Terrorism and Voting:

The Rise of Right-Wing Populism in Germany

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Economics of National Security
ASSA Meetings San Antonio
January 2024

Right-Wing Authoritarian Populism

Right-wing populist movements threaten liberal democracy worldwide (Levitsky & Ziblatt 2019; Norris & Inglehart 2019):

- In the past, the threat was explicit: coup, dictatorships.
- Today, the threat is more subtle: *gradual* erosion of trust.

Yet, right-wing movements thrive in Western societies (Norris & Inglehart 2019):

- They claimed 5 percent of vote in the 1960s;
- By the 2010s, they claimed more than 12 percent.

Understanding Populism

- A substantial literature has argued that the rise of right-wing populism can be attributed to:
  - Economic insecurity and distress (Guiso et al. 2020, 2017);
  - Globalization shocks (Rodrick 2018);
  - Identity and education (Bonomi et al. 2021, Gethin et al. 2021);
  - Cultural attitudes and migration (Norris and Inglehart 2019)

The Violent Roots of Populism

- Although this literature has examined role of cultural conflict, the role of violent conflict in has received less attention.
  - This is especially true in the context of Western democracies.
- Can acts of terror can actually shift the political landscape of a nation to the right: Can they, for example:

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  - mobilize voters,
  - shape voter preferences and attitudes, and
  - lead to differential voting behavior?

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   - Shift individual attitudes significantly to the right;
   - Receive differential media coverage;
   - Realign the language used by political parties

Identification Strategy: Successful vs. Failed Attacks

- Acts of terror are, obviously, endogenous.
- Similar to Brodeur (2018) and Jones and Olken (2009), we exploit the "randomness" of an attacks success.
- Conditional on being targeted, municipalities hit with successful and failed attacks are indistinguishable.
- We compare political outcomes in municipalities hit with successful attacks to those hit with failed attacks.

▸ Contributions

Terrorism in Germany

Terror attacks in Germany

Terror data from Global Terror Database (GTD, 2021) collected by the University of Maryland, College Park.

- 232 attacks in Germany between 2010 and 2020.
  - Map on to 124 unique municipalities.
  - Attacks in all 16 Federal states.
- Most are small, local affairs.
  - Average population of targeted cities $\approx 155,000$.
  - Majority are non-deadly (1 injury and .2 casualties)
- Most attacks are for right-wing causes.
  - 75 percent: right-wing extremism or anti-migration.
  - 25 percent: mixed motivations (left-wing, religious...)

▸ Details on the GTD

Successful and Failed Attacks

A novel feature of the data is that it records whether an attack was successful or not.

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Success is defined according to the tangible effects of the attack but not the realization of the perpetrators' overarching goals.

- i.e., it is decisive whether the bomb goes off or not. ▸ Examples

Right-wing populism

The AfD in Germany

- The AfD, established in 2013, sits on the far right of the German political landscape.
- Founded in response to Euro crisis and the Greek bailout.
- Hard-right anti-migrant sentiments from the start.
- In 2015, for example, Björn Höcke and Andreas Kalbitz released the “Erfurt Declaration” in which they founded the far-right faction of the AfD (Der Flügel).
- The document describes the AfD as ‘a resistance movement against the further erosion of the identity of Germany.”
- Recent polls suggest that the AfD is the second strongest party on the Federal level ($\approx$ 21% of the vote share).

The AfD in Germany

Data from the Manifesto Project shows the parties as follows:



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Elections in Germany

Our data includes the following elections:

- 2013, 2017 and 2021 Federal elections.
- 2014 and 2019 European Parliament elections.
- State elections from 2013 to 2021.

All data from either the Bundeswahlleiter or Regional Data Bank service.

Empirical Analysis

Establishing Balance

Testing for Balance

- Our identification relies on the inherent randomness associated with whether an attack succeeds.
- To validate this assumption, we estimate β from the following:

$$X_{i,t<t_{ATTACK}} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 SUCCESS_i + \epsilon_i \tag{1}$$

