial. To address this challenge, we apply a structural model with a general utility function which incorporates heterogeneity of consumer preferences across households. We construct individual-level consumer utility functions and calibrate the model parameters using disaggregated household-level expenditure data from 2016 to 2019. We derive an ideal household-level price index to measure the price index for each consumer.

The additional tariffs imposed on Chinese goods during 2016-2019 resulted in a sizable increase in the household price index. On average, the additional tariff imposed by the US results in a 1.09% increase in household price index. However, the distributional effects are uneven, with the burden falling more heavily on lower-income groups. Specifically, the increase in the price index for the highest-income group is 0.9 percentage points lower than that experienced by the lowest-income group. We investigate the reasons for this heterogeneity of effects and find that higher-income households are more adaptable in reshuffling expenditure shares across products. Moreover, the imposition of additional tariffs reduces the product variety consumed, particularly affecting lower-income households.

Our paper not only evaluates the impact of US-China trade war tariffs during 2018 and 2019 but also sheds light on the way in which future tariff hikes impact consumers of different income levels. Given the results of the 2024 US presidential election, new duties on foreign goods are likely to be introduced. Using tariffs as a political weapon has the likely effect of increasing the price index of US households, especially the low-income ones who are less able to adjust their spending patterns and may face a much greater reduction in product diversity.

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Online Appendix for

"Tariffs Tax the Poor More: Evidence from Household Consumption During the US-China Trade War"[†]

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Online Appendix A: The Background of the US-China Trade War

This section summarizes the key events that characterized the US-China trade war between 2018 and 2019. During Donald Trump's presidency (2016-2020), the US government levied new tariffs on a number of products. These tariff changes, represented in Figure A.1, were implemented in seven waves. The average US tariff on China increased from 2.46% in January 2018 to 16.28% in December 2019. The additional tariffs are worth approximately $331.1 billion and cover 9,863 eight-digit HS products, including high-end manufacturing industries such as machinery, transportation and precision instruments, and middle- and low-end manufacturing industries such as textiles and furniture. In the following, we briefly summarize the timeline and coverage of the seven waves of tariffs imposed by the US government.[‡]

Figure A.1: US Import Tariffs Against China



Notes: The figure presents the weighted average US import tariff rates on goods imported from China. Weights are the annual import shares of each eight-digit HS product from China. Tariffs implemented after the 15th of each month are assigned to the following subsequent month.

Wave 1: In February 2018, the initial wave of additional tariffs was implemented, imposing a 30% duty on solar panels and duties varying between 20%-50% on washing machines. This

[‡]For more detailed information on the US-China trade war, see Ma et al. (2021). Bown and Kolb provide a detailed and up-to-date timeline for the US-China trade war: https://www.piie.com/blogs/trade-investment-policy-watch/trump-trade-war-china-date-guide.

wave affected imports of approximately \$10 billion. Notably, China has refrained from retaliating against this initial round of tariff hikes.

Wave 2: In March 2018, a second wave of tariff increases was implemented, targeting approximately \$18 billion worth of aluminum and steel products. The additional import duty for aluminum products was set at 10%, and for steel products it was 25%. In response, China imposed retaliatory tariffs on approximately \$3 billion worth of products in April 2018. These included 25% tariffs on items such as pork and recycled aluminum and 15% tariffs on products such as fresh fruit and wine. Following these actions, both countries adopted a "tit-for-tat" strategy, mirroring each other's protectionist measures. In the remainder, we do not describe the retaliatory tariffs imposed by China and only present the US protectionist measures, which are the focus of the paper.

Wave 3: In April 2018, the United States Trade Representative (USTR) announced a 2% duty on a list of 1,333 eight-digit HS products, representing about \$50 billion in Chinese imports. This list was revised on June 15, 2018, reducing its coverage to about \$34 billion, including 818 eight-digit HS products. The tariffs were implemented on July 6, 2018.

Wave 4: On June 15, a new list comprising 284 products identified as beneficiaries of Chinese industrial policies, such as "Made in China 2025," was announced to incur a 25% tariff. This affected approximately \$16 billion worth of imports from China and became effective on August 23, 2018.

Wave 5: On July 10, the USTR unveiled a new list targeting \$200 billion worth of Chinese imports. The US imposed an additional 10% tariff on products in this list, which took effect in September 2018.

Wave 6: After a period of negotiations, the Trump administration decided to impose an additional 15% tariffs on \$200 billion of Chinese products on May 10, 2019.

Wave 7: On August 1, 2019, the US announced tariffs on nearly all remaining imports from China. This announcement was marked by significant uncertainty, with the US initially postponing the tariff increase on some portions of the Wave 7 goods and later releasing two lists on August 13. The first list, effective on September 1, 2019, imposed 15% tariffs on \$125 billion worth of imports from China. The second list, originally scheduled to take effect on December 15, was later canceled.

On January 15, 2020, China and the US signed the "Phase One" economic and trade agreement. Subsequently, both countries issued announcements to reduce the previously imposed tariffs. The USTR announced that, starting on February 14, 2020, the US would lower tariffs from 15% to 7.5% on approximately \$120 billion worth of imports from China, which are part of the Wave 7 goods list.

The range of products affected by the additional tariffs imposed by the United States is extensive. Wave 1 only targeted solar panels and washing machines; Wave 2 mainly focused on steel and aluminum products. Subsequent waves were initially concentrated on the high-tech industries mentioned by the "Made in China 2025" initiative, such as aerospace, information technology and auto parts, and then gradually expanded to more mid to low-end manufacturing industries, such as textiles, clothing, plastics, and rubber. Our analysis combines the tariff changes of the seven waves with the Most Favored Nation (MFN) tariffs imposed by the US on imports from China. Our focus is on goods sold in retail markets, which comprise almost 50% of the HS six-digit products affected by the tariffs.

Appendix B: Tables & Figures

Appendix B1: Descriptive results

This section provides more descriptive results on the household expenditure structure. Figure B1.1 illustrates the hierarchical structure encompassing broad product groups, categories, product modules, and individual Universal Product Codes (UPCs). Figure B1.2 displays the distribution of the average expenditure shares in a selected number of broad product groups prior to the trade war for the highest and lowest income households. The consumption shares of "Textiles, apparel & footwear", not shown in Figure B1.2, are minimal, representing only about 0.1% of the total. The highest income group also exhibits a smaller expenditure share on these products. Figure B1.3 plots the relationship between household per capita income and expenditure shares across various product categories, displaying a pattern similar to Figure B1.2. Figure B1.4 displays the expenditure share across product modules, calculated as the average expenditure share across all households during 2016-2017. Figure B1.5 illustrates the distribution of expenditure share across high- and low- income households.

Table B1.1 lists the top 10 products with the largest differences in expenditure shares between low- and high-income households. Table B1.2 provides mean and standard deviation of average prices and consumption shares across continuously purchased modules and dropped modules.

Table B1.1: Top 10 Products with the Largest Differences in Expenditure Shares Between Low- and High-Income Consumers

Group Name	Module Name	Expenditure Share (%)		
Difference (p.p.)				
		Low Income Group	High Income Group	
Panel (A): Top 10 Products with Higher Expenditure Shares Among Low-Income Consumers Compared to High-Income Consumers				
Drinks	Soft drinks - carbonated	2.24	1.28	-0.96
Household/Office/School Supplies	Disposable diapers	1.55	0.91	-0.65
Drinks	Dairy-milk-refrigerated	2.02	1.49	-0.53
Drinks	Beer	1.72	1.27	-0.45
Food	Cereal - ready to eat	1.66	1.23	-0.44
Drinks	Malt liquor	0.82	0.44	-0.39
Food	Entrees - poultry - 1 food - frozen	1.02	0.70	-0.32
Food	Bakery - bread - fresh	1.49	1.23	-0.27
Food	Fresh meat	1.05	0.80	-0.26
Food	Pizza-frozen	1.10	0.85	-0.25
Panel (B): Top 10 Products with Higher Expenditure Shares Among High-Income Consumers Compared to Low-Income Consumers				
Electrical Appliances	Cellular phone	1.77	3.95	2.17
Health & Beauty	Anti-smoking products	2.57	4.48	1.91
Miscellaneous	Tobacco-smoking	2.70	4.34	1.64
Drinks	Wine-domestic dry table	1.45	2.97	1.52
Electrical Appliances	Cameras	1.79	3.24	1.45
Household/Office/School Supplies	Prepaid gift cards	1.90	3.29	1.38
Food	Cat food - wet type	1.97	3.28	1.31
Drinks	Scotch	1.30	2.51	1.21
Health & Beauty	Nutritional supplements	1.54	2.52	0.98
Food	Dog food - dry type	2.17	3.11	0.95

Table B1.2: The Intensive and Extensive Margin of Module Price and Expenditure Share

	Intensive Margin $m \in \bar{\Omega}_h^M$		Extensive Margin $m \in \Omega_{hmt} \setminus \bar{\Omega}_h^M$	
	2016	2019	2016	2019
Module Price Index	0.68	0.75	0.94	0.98
	(0.30)	(0.31)	(0.27)	(0.28)
Average Module Price	1.03	1.07	1.05	1.08
	(0.29)	(0.30)	(0.27)	(0.28)
Average Consumption Share	0.97	1.01	0.33	0.37
	(1.01)	(1.30)	(0.22)	(0.31)

Notes: This table presents the mean and standard deviation (in parentheses) of three variables—average module-level price index, average module price (calculated as total expenditures divided by total quantity for each module), and average expenditure share—calculated separately for common modules and non-common modules. For each household, we first calculate the average of these three variables within the two groups of modules: common modules (representing the intensive margin) and non-common modules (representing the extensive margin). Then, we report the mean and standard deviation of these variables across all households.

Figure B1.1: The Hierarchical Relationship of Product Classification



Notes: The figure presents the hierarchical relationship among broad product groups, categories, product modules, and individual UPCs.

Figure B1.2: Expenditure Shares on Main Broad Product Groups for Selected Income Groups



Notes: The figure presents the expenditure shares across broad product groups, averaged from 2016 to 2017, for the highest-income and lowest-income groups.

Figure B1.3: Distribution of Consumption Shares by Product Group



(a) Food



(b) Drinks



(c) Household/Office/School Supplies



(d) Health & Beauty



(e) Electrical Appliances



(f) Textiles,Apparel & Footware



(g) Miscellaneous

Notes: These figures plot the relationship between per capita household income and their expenditure shares across various product categories.

Figure B1.4: The Distribution of Expenditure Share across Product Modules



Notes: This histogram illustrates the distribution of expenditure shares across modules in 2016.

Figure B1.5: The Distribution of Expenditure Share by Different Income Groups



(a) All sample



(b) Limit the expenditure share less than 2%

Notes: These histograms illustrate the distribution of expenditure shares by the high-income and low-income groups across modules in 2016. The expenditure share (%) for each product module is in the horizontal axis.

Appendix B2: Descriptive Statistics on Tariffs

This section provides more descriptive statistics on tariffs. Figure B2.1 displays the distribution of additional tariffs imposed by the US on China, for all product modules together and by product group, respectively. Panel (A) of Table B2.1 summarizes the additional trade war tariff rates and the number of modules included in each broad product group. Panel (B) presents the top and bottom ten product modules that experienced the highest and lowest average additional tariffs during 2018-2019, respectively.

Figure B2.1: Distribution of US Addition Tariffs on Chinese Goods



Notes: This histogram illustrates the distribution of the average US additional tariffs on China (2018-2019) across modules within broad product groups. The bar width is set to 0.5, with the vertical axis displaying relative frequency, which normalizes the heights of the rectangles to sum to one.

Figures 1a and 1b are generated using trade flow data at the HS six-digit level, which is then mapped to the product module. Specifically,

- For the variable "the proportion of US imports from China", we use 2016 US import data to calculate the share of each six-digit HS product imported from China as a proportion of total US imports. Then we map the import share of HS six-digit products to the module level using the crosswalk between modules and HS codes.

