

### Introduction

- The Uniqueness of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Standards
  - Other Measures must follow MFN Principles
  - SPS allows for (and even encourages) prima facie discrimination
    - Can target finite set of countries
    - An individual country
    - Specific district or province within an exporting country
  - Unequal application -> Unequal Outcomes

### The Case of Avocados

- Approximately 90% of avocados consumed in the U.S. are imported from Mexico.
- Prior to August 2022, U.S. only allowed imports from one Mexican state (Michoacan) due to concerns about seed weevil and fruit flies.
- Recently, U.S. authorized shipments from additional state (Jalisco).

"Mexican organized crime has long mutated away from 'just' drugs trafficking. Today, the model is this: you control a given territory, and within it you exploit whichever commodity is locally available. That includes avocados . . . ." Falko Ernst, International Crisis Group (Dehghan, 2019).

# Research Question

 We investigate the <u>economic impacts</u> of expanding the phytosanitary exclusion zone to include Jalisco:

- Trade Impacts: Impacts on avocado prices and trade quantities crossing U.S.-Mexico border
- MX Domestic Impacts: Impacts on avocado prices across 37 local Mexican markets.

# Research Findings

- U.S. Perspective: Unequivocally beneficial from perspective of U.S. avocado users and consumers— economic welfare gain of approximately \$40 million per year.
- Michoacan Producers: Reduced gross receipts for Michoacan avocado producers by approximately \$310 million per year (6.4% of total gross receipts).
- Jalisco Producers: Increased gross receipts for Jalisco producers by \$1.2 million per year (0.33% of total gross receipts).
- Cartel Incentives: Uncertain how these market outcomes will affect cartel incentives to control the industry in the future.

# Background

#### Economic Overview of the Industry

- 8.6M tonnes and growing
- MX is largest producer and exporter
- Production limited by climate


#### Cartel Takeover of the Michoacan Industry

- Criminal orgs use avocado production as a means of money laundering and income diversification.
- Threats to U.S. inspectors
- Illegal Logging

#### U.S. Phytosanitary Requirements for Mexican Avocados

- Import ban from 1914 to 1993.
- Shipments from Michoacan resumed under NAFTA
- Producers in 15 Jalisco municipalities granted access in August 2022.

Figure 1: Evolution of Avocado Trade in the U.S. and Mexico



## Methodology

- We construct a series of econometric models to analyze market effects in two dimensions:
  - Bilateral Trade Effects: How regulatory change affected avocado prices and trade quantities at U.S.-Mexico border.
  - Mexican Domestic Market Effects: How the change affected prices in the Mexican domestic market.
- **Sample period:** For both analysis, we use data from Jan-2021 to Dec-2022.


# Bilateral Trade Effects—Natural Experiment Design

#### **Trade Prices (Unit Values):**



(b) Distribution of Unit Values in Levels

#### **Export Quantities:**



(c) Monthly Exports to U.S., CY2021–2022

#### Two-Step Applied Time Series Approach:

- Jalisco Relative Price Effects: We first assess whether domestic prices for avocados originating from Jalisco changed relative to prices originating from Michoacan.
- Michoacan Absolute Price Effects: When then assess whether regulatory change coincided with observed deviation in historical co-movement between Michoacan prices and various indices designed to capture shifts in demand and supply.

• Data: We collect weekly, wholesale avocado prices across 37 local Mexican markets from National Service for Information and Market Integration (SNIIM) in Mexico.

- Data Description: For each terminal market, data Include:
  - Minimum, "Average", and Maximum Reported Price per KG
  - Disaggregated by State of Origin (i.e., Michoacan vs. Jalisco)
  - Volumetric Packaging (e.g., 10-KG box vs. sold by KG).

Figure 4: Location and Availability of Price Data by Origin and Destination Market






Figure 5: Share of Observations by Volumetric Packaging




### Results—Bilateral Trade Effects

### **Trade Prices (Unit Values):**




## (b) Levels Estimation

#### **Export Quantities:**



(d) U.S.-only Levels Estimation

### Results—Mexican Domestic Market Effects



(b) Levels Estimation

## Welfare Impacts

#### **Economic Returns**

	Actual	$\operatorname{CF}$	$\Delta$	%
	$(US\$\;Billions)$			
Michoacán Producers	4.44	4.74	-0.31	-6.4%
Jalisco Producers	0.35	0.35	0.001	0.3%
U.S. Avocado Users	2.68	2.64	0.04	1.5%
Mexico Avocado Users	2.12	2.46	-0.34	-13.9%

# Policy Implications and Conclusion

- These market impacts will change incentive structures within (and outside) Mexican avocado industry.
- May affect underlying motivation for cartel control of the industry.
  - Cartel actors could reliniquish commands of Michoacan industry as a result of the economic losses generated by the policy change.
  - Minimal welfare gains in Jalisco could mitigate concerns of cartel actors wresting control of industry in that region.
  - Could increase or decrease violence in these regions.
- However, estimates are "short run" in nature.
  - Longer run: Price impacts (and associated welfare outcomes) may diminish.
  - Increased potential for pest and disease risks in U.S.?