- Our identification strategy is validated if:

$$\hat{\beta}_1 = 0$$

Testing for Balance: Municipality Characteristics I

Variable	(1) $\hat{\beta}$	(2) p-value $H_0 : \beta = 0$	(3) N
Panel A: Municipality Characteristics			
Economic:			
Per capita Income (0000s)	1.427	0.284	411
Unemployed (0000s)	-3.478	0.280	408
Employed (0000s)	-24.401	0.345	405
Tax revenue (pc)	0.165	0.669	353
Demographic:			
Population (0000s)	-62.891	0.313	423
Average age	0.409	0.615	401
Share men	-0.003	0.437	423
Migration:			
In-migration (0000s)	-4.058	0.382	423
Out-migration (0000s)	-4.143	0.328	423
Asylum seekers	-791.335	0.585	402
Asylum seekers, Syria	-28.494	0.908	397
Education:			
University eligible	58.139	0.747	402
No secondary education	-50.275	0.295	402
Geographic:			
Surface area (km^2)	-1.662	0.938	432
Forest area (ha)	-263.798	0.736	389
East Germany	-0.100	0.526	124

Testing for Balance: Municipality Characteristics II

Variable	(1) $\hat{\beta}$	(2) p-value $H_0 : \beta = 0$	(3) N
Panel A: Municipality Characteristics (Cont'd)			
Social Assistance:			
Welfare recipeints (pc)	-0.556	0.381	402
Welfare recipients (foreingers),(pc)	-0.000	0.928	386
Road Accidents:			
Traffic accidents	-247.482	0.413	432
Deadly accidents	-202.472	0.433	432
Tourism:			
Number of hotels	-6.770	0.713	410
Tourists (000s)	-69.541	0.872	374
Health:			
Number of hospitals	-0.337	0.852	393
Hospitals beds	-68.165	0.847	393
Political:			
Eligibe voters (000s)	-31.778	0.374	431
Turnout	0.017	0.422	429
AfD Vote Share	-0.007	0.533	326
1933 NSDAP Vote Share	-0.004	0.870	121
Days b/w Attack and Election	1.55	0.995	916

Testing for Balance: Attack Characteristics

Variable	(1) $\hat{\beta}$	(2) p-value $H_0 : \beta = 0$	(3) N
Panel B: Attack Characteristics			
Weapon Type:			
Explosives	-0.052	0.488	232
Firearms	0.039	0.280	232
Melee	0.027	0.564	232
Casualties:			
Killed	0.204	0.027	232
Wounded	1.054	0.001	231
Motivation:			
Right-Wing	0.097	0.332	211
Neo-Nazi	0.061	0.543	211
Left-Wing	0.013	0.875	211
Islamist	-0.108	0.172	211

Baseline Effects of Terror on AfD

Estimating Equation

$$AfD_{i,e,t} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \left[SUCCESS_i \times POST_{i,e,t} \times ELECTION_e \right] + \zeta \mathbf{X_{i,e,t}} + \lambda_{ie} + \alpha_t + \epsilon_{i,t} \quad (2)$$

$AfD_{i,e,t}$:	AfD vote share in municipality *i* in election type *e* in year *t*.
$SUCCESS_i$:	1 if successful attack, 0 if failed attack.
$POST_{i,e,t}$:	1 if election *e* in year *t* was *post* attack, 0 otherwise.
$ELECTION_e$:	Federal, European or State election.
$\mathbf{X_{i,e,t}}$:	All lower order terms of the triple interaction.
λ_{ie} :	Municipality $\times$ Election fixed effects.
α_t :	Year fixed effects.
$\epsilon_{i,t}$:	Standard errors clustered at the municipality level.

Baseline Estimates

Table 1: Successful Terror Attacks and AfD Vote Share

	Outcome: AfD Vote Share								
	(1) Baseline Model	(2) East × Year	(3) Omit Berlin	(4) Urban × Year	(5) Weapon × Year	(6) Attack Timing	(7) Omit Mulitple	(8) Omit Coordinated	(9) All Controls
Success × Post × Federal	0.0005	0.0225	0.0071	-0.0068	-0.0066	0.0005	0.0050	0.0030	0.0271
	(0.0198)	(0.0144)	(0.0213)	(0.0169)	(0.0207)	(0.0198)	(0.0217)	(0.0200)	(0.0192)
Success × Post × European	-0.0116	0.0226	-0.0102	-0.0166	-0.0098	-0.0116	-0.0113	-0.0104	0.0066
	(0.0251)	(0.0177)	(0.0290)	(0.0208)	(0.0264)	(0.0251)	(0.0288)	(0.0253)	(0.0211)
Success × Post × State	0.0625**	0.0501***	0.0671***	0.0589**	0.0335***	0.0733**	0.0477***	0.0715**	0.0482***
	(0.0263)	(0.0132)	(0.0255)	(0.0228)	(0.0096)	(0.0308)	(0.0151)	(0.0307)	(0.0130)
N	734	734	664	734	723	734	534	664	511
Clusters	124	124	114	124	123	124	91	112	89
$\bar{Y}_{State}$	.17	.17	.19	.17	.18	.17	.19	.17	.19
$[S.D]$	[.1]	[.1]	[.1]	[.1]	[.1]	[.1]	[.11]	[.1]	[.1]