- We calculate the "US Import Penetration Rate from China" as the share of imports from

Table B2.1: Summary of module-level tariffs

Panel (A): Summary of Additional Tariffs by Product Groups

Group Name	Additional Tariff (2018, %)		Additional Tariff (2019, %)		Number of Modules
	Mean	STD	Mean	STD	
Food	1.02	1.06	11.07	6.39	562
Drinks	0.84	0.86	10.00	5.17	96
Household/Office/School Supplies	2.02	2.05	14.12	7.35	308
Health & Beauty	1.14	1.22	9.38	9.57	145
Electrical Appliances	2.91	2.98	10.89	8.40	67
Textiles, Apparel and Footwear	0.34	0.79	6.29	5.03	19
Miscellaneous	1.58	1.56	11.69	8.00	49

Panel (B): The Top/Bottom Ten Products with the Highest/Lowest Average Additional Tariffs in 2018-2019

Top Ten Product Modules			Bottom Ten Product Modules (Tariff=0)		
Module Name	Group Name	Additional Tariff (%)	Module Name	Group Name	Consumption share in 2016 (%)
Water Softeners & Conditioners	Household/Office/School Supplies	18.75	Nutritional Supplements	Health & Beauty	1.49
Salt-Water Softening	Household/Office/School Supplies	18.75	Cold Remedies - Adult	Health & Beauty	0.57
Ice Cream and Yogurt Maker Appliance	Electrical Appliances	18.75	Pain Remedies - Headache	Health & Beauty	0.37
Water Conditioners Filters and Units	Household/Office/School Supplies	18.75	Antacids	Health & Beauty	0.32
Water Filtration Storage Container	Household/Office/School Supplies	18.75	Adult-Incontinence	Health & Beauty	0.30
Plumbing Accessories	Household/Office/School Supplies	18.20	Vitamins-Remaining	Health & Beauty	0.28
Humidifier and Vaporizer Appliance	Electrical Appliances	17.71	Vitamins-Multiple	Health & Beauty	0.26
Home Canning Supply	Household/Office/School Supplies	17.19	Laxatives	Health & Beauty	0.25
Home Canning Accessories	Household/Office/School Supplies	17.19	Cookware Product	Household/Office/School Supplies	0.20
Power Pressure Washer Appliance	Electrical Appliances	17.01	Protein Supplements	Health & Beauty	0.17

Notes: Panel (A) describes the module-level additional tariff shocks for each broad product group in 2018 and 2019. Panel (B) presents the top and bottom ten products experiencing the highest and lowest average additional tariffs during 2018-2019. Since 77 product modules are unaffected by tariff shocks (additional tariff equaling zero), we report on the bottom ten products with the largest consumption share in 2016.

China in total US expenditure (domestic output plus imports minus exports) for each industry in 2016. The US domestic output data, at the SIC (1987) level, is sourced from the NBER-CES Manufacturing Industry Database. Using the crosswalk between SIC and HS codes, we aggregate trade flows from the HS six-digit to the SIC industry level and then calculate US import penetration from China at the SIC level. Finally, we map SIC-level US import penetration from China back to the HS six-digit level and then to the module level.

- For the variable "average additional tariff imposed during 2018-2019", we aggregate the US additional tariff rates from the HS ten-digit level to the HS six-digit level using a simple average method.

Appendix B3: Summary Statistics

In this section, we present summary statistics for key variables. Table B3.1 provides the summary statistics for the key variables used in the baseline regressions, detailing their means and standard deviations before and after the US-China trade war. Panel (A) of Table B3.2 summarizes the descriptive statistics for all variables, while Panel B focuses on household characteristics, and Panel C provides details on the characteristic of the product.

Figure B3.1 presents the GMM estimators of the elasticity of substitution among UPCs within the product modules (σ^m). The estimated median elasticity is 5, with food products typically exhibiting lower elasticities, while appliance products tend to have higher elasticities. Figure B3.2 shows the tariff increases across US commuting zones from 2016 to 2019, computed by $\Delta TAR_{c,2016-2019} = \sum_{m \in \Omega^M_{c,2016}} S_{cm,2016} \Delta\tau^{US,CHN}_{m,2016-2019}$. The $S_{cm,2016}$ denotes the expenditure share on module m in commuting zone c before the trade war, and $\Omega^M_{c,2016}$ denotes the set of modules in commuting zone c. By construction, $\sum_{m \in \Omega^M_{c,2016}} S_{cm,2016} = 1$ for each commuting zone. Figure B3.3 shows the price index before and after the US-China trade conflict for the highest income group and the lowest income group.

Table B3.1: Summary Statistics of Key Variables Before and After Trade Shocks

VarName	Before (2016-2017) Mean	Before (2016-2017) SD	After (2018-2019) Mean	After (2018-2019) SD
$\ln P_{ht}$: Household price index	-2.258	0.398	-2.217	0.406
$\ln \widetilde{p_{hvt}}$: Price term	1.003	0.266	1.026	0.271
$\ln S_{ht}$: Expenditure share term	-3.033	0.328	-3.025	0.331
$\ln \Lambda_{ht}$: Variety adjustment term	-0.228	0.127	-0.218	0.122
$\ln \widetilde{s_{hmt}}$: Average module expenditure share	-2.715	0.306	-2.723	0.307
$\ln \widetilde{s_{hvt}}$: Average UPC expenditure share	-0.318	0.064	-0.302	0.063
$\ln(1 + TAR_{ht})$: Tariff exposure	0.048	0.027	0.095	0.046
Tariff exposure by income group:				
Lowest:	0.049	0.031	0.096	0.047
Second:	0.048	0.031	0.095	0.048
Third:	0.048	0.028	0.095	0.046
Fourth:	0.047	0.025	0.095	0.044
Highest:	0.047	0.047	0.095	0.044
$\ln(1 + TAR\_IMP_{ht})$: Tariff exposure (Robustness)	0.001	0.000	0.002	0.002
$\ln(1 + TAR\_Impsh_{ht})$: Tariff exposure (Robustness)	0.003	0.001	0.009	0.006
Observations	76211		76148	

Notes: The table describes the summary statistics of the key variables used in the baseline regressions.

Table B3.2: Summary Statistics

Panel A: Summary Statistics for key variables used in the regressions					
VarName	Observations	Mean	SD	Min	Max
$\ln P_{ht}$: Household price index	152,359	-2.238	0.402	-3.066	-0.869
$\ln \widetilde{p_{hvt}}$: Price term	152,359	1.015	0.268	0.076	2.146
$\ln S_{ht}$: Expenditure share term	152,359	-3.029	0.33	-4.199	-0.344
$\ln \Lambda_{ht}$: Variety adjustment term	152,359	-0.223	0.125	-2.264	-0.012
$\ln \widetilde{s_{hmt}}$: Average barcode expenditure share	152,359	-2.719	0.307	-3.801	0.000
$\ln \widetilde{s_{hvt}}$: Average module expenditure share	152,359	-0.31	0.064	-0.897	0.000
$\ln(1 + TAR_{ht})$: Tariff expsoure	152,359	0.071	0.044	0.000	1.052
$\ln(1 + TAR\_IMP_{ht})$:Tariff expsoure (Robust Check)	152,359	0.002	0.001	0.000	0.021
$\ln(1 + TAR\_Impsh_{ht})$:Tariff expsoure (Robust Check)	152,359	0.006	0.005	0.000	0.049
# Variety (module) number					
Log (Total variety number in Ω_{hmt})	152,359	5.212	0.358	1.792	6.335
Log (Variety number in $\Omega_{hmt} \setminus \bar{\Omega}_h^M$)	152,359	4.637	0.341	1.386	5.922
Log (Number of High tariff product in $\Omega_{hmt} \setminus \bar{\Omega}_h^M$)	152,335	2.903	0.463	0.000	4.317
Log (Number of Low tariff product in $\Omega_{hmt} \setminus \bar{\Omega}_h^M$)	152,359	4.434	0.343	1.099	5.759
Household per capita income	152,359	31434.351	19349.262	714.2857	100000
# Household-Module Level					
Log (barcode number)	31,004,629	0.612	0.729	0.000	5.762
HHI_{hmt}	31,004,629	0.71	0.312	0.006	1
#Household-Module Price Index					
$\ln P_{hmt}$: Module price Index	20,444,655	0.963	0.789	-5.886	6.908
$\ln \widetilde{p_{hvt}}$: Price term	20,444,655	1.139	0.74	-5.298	6.908
$\ln s_{hvt}$: Share term	20,444,655	-0.176	0.239	-5.990	0

Panel B : Household characteristic		
Type	Observations	Share
# Household income		
Under \$9999	3,640	2.39
\$10,000-\$19,999	9,174	6.02
\$20,000-\$29,999	14,884	9.77
\$30,000-\$39,999	17,106	11.23
\$40,000-\$49,999	17,184	11.28
\$50,000-\$59,999	15,720	10.32
\$60,000-\$69,999	12,479	8.19
\$70,000-\$99,999	32,930	21.61
\$10,000+	29,242	19.19
# Household size		
1	39,541	25.95
2	67,098	44.04
3	20,635	13.54
4	15,791	10.36
5+	9,294	6.1

Table B3.2: Summary Statistics (continued)

Panel B : Household characteristic		
Type	Observations	Share
# Income Group		
Lowest Income Group (Highest: Bottom 20%)	30,572	20.07
Lower-Middle Income Group (Second: pp 20%-pp40%)	30,505	20.02
Middle Income Group (Third: pp 40%-pp60%)	34,113	22.39
Upper-Middle Income Group (Fourth: pp 60%-pp80%)	27,105	17.79
Highest Income Group (Highest: Top 20%)	30,064	19.73
# Head Education		
Graduated High School and below	27,851	18.28
Some college	42,038	27.59
Graduated collge	52,404	34.4
Post College Grad	30,066	19.73
# Race		
White/Caucasian	119,245	78.27
Black/African American	15,812	10.38
Asian	4,934	3.24
Hispansic	8,872	5.82
Other	3,496	2.29
Panel C: Product characteristic		
Group	Number of UPCs	Log of UPC price
Food	567,541	1.087 (0.807)
Drinks	133,516	1.439 (1.065)
Household/Office/School Supplies	422,731	1.544 (1.052)
Health & Beauty	173,076	1.604 (0.981)
Electrical Appliances	38,323	2.537 (1.267)
Textiles, Apparel and Footwear	8,157	1.381 (0.906)
Miscellaneous	28,365	1.993 (1.086)

Notes: Panel A describes the summary statistics for all variables used in the analysis, while Panel B outlines household characteristics, and Panel C provides details on product characteristics.

Figure B3.1: Estimated Elasticity of Substitution within Product Module



Notes: The figure presents the GMM estimators of the elasticity of substitution among UPCs within product modules.

Figure B3.2: Tariff change across US Commuting Zone, 2016-2019



Notes: The figure presents the tariff increase across US Commuting Zone, weighted by regional consumption shares.

Figure B3.3: Change of Household Price Index by Income Group



Notes: This figure shows the price index before and after US-China trade conflict for the highest-income group and the lowest-income group.

Appendix C: Decomposing Changes in Household-Module Price Index

To find a suitable instrument for changes in household-module price index, we use the model's structure to represent changes in module price index in terms of the underlying UPC characteristics within the module. Inverting the demand equation (5), we can get the CES expenditure shares and express relative UPC expenditures in terms of relative UPC prices and relative UPC demand shifters: we calculate

$$s_{hvt} = \frac{\left(\frac{p_{vt}}{\varphi_{hvt}}\right)^{1-\sigma^m}}{P_{hmt}^{1-\sigma^m}}, \quad \frac{s_{hvt}}{\widetilde{s_{hvt}}} = \frac{\left(\frac{p_{vt}}{\varphi_{hvt}}\right)^{1-\sigma^m}}{\left(\widetilde{\frac{p_{vt}}{\varphi_{hvt}}}\right)^{1-\sigma^m}}, \quad v \in \Omega_{hmt} \tag{25}$$

where a tilde above a variable denotes the geometric mean of the variable across UPCs within a module, consumed by household h. Using this expression for relative expenditure shares to substitute for UPC price and demand shifter (φ_{hvt}) in the CES price index (4), we can derive the household-module price index in terms of the geometric mean of UPC prices and relative expenditures:

$$\begin{aligned}
\ln P_{hmt} &= \frac{1}{1-\sigma^m} \ln \left[\sum_{v \in \Omega_{hmt}} \frac{s_{hvt}}{\widetilde{s_{hvt}}} \left(\frac{\widetilde{p_{vt}}}{\widetilde{\varphi_{hvt}}} \right)^{1-\sigma^m} \right] \\
&= \ln \widetilde{p_{vt}} + \ln \widetilde{\varphi_{hvt}} + \frac{1}{1-\sigma^m} \ln \left[\sum_{v \in \Omega_{hmt}} \frac{s_{hvt}}{\widetilde{s_{hvt}}} \right] \\
&= \ln \widetilde{p_{vt}} + \ln \widetilde{\varphi_{hvt}} + \frac{1}{1-\sigma^m} \ln N_{hmt} + \frac{1}{1-\sigma^m} \ln \left[\frac{1}{N_{hmt}} \sum_{v \in \Omega_{hmt}} \frac{s_{hvt}}{\widetilde{s_{hvt}}} \right]
\end{aligned}$$

By substituting the relative expenditure shares using Equation (25) and applying a double-difference with respect to both time and UPC k within Ω_{hmt}, we are able to reformulate the change in the logarithm of the module price index into four terms:

$$\begin{aligned}
\Delta^{k,t} \ln P_{hmt} = \Delta^{k,t} &\left(\frac{1}{N_{hmt}} \sum_{v \in \Omega_{hmt}} \ln p_{vt} \right) - \left(\frac{1}{N_{hmt}} \sum_{v \in \Omega_{hmt}} \ln \varphi_{hvt} \right) \\
&- \Delta^{k,t} \frac{1}{\sigma^m - 1} \ln N_{hmt} - \Delta^{k,t} \frac{1}{\sigma^m - 1} \ln \left(\frac{1}{N_{hmt}} \sum_{v \in \Omega_{hmt}} \frac{(p_{vt}/\varphi_{hvt})^{1-\sigma^m}}{(\widetilde{p_{vt}/\varphi_{hvt}})^{1-\sigma^m}} \right)
\end{aligned}$$

Appendix D: Microfoundation

In this section, we provide a microfoundation for the two principal mechanisms identified in our empirical analysis, which describe how consumers with varying income levels react to increased tariffs. Our focus is to explain why wealthier consumers typically face a smaller reduction in the variety of goods they purchase and demonstrate a greater tendency to shift their spending toward goods with lower tariffs. In contrast to the empirical analysis model, where any changes in consumption patterns can be rationalized with an appropriate change in demand shifters, in this section, we rely on a generalized Constant Elasticity of Substitution (CES), also known as Pollak preference structure (Arkolakis et al., 2019; Jung et al., 2019), to better understand the consumer's decision-making process.