Baseline Estimates: Additional Results

Our baseline findings:

1. Are driven primarily by right-wing attacks targeted against migrants. ▸ Attack Motive Heterogeneity
2. Are robust to a range of additional checks:
   - Placebo tests ▸ Placebos
   - Dropping 1 id at a time ▸ Dropping
   - Alternative statistical inference ▸ Inference
   - Heterogeneity-robust DiD estimators ▸ Robust
   - Rolling window approach ▸ Rolling Window
3. Exhibit geographic spillover effects ▸ Spillovers

Why Does (Right-Wing) Terror Affect Right-Wing Voting?

Linking Successful Terror to Right-Wing Populism

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2. **Shifts individual voter preferences to more populist positions.**
3. Receives differential media coverage in terms of *quantity*, *tone*, and *content*. ▸ Details
4. Realigns the language of political parties on key issues. ▸ Details

Terror and Individual of Voter Preferences: German SOEP

- We test terror's effects on people's political and social attitudes using the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP).
- This enables us to study the political preferences and attitudes of the *same person* before and after an attack.
- For each person, p, residing in municipality i surveyed in period t, we estimate the parameters of the following model:

$$y_{p,i,t} = \beta_o + \beta[SUCCESS_i \times POST_{p,t}] + \delta_p + \alpha_t + \epsilon_{i,t} \tag{3}$$

Terror and Individual Attitudes: German SOEP

Table 2: Successful Terror and Individual Political Attitudes

	Dependent Variable: Individual Attitudes and Prefereces							
	(1) Identify Right-Wing	(2) Identify Hard-Right	(3) Prefer AfD	(4) Prefer CDU	(5) Prefer SPD	(6) Participate Local Politcs	(7) Worried Immigration	(8) Worried Terrorism
Success × Post	0.0652***	0.0438**	0.0234**	-0.00693	0.0314*	0.0205***	0.0361***	0.00204
	(0.0206)	(0.0179)	(0.0104)	(0.0185)	(0.0178)	(0.00693)	(0.0174)	(0.0261)
N	4,572	4,572	13,279	13,279	13,279	14,298	29,610	9,587
Clusters	87	87	89	89	89	95	95	88
People in Sample	2,286	2,286	2,401	2,401	2,401	3,715	4,102	2,682
$\bar{Y}$	0.176	0.0956	0.0297	0.318	0.307	0.0254	0.289	0.84
[*S.D*]	[0.381]	[0.294]	[0.170]	[0.466]	[0.461]	[0.157]	[0.453]	[0.367]

Terror and Individual Attitudes: Additional Findings

Using the SOEP, we document further important findings:

- Heterogeneous Effects:
  - Along dimensions of Cultural Conflict ▸ SOEP Conflict
  - Voter migration and political activation ▸ SOEP Migration

Balance in the SOEP



Figure 1: Characteristics of people in successful v. failed municipalities

Terror is politically impactful because it shapes political attitudes and not because it targets different types of people.

Conclusion

Conclusions

- A striking feature of our results is that the AfD benefits from right-wing acts of terror against migrants.
- In response to successful attacks:
  - Otherwise similar municipalities vote more for the far-right.
  - Otherwise similar people worry about migration and prefer AfD.
  - News reports use different vocabulary to describe otherwise similar attacks:
    - They highlight Islam and downplay right-wing populism.
- Results demonstrate that political attitudes, preferences and outcomes can be shaped by powerful social forces like media.

That’s all!

Thank you!

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Details on the GTD

For an event to be included in the GTD it must:

1. Be intentional; entail some levels of violence, be conducted by non-state actors.
2. Aimed at political, religious or economic goal; have intention to send a larger message; not in the context of war.
3. Plots of conspiracies that are *not* attempted are not included in the GTD.