For a household h and product module m, the preference structure is illustrated by the following equation:

$$U_h = \sum_{m \in I_h} (q_{hm}(\omega) + \bar{q})^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}} \, d\omega - \sum_{m \in \Omega_h} \bar{q}^{\frac{\sigma}{\sigma-1}} d\omega \tag{26}$$

where $\sigma > 1$ and $\bar{q} > 0$ are constants. In this expression, Ω_h represents the set of products consumed by household h. The households differ according to their income levels, denoted by w_h. These preferences nest the CES case for $\bar{q} = 0$. By solving the consumer's problem, we derive the inverse demand function, given by:

$$p_m = \frac{1}{\lambda_h} (q_{hm}(\omega) + \bar{q})^{-\frac{1}{\sigma}} \tag{27}$$

where λ_h stands for the marginal utility of income. This allows us to state the direct demand function as:

$$q_{hm} = \left(\frac{w_h + \bar{q} \left(\sum_{m \in \Omega_h} p_i \right)}{\sum_{m \in \Omega_h} p_m^{1-\sigma}} \right) p_m^{-\sigma} - \bar{q} \tag{28}$$

To streamline the notation, we introduce the concept of the reservation price, p_h^*, defined as the price that reduces the demand to zero. It is formulated as:

$$p_h^* = \left(\frac{w_h + \bar{q} \left(\sum_{m \in \Omega_h} p_m \right)}{\sum_{m \in \Omega_h} p_m^{1-\sigma}} \right)^{\sigma} \bar{q}^{-\sigma} \tag{29}$$

Consequently, we can express the demand as:

$$q_{hm} = \bar{q} \left(\left(\frac{p_h^*}{p_m} \right)^{\sigma} - 1 \right) \tag{30}$$

The variation in incomes among consumers inherently leads to differing reservation prices and higher income implies a higher reservation price (Simonovska, 2015) holding constant the number of consumed varieties. Formally, if $w_h > w_v$, then $p_h^* > p_v^*$. Furthermore, this difference in reservation prices impacts the variety of goods that different consumers can afford, with wealthier consumers having access to a broader set of goods; thus $\Omega_h \supseteq \Omega_v$ when $w_h > w_v$.

Now, consider a scenario where a subset of goods, denoted as Ω_t, undergoes a price surge due to the implementation of a tariff t. We first consider the variety channel and then turn to the expenditure share channel.

Variety Channel. In our model, a product is eliminated from a consumer's consumption bundle when its price exceeds the consumer's reservation price. Our empirical analysis has shown that lower-income consumers tend to eliminate more product varieties from their consumption bundles compared to higher-income consumers. This suggests that tariffs disproportionately increase the prices of products commonly purchased by lower-income consumers beyond their reservation prices, in contrast to the impact on products purchased by wealthier consumers, which can still increase, but not beyond their reservation prices.

To further understand this, consider a ranking of products based on their increasing prices: $p_1 < p_2 < ... < p_M$. Let p_h^* represent the reservation price for a wealthier household and p_l^* for a less affluent household, implying that $p_1 < p_2 < ... < p_l^* < ... < p_h^*$. Given that lower-income consumers drop more product varieties, a significant portion of the products affected by the tariff had initial prices below p_l^*, the reservation price of poorer consumers, before the tariff was imposed. This scenario is more likely if the varieties subject to the tariff predominantly fall in the bottom or middle of the price distribution, affecting lower-income consumers more severely.

Expenditure Share Channel. To understand the changes in expenditures shares across two different product in response to tariff increase, consider the ratio of quantities demanded for products i and a product j by a specific household h. The equation is expressed as follows:

$$\frac{q_{hm}}{q_{hj}} = \frac{\left(\frac{p_h^*}{p_m}\right)^{\sigma} - 1}{\left(\frac{p_h^*}{p_j}\right)^{\sigma} - 1} \tag{31}$$

Next, we turn our attention towards understanding the elasticity of this relative quantity with respect to the price of product j:

$$\epsilon_{mj} = \frac{d\ln\left(\frac{q_{hm}}{q_{hj}}\right)}{d\ln p_j} = \sigma\frac{(p_h^*)^{\sigma}}{(p_h^*)^{\sigma} - p_j^{\sigma}} \tag{32}$$

A marginal increase of 1% in the price of the product j will augment the relative demand for product m by $\epsilon_{mj}\%$. Notice that as the reservation price approaches infinity, the elasticity converges to σ, which aligns to the standard CES case.

First, let us consider how ϵ_{ij} varies across consumers of different incomes:

$$\frac{\partial \epsilon_{mj}}{\partial (p_h^*)^\sigma} = -\sigma \frac{p_j^\sigma}{((p_h^*)^\sigma - p_j^\sigma)^2} \tag{33}$$

Hence, the elasticity declines with the reservation price. Consequently, richer consumers, characterized by higher reservation prices, exhibit a decreased response to price increases compared to poorer consumers. Intuitively, households in higher income brackets have a relatively inelastic demand for a given product, prompting a more significant reorganization of expenditure distribution among the lower income consumers in response to a tariff increase. This mechanism is not in line with our findings.

To solve this apparent contradiction, let us now consider how ϵ_{ij} varies across different products:

$$\frac{\partial \epsilon_{mj}}{\partial p_j^\sigma} = +\sigma \frac{(p_h^*)^\sigma}{((p_h^*)^\sigma - p_j^\sigma)^2} \tag{34}$$

Hence, the elasticity is higher for more expensive goods: more expensive goods, which tend to be luxuries, are more responsive to price changes. Given that wealthier consumers gravitate towards these pricier varieties, this mechanism aligns well with the empirical findings of the paper. Drawing a comparative analysis of these two last mechanisms, the tariff's effect on expenditure switching is ambiguous. Although affluent consumers exhibit less sensitivity to price fluctuations, they predominantly opt for the pricier products, which inherently have a more elastic demand. The paper's evidence underscores that this latter channel dominates the previous one in governing the dynamics of consumer responses to price changes.

Appendix E: Additional Empirical Results and Checks

Appendix E1: Entry and Exit in the Full Sample

In the full sample, we find that each year, less than 0.2% of product modules are introduced or discontinued, whereas around 28% to 29% of UPCs undergo entry or exit. As detailed in Table E1.1, our examination of how tariffs influence the introduction and discontinuation of UPCs within the entire dataset reveals that tariffs do not significantly impact these rates. This suggests that the findings discussed in this paper are predominantly influenced by consumer preferences. Even if certain products are not purchased by households, they remain on the market, albeit selected by fewer consumers. This means that the loss of product variety in the consumer's price index is driven by consumer reducing the number of purchased varieties, and not by an exit of these varieties from the market.

Table E1.1: Entry and Exit of the Full Sample

Dep var.	(1) Entry	(2) Exit
$\ln(1 + TAR_{mt})$	-0.013	-0.124
	(0.033)	(0.084)
Observations	2,057,510	2,100,986
R^2	0.070	0.075

Notes: The table explore the effect of tariff exposure on entry and exit of barcode for all samples. The dependent variable of column (1) is a dummy variable which equals one if the barcode is a new entry to the sample; while the dependent variable of column (2) is a dummy variable which equals one if the barcode exits from the sample. Tariffs are calculated at module level. All columns include module fixed effects and year fixed effects. Robust standard errors clustered at household level are in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01

Appendix E2: Heterogeneous Effects

This section examines the heterogeneous effects of tariffs across different household characteristics. Table E2.1 presents the heterogeneous effects by the education level of household heads, categorizing households into high- and low-education groups based on whether the minimum education level of the female and male heads exceeds a high school diploma. The findings indicate that households with highly educated heads experience a less pronounced increase in the price index. Table E2.2 explores the heterogeneous effects based on the age of household heads, revealing that younger households, defined as those with the minimum age of the female and male heads below 45, tend to experience a more pronounced increase in the price index. Table E2.3 investigates the heterogeneous effects by household race, indicating that white households tend to experience a less pronounced increase in the price index. Table E2.4 examines the heterogeneous effects by household marital status, showing that single households experience a less pronounced increase in the price index compared to married households. Finally, we also explore the heterogeneous effects based on whether households have children in Table E2.5. The results demonstrate that households with children tend to experience a more pronounced increase in the price index.

Table E2.6 explores the heterogeneous effects across different regions, focusing on counties with high exposure to China shocks, higher income levels, and larger Gini index. The exposure of US local labor markets to Chinese import shocks is sourced from Autor et al. (2013b) Counties with high income are identified using the Nielsen consumer panel data in 2016, with a value of one assigned to counties where the weighted average household income exceeds the national median. The US Gini index in 2000 is derived from the US Census Historical Income Tables. The results show no significant heterogeneity, which alleviates concerns of potential pre-existing trends specific to different counties.

Table E2.1: Heterogeneous Effects by Head Education

	$\ln P_{ht} = ln\widetilde{p_{hvt}} + \ln S_{ht} + \ln \Lambda_{ht}$				$\ln S_{ht} = \ln \widetilde{s_{hmt}} + \ln \widetilde{s_{hvt}}$	
Dep var.	(1) $\ln P_{ht}$	(2) $\ln \widetilde{p_{hvt}}$	(3) $\ln S_{ht}$	(4) $\ln \Lambda_{ht}$	(5) $\ln \widetilde{s_{hmt}}$	(6) $\ln \widetilde{s_{hvt}}$
$\ln(1 + TAR_{ht})$	0.269***	0.107***	-0.088**	0.250***	-0.134***	0.046*
	(0.064)	(0.035)	(0.044)	(0.034)	(0.040)	(0.024)
$\ln(1 + TAR_{ht}) \times High\ Education_{t_0}$	-0.054***	-0.015	-0.027**	-0.011	0.005	-0.032***
	(0.020)	(0.011)	(0.012)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.008)
Observations	152,359	152,359	152,359	152,359	152,359	152,359
R^2	0.951	0.963	0.974	0.865	0.978	0.692

Notes: Observations are at the household-year level from 2016 to 2019. The dependent variable in column (1) is the household price index ($\ln P_{ht}$) as shown in equation (13), which can be decomposed into three components: price term ($\ln \widetilde{p_{hvt}}$), share term ($\ln S_{ht}$), and variety adjustment term ($\ln \Lambda_{ht}$). Specifically, columns (2)-(4) use price term, share term, and variety adjustment term as dependent variables respectively. The share term can be decompose into two components: the expenditure share adjustment across product modules ($\ln \widetilde{s_{hmt}}$), corresponding to the dependent variable in column (5); and the expenditure share adjustment within product modules ($\ln \widetilde{s_{hvt}}$), corresponding to the dependent variable in column (6). The independent variable is the interaction between head education level and tariff shocks. We categorize households into high and low education group based on whether the minimum education level of the household head is greater than high school. All columns include household fixed effects and county-year fixed effects. Robust standard errors clustered at household level are in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.