▸ Back

Contribution I

Literature on electoral consequences of terrorism. Most of these studies focus on

- Israel (Gould and Klor 2010; Berrebi and Klor 2008; Getmansky and Zeitzoff 2014)
- less stable, non-Western democracies (Rehman and Vanin 2017; Kibris 2011)
- Cross country settings which include a wide range of democracies (Jones and Olken 2009; Rees and Smith 2022; Larsen, Cutts, and Goodwin 2020; Gassebner, Jong-A-Pin, and Mierau 2008)

$\rightarrow$ Our point of departure from this literature is twofold:

1. We examine the effect of terrorism on far-right voting in the context of an advanced, multi-party Western democracy.
2. our analysis includes a full account of why terror influences political outcomes.

▸ Back

Contribution II

Literature on the recent rise of populist movements. The majority of related articles emphasizes

Economic factors

- Economic insecurity and distress (Guiso et al. 2020; Guiso et al. 2017b; Bo' et al. 2023; Dehdari 2021)
- Globalization shocks (Rodrick 2018)
- Government austerity (Fetzer 2019)

Cultural Factors

- Identity and education (Bonomi et al. 2021, Gethin et al. 2022)
- Cultural attitudes and migration (Norris and Inglehart 2019)

$\rightarrow$ We advance this literature by shedding light on the causal role of violence in explaining the rise of, or at least the added support for, right-wing populism.

▸ Back

Contribution III

Literature that documents the important role of media — including radio, newspapers, and cable news — in shaping political outcomes

- Strömberg 2004; Gentzkow, Shapiro, and Sinkinson 2011; DellaVigna and Kaplan 2007; Durante, Pinotti, and Tesei 2019

It also adds to scholarship that illustrates the specific impact of media attention in amplifying terror's effects

- Alfano and Görlach 2022; Brodeur 2018; Jetter 2017, 2019

▸ Back

Example of Successful Attack from the GTD

04/22/2015: *An assailant threw fire crackers at the home of an asylum seeker, and stabbed him in Brand-Erbisdorf, Saxony, Germany. The asylum seeker was injured in the assault. Authorities identified the assailant as a right-wing extremist and noted that he shouted "I will kill you" and "I will remove the foreigners" during the attack.*

Back

Example of Failed Attack from the GTD

*03/23/2015: Assailants **threw an incendiary device** that landed near Paul-Loebe-Haus and **failed to ignite** in Tiergarten neighborhood, Berlin. An unknown right-wing extremist group claimed responsibility for the attack.*

Back

Baseline Effects According to Attack Motive



Figure 2: Heterogeneous effects according to attack type or target

Back to baseline

Placebo Tests

Table 3: Effects of Successful and Failed Attacks

	Balance Test		Baseline Estimate	
	(1) Success v. Placebo Fail	(2) Failed v. Placebo Fail	(3) Success v. Placebo Fail	(4) Failed v. Placebo Fail
Success	0.0090			
	(0.0066)			
Failed		0.0162		
		(0.0155)		
Success × Post × Federal			0.0132	
			(0.0085)	
Success × Post × European			-0.0033	
			(0.0132)	
Success × Post × State			0.0505***	
			(0.0161)	
Failed × Post × Federal				0.0107
				(0.0184)
Failed × Post × European				0.0083
				(0.0259)
Failed × Post × State				-0.0007
				(0.0357)
N	1,993	1,334	1,828	1,214
Clusters	316	214	314	212
$\bar{Y}_{State}$	.14	.14	.17	.17
[*S.D*]	[.083]	[.074]	[.091]	[.08]

▸ Back to baseline

Baseline Specification, Dropping one ID at a time



Figure 3: Success × Post × State, dropping One Municipality at a time

Back to baseline

Alternative Inference

Table 4: Alternative inference

	(1)
$\hat{\beta}$	0.0625
N	734
Clusters	124
p-values:	
1. Analytical	.019
2. Wild Cluster Bootstrap	.034
3. Permutation Based	.000

Back to baseline

Heterogeneity Robust DiD Estimators

Table 5: Heterogeneity Robust DiD Estimation

	Coefficient on Success × Post × State Election	
	(1)	(2)
	Baseline	DiD Imputation
β	0.0741***	
	(0.0280)	
τ		0.0938***
		(0.0022)
N	734	623
Clusters	124	105
Estimator	reghdfe	DID imputation