Table E2.2: Heterogeneous Effects by Head Age

Dep var.	$\ln P_{ht} = ln\widetilde{p_{hvt}} + \ln S_{ht} + \ln \Lambda_{ht}$				$\ln S_{ht} = \ln \widetilde{s_{hmt}} + \ln \widetilde{s_{hvt}}$	
	(1) $\ln P_{ht}$	(2) $\ln \widetilde{p_{hvt}}$	(3) $\ln S_{ht}$	(4) $\ln \Lambda_{ht}$	(5) $\ln \widetilde{s_{hmt}}$	(6) $\ln \widetilde{s_{hvt}}$
$\ln(1 + TAR_{ht})$	0.497***	0.165***	0.032	0.299***	-0.095**	0.128***
	(0.067)	(0.037)	(0.046)	(0.036)	(0.041)	(0.025)
$\ln(1 + TAR_{ht}) \times I(65 > Age \geq 45)_{t_0}$	-0.308***	-0.074***	-0.157***	-0.076***	-0.043***	-0.114***
	(0.027)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.013)	(0.012)	(0.011)
$\ln(1 + TAR_{ht}) \times I(Age \geq 65)_{t_0}$	-0.280***	-0.091***	-0.165***	-0.023	-0.032**	-0.133***
	(0.030)	(0.017)	(0.018)	(0.015)	(0.014)	(0.012)
Observations	152,359	152,359	152,359	152,359	152,359	152,359
R^2	0.951	0.963	0.974	0.865	0.978	0.693

Notes: Observations are at the household-year level from 2016 to 2019. The dependent variable in column (1) is the household price index ($\ln P_{ht}$) as shown in equation (13), which can be decomposed into three components: price term ($\ln \widetilde{p_{hvt}}$), share term ($\ln S_{ht}$), and variety adjustment term ($\ln \Lambda_{ht}$). Specifically, columns (2)-(4) use price term, share term, and variety adjustment term as dependent variables respectively. The share term can be decompose into two components: the expenditure share adjustment across product modules ($\ln \widetilde{s_{hmt}}$), corresponding to the dependent variable in column (5); and the expenditure share adjustment within product modules ($\ln \widetilde{s_{hvt}}$), corresponding to the dependent variable in column (6). The independent variable is the interaction between head age level and tariff shocks. We categorize households into three groups based on the minimum age of the female and male heads of the household: those where the head is under 45 years old, those aged between 45 to 64 years, and those 65 years or older. We use the group with ages under 45 years as the reference group. All columns include household fixed effects and county-year fixed effects. Robust standard errors clustered at household level are in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.

Table E2.3: Heterogeneous Effects by Household Race

Dep var.	$\ln P_{ht} = ln\widetilde{p_{hvt}} + \ln S_{ht} + \ln \Lambda_{ht}$				$\ln S_{ht} = \ln \widetilde{s_{hmt}} + \ln \widetilde{s_{hvt}}$	
	(1) $\ln P_{ht}$	(2) $\ln \widetilde{p_{hvt}}$	(3) $\ln S_{ht}$	(4) $\ln \Lambda_{ht}$	(5) $\ln \widetilde{s_{hmt}}$	(6) $\ln \widetilde{s_{hvt}}$
$\ln(1 + TAR_{ht})$	0.195***	0.081**	-0.120***	0.234***	-0.135***	0.016
	(0.063)	(0.035)	(0.044)	(0.034)	(0.040)	(0.023)
$\ln(1 + TAR_{ht}) \times Race(Black/African\ American)_{t_0}$	0.106***	0.060***	0.022	0.024	0.008	0.014
	(0.034)	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.018)	(0.016)	(0.014)
$\ln(1 + TAR_{ht}) \times Race(Asian)_{t_0}$	-0.033	0.009	-0.044	0.003	-0.036	-0.008
	(0.060)	(0.036)	(0.034)	(0.031)	(0.027)	(0.021)
$\ln(1 + TAR_{ht}) \times Race(Hispanic)_{t_0}$	0.185***	0.046*	0.113***	0.026	0.053***	0.060***
	(0.044)	(0.026)	(0.025)	(0.021)	(0.019)	(0.017)
$\ln(1 + TAR_{ht}) \times Race(Other)_{t_0}$	0.152**	0.056	0.053	0.042	0.020	0.033
	(0.068)	(0.038)	(0.039)	(0.035)	(0.032)	(0.025)
Observations	152,359	152,359	152,359	152,359	152,359	152,359
R^2	0.951	0.963	0.974	0.865	0.978	0.692

Notes: Observations are at the household-year level from 2016 to 2019. The dependent variable in column (1) is the household price index ($\ln P_{ht}$) as shown in equation (13), which can be decomposed into three components: price term ($\ln \widetilde{p_{hvt}}$), share term ($\ln S_{ht}$), and variety adjustment term ($\ln \Lambda_{ht}$). Specifically, columns (2)-(4) use price term, share term, and variety adjustment term as dependent variables respectively. The share term can be decompose into two components: the expenditure share adjustment across product modules ($\ln \widetilde{s_{hmt}}$), corresponding to the dependent variable in column (5); and the expenditure share adjustment within product modules ($\ln \widetilde{s_{hvt}}$), corresponding to the dependent variable in column (6). The independent variable is the interaction between race group dummy and tariff shocks. We categorize households into four groups based on household race: White/Caucasian, Black/African American, Asian, Hispanic and Other. The White/Caucasian group serves as the control group. All columns include household fixed effects and county-year fixed effects. Robust standard errors clustered at household level are in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.

Table E2.4: Heterogeneous Effects by Household Marital Status

	$\ln P_{ht} = ln\widetilde{p_{hvt}} + \ln S_{ht} + \ln \Lambda_{ht}$				$\ln S_{ht} = \ln \widetilde{s_{hmt}} + \ln \widetilde{s_{hvt}}$	
Dep var.	(1) $\ln P_{ht}$	(2) $\ln \widetilde{p_{hvt}}$	(3) $\ln S_{ht}$	(4) $\ln \Lambda_{ht}$	(5) $\ln \widetilde{s_{hmt}}$	(6) $\ln \widetilde{s_{hvt}}$
$\ln(1 + TAR_{ht})$	0.259***	0.097***	-0.095**	0.257***	-0.128***	0.034
	(0.063)	(0.035)	(0.043)	(0.034)	(0.040)	(0.023)
$\ln(1 + TAR_{ht}) \times Marital\ Status(Single)$	-0.113***	0.001	-0.051***	-0.064***	-0.011	-0.040***
	(0.029)	(0.017)	(0.018)	(0.016)	(0.015)	(0.011)
Observations	152,359	152,359	152,359	152,359	152,359	152,359
R^2	0.951	0.963	0.974	0.865	0.978	0.692

Notes: Observations are at the household-year level from 2016 to 2019. The dependent variable in column (1) is the household price index (lnP_{ht}) as shown in equation (13), which can be decomposed into three components: price term ($\ln \widetilde{p_{hvt}}$), share term ($\ln S_{ht}$), and variety adjustment term ($\ln \Lambda_{ht}$). Specifically, columns (2)-(4) use price term, share term, and variety adjustment term as dependent variables respectively. The share term can be decompose into two components: the expenditure share adjustment across product modules ($\ln \widetilde{s_{hmt}}$), corresponding to the dependent variable in column (5); and the expenditure share adjustment within product modules ($\ln \widetilde{s_{hvt}}$), corresponding to the dependent variable in column (6). The independent variable is the interaction between marital status group and tariff shocks. We categorize households into two groups based on their marital status: single or married. The married group is utilized as the control group. All columns include household fixed effects and county-year fixed effects. Robust standard errors clustered at household level are in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table E2.5: Heterogeneous Effects by Household with/without Children

	$\ln P_{ht} = ln\widetilde{p_{hvt}} + \ln S_{ht} + \ln \Lambda_{ht}$				$\ln S_{ht} = \ln \widetilde{s_{hmt}} + \ln \widetilde{s_{hvt}}$	
Dep var.	(1) $\ln P_{ht}$	(2) $\ln \widetilde{p_{hvt}}$	(3) $\ln S_{ht}$	(4) $\ln \Lambda_{ht}$	(5) $\ln \widetilde{s_{hmt}}$	(6) $\ln \widetilde{s_{hvt}}$
$\ln(1 + TAR_{ht})$	0.219***	0.095***	-0.115***	0.239***	-0.131***	0.017
	(0.062)	(0.034)	(0.043)	(0.034)	(0.040)	(0.023)
$\ln(1 + TAR_{ht}) \times Household\ with\ Children$	0.263***	0.048***	0.160***	0.054***	0.011	0.150***
	(0.025)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.012)	(0.011)	(0.011)
Observations	152,359	152,359	152,359	152,359	152,359	152,359
R^2	0.951	0.963	0.974	0.865	0.978	0.693

Notes: Observations are at the household-year level from 2016 to 2019. The dependent variable in column (1) is the household price index ($\ln P_{ht}$) as shown in equation (13), which can be decomposed into three components: price term ($\ln \widetilde{p_{hvt}}$), share term ($\ln S_{ht}$), and variety adjustment term ($\ln \Lambda_{ht}$). Specifically, columns (2)-(4) use price term, share term, and variety adjustment term as dependent variables respectively. The share term can be decompose into two components: the expenditure share adjustment across product modules ($\ln \widetilde{s_{hmt}}$), corresponding to the dependent variable in column (5); and the expenditure share adjustment within product modules ($\ln \widetilde{s_{hvt}}$), corresponding to the dependent variable in column (6). The independent variable is the interaction between children group and tariff shocks. We categorize households into two groups based on on the presence of children under the age of 18. Households with no children are utilized as the control group. All columns include household fixed effects and county-year fixed effects. Robust standard errors clustered at household level are in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table E2.6: Robustness: Heterogeneous Effects across Counties

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	$\ln P_{ht}$	$\ln P_{ht}$	$\ln P_{ht}$	$\ln P_{ht}$
$\ln(1 + TAR_{ht})$	0.219**	0.201**	0.239*	0.266***
	(0.089)	(0.083)	(0.133)	(0.102)
× High "China Shock" Exposure (1990-2000)	0.026			
	(0.125)			
× High "China Shock" exposure (2000-2007)		0.071		
		(0.126)		
× Counties with High Income			-0.008	
			(0.151)	
× Counties with High Income Inequality (Gini Index)				-0.054
				(0.129)
Observations	152,359	152,359	152,359	152,359
R^2	0.951	0.951	0.951	0.951

Notes: Observations are at the household-year level from 2016 to 2019. The dependent variable is the household price index $\ln P_{ht}$ as shown in equation (14). Column (1) and column (2) examine the county-level heterogeneity with high or low China Shock exposure. The variable "High China shock exposure" is a dummy variable which equals to 1 if the county is exposed to import shocks from China above the median. We use the exposure of US local labor markets to Chinese import shocks from 1990-2000 and 2000-2007 respectively (Autor et al., 2013b). In column (3), the variable "counties with high income" is a dummy variable, taking a value of one if the weighted average income of households in the county is above the national median in 2016. In column (4), the variable "counties with high income inequality" is also a dummy variable, which equals to one if Gini index in the county exceeds the median level in 2000, based on data from the Census Historical Income Tables. All columns include household fixed effects and county-year fixed effects. Robust standard errors clustered at household level are in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.

Appendix E3: Robustness Checks

Accounting for Input-output linkages. Consumer prices can increase indirectly if tariffs increase the cost of inputs used in production. To examine these indirect effects (Acemoglu et al., 2016), we incorporate upstream tariff shocks in Table E3.1. The upstream tariff shock for industry i is calculated as $\tau_{it}^{U} = \sum_{j=1}^{N} \omega_{ij}\tau_{jt}$, where ω_{ij} represents the cost share of input j in the production of i (see columns (2) and (3)). As a robustness check, we also construct an alternative measure of upstream exposure that excludes diagonal elements from the input-output matrix (see columns (4) and (5)). The results show that tariff shocks on upstream inputs are passed on to consumers through input-output linkages, with the effect roughly one-third of the direct impact.

Homogeneous UPC Demand Shifters for All Households. In Table E3.2, we assume that the UPC-specific demand shifters are not household-specific, as in Hottman et al. (2016) and Hottman and Monarch (2020), while the demand shifters in the outer part of the utility function remain household-specific for each module. Relative to our baseline price index, there are two key differences that we should highlight. First, the price index for module m does not vary across households (as households do not differ in their UPC-specific taste. The module specific price index is shown in the following expression:

$$P_{mt} = s_{vt}^{1/(\sigma^m - 1)} \left(\frac{p_{vt}}{\varphi_{vt}} \right) \tag{35}$$

where $s_{vt} = Y_{vt}/Y_{mt} = \frac{p_{vt} \sum_h q_{hvt}}{Y_{mt}}$ is the average expenditure on UPC v as a share of total expenditure in module m in year t.

Second, there is a difference in the price term of the price index:

$$P_{ht} = \left[\prod_{m \in \bar{\Omega}_h^M} \prod_{v \in \Omega_{mt}} (p_{vt})^{\frac{1}{M_h N_{mt}}} \right] S_{ht}(\bar{\Omega}_h^M) \Lambda_{ht}(\bar{\Omega}_h^M) \tag{36}$$

In the baseline exercise, the set of UPCs consumed varies by household, while that is not the case here, where all households have the same UPC-specific demand shifters. In other words, while the set of UPCs in the baseline model is Ω_{hmt}, in this robustness exercise it is Ω_{mt}.

China's retaliatory tariffs. Table E3.3 examines the impact of China's retaliatory tariffs on US exports, revealing a significant negative effect on the household price index. This may be attributed to the reduction in US exports to China, which likely resulted in excess supply in the domestic US market, potentially driving prices down. Importantly, accounting for these retaliatory tariffs does not affect the results of our baseline regression.

Differential Substitution Elasticities Across Household Groups. As a robustness check, we categorize households into two groups, rich and poor, according to per capita income levels and estimate the substitution elasticity for each group. The estimation results are presented in Tables E3.4 and E3.5. Using these new estimation results, we construct the household price index and examine the effects of tariffs on the new price index, as shown in Table E3.6. Our baseline results remain robust under this specification.

Alternative Measurement of Tariff Shock. As a robustness check, we construct an additional measure of tariff exposure. Specifically, we incorporate the US import penetration rate from China, and the results are shown in table E3.7.

In addition, we also construct an alternative measure of tariff exposure by incorporating the share of US imports from China. That is, $TAR\_Impsh_{ht} = \sum_{m \in \Omega^M_{h0}} S_{hmt_0} Impsh^{CHN}_{mt-1} \tau^{US,CHN}_m$, where $Impsh^{CHN}_{mt-1}$ denotes the share of US imports of product module m from China in the initial equilibrium $t-1$. Table E3.8 reports the results using the new tariff exposure measure, which remains consistent with our baseline results. In this case, the average exposure to tariffs increases from 0.3% before the tariff war to 1% after the tariff war. Using the results from the estimation, a simple back-of-the-envelope calculation indicated that the additional tariffs levied by the US on China's goods led to an increase of $1\%(= (1\% - 0.3\%) * 1.422)$ in the price index for US households. This increase is close to our baseline results. Moreover, this increase in the price index is lower for the highest-income group, compared to the lowest-income group, by 0.89 percentage points $(=(1\% - 0.3\%) * 1.276)$, which is consistent with the baseline estimation.

Table E3.1: Robustness: Input-Output Linkages

	(1) $\ln P_{ht}$	(2) $\ln P_{ht}$	(3) $\ln P_{ht}$	(4) $\ln P_{ht}$	(5) $\ln P_{ht}$
$\ln(1+TAR_{ht})$	0.232***	0.231***	0.257***	0.237***	0.261***
	(0.062)	(0.062)	(0.063)	(0.063)	(0.063)
$\ln(1+TAR_{ht}^{UP})$		0.086*	0.115**	0.087**	0.117***
		(0.044)	(0.045)	(0.042)	(0.043)
$\ln(1+TAR_{ht}^{UP}) \times Second\ Income_{t_0}$			-0.018		-0.018
			(0.020)		(0.019)
$\ln(1+TAR_{ht}^{UP}) \times Third\ Income_{t_0}$			-0.058***		-0.059***
			(0.019)		(0.019)
$\ln(1+TAR_{ht}^{UP}) \times Fourth\ Income_{t_0}$			-0.088***		-0.088***
			(0.020)		(0.020)
$\ln(1+TAR_{ht}^{UP}) \times Highest\ Income_{t_0}$			-0.139***		-0.139***
			(0.020)		(0.020)
Observations	152,359	152,359	152,359	152,359	152,359
R^2	0.951	0.951	0.951	0.951	0.951

Notes: Observations are at the household-year level from 2016 to 2019. The upstream tariff shock to i is a weighted average of the direct import shocks to its suppliers j, where the weight on industry j equals i's purchases from j divided by i's total inputs, using 2012 BAE input-output table for the US economy. In column (4) and (5), we calculate the upstream shock ignoring the input-output relationship of the industry itself, which means the diagonal elements in the input-output matrix are marked as 0. All columns include household fixed effects and county-year fixed effects. Robust standard errors clustered at household level are in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.

Table E3.2: Uniform Barcode Demand Shifters Across All Households

	$\ln P_{ht} = ln\widetilde{p_{hvt}} + \ln S_{ht} + \ln \Lambda_{ht}$							
Dep var.	(1) $\ln P_{ht}$	(2) $\ln \widetilde{p_{hvt}}$	(3) $\ln S_{ht}$	(4) $\ln \Lambda_{ht}$	(5) $\ln P_{ht}$	(6) $\ln \widetilde{p_{hvt}}$	(7) $\ln S_{ht}$	(8) $\ln \Lambda_{ht}$
$\ln(1+TAR_{ht})$	0.339***	0.227***	-0.130***	0.242***	0.377***	0.237***	-0.116***	0.256***
	(0.043)	(0.007)	(0.040)	(0.034)	(0.046)	(0.007)	(0.041)	(0.037)
$\ln(1+TAR_{ht}) \times Second\ Income_{t_0}$					-0.014	-0.007***	-0.010	0.003
					(0.018)	(0.003)	(0.014)	(0.015)
$\ln(1+TAR_{ht}) \times Third\ Income_{t_0}$					-0.041**	-0.011***	-0.028*	-0.002
					(0.018)	(0.003)	(0.014)	(0.015)
$\ln(1+TAR_{ht}) \times Fourth\ Income_{t_0}$					-0.032*	-0.011***	-0.003	-0.018
					(0.019)	(0.003)	(0.015)	(0.016)
$\ln(1+TAR_{ht}) \times Highest\ Income_{t_0}$					-0.058***	-0.012***	-0.015	-0.030*
					(0.019)	(0.003)	(0.016)	(0.016)
Observations	152,359	152,359	152,359	152,359	152,359	152,359	152,359	152,359
R^2	0.963	0.996	0.978	0.865	0.963	0.996	0.978	0.865

Notes: Observations are at the household-year level from 2016 to 2019. The dependent variable in column (1) and (5) is the household price index ($\ln P_{ht}$) as shown in equation (13), which can be decomposed into three components: price term $\ln \widetilde{p_{hvt}}$, corresponding to the dependent variables in columns (2) and (6); share term $\ln S_{ht}$, corresponding to the dependent variables in columns (3) and (7); and variety adjustment term $\ln \Lambda_{ht}$, corresponding to the dependent variables in columns (4) and (8). Households are divided into five groups based on their income quantile, with the lowest income group serving as the reference group. All columns include household fixed effects and county-year fixed effects. Robust standard errors clustered at household level are in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.

Table E3.3: Robustness: Controlling for China's Retaliatory Tariff

	$\ln P_{ht} = ln\widetilde{p_{hvt}} + \ln S_{ht} + \ln \Lambda_{ht}$							
Dep var.	(1) $\ln P_{ht}$	(2) $\ln \widetilde{p_{hvt}}$	(3) $\ln S_{ht}$	(4) $\ln \Lambda_{ht}$	(5) $\ln P_{ht}$	(6) $\ln \widetilde{p_{hvt}}$	(7) $\ln S_{ht}$	(8) $\ln \Lambda_{ht}$
$\ln(1 + TAR_{ht})$	0.216***	0.089***	-0.104**	0.231***	0.327***	0.095**	-0.009	0.240***
	(0.062)	(0.034)	(0.043)	(0.034)	(0.067)	(0.037)	(0.045)	(0.036)
$\ln(1 + TAR_{ht}^{CHN})$	-0.165***	-0.084***	0.035	-0.116***	-0.139***	-0.081***	0.055*	-0.112***
	(0.045)	(0.025)	(0.029)	(0.024)	(0.045)	(0.025)	(0.029)	(0.024)
$\ln(1 + TAR_{ht}) \times Second\ Income_{t_0}$					-0.020	0.008	-0.033*	0.005
					(0.031)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.015)
$\ln(1 + TAR_{ht}) \times Third\ Income_{t_0}$					-0.075**	-0.000	-0.077***	0.002
					(0.029)	(0.017)	(0.018)	(0.015)
$\ln(1 + TAR_{ht}) \times Fourth\ Income_{t_0}$					-0.119***	-0.010	-0.097***	-0.012
					(0.031)	(0.018)	(0.019)	(0.016)
$\ln(1 + TAR_{ht}) \times Highest\ Income_{t_0}$					-0.182***	-0.015	-0.144***	-0.023
					(0.031)	(0.018)	(0.019)	(0.016)
Observations	152,359	152,359	152,359	152,359	152,359	152,359	152,359	152,359
R^2	0.951	0.963	0.974	0.865	0.951	0.963	0.974	0.865

Notes: Notes: Observations are at the household-year level from 2016 to 2019. The variable TAR_{ht}^{CHN} represents China's retaliatory tariff. All columns include household fixed effects and county-year fixed effects. Robust standard errors clustered at household level are in parentheses. For other detailed notes, see Table 2. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.

Table E3.4: Summary of Estimation Parameters for Rich Households

Panel A: Estimation of σ^m and ω^m											
Percentiles	1%	5%	10%	25%	50%	75%	90%	95%	99%	Mean	Observations
σ^m	1.93	2.66	3.21	4.14	5.12	6.58	8.64	11.98	30.39	6.32	889
ω^m	0.05	0.11	0.15	0.21	0.31	0.48	0.91	1.57	9.31	0.77	889
Panel B: Estimation of σ											
	OLS	IV	IV 95% CI								
σ	1.45	2.74	2.71-2.77								

Table E3.5: Summary of Estimation Parameters for Poor households

Panel A: Estimation of σ^m and ω^m											
Percentiles	1%	5%	10%	25%	50%	75%	90%	95%	99%	Mean	Observations
σ^m	1.70	2.46	2.98	4.02	5.16	6.70	8.91	11.78	30.75	6.29	882
ω^m	0.04	0.11	0.15	0.21	0.30	0.48	0.89	1.69	4.48	0.85	882
Panel B: Estimation of σ											
	OLS	IV	IV 95% CI								
σ	1.65	2.74	2.71-2.76								

Table E3.6: Heterogeneous Substitution Elasticities Across Household Groups

	$\ln P_{ht} = ln\widetilde{p_{hvt}} + \ln S_{ht} + \ln \Lambda_{ht}$							
Dep var.	(1) $\ln P_{ht}$	(2) $\ln \widetilde{p_{hvt}}$	(3) $\ln S_{ht}$	(4) $\ln \Lambda_{ht}$	(5) $\ln P_{ht}$	(6) $\ln \widetilde{p_{hvt}}$	(7) $\ln S_{ht}$	(8) $\ln \Lambda_{ht}$
$\ln(1 + TAR_{ht})$	0.341***	0.226***	-0.121***	0.236***	0.366***	0.242***	-0.126***	0.251***
	(0.043)	(0.007)	(0.040)	(0.034)	(0.046)	(0.007)	(0.041)	(0.036)
$\ln(1 + TAR_{ht}) \times Second\ Income_{t_0}$					-0.011	-0.007***	-0.004	0.000
					(0.018)	(0.003)	(0.014)	(0.015)
$\ln(1 + TAR_{ht}) \times Third\ Income_{t_0}$					-0.028	-0.014***	-0.012	-0.002
					(0.018)	(0.003)	(0.014)	(0.014)
$\ln(1 + TAR_{ht}) \times Fourth\ Income_{t_0}$					-0.017	-0.019***	0.021	-0.018
					(0.019)	(0.003)	(0.015)	(0.016)
$\ln(1 + TAR_{ht}) \times Highest\ Income_{t_0}$					-0.040**	-0.020***	0.011	-0.031*
					(0.019)	(0.003)	(0.016)	(0.016)
Observations	152,060	152,060	152,060	152,060	152,060	152,060	152,060	152,060
R^2	0.963	0.996	0.978	0.864	0.963	0.996	0.978	0.864