Back to baseline

Rolling Window

Table 6: Terror Attacks and AfD Vote Share Using a Rolling Window

	(1) Baseline Model	(2) East × Year	(3) Omit Berlin	(4) Urban × Year	(5) Weapon × Year	(6) Attack Timing	(7) Omit Mulitple	(8) Omit Coordinated	(9) All Controls
Success × Post × Federal	0.0019	0.0106	0.0118	-0.0053	-0.0031	0.0060	0.0050	0.0039	0.0122
	(0.0159)	(0.0125)	(0.0180)	(0.0138)	(0.0166)	(0.0162)	(0.0217)	(0.0162)	(0.0172)
Success × Post × European	-0.0184	0.0028	-0.0075	-0.0251	-0.0156	-0.0154	-0.0113	-0.0166	0.0104
	(0.0222)	(0.0183)	(0.0291)	(0.0190)	(0.0234)	(0.0220)	(0.0288)	(0.0223)	(0.0206)
Success × Post × State	0.0571**	0.0436***	0.0533**	0.0563**	0.0441	0.0683**	0.0477***	0.0588**	0.0436***
	(0.0252)	(0.0115)	(0.0237)	(0.0236)	(0.0272)	(0.0300)	(0.0151)	(0.0266)	(0.0123)
N	787	787	693	787	776	787	534	711	549
Clusters	124	124	114	124	123	124	91	112	92
$\bar{Y}_{State}$	.16	.16	.18	.16	.17	.16	.19	.16	.18
[*S.D*]	[.099]	[.099]	[.1]	[.099]	[.1]	[.099]	[.11]	[.1]	[.1]

▸ Back to baseline

Spillovers

- We next investigate whether our effects spillover to neighboring municpalities.
- We code untargeted municipalities within an 80 km radius of targeted municipalities as either success or failed depending on their distance to the nearest successful or failed attack.
- We then re-run our baseline estimating equation in samples of municipalities according to their distance to an actual attack and plot the coefficient of interest for state elections.

▶ Back to baseline

Spillovers



Figure 4: Geographic Spillovers of Successful Terror

Back to baseline

Terror and Political Mobilization

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(a) Turnout: Votes per Eligible Voters



(b) Vote Shares: Votes per Votes Cast



Heterogeneous Effects of Terror

Using the SOEP, we also find that terror increases preference for AfD for people without university education.

- Consistent with "authoritarian reflex" (Norris and Inglehart 2019).
- Groups in society who are "left behind" by globalization react defensively to shocks that undermine security by adopting more extreme ideological positions.

Heterogeneous Effects of Terror



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Terror and Voter Migration and Activiation:

We estimate the parameters of the following two estimating equations:

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Prefer AfD}_{p,i,t} &= \beta_0 + \beta_1 \left[SUCCESS_i \times POST_{i,t} \times PARTISAN_p \right] \\ &\quad + \zeta \mathbf{X_{p,i,t}} + \delta_p + \alpha_t + \epsilon_{m,t} \end{aligned} \tag{4}$$

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Prefer AfD}_{p,i,t} &= \gamma_0 + \gamma_1 \left[SUCCESS_i \times POST_{i,t} \times ACTIVE_p \right] \\ &\quad + \zeta \mathbf{X_{p,i,t}} + \delta_p + \alpha_t + \epsilon_{m,t} \end{aligned} \tag{5}$$

- $PARTISAN_p$ is 1 if a person prefers a particular party in all pre-attack surveys. It is 0 if an individual states more than one party as their preferred political party in pre-attack surveys.
- $ACTIVE_p$ is 1 if a person participates in local politics frequently in all pre-attack surveys. It is 0 for individuals who, pre-attack, participate in local politics seldom or never.

Heterogeneous Effects of Terror II:

Table 7: Political Commitment, Political Activation and the AfD

	Dependent Variable: Individual Prefer's AfD						
	(1) CDU	(2) SPD	(3) FDP	(4) Linke	(5) Greens	(6) Ultra Right	(7) Politically Active
Success × Post × Non-partisan	0.0253*	0.0281***	0.0230**	0.0230**	0.0257**	0.0219**	
	(0.0145)	(0.00895)	(0.0109)	(0.0110)	(0.0125)	(0.0106)	
Success × Post × Partisan	0.0166***	0.0109	0.0715	0.0381**	0.00806	0.267**	
	(0.00475)	(0.0262)	(0.0525)	(0.0188)	(0.00623)	(0.125)	
Success × Post × Inactive							0.0259**
							(0.0115)
Success × Post × Active							-0.0116
							(0.00868)
N	9,089	9,089	9,089	9,089	9,089	9,089	9,162
Clusters	76	76	76	76	76	76	76
People in Sample	1,591	1,591	1,591	1,591	1,591	1,591	1,647

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Terror and News Media

We test if successful attacks receive differential media coverage.