Notes: Observations are at the household-year level from 2016 to 2019. The dependent variable in column (1) and (5) is the household price index ($\ln P_{ht}$) as shown in equation (13), which can be decomposed into three components: price term $\ln \widetilde{p_{hvt}}$, corresponding to the dependent variables in columns (2) and (6); share term $\ln S_{ht}$, corresponding to the dependent variables in columns (3) and (7); and variety adjustment term $\ln \Lambda_{ht}$, corresponding to the dependent variables in columns (4) and (8). Households are divided into five groups based on their income quantile, with the lowest income group serving as the reference group. All columns include household fixed effects and county-year fixed effects. Robust standard errors clustered at household level are in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table E3.7: Alternative Tariff Exposure incorporate the U.S. import penetration rate

	$\ln P_{ht} = ln\widetilde{p_{hvt}} + \ln S_{ht} + \ln \Lambda_{ht}$							
Dep var.	(1) $\ln P_{ht}$	(2) $\ln \widetilde{p_{hvt}}$	(3) $\ln S_{ht}$	(4) $\ln \Lambda_{ht}$	(5) $\ln P_{ht}$	(6) $\ln \widetilde{p_{hvt}}$	(7) $\ln S_{ht}$	(8) $\ln \Lambda_{ht}$
$\ln(1 + TAR\_IMP_{ht})$	3.078***	0.685*	-2.176***	4.568***	5.640***	0.596	-0.094	5.138***
	(0.722)	(0.396)	(0.429)	(0.397)	(1.055)	(0.577)	(0.617)	(0.574)
$\ln(1 + TAR\_IMP_{ht}) \times Second\ Income_{t_0}$					-0.105	0.436	-0.754	0.213
					(1.015)	(0.577)	(0.591)	(0.535)
$\ln(1 + TAR\_IMP_{ht}) \times Third\ Income_{t_0}$					-1.915**	0.162	-1.907***	-0.169
					(0.956)	(0.541)	(0.560)	(0.493)
$\ln(1 + TAR\_IMP_{ht}) \times Fourth\ Income_{t_0}$					-2.813***	0.039	-2.282***	-0.569
					(1.019)	(0.568)	(0.588)	(0.537)
$\ln(1 + TAR\_IMP_{ht}) \times Highest\ Income_{t_0}$					-4.755***	-0.050	-3.340***	-1.365***
					(0.990)	(0.556)	(0.583)	(0.529)
Observations	152,359	152,359	152,359	152,359	152,359	152,359	152,359	152,359
R^2	0.929	0.947	0.962	0.806	0.929	0.947	0.962	0.806

Notes: Observations are at the household-year level from 2016 to 2019. The dependent variable in column (1) and (5) is the household price index ($\ln P_{ht}$) as shown in equation (13), which can be decomposed into three components: price term $\ln \widetilde{p_{hvt}}$, corresponding to the dependent variables in columns (2) and (6); Share term $\ln S_{ht}$, corresponding to the dependent variables in columns (3) and (7); and variety adjustment term $\ln \Lambda_{ht}$, corresponding to the dependent variables in columns (4) and (8). The tariff shock also incorporate the US import penetration rate from China. Households are divided into five groups based on their income quantile, with the lowest income group serving as the reference group. All columns include household fixed effects and county-year fixed effects. Robust standard errors clustered at household level are in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table E3.8: Alternative Tariff Exposure

	$\ln P_{ht} = ln\widetilde{p_{hvt}} + \ln S_{ht} + \ln \Lambda_{ht}$							
Dep var.	(1) $\ln P_{ht}$	(2) $\ln \widetilde{p_{hvt}}$	(3) $\ln S_{ht}$	(4) $\ln \Lambda_{ht}$	(5) $\ln P_{ht}$	(6) $\ln \widetilde{p_{hvt}}$	(7) $\ln S_{ht}$	(8) $\ln \Lambda_{ht}$
$\ln(1 + TAR\_Impsh_{ht})$	1.422***	0.260**	-0.298**	1.460***	2.179***	0.289*	0.244	1.646***
	(0.207)	(0.115)	(0.135)	(0.112)	(0.270)	(0.152)	(0.168)	(0.147)
$\ln(1 + TAR\_Impsh_{ht}) \times Second\ Income_{t_0}$					-0.163	0.063	-0.192	-0.034
					(0.227)	(0.131)	(0.135)	(0.116)
$\ln(1 + TAR\_Impsh_{ht}) \times Third\ Income_{t_0}$					-0.550**	-0.011	-0.474***	-0.065
					(0.216)	(0.124)	(0.131)	(0.111)
$\ln(1 + TAR\_Impsh_{ht}) \times Fourth\ Income_{t_0}$					-0.845***	-0.067	-0.585***	-0.193
					(0.229)	(0.131)	(0.135)	(0.118)
$\ln(1 + TAR\_Impsh_{ht}) \times Highest\ Income_{t_0}$					-1.276***	-0.064	-0.844***	-0.368***
					(0.226)	(0.129)	(0.138)	(0.119)
Observations	152,359	152,359	152,359	152,359	152,359	152,359	152,359	152,359
R^2	0.951	0.963	0.974	0.865	0.951	0.963	0.974	0.865

Notes: Observations are at the household-year level from 2016 to 2019. The dependent variable in column (1) and (5) is the household price index ($\ln P_{ht}$) as shown in equation (13), which can be decomposed into three components: price term $\ln \widetilde{p_{hvt}}$, corresponding to the dependent variables in columns (2) and (6); Share term $\ln S_{ht}$, corresponding to the dependent variables in columns (3) and (7); and variety adjustment term $\ln \Lambda_{ht}$, corresponding to the dependent variables in columns (4) and (8). The tariff shock also incorporate the US import share from China. Households are divided into five groups based on their income quantile, with the lowest income group serving as the reference group. All columns include household fixed effects and county-year fixed effects. Robust standard errors clustered at household level are in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Appendix E4: Validating the Bartik Strategy

Balanced Tests: We follow Borusyak et al. (2022) to test whether the tariff shocks are balanced with respect to various initial household characteristics. Specifically, we examine a range of household characteristics from 2016, including: the logarithm of household size, whether the head of household is single, whether the head of household is over 45 years old, whether the household has children under 18, the share of coupon value in total expenditure, the share of cash payments in total expenditure, the share of one-dollar store expenditure in total expenditure, the share of online purchases in expenditure, and whether the household has internet access. Table E4.1 presents the results of the balance test. Following the approach recommended by Borusyak et al. (2022), we aggregate household-level regressions to the module level. The lack of statistical significance of the coefficients provides supporting evidence that our empirical setting meets the requirements for treatment balance.

Statistical Inference Based on Alternative Specification and Standard Errors: As highlighted by Adao et al. (2019), regression residuals in shift-share empirical specifications can be correlated across households with similar consumption baskets, which can lead to downward bias in standard errors when they are clustered at the household level. Column (2) in Table E4.2 presents the results of module-level regressions, following the approach recommended by Borusyak et al. (2022), which provides consistent standard errors that avoid the issues raised by Adao et al. (2019). Note that, to reformulate the household-level regression into a module-level regression, we approximate the independent variable $\ln(1 + TAR_{ht})$ as TAR_{ht}, which is constructed in the form of a shift-share design. Column (1) in Table E4.2 shows the corresponding household-level regression results using TAR as the independent variable, which produces the same estimated coefficient as in column (2). Columns (3) through (5) confirm that if the household-level regression is maintained as the baseline, the results remain robust under various alternative clustering protocols, including clustering by county and partitioning households based on the similarity of their consumption baskets.

Dropping Category Sections. To assess concerns that our results may be influenced by endogeneity or pre-trend issues that are associated with a particular sector, as raised by Goldsmith-Pinkham et al. (2020), we reconstruct household-level tariff shocks by leaving out the products from one category at a time. Table E4.3 summarizes the range of coefficients obtained from these robustness checks. Panel A reports the minimum and maximum coefficients, while Panel B also includes the second minimum and second maximum coefficients. The results mitigate concern that there may be a particularly pivotal or influential product category.

Table E4.1: Robustness: Balance Tests

Balance variable	Coef.	SE
Log household size, 2016	-0.013	(0.018)
The head of household is single, 2016	-0.002	(0.013)
The head of household is over 45 years old, 2016	0.001	(0.011)
Household with children under 18, 2016	0.014	(0.011)
Share of coupon value in total household expenditure, 2016	-0.000	(0.001)
Share of cash payment in total household expenditure, 2016	0.007	(0.008)
Share of one dollar store expenditure in total household expenditure, 2016	0.003	(0.002)
Share of online purchases in household expenditure, 2016	0.000	(0.004)
Household internet connection, 2016	0.011	(0.007)

Notes: This table reports coefficients from regression module-specific weighted averages of beginning-of-period household characteristics on module-level tariff shocks, as recommended by (Borusyak et al., 2022). Robust standard errors clustered at module level are in parentheses. The number of industry-year observations is 3,776. None of the estimates are significant at the 10% level.

Table E4.2: Robustness: Statistical Inference Based on Alternative Specification and Standard Errors

Dep var: ln_pht	(1) Approximate independent variable	(2) BHJ shock level Regression	(3) Cluster at county-level	(4) k-mean cluster (100 groups)	(5) k-mean cluster (500 groups)
Tariff shock	0.188***	0.188*	0.232***	0.232**	0.232***
	(0.056)	(0.061)	(0.061)	(0.103)	(0.084)
Observations	152,359	3,776	152,359	152,359	152,359

Notes: This table reports results from inference corrections. Column (1) repeats the baseline regression, but approximates the independent variable $\ln(1 + TAR_{ht}) \approx TAR_{ht}$, ensuring that the independent variable is in the form of shift-share, so that the household-level regression can be reformulated to the shock-level regression in column (2). Column (2) reports the results of module-level regressions that yield tariff shock coefficients equivalent to the household-level specifications, as recommended by Borusyak et al. (2022). In column (3)-(5), coefficients are obtained from the primary household-level estimating equation (24), including household fixed effects and county-year fixed effects. In column (3), robust standard errors are clustered at county-level. In column (4)-(5), k-mean clustering approach is applied to categorize households based on similarity of expenditure share, using 100 clusters and 500 clusters respectively. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table E4.3: Robustness: Dropping One Category at A Time

Dep var.	$\ln P_{ht} = \ln \widetilde{p_{hvt}} + \ln S_{ht} + \ln \Lambda_{ht}$				$\ln S_{ht} = \ln \widetilde{s_{hmt}} + \ln \widetilde{s_{hvt}}$	
	(1) $\ln P_{ht}$	(2) $\ln \widetilde{p_{hvt}}$	(3) $\ln S_{ht}$	(4) $\ln \Lambda_{ht}$	(5) $\ln \widetilde{s_{hmt}}$	(6) $\ln \widetilde{s_{hvt}}$
Panel A: Range of Estimates (Min - Max)						
Min coefficient	0.160**	0.063*	-0.206***	0.200***	-0.217***	-0.012
	(0.070)	(0.034)	(0.048)	(0.034)	(0.044)	(0.023)
Max coefficient	0.405***	0.139***	-0.050	0.316***	-0.100**	0.050**
	(0.064)	(0.035)	(0.044)	(0.034)	(0.039)	(0.024)
Panel B: Range of Estimates (Second Min - Second Max)						
Second min coefficient	0.168***	0.068*	-0.133***	0.217***	-0.144***	-0.002
	(0.062)	(0.035)	(0.043)	(0.034)	(0.040)	(0.023)
Second max coefficient	0.258***	0.117***	-0.076*	0.264***	-0.108***	0.042*
	(0.062)	(0.034)	(0.043)	(0.034)	(0.040)	(0.023)

Notes: For each column, the regression drops one category at a time and reconstruct household tariff shock. The smallest and largest household tariff shock coefficients are reported with the associated standard errors in panel A, while the second smallest and largest coefficients are reported in panel B. All columns include household fixed effects and county-year fixed effects. All robust standard errors are reported in parentheses and are clustered at household level. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. For other detailed notes, see Table 2.

Appendix E5: Other Robustness

Placebo Tests. To address the possibility that the results might be driven by pre-trends in the key variables, Panel (A) of Table E5.1 presents the results of a placebo test using consumption data before the trade war (2016–2017), while applying the additional tariffs of 2018–2019. The small magnitude and insignificant coefficients of Table E5.1 reinforce our results.

To mitigate the possibility that our findings might be driven by some unobserved stochastic trends common to price index and import tariffs, we randomly assign tariff shocks and repeat the regressions 1,000 times. The resulting estimates from these simulations are presented in Figure E5.1, where we also highlight our baseline estimate using a vertical dotted line for comparison. Notably, the figure illustrates that the estimates derived from the simulated samples are closely centered around zero, while the benchmark estimate lies beyond the 99th percentile of the distribution. This robustness check lends further support to the reliability of our baseline findings

Alternative Normalization. In the baseline model, we assume that the geometric mean of consumer tastes across common modules ($m \in \bar{\Omega}_h^M$) for household h remains constant. We adopt an alternative normalization procedure by assuming that demand shifters across all product modules in a household's consumption basket ($m \in \Omega_h^M$) —including both products within the common module set and those outside it —remain constant over time. With this change, we do not distinguish the new entry from the disappearing products.

With the new normalization, we take the unweighted geometric mean over the number of modules (M_{ht}) in the consumption basket of household h. Combining the geometric mean with equation (9), we derive the following exact price index:

$$P_{ht} = \left[\prod_{m \in \Omega_{ht}^M} \prod_{v \in \Omega_{hmt}} (p_{vt})^{\frac{1}{M_{ht} N_{hmt}}} \right] S_{ht}, \tag{37}$$

$$S_{ht} \equiv \left[\prod_{m \in \Omega_{ht}^M} S_{hmt}^{\frac{1}{M_{ht}(\sigma-1)}} \prod_{v \in \Omega_{mt}} s_{hvt}^{\frac{1}{M_{ht} N_{hmt}(\sigma^m - 1)}} \right] \tag{38}$$

where N_{hmt} is the number of UPCs in Ω_{hm}, and M_{ht} is the number of modules in Ω_{ht}^M. Table E5.2 presents the regression results using this new price index, based on alternative normalization, as the dependent variable. Consistent with the baseline results, the negative estimation coefficients suggest that the imposition of tariffs is associated with an increase in the household price index, as shown in column (1). This effect is notably more significant for low-income households, as indicated in column (4).

Alternative Definition of Common Module Sets. We refine the definition of the common module sets, $\bar{\Omega}_h^M$, used in the calculation of the household price index by excluding the product modules that were consistently consumed between 2016 and 2019 but had a consumption share below one-thousandth of a percent in each year. As shown in Table E5.3, the estimation results remain largely consistent with our baseline findings.

Additional Tariffs Specific to China. In the baseline analysis, we include all seven waves of additional tariffs imposed by the United States (Figure A.1). However, the first two waves were not exclusively targeted at China. For robustness, we exclude these initial two waves and focus solely on the additional tariffs that specifically target China. The results are detailed in Table E5.4. Consistent with the baseline findings, the negative coefficients indicate that the imposition of tariffs raises the household price index, particularly affecting low-income households.

First-Difference Specification. Finally, we perform a robustness check employing the first-difference model specification. The dependent variable represents the change in the household price index between period t and period $t-1$, defined as $\Delta \ln(P_{ht}) = \ln(P_{ht}) - \ln(P_{ht-1})$. The independent variable captures the change in tariff exposure between these two periods. The findings, as illustrated in Table E5.5, are similar to our baseline results.

Controlling for Household Income. In the Consumer Panel Database, household incomes are classified into 16 discrete income brackets, with 42.7% of households remaining in the same bracket throughout the sample period (2016–2019). In Table E5.6, we include controls for household income - defined using the median of each income bracket - and confirm that our results remain robust to these adjustments.

Household Size Adjustments. In panel (B) of Table E5.1, we adjust for differences in household size with an equivalence scale to compute "the equivalised income", a method used to adjust household income to allow a more fair comparison between households with different sizes and compositions. Bigger households usually need a higher income than smaller households to achieve a comparable standard of living. Both per capita and equivalised income consider the impact of household size on its level of affluence. However, compared to per capita income, equivalised income assigns different weights to different household members, recognizing that larger households need more resources than smaller households, but not directly proportionally to their size due to shared living costs.[§] In our robustness check, we use the square root scale to adjust household size. The

[§]For instance, the need for a household with three members may not be three times that of a single-person household due to economies of scale in consumption. The calculation of equivalised income utilizes equivalence scales, where each household type is assigned a value proportional to its needs. The method is widely used to compare adjusted household income per capita can be written as $(Household\ Income)/(Household\ Size^{0.5})$. The findings are consistent with the baseline results, suggesting that households with lower per capita incomes experience a more pronounced impact from tariff hikes.

Alternative Household Income Measure. The baseline regression incorporates an interaction term between tariff exposure and high-income groups. We also explore alternative interactions in Table E5.7. We introduce an interaction term between household per capita income and tariff shocks, where the household per capita income is standardized with a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one. The results align with the baseline findings, indicating that tariff increases affect households with lower per capita income more significantly.

Alternative Sample. In Table E5.8, we repeat the baseline regression using the entire unbalanced panel of households, and the corresponding estimated coefficients are similar to the baseline regression.

Table E5.1: Other Robustness Checks

	Panel A: Placebo Test		Panel B: Adjust Household Size			
Dep var.	(1) $\ln P_{ht}$	(2) $\ln P_{ht}$	(3) $\ln P_{ht}$	(4) $\ln \widetilde{p_{hvt}}$	(5) $\ln S_{ht}$	(6) $\ln \Lambda_{ht}$
$\ln(1+TAR_{ht})$	0.051	0.085	0.262***	0.086**	-0.066	0.242***
	(0.067)	(0.072)	(0.066)	(0.037)	(0.045)	(0.036)
$\ln(1+TAR_{ht}) \times Second\ Income_{t_0}$		-0.017	0.013	0.022	-0.014	0.006
		(0.030)	(0.030)	(0.017)	(0.018)	(0.016)
$\ln(1+TAR_{ht}) \times Third\ Income_{t_0}$		-0.023	-0.020	0.025	-0.043**	-0.002
		(0.030)	(0.029)	(0.017)	(0.018)	(0.015)
$\ln(1+TAR_{ht}) \times Fourth\ Income_{t_0}$		-0.041	0.001	0.010	-0.019	0.011
		(0.031)	(0.029)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.015)
$\ln(1+TAR_{ht}) \times Highest\ Income_{t_0}$		-0.049	-0.120***	-0.005	-0.101***	-0.015
		(0.032)	(0.032)	(0.018)	(0.020)	(0.017)
Observations	72,910	72,910	152,359	152,359	152,359	152,359
R^2	0.970	0.970	0.951	0.963	0.974	0.865

Notes: Panel (A) presents the placebo test using data from 2016-2017 before the US-China trade war, assuming that tariff increase is two years ahead of schedule. The dependent variable in column (1)-(2) are the household price index. Panel (B) adjusts household size using the square root since per capita income may be misleading due to non-linearities in per capita outlays with respect to household size. The dependent variable in column (3) is the household price index ($\ln P_{ht}$), which can be decomposed into three components: price term $\ln \widetilde{p_{hvt}}$, corresponding to the dependent variable in column (4); share term $\ln S_{ht}$, corresponding to the dependent variable in column (5); and variety adjustment term $\ln \Lambda_{ht}$, corresponding to the dependent variable in column (6). Households are divided into five groups based on their income quantile, with the lowest income group serving as the reference group. All columns include household fixed effects and county-year fixed effects. Robust standard errors clustered at household level are in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.

income inequality and poverty across countries in the OECD Income Distribution database. There are various equivalence scales, many of which are reviewed in Atkinson et al. (1995) and Atkinson and Brandolini (2001).

Table E5.2: Alternative Normalization

Dep var.	(1) $\ln P_{ht}$	(2) $\ln \widetilde{p_{hvt}}$	(3) $\ln S_{ht}$	(4) $\ln P_{ht}$	(5) $\ln \widetilde{p_{hvt}}$	(6) $\ln S_{ht}$
	$\ln P_{ht} = \ln \widetilde{p_{hvt}} + \ln lnS_{ht}$					
$\ln(1 + TAR_{ht})$	0.220**	0.044	0.177**	0.401***	0.075	0.326***
	(0.093)	(0.049)	(0.069)	(0.099)	(0.052)	(0.074)
$\ln(1 + TAR_{ht}) \times Second\ Income_{t_0}$				-0.035	-0.008	-0.027
				(0.042)	(0.023)	(0.032)
$\ln(1 + TAR_{ht}) \times Third\ Income_{t_0}$				-0.121***	-0.018	-0.104***
				(0.040)	(0.022)	(0.031)
$\ln(1 + TAR_{ht}) \times Fourth\ Income_{t_0}$				-0.186***	-0.023	-0.163***
				(0.043)	(0.023)	(0.033)
$\ln(1 + TAR_{ht}) \times Highest\ Income_{t_0}$				-0.305***	-0.060**	-0.245***
				(0.043)	(0.024)	(0.033)
Observations	152,471	152,471	152,471	152,471	152,471	152,471
R^2	0.907	0.922	0.894	0.907	0.922	0.894

Notes: Observations are at the household-year level from 2016 to 2019. We experiment with a different normalization by assuming $\widetilde{\varphi_{hvt}} = \widetilde{\varphi_{hv}} = 1$ for all UPC varieties, and $\widetilde{\Phi_{hmt}} = \widetilde{\Phi_{hm}} = 1$ for all product modules in a household consumption basket. The dependent variables in column (1) and column (4) represent the alternative household price index derived from the new normalization assumption, as shown in equation (37). This Price index can be decomposed into two components: the average price term, corresponding to the dependent variables in columns (2) and (5); and the average expenditure share term, corresponding to to the dependent variables in column (3) and (6). Households are divided into five groups based on their income quantile, with the lowest income group serving as the reference group.All columns include household fixed effects and county-year fixed effects. Robust standard errors clustered at household level are in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.

Table E5.3: Alternative Common Set

Dep var.	(1) $\ln P_{ht}$	(2) $\ln \widetilde{p_{hvt}}$	(3) $\ln S_{ht}$	(4) $\ln \Lambda_{ht}$	(5) $\ln P_{ht}$	(6) $\ln \widetilde{p_{hvt}}$	(7) $\ln S_{ht}$	(8) $\ln \Lambda_{ht}$
	$\ln P_{ht} = ln\widetilde{p_{hvt}} + \ln S_{ht} + \ln \Lambda_{ht}$							
$\ln(1 + TAR_{ht})$	0.321***	0.157***	-0.094**	0.258***	0.429***	0.173***	-0.005	0.262***
	(0.058)	(0.035)	(0.041)	(0.035)	(0.063)	(0.038)	(0.044)	(0.038)
$\ln(1 + TAR_{ht}) \times Second\ Income_{t_0}$					-0.014	0.009	-0.028	0.004
					(0.029)	(0.018)	(0.017)	(0.016)
$\ln(1 + TAR_{ht}) \times Third\ Income_{t_0}$					-0.060**	0.001	-0.074***	0.014
					(0.028)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.015)
$\ln(1 + TAR_{ht}) \times Fourth\ Income_{t_0}$					-0.119***	-0.021	-0.089***	-0.008
					(0.030)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.016)
$\ln(1 + TAR_{ht}) \times Highest\ Income_{t_0}$					-0.200***	-0.039**	-0.144***	-0.018
					(0.030)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.017)
Observations	152,347	152,347	152,347	152,347	152,347	152,347	152,347	152,347
R^2	0.942	0.964	0.958	0.849	0.942	0.964	0.958	0.849

Notes: Observations are at the household-year level from 2016 to 2019. We refine the definition of common module sets ($\bar{\Omega}_h^M$) by assuming that only those module products with a consumption share greater than one-thousandth and consistently present in both comparative periods are included.The dependent variable in column (1) and (5) is the household price index (lnP_{ht}) as shown in equation (13), which can be decomposed into three components: price term $\ln \widetilde{p_{hvt}}$, corresponding to the dependent variables in columns (2) and (6); share term lnS_{ht}, corresponding to the dependent variables in column (3) and (7); and variety adjustment term $\ln \Lambda_{ht}$, corresponding to the dependent variables in column (4) and (8)). Households are divided into five groups based on their income quantile, with the lowest income group serving as the reference group. All columns include household fixed effects and county-year fixed effects. Robust standard errors clustered at household level are in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.