- We find that successful attacks:

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  3. Use words related to right-wing populism significantly less.
- These patterns hold for regional and local news stories.

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Table 8: Successful Terror and Media Coverage

	Articles		Sentiment		Topics				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
	Found	Count	Title	Body	Right-wing Populism	Migration	Crime	Islam	Terror
Panel A: LexisNexis									
Success	.0756	8.246**	-.0339	-.0321**	-.3467***	-.1185	-.8085***	.6186***	.1895***
	(.1754)	(4.015)	(.0232)	(.0145)	(.091)	(.0995)	(.1641)	(.0818)	(.0684)
State × Year FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Publisher FE			✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
N	232	232	4,683	4,683	4,683	4,683	4,683	4,683	4,683
Clusters	124	124	1,303	1,303	1,303	1,303	1,303	1,303	1,303
$\bar{Y}$	0.642	11.125	-0.091	-0.114	0.544	0.440	1.162	0.314	0.607
Panel B: FAZ									
Success	.0241	-.017	-.0251	.0338	-.2848	.1211	-.4963*	.3178***	.1145
	(.1531)	(.3378)	(.042)	(.029)	(.212)	(.0963)	(.2774)	(.1052)	(.1023)
State × Year FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
N	186	186	338	338	338	338	338	338	338
$\bar{Y}$	0.457	0.828	-0.053	-0.105	0.715	0.576	1.229	0.298	0.515
Unit of Observation	Attack		Story						

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Highly Covered Attacks and the AfD

- Next we test the extent to which news coverage of attacks actually drives our results.
- To do this exercise, we identify the number of news reports received by each attack.
- We then carry out our baseline estimate in samples split by media coverage:
    - Does terror have a larger impact for more highly-covered attacks?

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Highly Covered Attacks and the AfD



Figure 5: Baseline Effects of Terror on AfD Vote Share in Samples Split by Media Coverage

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Realignment of Political Parties:

- We collect the Election Manifesto (*Wahlprogramm*) for each party in each state election from 2013 to 2019.
- These documents articulate each party's policy goals and ideological commitments.
- Identify trigger words related to crime, terror and migration.
- We collect the 2009 Federal election manifesto of the CDU which we use as a reference point.

Political Realignment of Political Parties:

Using these documents, we estimate π_3 from the following model:

$$\Delta TR_{p,t} = \pi_0 + \pi_1 \sum_s SUCCESS_{s,t-1} + \pi_2 1\{Party = p\} + \pi_3 \Big[\sum_s SUCCESS_{s,t-1} \times 1\{Party = p\} \Big] + \alpha_t + \zeta_s + \epsilon_{s,t} \quad (6)$$

$\Delta TR_{p,t}$	Difference in trigger words in party p's state election manifesto in year t compared to the 2009 Federal election manifesto of the CDU.
$SUCCESS_{s,t-1}$:	Successful attacks in state s in $t-1$.
$1\{Party = p\}$:	1 for party p, 0 for all other parties.
α_t, ζ_s :	Year and state fixed effects.
$\epsilon_{s,t}$:	Bootstrapped standard errors, state level.

Realignment of Political Parties in Response to Terror

	Linke	Grünen	SPD	FDP	CDU/CSU	AfD
Attack	-0.106 (0.076)	-0.082 (0.024)	0.095 (0.103)	-0.111 (0.059)	-0.101 (0.116)	0.306 (0.19)
Naturalization	-0.092 (0.063)	-0.055 (0.041)	-0.138 (0.023)	0.048 (0.041)	-0.109 (0.022)	0.331 (0.104)
Integration	-0.048 (0.061)	-0.128 (0.054)	-0.011 (0.167)	-0.052 (0.074)	-0.012 (0.035)	0.262 (0.06)
Criminal (adj)	-0.114 (0.033)	-0.147 (0.031)	-0.066 (0.033)	-0.009 (0.054)	0.011 (0.033)	0.294 (0.032)
Crime	-0.037 (0.11)	-0.026 (0.059)	0.049 (0.033)	-0.053 (0.081)	-0.052 (0.098)	0.092 (0.031)
Asylum	-0.03 (0.035)	-0.066 (0.051)	-0.047 (0.061)	-0.023 (0.045)	-0.086 (0.094)	0.196 (0.209)
Terror	-0.043 (0.132)	-0.001 (0.046)	0.069 (0.09)	-0.019 (0.048)	0.075 (0.073)	-0.098 (0.097)

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