Table E5.4: Additional Tariffs Specific to China

Dep var.	(1) $\ln P_{ht}$	(2) $\ln \widetilde{p_{hvt}}$	(3) $\ln S_{ht}$	(4) $\ln \Lambda_{ht}$	(5) $\ln \widetilde{s_{hmt}}$	(6) $\ln \widetilde{s_{hvt}}$
	$\ln P_{ht} = \ln \widetilde{p_{hvt}} + \ln S_{ht} + \ln \Lambda_{ht}$				$\ln S_{ht} = \ln \widetilde{s_{hmt}} + \ln \widetilde{s_{hvt}}$	
Panel (A): Tariff Shock and Household Price Index						
$\ln(1 + TAR_{ht})$	0.227***	0.069**	-0.107**	0.264***	-0.115***	0.008
	(0.063)	(0.035)	(0.043)	(0.034)	(0.040)	(0.023)
Household FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
County-Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	152,359	152,359	152,359	152,359	152,359	152,359
R^2	0.951	0.963	0.974	0.865	0.978	0.692
Panel (B): Heterogeneous Effects across Households						
$\ln(1 + TAR_{ht})$	0.343***	0.079**	-0.015	0.280***	-0.101**	0.085***
	(0.068)	(0.038)	(0.046)	(0.037)	(0.042)	(0.025)
$\ln(1 + TAR_{ht}) \times Second\ Income_{t_0}$	-0.022	0.007	-0.032*	0.003	-0.010	-0.022*
	(0.031)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.015)	(0.014)	(0.012)
$\ln(1 + TAR_{ht}) \times Third\ Income_{t_0}$	-0.081***	-0.003	-0.074***	-0.003	-0.027*	-0.047***
	(0.029)	(0.017)	(0.018)	(0.015)	(0.014)	(0.012)
$\ln(1 + TAR_{ht}) \times Fourth\ Income_{t_0}$	-0.127***	-0.015	-0.092***	-0.020	-0.003	-0.089***
	(0.031)	(0.018)	(0.019)	(0.016)	(0.015)	(0.012)
$\ln(1 + TAR_{ht}) \times Highest\ Income_{t_0}$	-0.190***	-0.019	-0.138***	-0.033**	-0.016	-0.123***
	(0.031)	(0.018)	(0.019)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.012)
Household FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
County-Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	152,359	152,359	152,359	152,359	152,359	152,359
R^2	0.951	0.963	0.974	0.865	0.978	0.693

Notes: Observations are at the household-year level from 2016 to 2019. The dependent variable in column (1) is the household price index ($\ln P_{ht}$) as shown in equation (13), which can be decomposed into three components: price term ($\ln \widetilde{p_{hvt}}$), share term ($\ln S_{ht}$), and variety adjustment term ($\ln \Lambda_{ht}$). Specifically, columns (2)-(4) use price term, share term, and variety adjustment term as dependent variables respectively. The share term can be decompose into two components: the expenditure share adjustment across product modules ($\ln \widetilde{s_{hmt}}$), corresponding to the dependent variable in column (5); and the expenditure share adjustment within product modules ($\ln \widetilde{s_{hvt}}$), corresponding to the dependent variable in column (6). In panel B, households are divided into five groups based on their income quantile, with the lowest income group serving as the reference group. All columns include household fixed effects and county-year fixed effects. Robust standard errors clustered at household level are in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table E5.5: First Difference: Tariff Shock and Household Price Index

	$\Delta \ln P_{ht} = \Delta \ln \widetilde{p_{hvt}} + \Delta \ln S_{ht} + \Delta \ln \Lambda_{ht}$							
Dep var.	(1) $\Delta \ln P_{ht}$	(2) $\Delta \ln \widetilde{p_{hvt}}$	(3) $\Delta \ln S_{ht}$	(4) $\Delta \ln \Lambda_{ht}$	(5) $\Delta \ln P_{ht}$	(6) $\Delta \ln \widetilde{p_{hvt}}$	(7) $\Delta \ln S_{ht}$	(8) $\Delta \ln \Lambda_{ht}$
$\Delta \ln(1 + TAR_{ht})$	0.166***	0.099***	-0.030	0.097***	0.209***	0.095**	0.017	0.097***
	(0.064)	(0.035)	(0.043)	(0.034)	(0.068)	(0.038)	(0.046)	(0.037)
$\Delta \ln(1 + TAR_{ht}) \times Second\ Income_{t_0}$					0.011	0.020	-0.016	0.006
					(0.030)	(0.017)	(0.018)	(0.015)
$\Delta \ln(1 + TAR_{ht}) \times Third\ Income_{t_0}$					-0.016	0.014	-0.038**	0.008
					(0.029)	(0.016)	(0.017)	(0.014)
$\Delta \ln(1 + TAR_{ht}) \times Fourth\ Income_{t_0}$					-0.060*	-0.001	-0.054***	-0.005
					(0.031)	(0.018)	(0.019)	(0.016)
$\Delta \ln(1 + TAR_{ht}) \times Highest\ Income_{t_0}$					-0.082***	-0.006	-0.070***	-0.006
					(0.031)	(0.018)	(0.019)	(0.016)
Observations	116,814	116,814	116,814	116,814	116,814	116,814	116,814	116,814
R^2	0.054	0.063	0.051	0.057	0.054	0.063	0.052	0.057

Notes: Observations are at the household-year level from 2017 to 2019. The dependent variable in column (1) and (5) is the first difference of household price index ($\ln P_{ht}$) between t and $t-1$, which can be decomposed into three components: price term $\Delta \ln \widetilde{p_{hvt}}$, corresponding to the dependent variables in column (2) and (6); share term $\Delta \ln S_{ht}$, corresponding to the dependent variables in column (3) and (7); and variety adjustment term $\Delta \ln \Lambda_{ht}$, corresponding to the dependent variables in column (4) and (8). Households are divided into five groups based on their income quantile, with the lowest income group serving as the reference group. Since both the independent and dependent variables have undergone first difference with respect to time t, the household fixed effects in the baseline model are differenced out. All columns include county-year fixed effects. Robust standard errors clustered at household level are in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table E5.6: Robustness: Controlling for Household Income

Dep var.	$\ln P_{ht} = ln\widetilde{p_{hvt}} + \ln S_{ht} + \ln \Lambda_{ht}$							
	(1) $\ln P_{ht}$	(2) $\ln \widetilde{p_{hvt}}$	(3) $\ln S_{ht}$	(4) $\ln \Lambda_{ht}$	(5) $\ln P_{ht}$	(6) $\ln \widetilde{p_{hvt}}$	(7) $\ln S_{ht}$	(8) $\ln \Lambda_{ht}$
$\ln(1 + TAR_{ht})$	0.232***	0.097***	-0.107**	0.242***	0.341***	0.093**	-0.014	0.262***
	(0.062)	(0.034)	(0.043)	(0.034)	(0.067)	(0.037)	(0.046)	(0.037)
$\ln Income_{ht}$	0.005***	0.009***	-0.001	-0.004***	0.003*	0.009***	-0.002	-0.004***
	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
$\ln(1 + TAR_{ht}) \times Second\ Income_{t_0}$					-0.019	0.016	-0.033*	-0.002
					(0.031)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.015)
$\ln(1 + TAR_{ht}) \times Third\ Income_{t_0}$					-0.076***	0.009	-0.078***	-0.008
					(0.029)	(0.017)	(0.018)	(0.015)
$\ln(1 + TAR_{ht}) \times Fourth\ Income_{t_0}$					-0.121***	0.002	-0.097***	-0.026
					(0.031)	(0.018)	(0.019)	(0.016)
$\ln(1 + TAR_{ht}) \times Highest\ Income_{t_0}$					-0.185***	-0.004	-0.144***	-0.038**
					(0.031)	(0.018)	(0.019)	(0.016)
Observations	152,359	152,359	152,359	152,359	152,359	152,359	152,359	152,359
R^2	0.951	0.963	0.974	0.865	0.951	0.963	0.974	0.865

Notes: Observations are at the household-year level from 2016 to 2019. The variable $\ln Income_{ht}$ represents the log of household income. All columns include household fixed effects and county-year fixed effects. Robust standard errors clustered at household level are in parentheses. For other detailed notes, see Table 2. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.

Table E5.7: Robustness: Alternative Interactions

Dep var.	$\ln P_{ht} = \ln \widetilde{p_{hvt}} + \ln S_{ht} + \ln \Lambda_{ht}$				$\ln S_{ht} = \ln \widetilde{s_{hmt}} + \ln \widetilde{s_{hvt}}$	
	(1) $\ln P_{ht}$	(2) $\ln \widetilde{p_{hvt}}$	(3) $\ln S_{ht}$	(4) $\ln \Lambda_{ht}$	(5) $\ln \widetilde{s_{hmt}}$	(6) $\ln \widetilde{s_{hvt}}$
$\ln(1 + TAR_{ht})$	1.259***	0.184*	0.645***	0.430***	-0.085	0.730***
	(0.170)	(0.098)	(0.104)	(0.088)	(0.086)	(0.067)
$\ln(1 + TAR_{ht}) \times \ln\ Per\ Capita\ Income$	-0.098***	-0.008	-0.072***	-0.018**	-0.004	-0.067***
	(0.015)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.006)
Observations	152,359	152,359	152,359	152,359	152,359	152,359
R^2	0.951	0.963	0.974	0.865	0.978	0.693

Notes: Observations are at the household-year level from 2016 to 2019. The dependent variable in column (1) is the household price index ($\ln P_{ht}$) as shown in equation (13), which can be decomposed into three components: price term ($\ln \widetilde{p_{hvt}}$), share term $\ln S_{ht}$ and variety adjustment term ($\ln \Lambda_{ht}$). Specifically, columns (2)-(4) use price term, share term, and variety adjustment term as dependent variables respectively. The share term can be decompose into two components: the expenditure share adjustment across product modules ($\ln \widetilde{s_{hmt}}$), corresponding to the dependent variable in column (5); and the expenditure share adjustment within product modules ($\ln \widetilde{s_{hvt}}$), corresponding to the dependent variable in column (6) . The independent variable interact logarithm of the household per capita income with tariff shocks. All columns include household fixed effects and county-year fixed effects. Robust standard errors clustered at household level are in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.

Table E5.8: Unbalance Panel: Tariff Shock and Household Price Index

	$\ln P_{ht} = \ln \widetilde{p_{hvt}} + \ln S_{ht} + \ln \Lambda_{ht}$							
Dep var.	(1) $\ln P_{ht}$	(2) $\ln \widetilde{p_{hvt}}$	(3) $\ln S_{ht}$	(4) $\ln \Lambda_{ht}$	(5) $\ln P_{ht}$	(6) $\ln \widetilde{p_{hvt}}$	(7) $\ln S_{ht}$	(8) $\ln \Lambda_{ht}$
$\ln(1 + TAR_{ht})$	0.243***	0.119***	-0.116***	0.240***	0.362***	0.126***	-0.015	0.250***
	(0.061)	(0.033)	(0.042)	(0.033)	(0.066)	(0.037)	(0.044)	(0.036)
$\ln(1 + TAR_{ht}) \times Second\ Income_{t_0}$					0.012	0.014	-0.020	0.018
					(0.031)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.015)
$\ln(1 + TAR_{ht}) \times Third\ Income_{t_0}$					-0.100***	-0.007	-0.095***	0.001
					(0.029)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.015)
$\ln(1 + TAR_{ht}) \times Fourth\ Income_{t_0}$					-0.131***	-0.011	-0.108***	-0.013
					(0.032)	(0.018)	(0.019)	(0.016)
$\ln(1 + TAR_{ht}) \times Highest\ Income_{t_0}$					-0.199***	-0.016	-0.149***	-0.033**
					(0.032)	(0.018)	(0.019)	(0.016)
Observations	186,474	186,474	186,474	186,474	186,474	186,474	186,474	186,474
R^2	0.950	0.963	0.974	0.867	0.950	0.963	0.974	0.867

Notes: This table presents the robustness check using the 2016-2019 unbalance panel. observations are at the household-year level from 2016 to 2019. The dependent variable in column (1) and (5) is the household price index ($\ln P_{ht}$) as shown in equation (13), which can be decomposed into three components: price term $\ln \widetilde{p_{hvt}}$, corresponding to the dependent variables in columns (2) and (6); share term $\ln S_{ht}$, corresponding to the dependent variables in columns (3) and (7); and variety adjustment term $\ln \Lambda_{ht}$, corresponding to the dependent variables in columns (4) and (8). Households are divided into five groups based on their income quantile, with the lowest income group serving as the reference group. All columns include household fixed effects and county-year fixed effects. Robust standard errors clustered at household level are in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.

Figure E5.1: Distribution of Estimated Coefficients in Placebo Test



Notes: The figure presents the distribution of coefficients estimated from 1,000 simulations wherein tariff shocks are randomly assigned.The vertical dotted line shows the estimation in column(1) of Table 2